afterwards. Nearly three-quarters of the survivors did not return to Communist Poland, with a few of the ‘few’ remaining in the RAF. Others were not welcome in Britain and told they had to leave. By the time the book appeared, none of the Polish ‘few’ survived. Had they lived to see it, they would have had good reason to feel that the story of their involvement in the Battle of Britain had at last been set down in the detail it deserves.

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In no other allied army during the Second World War was the problem of defection so severe as in the Red Army. Nowhere else did the phenomenon of defection generate such political controversy as in the post-war Soviet Union. Moreover, in modern-day Russia, where historical memory continues to be shaped by on-going political, economic, and military struggles, the study of Red Army defectors is shackled to a nationalist historiography (p. 163). For these reasons, Mark Edele’s fascinating book is important and not only for its much-needed forensic examination of Red Army defectors. This study of Red Army defectors is a ‘military history from below’ (p. 8), encompassing social, cultural, and detailed statistical analyses. More broadly, the book presents convincing challenges to recent research on popular support for Stalinism. In this way, Edele’s book will remain the definitive account of defection in the Red Army and it moves contested debates about the nature of Soviet society further forward.

Stalin’s Defectors is structured into nine chapters that systematically examine the phenomenon of Red Army defections. By way of introduction, chapter one begins with the case of Major Ivan Kononov, a Soviet defector who gave himself up to the Germans along with his unit in August 1941. Kononov would later organise one of the first units to fight against the Soviets for the Nazis. Yet Kononov’s motivation – that of deep political opposition to the Stalinist regime – was untypical. As Edele shows, the vast majority of defectors were not in fact ideologically motivated traitors; they were ‘refugees from Stalinism’ seeking escape from death, dictatorship, and total war. Survival was the primary motivating factor (p. 10).
Edele’s research base is impressive, drawing upon archival documents from various Russian, German, Australian, and American archives; and also incorporating a multitude of personal accounts, memoirs, and interviews giving detailed insight into individual defections. Moreover, in his chapter on the numbers of defections, Edele puts his appeal for historians to make better use of statistics into practice. Despite difficult and fragmentary evidence for defections in 1941, Edele’s analysis reveals that 117,000 Soviet soldiers at the very least crossed the front line during the war. He reveals other surprising trends. For instance, the share of defections among Soviet POWs actually increased as the war persisted. A string of Red Army victories and subsequent fighting on non-Soviet soil from 1942 actually increased the likelihood of voluntary surrender (p. 33).

In his chapter on the obstacles to defection, Edele covers the serious risks undertaken by crossing the front line, including the danger of being shot on sight and the use of violence and coercion within units. In sum, both German and Soviet actions worked together to create ‘extremely strong incentives against surrender’. That so many Red Army soldiers still took the risk makes the decision to defect even more impressive (p. 57).

Over subsequent chapters, Edele discusses defection scenarios; profiles; motivations, and the substance of collaborations. What is clear from reading Edele’s book is how defections cannot be adequately understood with clear-cut categories. The ‘ideal’ defector profile is very difficult to pin down. Moreover, defections themselves were similarly varied, spanning those with peaceful outcomes to cases involving far more violence. Motivations spanned from deep anti-Bolshevism to a basic fight for survival, with the majority of defectors expressing defeatism rather than a willingness to take up arms against the Stalinist regime (p. 119).

In the final chapters Edele discusses how Red Army defections have been presented inside and outside the Soviet Union. However, for historians of Soviet society, the chapter focused on the ‘implications’ of defections engages with on-going debates about popular support for Stalinism. Challenging a recent school of thought emphasising ideology and ‘Stalinist subjectivity’ as underpinning Stalinism (that ordinary citizens were ideologically committed and their worldviews shaped by official discourse), Edele instead convincingly argues for a mass sense of defeatism in Soviet society from the very start of the war. Rather than place too great emphasis on the power of ideology, to understand Soviet society at war – and with it Red Army defectors - we need to better understand how the state was able to motivate (or coerce), with varying success, the mass of the non-committed majority (p. 174).

Benjamin Cowan’s extensive research into the archives of right-wing ideologues, both non-military and civilian, fills an important lacuna in the history of Brazil’s military dictatorship from 1964 to 1985. While often seen as less repressive than the dictatorship in Argentina where approximately 30,000 Argentines disappeared and never reappeared, in Brazil, by Cowan’s admission, fewer than 500 died at the hands of the military, while hundreds disappeared. It is worth noting that Argentina had a population of about 33 million, while Brazil had about 92 million. For these reasons and others, the history of right-wing ideology in Brazil seemed less pressing. Cowan noted in his introduction that the 1930s dictatorship of Getúlio Vargas often sabotaged the efforts of conservatives. But, as Cowen states: ‘Right-wing culture warriors were not all powerful…. They did, however, play a key ideological role.’ (p. 11)

In the 1960s and 1970s, inspired by 1930s integralista fascists, conservative Catholicism, and unfashionable scientific and philosophical writers from all over the world, Brazilian culture warriors had new opportunities to define morality, especially among the young and the sexually liberated. Although Cowan does not mention this, Brazil at this time had a very large proportion of youths under 15 who were already, or about to reach puberty in 1966 just at the time that rock and roll, the pill, and anti-militarism and world youth movements became visible through movies and music.

As Cowen proceeds from topic to topic, it appears that the right was all powerful, placed in important governmental and military positions. By the 1960s they confronted demands for divorce, abortion, birth control and women’s rights—all unacceptable. Sexual promiscuity, both heterosexual and homosexual were anathema while the rest of the world extolled sexual rights. No wonder that later military governments subsidized a uniquely Brazilian form of cinema soft porn called pornochanchadas to keep the public away from American and European movies. Military governments even considered allowing the sale of contraceptives.