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Paul Vo-Ha

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The Wages of Fear: Fear and Surrender in the 16th and 17th Centuries

PAUL VO-HA*

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne, France

Email: paul.vo-ha@univ-paris1.fr

ABSTRACT

In early modern times fear played a central role in combat. Victory often belonged to the side that best managed the moral economy of the engagement. If the balance of power obviously played its role, the management of the combatants' emotions could be equally decisive in the outcome of the engagement. Men of war therefore sought to fight their own fears, through prayer, alcohol or harangues. On the contrary, they tried to instil fear in their opponents through threats, summonses or terroristic strategies. Fear was so decisive that states come to criminalize it, charging certain unfortunate officers with cowardice and treason.

Fear, wrote Charles Ardant du Picq in *Études sur le combat*, was the driving force behind the conduct of a man under fire. Between 1850 and 1870, this officer had seen combat in the Crimea, Syria, Algeria and in the Vosges. For him, psychology was what motivated the behaviour of soldiers facing death. Discipline, training and building unit cohesion were tools as important as tactics or equipment; acquiring these would reassure the combatant, allow him to overcome his fear, and avoid defeat – for defeat was the product of moral failure, which generated disorder, confusion, panic, flight or surrender. In sum, he defined tactics as ‘the art, the science of getting men to fight at their maximum outputs – a maximum which, in the face of fear, only order can provide.’¹

Well before Ardant du Picq, captains and officers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were acutely aware of the role of fear in combat, though they did not formally theorise on it. They knew from experience how much this ‘passion of the

*Paul Vo-Ha is an Assistant Professor in Early Modern History at the Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne.

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¹Charles Ardant du Picq, *Études sur le combat*, (Paris: Hachette-Dumaine, 1880), p. 8. This and all subsequent citations trans. N. Charley unless otherwise mentioned.

soul' influenced the soldier and 'made him fear that which might endanger him'² on the battlefield, during a siege or operations of *petite guerre*.³ They knew the impact of such an emotion on decisions to cease fighting, retreat or surrender, or on the contrary to pursue resistance, at times for fear of unfavourable treatment. Memoirs and correspondence written by these professionals of violence are silent on the subject of fear except in occasionally socially accepted circumstances, such as fear of drowning. However, this did not mean that they ignored or minimised the effect of fear on fighting men.

Noblemen did not readily admit to their own fear in combat, but they sometimes described the emotion in others – brothers in arms, subordinates and, of course, the enemy. Early Modern warfare was not only an economy of means, a balance of material forces, but also a moral economy in which fear played a central role. And when fear was victorious, it could trigger combatants to retreat – or to surrender if the first option were not possible. Combat was much more a psychological struggle than a physical one.⁴ He who feared the most would lose ground to his enemy. In fact, Clausewitz considered the destruction of enemy morale, of his will to fight, to be the supreme goal of all military operations.⁵

Historians of war have long been interested in fear, following in the tradition of seminal works written by Jean Delumeau.⁶ Inspired by the lines of thought opened by their

²Antoine Furetière, *Dictionnaire Universel*, (La Haye Rotterdam: Arnout and Reignier Leers, 1690), vol. 3, 'peur', p. 113.

³It is worth noting that 'small wars' is not an entirely accurate translation of *petite guerre*. The English term encompasses all of the operations of irregular warfare, including guerilla, which is not the case in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century texts and not how French historiography understands it. Cf. Beatrice Heuser (ed.), *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Special Issue: *The Origins of Small Wars: From Special Operations to Ideological Insurgencies*, 25, 4 (August 2014).

⁴Charles Joseph Ligne, *Préjugés militaires*, (Paris: H. Charles-Lavauzelle, 1895), p. 13.

⁵Carl von Clausewitz, *De la Guerre*, (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1955), p. 70.

⁶Jean Delumeau, *La peur en Occident (XIV^e-XVIII^e siècles). Une cité assiégée*, (Paris: Fayard, 1978). On the military history of fear, see John Keegan, *The Face of Battle: A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo, and the Somme*, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1976), p. 28; Fernand Gambiez, 'Étude historique des phénomènes de panique', *Revue d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine*, 20, 1 (1973), pp. 153-166; André Corvisier, 'Le moral des combattants, panique et enthousiasme, Malplaquet, 11 septembre 1709', *Revue Historique des armées*, 3 (1977), pp. 7-32; Jean Chagniot, 'Une panique, les Gardes Françaises à Dettingen (27 juin 1743)', *Revue d'Histoire moderne et contemporaine*, 24 (1977), pp. 78-95; Olivier Chaline, *La bataille de la Montagne Blanche, 8 novembre 1620, un mystique chez les guerriers*, (Paris: Noesis, 2000); Benjamin Deruelle, 'Contrôler l'incontrôlable:

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reflections, and with perspective gained from the historical anthropology of combat emotions, this article will discuss the manner in which stakeholders, including soldiers, attempted to tame, manage and weaponise fear.⁷ What relationship did fighting men have with fear in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries? How did they express or confront fear? How was it deployed during operations to shorten battles and force surrender? How did states and military justice criminalise it?

Soldiers mobilised any number of resources in the struggle to surmount their own fear. Alcohol, harangues, collective prayer before a battle, clamour and battle cries all aided the individual to overcome his feelings of isolation and gave him a sense of the community to which he belonged. But above all, soldiers sought to make fear change sides, to instil it in the adversary through speech (summonses and threats), images (emblems, mottos, uniforms, equipment, reputations), and practice (exaction, collective executions, bombing attacks, etc.). These are some of the many terror related strategies which relied on emotion to hasten the end of hostilities, frighten the enemy and press him to surrender. Moral foundering carried potentially dramatic consequences for the survival of the state. To prevent such a risk, authorities began to criminalise and 'judicialise' fear. It was transmuted into cowardice and likened to the moral and political crime of treason. Military criminal courts attempted to 'ward off fear' and its adverse effects through repressive measures, to inspire a still greater fear of the punishment reserved for 'cowards' and 'traitors', which brought dishonour and shame.

Confronting fear

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, men of war euphemised or stifled mention of fear in their writings. Still, it remained a harsh reality of warfare and was evoked in some memoirs. La Colonie, an engineer during the siege of Charleroi in 1693, described its impact on the shock troops preparing to mount an assault of the breach:

Perception et contrôle du sentiment de la peur au combat chez les hommes de guerre du XVI^e siècle', in Laurent Vissière and Marion Trevisi (ed.), *Le feu et la folie. L'irrationnel et la guerre de la fin du Moyen Âge à 1920*, (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2016), pp. 113-133; Benjamin Deruelle, "'Touteffois la crainte est radoulcyce par ce remède'", perception et gestion de la peur dans les armées du roi de France au XVI^e siècle', in Jean Baechler and Michel Battesti (ed.), *Guerre et santé*, (Paris: Hermann, 2018), pp. 141-159.

⁷Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, *Combattre. Une anthropologie historique de la guerre moderne, XIX^e-XX^e siècle*, (Paris: Seuil, 2008); Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, 'Vers une anthropologie historique de la violence de combat au XIX^e siècle; relire Ardant du Picq?', *Revue d'histoire du XIX^e siècle*, 30 (2005), <http://journals.openedition.org/rh19/1015>. Accessed 16 April 2019

Each one of us set to work to examine his conscience in a most contrite manner, for it was accepted by all concerned in this assault that nothing short of a miracle could prevent our total destruction. It was necessary, in the first place, to defile the full length of the glacis to get at the gorge, at the mercy of the fire of the enemy occupying the covered-way, who would not be lying in fear of our shells; and, secondly, there were the works of the main fortification supporting the half-moon, which would certainly bring a terrific fire to bear upon us. These difficulties surmounted, there would yet be the garrison itself to be reckoned with, besides mines to send us skywards if we ever got inside. Nature suffers cruelly under such a strain – no one cares to talk, each being occupied with his own reflections and the thought of the death he is courting.

We remained in this painful state till three o'clock in the afternoon, without signal or even information of any sort. A little later the grenades were served out to the grenadiers, who were ordered to light their quick matches. We then had no doubt at all that the time for the signal was near at hand, and this state of tension brought on a renewed access of mental agony, or at all events it appeared so, judging by the faces of all concerned.

After all the signal did not come, and I took it into my head to examine the bearing of those in my immediate vicinity, wishing to see if I could discern their inmost thoughts, and the different degrees of anxiety as shown in their physiognomies. I looked them over most carefully, and the more I examined them the more it seemed to me that they were no longer the same persons I had known previously. Their features had become changed in a most extraordinary manner; there were long drawn-out faces, others quite twisted, others again, were haggard, with flesh of a livid hue, whilst some had a wandering look about the eyes; in fact, I saw but a melancholy set of sinners apparently under sentence of death.⁸

The men understood the considerable risks of such an attack. The fear they felt explains why they were often so ready to offer terms of an honourable surrender to those they besieged: to be spared the torments of an assault. These undertakings were the acme of warlike brutality and frequently resulted in huge losses in the ranks of the assailants. The governor of the besieged town would also be concerned with obtaining favourable conditions of capitulation; his objective was to convince his adversaries that the garrison was capable of causing considerable loss should they attempt an assault on the breach.

⁸Jean-Martin de La Colonie, *The Chronicles of an Old Campaigner: M. De La Colonie, 1692-1717*, trans. Walter C. Horsley, (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1904), pp. 32-33.

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Explicit mention of the effects of fear on troops was still rare. Its existence must be gleaned by reading between the lines of the strategies developed to confront fear or hold it in check: group prayer, the consumption of alcohol, harangues, war cries. Training and experience also played a significant role since recruits were clearly more likely to succumb to panic than the 'seasoned troops' so prized by war chiefs.

To ward off fear at the approach of a battle, many soldiers and noblemen turned to God.⁹ Prayers and sermons often preceded an engagement, just as it had in 1525, on the field of battle at Pavia, where the soldiers had knelt in prayer.¹⁰ Boyvin du Villars also relates that in 1554, the Sieur de la Roche, killed on the ravelin during the assault of Casale, Monferrato, 'had prepared himself for the assault in a Christianly manner'.¹¹ Jean de Serres describes Condé praying before the charge at Jarnac in 1569, while across the field, the Duke of Anjou received Holy Communion.¹² Likewise Henri de Navarre organised a collective prayer for his troops before the battle of Coutras in 1587.¹³ Psalm 118:24 arose with a clamour throughout the ranks of the Huguenots there: 'This is the day which the Lord hath made; we will rejoice and be glad in it'.¹⁴ Montluc confessed that he, too, turned to God to confront his fear:

Neither was I ever in any action whatever wherein I have not implor'd his Divine assistance, and never passed over day of my life, since I arriv'd at the age of man, without calling upon his Name, and asking pardon for my sins. And many times I can say with truth, that upon sight of the Enemy I have found myself so possess'd with fear, that I have felt my heart beat, and my limbs tremble [...] but so soon as I had made my prayer to God, I felt my spirits and my strength return.¹⁵

⁹Hélène Germa-Romann, *Du 'bel mourir' au 'bien mourir': le sentiment de la mort chez les gentilshommes français (1515-1643)*, (Geneva: Droz, 2001), pp. 56-57.

¹⁰Jean-Marie Le Gall, *L'honneur perdu de François I^{er}, Pavie, 1525*, (Paris: Payot, 2015), p. 100.

¹¹François de Boyvin, baron du Villars, *Mémoires du sieur F. de B. sur les guerres desmelées tant en Piedmont qu'au Montferrat et duché de Milan, par feu messire Charles de Cossé, comte de Brissac*, (Paris: J. Houzé, 1606), Vol. 2, p. 264.

¹²Jean de Serres, *Mémoires de la troisième guerre civile*, ([Genève: Jean Crespin], 1570), Vol. 1, p. 79.

¹³Simon Goulart, *Mémoires sur la Ligue*, (s.n, s.l, 1604), Vol. 2, p. 264.

¹⁴Arlette Jouanna et al. (ed.), *Histoire et dictionnaire des guerres de religion*, (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1998), p. 324. For the English bible reference, see <https://www.kingjamesbibleonline.org/Psalms-Chapter-118/>.

¹⁵*The commentaries of Messire Blaize de Montluc, Mareschal of France wherein are describ'd all the Combats, Rencounters, Skirmishes, Battels, Sieges, Assaults, Scalado's, the Taking and Surprizes of Towns and Fortresses, as also the Defences of the Assaulted and Besieg'd*, (London: Printed by Andrew Clark for Henry Brome, 1674), p. 398.

Cardinal Richelieu relates in his own memoirs that in 1638, Maréchal de Créqui, filled with a sense of foreboding, confessed before going into battle. He would shortly after be blown away by a cannon ball.¹⁶ The need to deal with fear experienced by soldiers explains the constant efforts of authorities to provide a framework of religious support. In the Early Modern army, religion was not so much a tool to galvanise the troops or to call a holy and violent crusade against the non-believer. It was more a means of reassuring combatants, who needed assurance of their salvation when their lives were at risk.¹⁷ Religion was also a means to discipline the troops. Faith offered similar succour to populations under siege, who often organised processions to call on divine protection. Rites such as these, meant to reassure the inhabitants and prolong resistance, took place throughout Lille during the siege of 1667.¹⁸

Alcohol was also a way of confronting fear. Blaise de Monluc and his companions downed 'eight or ten flasks of wine' before the assault on Rabastens in July 1570. The men who stormed the breach were no doubt quite tipsy, if not completely intoxicated. A short harangue accompanied the drinking bout: 'Let us drink Camrades: for it must now soon be seen which of us has been nursed with the best milk. God grant that another day we may drink together; but if our last hour be come, we cannot frustrate the decrees of Fate.'¹⁹ In 1669, the besieged in Candie also resorted to alcohol to

¹⁶Armand du Plessis Richelieu, cardinal de, *Mémoires*, ed. by Michaud and Poujoulat, (Paris: Éd. du commentaire analytique du Code civil, 1838), Vol. 9, p. 276.

¹⁷Ariane Boltanski, 'Forger le soldat chrétien. L'encadrement catholique des troupes pontificales et royales en 1568-1569', *Revue historique*, 316, 1, (2014), pp. 51-85; Ariane Boltanski, 'Une langue religieuse de la guerre: de quelques manuels jésuites à l'intention des soldats dans la seconde moitié du XVI^e siècle', in M.-M. Fontaine and J.-L. Fournel (ed.), *Les mots de la guerre dans l'Europe de la Renaissance*, (Geneva: Droz, 2015), pp. 169-196; Laurent Jalabert, Stefano Simiz, *Le soldat face au clerc. Armée et religion en Europe occidentale, XV^e-XIX^e siècle*, (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2016); Laurent Jalabert, 'Face à face, côte à côte? Les aumôniers des armées d'Empire entre coexistence, ignorance et affrontement au XVII^e siècle', in Julien Léonard (ed.), *Prêtres et pasteurs. Les clergés à l'ère des divisions confessionnelles (XVI^e-XVII^e siècles)*, (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2016), pp. 57-73; Pierre-Jean Souriac, 'La prédication protestante dans un contexte de révolte contre le roi au temps de Louis XIII', in Bruno Bethouart and Jean-François Galinier-Pallerola (ed.), *La prédication dans l'histoire, Les Cahiers du Littoral*, 16, (2017), pp. 115-132.

¹⁸Pierre-Ignace Chavatte, 'Chronique mémorial des choses mémorables par moy Pierre-Ignace Chavatte', 1657-1693, *Le mémorial d'un humble tisserand lillois au Grand Siècle*, Pierre-Ignace Chavatte, ed. by Alain Lottin, (Bruxelles: Commission royale d'histoire, 2010), p. 168.

¹⁹*The commentaries of Messire Blaize*, p. 366.

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recover from a failed *sortie* during the night of 24 June. And, in a letter addressed to Colbert on 30 June, *aide-major* Soisigny admits that he found the strength to sound the retreat amid a debacle only after he had taken a ‘stiff glass of wine’.²⁰

Before combat, captains often addressed their men to rouse their spirits and give them heart. But the context largely eludes historians, who must contend with what remnants were set down on paper. Such sources were principally memoirs or correspondence – post facto written testimonies, polished and self-valorising. They often project a belief in the performativity of speech and the effectiveness of a commander’s oratorical abilities. But in reality, over what distance could an orator be heard? And who would be within earshot?²¹ Harangues employed recurrent themes to motivate men, help them surmount their fear and give meaning to the risks they undertook. To encourage emulation, they frequently insisted upon the honour to be gained. Honour was symbolic capital, a reward, the true wages of fear. In an ‘economy of honour’, risk in war was weighed against potential gain in honour.²² The speeches also insisted on avenging fallen brothers in arms and defending the faith; that theirs was a defensive war, or one to be waged on the transgressions of a criminalised and disgraced enemy. These measures sought to gain the ideological adherence of the troops and give meaning to the conflict. At Rabastens, Monluc thus gave his men a short Remonstrance in these words:

Friends and Companions, we are now ready to fall on to the Assault, and every man is to shew the best he can do. The men who are in this place, are of those who with the Count de Montgomery destroyed your Churches, and ruined your houses; You must make them disgorge what they have swallowed of your Estates. If we carry the place, and put them all to the sword, you will have a

²⁰De Soisigny à Colbert, 30 June 1669, de Candie, in Ozkan Bardaky and François Pugnère, *La dernière croisade, Les Français et la guerre de Candie, 1669*, (Rennes: PUR, 2008), p. 144.

²¹Emmanuelle Cronier and Benjamin Deruelle (ed.), *Argumenter en guerre: discours de guerre, discours sur la guerre, discours dans la guerre de l’Antiquité à nos jours*, (Lille: Presses du Septentrion, 2019), in particular Xavier Le Person, ‘Haranguer ses soldats? Le Duc de Guise chef de guerre et stratège de mots à Châlons-en-Champagne (26 mars 1585)’, pp. 271-290; Xavier Lapray, ‘Argumenter en plein combat: formes et fonctions de la harangue du général romain dans les batailles rangées d’époque républicaine’, pp. 195-212; Laurent Cuvelier, ‘La voix des autorités militaires dans la “Révolution armée”: cris, harangues et discours des généraux à l’armée des Pyrénées orientales (1793-1795)’, pp. 195-212.

²²Benjamin Deruelle, *De papier, de fer et de sang, chevaliers et chevalerie à l’épreuve de la modernité ca. 1460-ca. 1620*, (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2015), pp. 359-374.

good bargain of the rest of Bearn. Believe me they will never dare to stand against you. Go on then. I will follow anon.²³

Though written down, it is impossible to say if this harangue was indeed pronounced or is a product of pure literary fiction. The historian will still find it useful for the clues it reveals about the values, motives and arguments that could be deployed to make soldiers overcome their fear, risk their lives, and focus on the battle at hand and the accomplishments which would lead to a decisive victory.²⁴

Like the harangue, the two main functions of the war cry were motivation and confronting fear. They were meant to extract the soldier from his bubble of dread and remind him that he belonged to a collective, a unit of strength. At times, the rallying cry was religious, such as the 'Santiago' of the Spanish *tercios* at Mühlberg in 1547, or the 'Santa Maria' of Imperial and Bavarian troops at White Mountain in November 1620.²⁵ But the war cry was not merely meant to reassure, encourage and motivate those who raised it. When assailants roared promises of death, they meant to terrorise their enemy. And so, in 1688, the French troops shouted 'Kill! Kill!' as they assaulted a redoubt during the siege of Philipsburg. And in 1701, Forbin bellowed the same as he rushed to board an English vessel.²⁶ These murderous cries were a promise of carnage. Some who heard them simply fled and did not return for their wages. Others tried to ask for quarter – a risky undertaking in the 'heat of the battle' as it more frequently ended in their execution.

Striking Terror in the Enemy

The fight against one's own fear went hand in hand with attempts to instil fear in the heart of one's enemy. Victory was as much a matter of moral and psychological factors as it was of material and human resources. The latter determined the balance of

²³Adapted from *The Commentaries of Messire Blaize de Montluc*, p. 366.

²⁴Herman Hansen Mogens, 'The Battle Exhortation in Ancient Historiography: Fact or Fiction?', *Historia. Zeitschrift für alte Geschichte*, 42, (1993), pp. 161-180; William Kendrick Pritchett, *Ancient Greek Battle Speeches and a Palfrey*, (Amsterdam: J. C. Gieben, 2002); Richard F. Miller, *In Words and Deeds. Battle Speeches in History*, (Lebanon: University of New England, 2008); Edward Anson, 'The General's Pre-Battle Exhortation in Graeco-Roman Warfare', *Greece and Rome*, 57, (2010), pp. 304-318.

²⁵Chaline, *La bataille de la montagne Blanche*, p. 172; Jean-Marie Le Gall, *Les guerres d'Italie (1494-1559), une lecture religieuse*, (Geneva: Droz, 2017), p. 20.

²⁶Service Historique de la Défense (SHD), GR, AI 826, fol 47, Vertillac, major general of the army of Germany to Louvois, from Philipsburg, 21 October 1688; Claude de Forbin, *Mémoires du comte de Forbin*, (Paris: Mercure de France, 1993), p. 343.

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power, but combat was still perceived in terms of a 'geometry of fear'.²⁷ From this perspective, to secure victory, fear must be directed toward the adversary, through threats and summons, terror inducing strategies like bombardments, sackings, pillages and military executions or through a folklore of terror used by some units.

The summonses sounded by trumpets, heralds and emissaries to cities under siege were often very threatening. Without doubt, their role was to frighten the enemy to surrender and bring the battle to a quicker end. In so doing, the lives, supplies and ammunition of the besiegers would be spared as much as possible. The choice was one of economics. Customary law also allowed the assailing side to do as they wished with a city they took by assault. Pillage, looting and associated violent acts could last up to three days in this case.²⁸ The *Mémoires* of Maréchal de Vieilleville relate the summons of Lumes, a small town near Sedan, in 1552. The account attests to the role of threats to strike fear in the besieged:

De Vieilleville had the trumpet summon Malberg to surrender. Should he wait until the first cannon volley, he would be shown no mercy, nor would all who dwelt within. [De Vieilleville] knew the count; there were none but valets and women left in the town. Other strongholds such as Montmedy had surrendered before a single cannonade had fired. Was it not unreasonable for such an ill-fortified town such as theirs to make the enemy wait upon their submission?²⁹

During the siege of Le Havre in 1563, the French addressed a similar warning to the English defenders, who had rejected an initial summons:

Prepare, presently, to die; for we have in our army more than one hundred captains and six thousand French soldiers who are of your own religion. Thus, they know your every secret and have sworn to the king their sovereign to return unto him what they caused him to lose, or to die trying. On their oath and on pain of the hangman's noose, they are to give mercy to none, but run every last one of you through with their swords.³⁰

²⁷Alain Joxe, *Voyage aux sources de la guerre*, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1991), pp. 320-325.

²⁸John Lynn, 'Honourable Surrender in Early Modern European History', in Holger Afflerbach and Hew Strachan (ed.), *How Fighting Ends: A History of Surrender*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 103.

²⁹*Mémoires de la vie de François de Scepeaux, sire de Vieilleville et comte de Durestal, mareschal de France*, (Paris: Éd. du commentaire analytique du code civil, 1838), p. 148.

³⁰*Ibid.*, p. 350.

D'Anelot and his former Protestant rebels, now rallied to the king, raised the ante, shouting that should the city be taken by force, 'you will perish one and all, for on pain of death we are ordered no quarter shall be given, as the Mareschal made you very well aware.'³¹ This polyphonic challenge sapped the courage of the defenders, and they capitulated as soon as the wall was breached. Such menacing summonses persisted throughout the seventeenth century. According to the critic Antoine Adam, Théophile de Viaux had written his sonnet on Clairac, which promised ruin to the city, to terrorise the defenders besieged by the troops of Louis XIII in August 1621.³² In 1672, Turenne also exploited fear in his summonses to minor enemy posts during the invasion of the Dutch Republic. 'I shall see if the forts of Wort and Saint-André wish to know fear,' he wrote to Louvois before sending a few detachments of troops to escort the trumpeters charged with sounding a sturdy summons. The forts surrendered immediately without fighting.³³

Mere threats did not systematically produce the desired result, however. On 27 March 1674, outside Arbois in Franche-Comté, Aspremont summoned the defenders with threats of rape for all girls, women and nuns, and the whip for all men.³⁴ But the approach of a column of rescuers did not give him the time to make good on his threats, revealing that his attempt at intimidation had very much been a bluff to secure victory through fear alone. This disconnect between language and the ability to act is found elsewhere: on 30 June 1689, Conrad de Rosen, commander of the Franco-Jacobite forces, who had been milling about the walls of Derry since 18 April, promised hell to the besieged if they did not surrender by the next day. It was a textual echo of the 'ravages' committed in the French sack of the Palatinate: the surrounding countryside would be thoroughly pillaged and razed; the inhabitants transported just outside the walls, whence their loved ones in the city would watch them starve to death.³⁵ The defenders would not be allowed to surrender, and no quarter would be given should the city fall. In the context of a civil war opposing two pretenders to the throne of England, and marked by denominational alterity, such radical discourse

³¹Ibid., pp. 349-350.

³²Adam Antoine, *Théophile de Viau et la libre pensée française en 1620*, (Geneva: Slatkine reprints, 2000), p. 263.

³³Letter from Turenne to Louvois, camp of Bexel-sur-Wahal, 21 June 1672, in Henri Griffet (ed.), *Recueil de lettres pour servir d'éclaircissement à l'histoire militaire du règne de Louis XIV*, (The Hague: Paris, Antoine Boudet, 1760), vol. 1, pp. 51-53.

³⁴Maurice Gresset, Pierre Gresser and Jean-Marc Debard, *Histoire de l'annexion de la Franche-Comté et du Pays de Montbéliard*, (Le Coteau: Horvath, 1988), p. 240.

³⁵SHD, GR A¹ 895, fol 94, *Sommation de la ville de Derhy*; Émilie Dosquet, *Le feu et l'encre: la 'désolation du Palatinat'. Guerre et information politique dans l'Europe de Louis XIV (Angleterre, France, Provinces-Unies, Saint-Empire)*, (PhD diss., Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne, 2017).

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became a stopgap for situations of operational impasse.³⁶ Indeed, these threats were never carried out. The besiegers were poorly equipped and poorly fed, and were inexperienced and weakened by outbreaks of disease. They had no choice but to lift the siege, though Rosen's letter had wrought scandal.³⁷ James II, who wished to project the image of a protective father figure to his subjects despite their 'rebellion', disavowed the terror laden rhetoric of Louis XIV's Maréchal Général of the army in Ireland.

Because military summons were substantiated by terror practices that were periodically revisited, they were often quite efficient. Victors unleashed what might seem like disproportionate violence on a few unlucky victims, whether in civil war or in external conflicts. There was, however, a rationale behind this violence. Its military function was, precisely, to terrorise and intimidate. Terror was a strategic tool to shorten military operations by precipitating the surrender of neighbouring territories. Emotion became a weapon.³⁸

Occasionally crossing the line of violence was rationalised in terms of political, economic and military gains. Resorting to a strategy of terror could indeed sap the enemy's aggression. Repressive acts made good deterrents. They softened the enemy, easing the way for the military operations that would follow, saving time, gunpowder and the lives of the troops.

Artillery attacks were a form of military terror, but the target was the entire urban community. Bombardments removed the distinction between combatant and non-combatant; the fires, death and destruction they caused were a direct threat to the lives and property of the population. The aim was to cause dissension in the besieged city, to transform the bourgeoisie into a fifth column, thereby forcing the garrison to hold siege against the enemy within as well as the one outside the walls. The inhabitants might then demand that the governor surrender and, if he refused, threaten insurrection. In *Treatise on the art of war (Travaux de Mars)*, published in 1672, Allain Manesson-Mallet warns defenders of a besieged town:

³⁶The notion of alterity incorporates the process of the social fabrication of the 'other', repeated in the discourses which forge an image of a repulsive other. To name a social group is to distinguish it from the 'self'. Christine Delphy, *Classer Dominer. Qui sont les 'autres'?*, (Paris: La Fabrique, 2008), p. 19 & p. 30.

³⁷Émilie Dosquet and François-Xavier Petit, 'Faire scandale. Enjeux méthodologiques et approches historiographiques', *Hypothèses*, 16, (2013), pp. 217-226.

³⁸In a forthcoming essay on terrorism, John Lynn defines it as the 'weaponization of emotions': John Lynn, *Another Kind of War: The Nature and History of Terrorism*, (Yale: Yale University Press, 2019), p. 19.

If the Enemy [...], by some deep covertway, boyau or simple trench, advance, from the outset, up to the very counterscarps of the city with the intention to bombard it; if he is upon you, ready to risk everything to take cities; then should the governor of the city confine, in the Churches, Temples, prisons and other strongholds, women, children and even those among the Bourgeois who show little zeal for defence, so that sedition, tumult and revolt among the people may be avoided.³⁹

A wise warning for in 1678, the inhabitants of Stralsund – besieged by the troops of the Elector of Brandenburg and facing a hail of red-hot shots which set fire to their city – revolted against the garrison, raised white flags and forced the governor to capitulate. The desire to spread fear in civilians led to bombardments being a relatively commonplace occurrence during the later wars of Louis XIV: Liège (1691), Brussels (1695), Geldern (1703) and Ostend (1706) were all targeted. In the eighteenth century, the development of *ius gentium*, or “law of nations”, and an increase in the value of human life paradoxically led to the generalisation of this pressure tactic.⁴⁰

The sacking and pillaging of cities were two further elements of military terrorism frequently implemented to precipitate the surrender of towns wanting to avoid the same fates as their neighbours. They were often accompanied by mass executions. The word ‘massacre’ was not new, but its use in designating a distinct category of killing increased over the course of the period.⁴¹ In the short term, the operational efficiency of such a pedagogy of terror was quite remarkable. For example, the sack of Melphe in 1528 provoked a chain reaction of panic-induced surrenders: ‘All of the other cities, great and small, yielded in terror of what had been so furiously executed in Melphe, and no one at all in the countryside dared resist any longer.’⁴² In a similar manner, following the storming of Saint-Bony in 1540, which had resulted in the execution of the garrison and the pillage of the city, neighbouring cities decided to surrender at the first challenge:

Considering the treatment of the citizens of Saint-Bony, and in sight of that great French army which had come, unexpected, they took such a fright that they surrendered, not waiting to for the first discharge, [and] relinquished four

³⁹Allain Manesson-Mallet, *Les Travaux de Mars, Troisième et dernière partie*, (Paris: Frédéric Léonard, 1672), p. 264.

⁴⁰Hervé Drévilion and Olivier Wieviorka (ed.), *Histoire militaire de la France*, (Paris: Perrin/Ministère des armées, 2018), vol. 1, pp. 402-405.

⁴¹David El Kenz (ed.), *Le massacre, objet d'histoire*, (Paris: Gallimard, 2005), pp. 1-23.

⁴²*Mémoires de la vie de François de Scepeaux, sire de Vieilleville et comte de Durestal, mareschal de France*, (Paris: Éd. du commentaire analytique du code civil, 1838), p. 11.

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hundred men, every one as well armed and as good a soldier as there ever was in Italy.⁴³

On the whole, the military execution of one city translated into enormous gains in terms of the time, effort and energy expended in war. ‘Massacres’ were used to set an example; in war, ignoring such a lesson meant feeling the full weight of the sovereign’s vengeful sword. Such military and political reasons justified the harsh treatment of protestants cities and fortresses at the end of the Huguenots rebellion in 1628-1629. On 20 July 1629, Louis XIII, in his Edict of Grace (*Édit de Grace de Nîmes*), explained that assault, sack and massacre of Privas, in the Vivarais, were justified to re-established the obedience of the other Protestant strongholds. Refusing surrender and ending lives were efficient methods, as we see in the following:

This punishment made others more prudent. Not only did upper and lower Vivarais swear fealty to us and meet their duty, several other cities and forts did the same. Their rebellions were pardoned, letters of remission drawn up, and their fortifications and walls, which had given them hope but were the cause of their suffering, demolished.⁴⁴

Louis XIII believed that the exactions demanded by the royal troops encouraged the more expeditious surrender of other Protestant centres, which capitulated one after the other. Such behaviour was even encouraged, in the second half of the seventeenth century, by Montecuccoli, who coined the principle that one should ‘treat those well who surrender and ill [those] who resist’.⁴⁵

On the field, executions were conducted by a category of soldiers who summoned all sorts of fearful imaginings. They sourced their tactics – which some observers judged transgressive – from particularly warlike cultures. Some units provoked such panic in the imagination that adversaries would turn tail at the mere rumour of their approach. Born from their tactics and a refusal of the accepted codes of war, their reputations and their image preceded them. Indeed, they rebuffed practices normally held in high esteem, such as sparing the life of a vanquished enemy or taking prisoners. This refusal to follow the norms of a ‘good war’ was meant to spread fear in the enemy. The mottos, ‘outfit’, and equipment of these units all promoted violence; violence was their

⁴³Martin Du Bellay, *Mémoires des choses advenues depuis l’an mille cent treize...*, (Clermont-Ferrand: Paleo, 2002-2003), Vol. 4, p. 80..

⁴⁴Quoted by Hervé Drévilion, *Les rois absolus*, (Paris: Belin, 2011), p. 14..

⁴⁵Raimondo Montecuccoli, *Mémoires de Montecuculi, généralissime des troupes de l’empereur...*, (Paris: Savoye, 1746), p. 87. English trans. source: Beatrice Heuser, *Strategy Before Clausewitz: Linking Warfare and Statecraft, 1400-1830*, p. 154.

'identifier'.⁴⁶ They cultivated a 'culture of carnage', understood as the sum of the attitudes and behaviours of defiance toward the dominant culture of chivalry. It was characterised by a more frequent denial of surrender and by the pursuit of violence as an end in itself. The displays of 'cruelties' were not gratuitous, but a form of discourse. The bodies of their victims were the medium.



Figure 1: Nicolas Guérard, *L'art militaire ou les exercices de Mars* ca. 1693.⁴⁷

Lightly armed troops were specialists in *la petite guerre* – the irregular, everyday operations of a campaign: going on reconnaissance patrols, capturing prisoners, ambushing enemy convoys, levying contributions. These troops built an image deliberately designed to strike fear in the adversary.⁴⁸ This was especially the case of

⁴⁶Rémi Masson, *Défendre le roi, la maison militaire au XVII^e siècle*, (Ceyzérieu: Champ Vallon, 2017), p. 284.

⁴⁷*Livre à dessiner*, Paris, N. Guérard, ca. 1693, plate 11; https://digi.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/diglit/guerard_art_militaire/0026. Accessed 2 April 2020.

⁴⁸Bertrand Fonck and George Satterfield, 'The Essence of War: French Armies and Small War in the Low Countries (1672-1697)', in *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, pp. 767-783; George Satterfield, *Princes, Posts and Partisans, The Army of Louis XIV and Partisan Warfare in the Netherlands (1673-1678)*, (Leiden: Brill, 2003) chapter III; Sandrine Picaud-Monnerat, *La petite guerre au XVIII^e siècle*, (Paris: Economica, 2010); see also the www.bjmh.org.uk

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hussars, whom La Colonie described as 'bandits on horseback'.⁴⁹ Hussar regiments were initially composed of cavalry mainly originating from Central Europe, and particularly from Hungary and Germany. Some had defected from the Imperial army. Their numbers were rapidly augmented with local troops, but they preserved their 'Oriental' appearance despite the subsequent disconnect with their geographical origins. Their appearance rapidly became part of wartime folklore. The dreaded units were singled out and marginalised; the transgressions of war could be ascribed to these reputedly foreign warriors, thus absolving the regular troops.⁵⁰

Everything, from their uniform (a shako topped with a plume which added to the height of the combatant, the wolf skin they wore on their shoulders) and their weapons (the sabre and axe reputed to facilitate the decapitation of their adversaries) to their tactics, drew on an oriental mythology which conjured images of the dreaded Ottoman, Mongolian, and so-called 'Croat', 'Albanian' or 'Cossack' light cavalry, or again the *stratioti*, *jinete* or *sipahi*. The horsemen reputedly took no prisoners. They embodied the presumed savagery of a war fought *à la turque*, *à l'orientale*, and largely wrought from fancy. In his *Livre à dessiner* published in 1693, Nicolas Guérard depicts them as savage steppe horsemen in wolf skins, a feathered headdress and a moustache. His engravings show predators hunting in packs, decapitating their foes and displaying the heads of their hapless victims on the points of their sabres. These post-mortem mutilations evoked images of the war as a hunt. The enemy was animalised, a butcher's carcass from which one carved proof of successful slaughter.⁵¹ The collecting and exhibiting of these macabre trophies, if only in a drawing book, shows how widespread this notion was in the eyes of the public and tells of the fear it instilled in the enemy. Their performativity seemed uncontested and their image and the associated topoi had a measurable effect on the behaviour of combatants: in 1704, La Colonie threw himself in the Danube despite barely knowing how to swim in order to escape imperial

contributions of Benjamin Deruelle, Bertrand Fonck, Guillaume Lasconjarias and George Satterfield in the studies on 'La petite guerre', *Revue historique des armées*, p. 286, (2017).

⁴⁹Jean-François Martin de La Colonie, *Mémoires*, p. 235.

⁵⁰André Corvisier (ed.), *Les hussards et la France*, (Paris: Musée de l'Armée/Complexe, 1993); Raymond Boisseau, 'La petite guerre et les hussards du roi', in Yves-Marie Bercé, Philippe Contamine and André Corvisier (ed.), *Combattre, gouverner, écrire, Mélanges Jean Chagniot*, (Paris: Commission Française d'Histoire Militaire, Institut de Stratégie Comparée Paris I Sorbonne and Éd. Economica, 2003), pp. 161-181; Raymond Boisseau, *Histoire des officiers de hussards de l'Ancien Régime*, (Paris: Archives et culture, 2017).

⁵¹Christian Ingraio, *Les chasseurs noirs. La brigade Dirlwanger*, (Paris: Perrin, 2009), p. 186.

hussars.⁵² Indeed, their frequent refusal to allow surrender set these troops apart; they valorised a form of honour that was – if not paradoxical – at the very least un-chivalric. It was based on a macabre sort of economics measured in murders, a grisly benchmark of bravery and military prowess. Early one morning in July 1711, the hussars of the Comte de Gassion discovered an allied encampment between Goeuzlin and Douai. Villars reported the operations to Louis XIV and seemingly vaunting the slaughter of the surprised and unarmed men, related that

most had not time to reach for their arms and in general were taken or killed. We gave very little quarter; our hussars claim they each killed five or six men and since they carry their sabres with such agility, one cannot but think that they have strayed little from the truth.⁵³

Executions such as these were the basis of their reputation as ‘crazy butchers’.

Like the hussars, shock or assault troops were rarely inclined to give quarter to the enemy. It was a consequence of their mission: these troops were tasked with the bloody, risky operations of storming a breach – the ultimate phase in siege operations and the acme of wartime brutalities. Physically eliminating an adversary nullified the chances that he could attack his capturer if the tide turned during battle, while killing allowed a soldier to exact vengeance for the death of fallen brothers in arms. The accumulation of losses in the initial phases of the assault also provoked the fear that drove defenders to cede terrain. The close-quarter arsenal of assault troops was not designed to take prisoners. Grenades, pistols fired at contact range, and bladed and edged weapons, were used to kill or to force the enemy into flight. Operational necessities, a vendetta principle and internalised violence all came together when these troops entered the battlefield. The mounted grenadiers and the Grey Musketeers, elite troops of the Maison du Roi, specialised in these assaults. They emphatically proclaimed a culture of universal rejection of surrender and destruction of the enemy. Even their heraldic devices reflected this. Grenadiers – recruited purely on merit and almost exclusively among commoners – overturned the codes of true chivalric warfare and boasted that they never took prisoners. They adopted the bone-chilling *Undique Terror, undique Lethum* (‘Terror everywhere, death everywhere’) and, like the hussars, invested their uniform with ‘Oriental’ folklore. They were meticulous about their appearance, sporting high fur hats, moustaches and braiding, all intended to inspire

⁵²Jean-François Martin de La Colonie, *Mémoires*, pp. 276-277.

⁵³Letter from Villars to the king, camp of Prieuré Saint-Michel, 12 July 1711, ed. by Jean-Jacques Pelet and François-Eugène Vault, *Mémoires militaires relatifs à la succession d’Espagne ...*, (Paris: Imprimerie royale, puis nationale et impériale, 1835-1862), Vol. 10, p. 623.

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fear.⁵⁴ The Musketeers adopted a motto that was every bit as terrifying: 'Death and destruction'. Their standard figured a bomb blasting a city, in echo of their specific role in siege warfare.⁵⁵ Every one of their engagements ended in a blood bath and their reputations as killers proceeded them. In Valenciennes, in 1677, the simple fact that they appeared was enough to paralyse the enemy. Quarré d'Aligny relates the assault of the musketeers, the guard and the mounted grenadiers, which turned into a slaughter of the petrified defenders:

We were killing people who put up no defence, [...] the enemies were fleeing through the Noir Mouton Gate. The grenadiers of the Maison du Roi who were mixed in with our detachment killed such a great number of soldiers that the entrance was clogged with the bodies of the dead, and the ditch was filled so that there were no longer means to pass except by the sluice gate. I attempted to enter, knowing that the king's musketeers, of which I am one, had been first to enter and had my back.⁵⁶

In a like manner, in Namur in June 1692, musketeers, mounted grenadiers and infantry grenadiers launched an attack on one of the citadel's redoubts: 'Though great in number, the enemy put up no defence. Having discharged once, they took flight. It was then that many perished by the sabre or the sword.'⁵⁷ Fear did its duty: panic overtook the enemy, who then yielded. Such assaults would be periodically repeated. Their goal was to terrify the enemy, destroy his moral, and expedite the surrender of neighbouring towns.

Criminalising fear

But if surrender allowed the soldier to avoid the fury of an assault, it offered no guarantee to the unfortunate governor who had ordered the drums to beat a parley. A breach of the signed agreement of capitulation was always a possibility, but the even greater risk was of judicial action. The political leaders who had entrusted the governor with the defence of a fortification might feel that the decision to cease fighting had been unjustified. The unfortunate captains faced the likelihood of dishonour and of standing trial for 'cowardice and treason'.⁵⁸

⁵⁴Masson, *Défendre le roi...*, pp. 286-290.

⁵⁵Rémi Masson, *Les mousquetaires ou la violence de l'État*, (Paris: Vendémiaire, 2013), pp. 86-90.

⁵⁶Pierre Quarré d'Aligny, *Mémoires des campagnes*, (Beaune: A. Batault, 1886), p. 98.

⁵⁷Letter from Barbézieux to the maréchal de Logres, Namur, 13 June 1692, ed. by Henri Griffet, *Recueil de lettres*, vol. 8, pp. 162-163.

⁵⁸Paul Vo-Ha, *Rendre les armes, le sort des vaincus, XVI^e-XVII^e siècles*, (Ceyzérieu: Champ Vallon, 2017), pp. 243-284; Yves-Marie Bercé, 'Les capitaines malheureux', in Yves-Marie Bercé (ed.), *Les procès politiques (XIV^e-XVII^e siècle)*, (Rome: EFR, 2007), pp. 35-60.

Giving way to fear in this way made the unfortunate captains vulnerable to loss of honour. As we see in the passage below, the surrender of Montmedy in 1552 ruined the symbolic capital of the imperial captains charged with defending it.⁵⁹

The captains who found themselves within Montmedy, frightened by the fall of Damvilliers and Yvoy, which they had thought impregnable, offered themselves up for surrender before the summons was even sounded. They were denounced as lily-livered cowards, for they had been roughly two thousand well-armed men of war. Signalled by a single hoisted standard and one beating drum, they surrendered the city to save their own lives, arms and baggage; they abandoned the artillery and military stores.⁶⁰

This controversial surrender was judged hasty and unjustified. It ruined the reputations of the men who had thought to gain much when they had accepted the mission of defending the city. '[When] this foolishness was related to the king [...], he said that the Queen of Hungary must have given the charge to some beer brewer in order to please her nursemaid.'⁶¹ The captain charged with the city's defence had failed in his duty: fear was a sentiment that, when unmastered, was unbecoming a gentleman. In refusing to pay the blood price, in giving in to fear, he was symbolically stripped of his nobility. No longer a gentleman but a vile commoner, who practised a menial craft, prospered because of a woman's favour and – worse still – because of a foreigner. This threefold transgression created the image of a world turned upside down and exposed the unfortunate governor to his social downfall.

In addition to dishonour – by definition a public sanction – there might also be judicial consequences. Fear became a criminal offense when transformed into an accusation of cowardice and treason. The judicialisation of surrenders judged too hasty was already well established. Since the sixteenth century, several affairs had resulted in convictions following profoundly political proceedings of extraordinary justice. Such cases often found scapegoats to punish. In 1523, for example, Captain Fanget was stripped of his noble title on a scaffold in Lyons for the crime of ceding Fontarabie to the Spanish.⁶² In the same manner, Jacques de Coucy-Vervins was condemned to death

⁵⁹Paul Vo-Ha, 'L'honneur du gouverneur, XVI^e-XVII^e siècles', in Nicolas Le Roux and Martin Wrede (ed.), *Noblesse oblige, Identités et engagements aristocratiques à l'époque moderne*, (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2017), pp. 163-182.

⁶⁰ *Mémoires de la vie de François de Scepeaux, sire de Vieilleville...*, p. 148.

⁶¹ *Ibid*, p. 148.

⁶²Bibliothèque nationale de France (BnF), ms. fr. 18428, fol. 85: *Peines ordonnées contre ceux qui ont perdu les places fortes par lâcheté et faute de courage ou par leur négligence.*

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for surrendering Boulogne to the English in 1544.⁶³ Vervins' father-in-law, Maréchal Oudard du Biez, was a collateral victim in the affair. Abandoned by the houses of Montmorency as well as Guise, who had both been his patrons, and out of favour with Henry II, he was tried for treason and misappropriation of public funds. Some of the key witnesses in the trial were close to the new king and bitter enemies of the Maréchal.⁶⁴

The crime of lese-majesty was a conveniently pliant offence. It was used to sentence to death the two accused, judged by *commissaires* in a 'chambre de la Reine'.⁶⁵ Vervins was beheaded in 1549 and while Oudar du Biez was pardoned he died disgraced in 1553. The government of Richelieu was marked by the rationalised banality of an extraordinary justice adapted to the 'necessities' of war.⁶⁶ The campaign of 1636, with Spanish parties advancing to the fringes of Paris, was a decisive moment in the process of the criminalisation of fear. It ended in the trial of three governors of the towns of La Capelle, Le Catelet and Corbie. Jurists in the pocket of the regime, eager to create a framework for the crime of precipitate surrender, introduced a significant shift in the definition: cowardice, a condition of moral bankruptcy, was morphed into treason, which was a crime against the state. Under Séguier and Richelieu, jurisprudence was created to establish the crime.⁶⁷ Prior to this, temporary special courts had ruled on a case-by-case basis with little foundation. But the exceptional procedures would rapidly become formalised and codified. In particular, the commission of governors now required that the besieged wait for the opening of a breach and make an attempt repel at least one assault before considering surrender. A permanent state of

⁶³Ibid., *Reddition de la ville de Boulogne-sur-mer*, fol. 90 and 137.

⁶⁴David Potter, *Un homme de guerre au temps de la Renaissance: la vie et les lettres d'Oudart du Biez, maréchal de France, gouverneur de Boulogne et de Picardie (vers 1475-1553)*, (Arras: Artois Presses Université, 2001); David Potter, 'A Treason Trial in Sixteenth-Century France: the Fall of Marshal du Biez, 1547-1551', *English Historical Review*, 105 (1990), pp. 595-623.

⁶⁵Benjamin Deruelle, 'Au préjudice de la fidélité, du droit et de la nature. Les usages de la lèse-majesté dans le discours monarchique à la noblesse de France (1560-1598)', *Revue d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine*, 67, 1, (2020) pp. 153-179; Mario Sbriccoli, *Crimen laesae maiestatis: il problema del reato politico alle soglie della scienza penalistica moderna*, (Milano: Giufre, 1974).

⁶⁶Hélène Fernandez-Lacôte, *Les procès du cardinal de Richelieu. Droit, grâce et politique sous Louis le Juste*, (Seyssel: Champ Vallon, 2010).

⁶⁷BnF, Cangé, Rés F. 167, fol. 32, *Pour montrer que la Loy des armes veut que ceux qui commandent aux armées ou dans les places meurent plutost que de faire une Lacheté, une mort honteuse leur estant reservée pour les obliger à en rechercher une plus glorieuse en se deffendant*, n.d.; fol. 64, *Peines imposées contre ceux qui commettent à la guerre quelque lacheté ou trahison*.

emergency became the normal state of affairs in war and cases of surrender naturally fell under the jurisdiction of the *conseils de guerre*. These special courts, documented in the early 1630's, gathered army or provincial *intendants* and members of the military hierarchy to act as prosecuting officers (*commissaires*).

This system condemned and dishonoured in compliance with the regime, as evidenced by the trial of Dupas, governor of Naerden, accused of cowardice and treason for precipitate surrender in 1673. His defence of the city had lasted a mere four days, far from the 48 recommended by Vauban in his *Traité de la défense des places*.⁶⁸ In an attempt to defend his reputation, Dupas tried to justify his surrender in a small printed *Mémoire*, putting his case before the public.⁶⁹ After recalling his long spotless career in the king's army, he explained, just as he did in front of the *conseil de guerre* that the fortifications were crumbling and that his garrison was composed of inexperienced soldiers who lacked everything. He then accused Marshal Luxembourg of letting him down, arguing that he could have rescued the place, and finally presented himself as a scapegoat for the fall of the French position in the Netherlands, a victim of Luxembourg's plot and favour. But this strategy of publication did not save him. Degraded, humiliated and imprisoned in Grave, Dupas would volunteer to take part in a sally. He restored his honour by dying in the operation, a genuine protest suicide to demonstrate the iniquity of the judgement handed down by the *conseil de guerre*.⁷⁰ His heroic sacrifice was even mentioned in the *Gazette de France*, the court journal. Like Dupas, dozens of unfortunate captains and governors from all over Europe fell to the mercy of royal or State special courts between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. Pain-et-Vin was a scapegoat executed in 1673 on orders of the Prince of Orange, following the French invasion in the beginning of the Dutch war. At the start of the War of the Spanish Succession, Arco, the governor of Breisach, was beheaded by order of the emperor.⁷¹ Lally-Tollendal was accused of treason following the surrender of Pondicherry during the Seven Years' War.⁷² These unfortunate commanders were invariably condemned to shaming punishments and, periodically, to death. Recourse to such a 'spectacle of the scaffold' established fear as a tool of the

⁶⁸Sébastien Le Prestre Vauban, *Traité de la défense des places*, in Michèle Virol (ed.), *Les oisivetés de Monsieur de Vauban*, (Seysssel: Champ Vallon, 2007), pp. 1361-1362.

⁶⁹BnF, Cangé, Rés. F. 167, fol. 176, *Mémoire servant à la justification de Philippe de Procé, sieur Dupas...*, 1673.

⁷⁰Paul Vo-Ha, 'Trahir le Prince: la reddition de Naerden (1673)', in Laurey Braguier-Gouverneur and Florence Piat (ed.), *Normes et transgressions dans l'Europe de la première modernité*, (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2013), pp. 159-172.

⁷¹Saint-Simon, *Mémoires*, ed. by Yves Coirault, (Paris: Gallimard, 1987-1990), Vol. 2, p. 429.

⁷²Pierre-Antoine Perrod, *L'affaire Lally-Tolendal. Une erreur judiciaire au 18^e siècle*, (Paris: C. Klincksieck, 1976).

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government: the spectator, principal protagonist in these public executions, must shake with fear and always keep in mind the cost of disobedience.⁷³

Conclusion

Practitioners and theoreticians of war in the Early Modern era were highly conscious of the role fear played in combat. To win the clash of emotions that would ensure victory in battle, they attempted to limit the fear felt by their own men and amplify it in the enemy. States penalised fear and punished surrender when judged unjustified or premature. The dishonour and death that awaited officers in the case of moral failure was to be feared far more than the honourable death that they might meet in doing their duty.

Like war or governance, fear was an art. It became a tactical, strategic and political tool to be summoned or banished as needed. But coercion was only one aspect of fear management. Its opposite, bravery, was also well rewarded: after his lengthy defence of Lille in 1708, Bouffers received a hero's welcome at court and was granted titles, offices and pensions for his bravery – a virtue which did not consist in denying fear, but in surmounting it.⁷⁴ Officers who overcame their fear with courage were handsomely recompensed with the 'wages of war', which took the form of honours as well as gold. The rank and file might occasionally be awarded such promotions and pensions, or even induction into the Invalides at the end of an illustrious career but they were still largely excluded from such rewards. A gulf divided the officer from the common ranks; the reign of Louis XIV did not yet acknowledge the 'honour of simple soldiers'.⁷⁵

⁷³Michel Foucault, *Surveiller et punir*, (Paris: Gallimard, 1975), pp. 51-58; Pascal Bastien, *L'exécution publique à Paris au XVIII^e siècle. Une histoire des rituels judiciaires*, (Seyssel: Champ Vallon, 2006).

⁷⁴Saint-Simon, *Mémoires*, vol. 3, pp. 317-322.

⁷⁵Arnaud Guinier, *L'honneur du soldat, Éthique martiale et discipline guerrière dans la France des Lumières*, (Ceyzérieu: Champ Vallon, 2014).