
In September 1355, Edward, the Black Prince (d.1376), landed at Gascony and for the next two and half months he led a devastating *chevauchée* (a destructive raid designed to undercut a region’s economic productivity), from Bordeaux on the Atlantic coast, east to Narbonne on the shores of the Mediterranean. Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in the Hundred Years War and Jonathon Sumption’s multi-volume history (to date, four of the five volumes have been published) has set the benchmark for detailed narratives of the conflict. On a more regional level and, incidentally, published in the same ‘Warfare in History Series’, Adam Chapman’s *Welsh Soldiers in the Later Middle Ages, 1282-1422* (Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 2015) has, for example, offered a re-assessment of the role played by Welsh soldiers in the conflict. Iain MacInnes’ *Scotland’s Second War of Independence, 1332-1357* (Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 2016), by comparison, has explored the ‘Scottish’ origins of the conflict. In the last decade, a growing body of scholarship has also been completed on the role played by other fronts (such as Italy and the Iberian Peninsula) within this conflict. In spite of these advances in scholarship, little attention has been devoted to exploring the grande *chevauchée* of 1355 and its wider significance for the Anglo-French conflict. As the author of this volume demonstrates, this issue is particularly intriguing as the *chevauchée* of 1355 offers a rich case study in the logistics of warfare in both the Hundred Years War and, the history of warfare in medieval Europe more generally. In particular, Mollie Madden argues that the English victory over the French at Poitiers in September 1356 has distracted scholars from examining the Black Prince’s earlier campaign in 1355. Madden emphasises that the grande *chevauchée* not only warrants closer attention as a significant campaign in its own right (one that played an important role in laying the groundwork for the subsequent victory at Poitiers), but also as a template for studying other English campaigns.

Broadly speaking, this book is divided into two main parts. The first two chapters delve into the organisational apparatus of the Plantagenet war machine; the remaining chapters focus on the campaign itself. One of the major advantages of this study is that Madden, in addition to drawing upon the large corpus of English material, also draws attention to the milieu of French material available to historians. Chapter One focuses on the origins of the 1355 expedition. Madden argues that preparations for the expedition were well underway by the late spring of 1355 and that Edward III’s decision to appoint his son as commander had important symbolic resonance: his appointment
reflected the need to show strong leadership in the face of French encroachment. A detailed examination of the systems of purveyance and supply underpinning the expedition reveals that the English government were well placed to equip and mount such long-distance and costly military operations. Chapter Two examines the recruitment process. The limitations of surviving source material make it difficult to reconstruct the precise numbers of soldiers in the Black Prince’s army. Madden however, draws upon the work of other scholars both to estimate the number of troops serving in the prince’s army (about 2,000 English troops, 3,000-4,000 Gascons as well as another 3,000 non-combatants). The breakdown is helpfully summarised on table 2.3 (p. 61). Madden then moves on to explore the organisational structure of the princes’ army, providing a valuable insight into the composition of English armies during the Hundred Years War (Appendix 2 offers a useful top-down breakdown of army’s structure). Chapters Three and Four examine the logistics behind the campaign itself. The third chapter traces the Black Prince’s march from Bordeaux to Narbonne. Madden argues that it is a measure of the organisational capabilities of the English administration in Gascony that the Black Prince’s army was ready to begin its march two weeks after landfall. The author then goes on to explore the impressive supply structures underpinning the prince’s expedition and details a day by day account of the army’s eastward progress down to mid-October when the force divided into three large groups (or battles). Chapter Four explores the return march home to Bordeaux. The English force was numerically inferior to the nearby French army under Jean (d.1373), Count of Armagnac; however, there was little Armagnac could do to stop the Black Prince’s pillaging of the French countryside. Indeed, Madden suggests that the level of violence inflicted upon the region was very possibly aimed at enticing Armagnac into an open confrontation. In any case, the prince failed to force a military encounter with Armagnac. Whether or not a pitched battle with French forces was the intended objective, the Black Prince, nevertheless, inflicted considerable damage upon the region’s infrastructure during the chevauchée. The final chapter examines the post-chevauchée period, linking the prince’s activities in southern France with the impending Poitiers campaign.

Overall, this is an impressive study which has done a great deal to situate the grande chevauchée of 1355 within the broader narrative of the Hundred Years War. The book offers an interesting insight into the English crown’s capacity for fitting-out, launching, and continuously supplying such large scale military ventures. Naturally, the book will of be of significant interest to scholars of the Hundred Years War. It should also attract a readership for those working in the area of medieval English history more generally
(social historians will be interested in Madden’s work on purveyance) as well as those studying warfare in Europe during the Middle Ages.

SIMON EGAN
University of Glasgow, UK

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The battle of Prestonpans is well enough known as the first major encounter of the Jacobite Rising of 1745. It is usually addressed - quite often in some detail - in histories of the Rising, but it is very much rarer for it to enjoy a book-length study, as it was only temporarily decisive and the scale of the victory it represented is diminished by the conclusion of the Rising of 1745 in the overwhelming and decisive defeat of Culloden, adopted by British historiography as a foundational battle in the history of the British Empire and the rise of the United Kingdom to global prominence.

How then does Arran Johnston justify a 250 page study of the fight at Prestonpans, where fewer than 5000 troops were involved on both sides? Shrewdly, he rests his case on the view that without a Jacobite victory at Prestonpans the significance of the ’45 would be as a footnote in history, something analogous to Glenshiel in 1719. He points out also the sense - from which the early title ‘Gladsmuir’ derived - of the battle as a fulfillment of Scottish historical prophecy.

There is much to commend in this study. The welcome use of the title ‘British Army’ to describe Cope’s forces is completely correct and overdue: British regulars are still exposed to being called ‘Government’ troops or even worse ‘Hanoverian’ ones in this one context alone. This detaches them from their role, and their link - especially later in the campaign - to George II’s personal leadership at Dettingen, and to the Continental firefights of the War of the Austrian Succession in which many of them had been involved. The ’45 was an existential threat to the British state, which defended itself using - not solely, but centrally - the British Army.

Johnston’s historical geography - the approach to Prestonpans, the sense of its status as an industrial site even in 1745 and at ‘the cutting edge of Scotland’s agricultural and industrial revolutions’ (p. 38) - is very detailed and draws the reader in to both the age