British Journal for Military History

Volume 8, Issue 1, March 2022

Cover picture: Portrait bust of Thucydides, Athenian historian and general, from the Royal Ontario Museum. The portrait is a copy, probably late Hellenistic, of a lost Greek work of the early 4th century BC. 

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Volume 8, Issue 1 March 2022

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British Journal for Military History – ISSN: 2057-0422
DOI: 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v8i1

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EDITORIAL*

We are pleased to make two sets of announcements in this issue of the BJMH.

With the support of funding from the British Commission for Military History, we have launched an annual Sir Michael Howard Prize for the best article published in the journal in each year. The prize was awarded for the first time at the BCMH Annual General Meeting on 5 March. The winner was Dr Graeme Callister for his article 'Napoleonic Conscription in Indre-et-Loire, 1798-1814' (Volume 7 Issue 3). Graeme received £250 plus an award for his fascinating examination of the challenge to filling the ranks of Napoleon's armies posed not by open evasion but by the many who escaped conscription working within the system to obtain legal exemptions. The runner-up certificate was presented to Dr Stephen Moore for his article 'Going Downhill': The Consequences of the Stabilisation Scheme on Fighter Command during the Battle of Britain and into 1941' (Volume 7 Issue 2). Stephen's article reveals the unintended consequences of the scheme adopted following the Battle of Britain that increased the flow of trained pilots to the fighter squadrons but which also produced an increased level of non-operational flying accidents in 1941.

Meanwhile, we have been making major changes to our Editorial Team to develop our temporal and geographic coverage. Both Dr Rosie Kennedy and Dr Erin Scheopner have stood down from their roles as, respectively, Book Reviews Editor and Managing Editor. We thank them for all their hard work and wish them all the best for the future. We are pleased to welcome to the editorial team Dr Máire MacNeill, a Visiting Research Fellow at Goldsmiths, University of London, as our new Book Reviews Editor and Dr Jack Doyle, Dr Mario Draper, Dr Sam Edwards, Nathan Finney, Dr Howard Fuller, Vikki Hawkins, Dr Nina Janz, Dr Raymond Kimball, Maria Ogborn and Dr Andrew Sanders as new Managing Editors. Between them they bring to our team a wealth of knowledge related to many periods and many regions. We look forward to working with the new expanded team in the months and years to come.

Finally, we would like to reiterate our call for contributors. The BJMH seeks to publish articles and research notes covering 'military history' – taken in the very widest sense – from all periods of history and from authors at all stages of their career. Finally, as always, we need additional book reviewers to cover the enormous range of books published each year. If you are interested Máire will be pleased to hear from you.

RICHARD S. GRAYSON & ERICA WALD
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* DOI: 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v8i1.1602

The Sicilian Expedition Reconsidered

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ABSTRACT
According to Thucydides, or the prevailing modern interpretation of his classic work, the Athenian campaign in Sicily was the main cause of the Athenian defeat in the Peloponnesian war. Modern scholars tend to favour this view, so much so that the Sicilian campaign is universally held up as a classic example of a strategic mistake. This essay attempts, through the lens of a structural realist or neorealist theory of International Relations, to demonstrate that this was not the case. In fact, the Sicilian expedition was a foreseeable and rational strategic choice which was in line with Athenian foreign policy, and was not the main cause of the Athenian defeat.

Neorealist theory and the structural foundations of Athens' grand strategy
After six years of peace with Sparta, briefly interrupted by open hostilities in 418 BCE, the Athenians, prompted by Pericles' charismatic nephew Alcibiades, decided in 415 BCE to launch a major expedition against the Greek great power of the West, and a Spartan sympathiser, the city of Syracuse on Sicily. Two years later that expedition ended in disaster, with thousands of men dead and an entire Athenian fleet destroyed. The renewed war with Sparta would carry on until Athens' final defeat in 404 BCE. The Sicilian disaster was a heavy blow to Athenian power, and is often considered to be the turning point for the fall of the Athenian Empire. But was it an outright strategic mistake?

This article does not claim that the Sicilian expedition was a safe or necessarily the best possible choice for Athens. The argument made here is that the Sicilian expedition confirms neorealist theory's views, as it was a rational strategic choice with a serious and realistic chance of success, that could indeed have altered decisively the balance of power to Athens' favour, while its outcome was not fatal for the city of Athens. The Sicilian expedition was risky, but not riskier than comparable expeditions in Greek/ancient history, which are instead considered to be genius strategic moves

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DOI: 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v8i1.1603

because they had a victorious outcome. A good example is Scipio Africanus's invasion of North Africa at a time when Hannibal and the Carthaginian army were still in Italy. Scipio is rightfully considered a strategic genius and Roman hero due to this risky operation with which Fabius Maximus, the Cunctator, did not agree. Although it should be noted that, according to a prominent Italian military historian, Scipio failed to beat Hannibal tactically at the Battle of Zama and the Romans won mainly thanks to Numidian help.[1] In any case, while outcome may be the most important criterion for judging a strategic choice, it should not be the only one, as Karl von Clausewitz might say.[2]

The argument of this paper is based on structural realist theory and will focus on the theory's core assumptions. These neorealist assumptions, which comply with Kenneth Walt's "defensive realist" paradigm[3] just as with John J. Mearsheimer's different "offensive realist" paradigm,[4] or Robert Gilpin's theory of war and change,[5] are: firstly, the structure of the international system is the major factor for the choices of the international actors, exceeding ideology and personal or group interests and ambitions. Secondly, states seek to increase or at least maintain the stability of their relative power in the international system and their influence on the international order. Thirdly, when the objective factors, that is, the state's demographics, economy and military power are growing, the state will probably have the tendency to reform the international order to its advantage. Fourthly, when an international actor thinks that their influence in the system could decrease because of the rise of another international actor, they could use force in order to counterbalance it. The Peloponnesian war, and Thucydides *History* in particular, is an exemplary model for this mechanism, and scholars often cite it as the founding work of realist thinking on international politics.[6]

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[1]Giovanni Brizzi, *Scipione e Annibale. La guerra per salvare Roma,* (Bari: Editori Laterza, 2010), p. 211.

[2]See Clausewitz's defence of Napoleon's choice to invade Russia in 1812, despite the disaster of the Grand Armée, in Karl von Clausewitz, *On War,* Book 8. 9, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).

[3]Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979); Kenneth N. Waltz, *Realism and International Politics*, (London: Routledge, 2008).

[4]John J. Mearsheimer, *The tragedy of great power politics*, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001); John J. Mearsheimer, 'Structural Realism', in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, Steve Smith (eds.), *International Relations Theories*: *Discipline and Diversity*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 77-94.

[5]Robert Gilpin, *War and change in international politics*, (New York: Cambridge University Press), 1981.

[6]For example Robert Gilpin, 'The theory of hegemonic war', *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol. 18, No. 4, Spring 1988, pp. 591-613; Robert Gilpin, *War and change in*

Neorealism explains the strategic choices of international actors by observing the structure of the international system and the necessities that arise for the individual actors.[7] Domestic processes are one of the processes that interact with others and which produce developments and results.[8] However, domestic processes are crucially affected by choices which are dictated by the structure on the basis of needs of the international system and cannot override structural requirements. The most obvious evidence for the decisive influence of structure and the secondary role of domestic processes in the stance taken by a country in the international arena is that states tend to maintain the same or a similar direction for their behaviour in the international system for as long as systemic factors remain the same, even when there is political and social change in those states.[9] Reductive analysis is therefore more useful in explaining how successful an international actor is and the specific ways in which they operate, than it is for explaining the reason behind their political stance.[10]

Therefore, in a structural realist view, Athens became a naval superpower because this was the most convenient way to face the existential Persian threat, and to increase its power relative to the hegemonic power of Sparta.[11] Given that the prerequisites for the development of Athenian naval power fell into place during the 6th Century BCE, what happened was exactly what could have been expected to happen on the

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international politics, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Giampiero Giacomello – Gianmarco Badialetti, *Manuale di studi strategici*, (Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 2009); Athanassios Platias & Konstantinos Koliopoulos, *Thucydides on Strategy*: *Grand Strategies in the Peloponnesian War and Their Relevance Today*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

[7]Other relevant books and studies: Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1990); A.F.K. Organski, *World Politics*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968); George Modelski, *Long cycles in world politics*, (Washington: University of Washington Press, 1987); Tobjorn Knutsen, *The rise and fall of world orders*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999); William C. Wohlforth, 'Gilpinian Realism and International Relations', *International Relations* 25 (4), 2011, pp. 499-511; Andreas Olsson, *A Study in structural realism*, (thesis, Lund University, 2012).

[8]Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 174-175.

[9]For a recent historical example Robert H. Donaldson & Joseph L. Nogee, *The foreign policy of Russia. Changing systems, enduring interests*, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2009).

[10]Sotirios F. Drokalos, *Imperialismo Romano: scelta di élite o di popolo?*, (Zermeghedo, Vicenza: Edizioni Saecula, 2015), pp. 29-33.

[11]Athens was also engaged in a struggle with the significant maritime power of Aegina. But the silver mines at Laurion meant the Athenians could beat the Aeginetans at their own game by building more ships.

basis of neorealist theory, i.e. Athens followed this particular way of gaining strength in the international system of that time. Athens could not compete with Sparta in terms of know-how, tradition, and quality when it came to land forces; and Sparta – as, of course did the Persian Empire – had more people to call on than Athens and Attica, at a time when Sparta controlled most of the Peloponnese and had a hegemonic relationship with other parts of the Greek world. Thebes to the immediate north of Athens was also a Spartan ally, such as other Boeotians. However, Athens had its own important ally in the region, Plataea, and there is evidence that Athens also developed an effective defensive system in the mountains between Attica and Boeotia.[12] On the other hand, Athens' geographical position gave it an advantage in terms of naval control of the Aegean as it lay at the centre of that sea. Finally, Athens was protected from the tribes of the far north by the Macedonians

To some extent., Athenian land owning aristocrats opposed naval power and maritime imperialism, but their opposition was inconsistent and it fluctuated according to Athens' relative power in the system, as structural realism would have predicted. At the time of the campaign in Sicily, Athens was at the height of its power and opposition to maritime imperialism within Athens was therefore weak. There was not even a faction opposed to it, only a few individual voices, whose stance can be seen as an expression of that era's mild version of the oligarchic pro-Spartan opposition to the Athenian naval power, which had increased the wealth and influence of the commercial and industrial classes in Athens and throughout the Aegean.[13] This demonstrates a change to the period before the Persian Wars, when there was very significant and strong opposition to the development of naval power, which was still only an idea that seemed uncertain and risky to the Athenian aristocracy.

The major structural change with the appearance of the Persian threat was the force that gave birth to Athenian naval power. Themistocles only managed to get support for his policy of creating a very powerful fleet on the eve of the second Persian invasion, after the Battle of Marathon, when the existential Persian threat had taken shape and the aristocrat Miltiades had, against his hopes, needed to defeat the Persians

[12]Mark H. Munn, *The defense of Attica. The Dema wall and the Boiotian War of 378-375 B.C.*, (Berkeley: California University Press, 1993). That was true mostly for the 4 Century BCE, but a couple of passages of Xenophon (Memorabilia, 3.5.25-27; 3.6.10-11) suggest that the Athenians knew by the 5 Century BCE how to use the hilly area to their advantage for defensive purposes.

[13]Victor Davis Hanson, *A war like no other*, (New York: Random House, 2006), p. 13.

without the help of Spartan allies.[14] After the Battle of Marathon, Athens realised that it had to become capable of dealing with the Persian threat on its own.

After the fleet was created and Athens had triumphed at the Battle of Salamis, Athens gained even more confidence and realised that its naval power enabled it to extend its dominance far beyond what could have been imagined before. Consequently, opposition to naval power within democratic Athens diminished and eventually disappeared altogether. Cimon, the leader of the aristocrats, was identified with the fleet and the only thing he retained from the previous aristocratic policy was his liking for Sparta which he recognized as an ally.[15]

As naval power developed further during the following decades, even this view in favour of an alliance with Sparta weakened and disappeared. Athens now understood that it could become an imperial power throughout the Mediterranean, supplanting Sparta as the former hegemonic leader of Greece. It was only after the end of the Archidamian War that Nicias felt emboldened to advocate not just peace but an alliance with Sparta. He was an aristocratic politician and the only reminder of the old aristocratic policy still present in the era of Athens' greatest power. Yet, in 415 BCE even Nicias did not argue that there should be an alliance with Sparta. As neorealist analysis would suggest, the relative power of Athens in the system was now such, that the greatest opposition to maritime imperialism that could now be voiced was the more modest option of peace with Sparta – and this with the stated aim of consolidating and deepening the existing Athenian supremacy.[16]

Athens' policy towards the west

A neorealist analysis would also point out that the Athenian campaign in Sicily was neither the product of Alcibiades' personal ambition, nor a hasty decision by the Ecclesia. On the contrary, it was an attempt to carry out a plan that had been evolving for decades, a plan which envisioned a drastic strengthening of Athenian influence in Italy and the western Mediterranean. This was to be a development which would signal that Athenian power had grown to a point where Sparta would be eclipsed by Athens, something that in itself would mark Athens' dominance throughout the Greek world.

[14]Paul A. Rahe, *Sparta's first Attic War. The grand strategy of classical Sparta, 478-446 B.C.*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019), p. 154; and Herodotus, *The Histories*, VI, 120, (London: Penguin Classics, 2015).

[15]Plutarch, *Parallel Lives, 'Life of Cimon'* 16. 8-9, (Cambridge Massachusetts: Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, 1914).

[16]Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, VI, 10.2, VI, 11.5 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). See also Robert B. Strassler (ed.), *The Landmark Thucydides: A comprehensive guide to the Peloponnesian War*, (Simon & Schuster: Free Press, 1998).

It is possible to identify two main trends in Athenian foreign policy in the aftermath of the Persian Wars. The first was supported by the faction lead by Themistocles, the architect of Athenian naval power, and hero of the Battle of Salamis.[17] This policy promoted maritime imperialism and maintained a hostile attitude towards Sparta.[18] The second trend was supported by the aristocrats who continued to be on friendly terms with Sparta even though, as already noted, they had abandoned the old views held by Miltiades, the victor of the Battle of Marathon.[19] Miltiades' son Cimon accepted the need for maritime strength, and for a naval empire, but, despite this, his perception of foreign policy had some fundamental differences to that of Themistocles. These differences can be found in the different attitudes the two leaders held towards Sparta, positions which reflected the initial disagreement over strategic orientation. Themistocles' faction saw Sparta as an enemy with which Athens could not coexist in the long term and argued that Athens should expand its naval empire further into the Aegean and the Mediterranean in opposition to Sparta and the Peloponnesian League. On the other hand, Cimon and the aristocrats had a cordial relationship with Sparta and believed that a status quo where both sides cooperated could be established in the Greek world.[20] This would be characterized by a dual, balanced hegemony of Athens and Sparta, focused against the Pan-Hellenic enemy, the Persian Empire.[21]

Italy had been one of Athens' main commercial markets for decades. Indeed, even in the north of Italy, since the 6 Century BCE, the strongest cultural influences were those of the Athenians and the Etruscans.[22] It is also worth noting that on the eve of the naval Battle of Salamis, the most dramatic moment in ancient Greek history, Themistocles told the admirals of the other Greek forces that if they did not stay to fight alongside the Athenians he would embark the Athenian population and set sail for Italy to found a new city there.[23] For something like this to have been suggested as a way out of existential danger, the Athenians must have known the area very well and must already have had close contacts and links to it.

[17]Barry Strauss, *The battle of Salamis*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005), p. 241.
[18]Rahe, *Sparta's first Attic War*, p. 132.
[19]Aristotle, The *Athenian Constitution*, (London Penguin: Classics, 1984).
[20]Rahe, *Sparta's first Attic War*, p. 133.
[21]Plutarch, *Parallel Lives, 'Life of Cimon'* 16. 8-9; Jennifer T. Roberts, *The plague of war,* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 36.
[22]Antonio Ferri & Giancarlo Roversi (a cura di), *Storia di Bologna*, (Bologna: Bononia University Press, 2005), p. 52.
[23]Herodotus, *Histories*, VIII, 62.2.

Athens launched an intensive western-looking policy in 458 BCE, concluding an alliance with the largest Elymian city, Egesta.[24] Although Egesta had a mixed native and Greek population, it was to some degree culturally Hellenised, although it was not considered a Greek city, and was located on the west of the island, close to Carthaginian territories.[25] Athens' decision to form an alliance and act as the guarantor of Egesta's independence from the two great regional powers, namely Syracuse and Carthage, tells us something about the Athenians' keen interest in expanding their influence to the West.

The fact that Egesta also chose to enter into an alliance with distant Athens shows how strong and well-respected Attica's great city was at that time. Moreover, the fact that the alliance with Egesta was concluded at the same time as the Athenian campaign in Cyprus and Egypt and the First Peloponnesian War in Greece (461-446 BCE), creates a picture of how Athenian power had spread on all fronts and in all directions.[26] Athens was fighting simultaneously against the Persian Empire in the east and with Sparta within Greece, but now it was also intervening in the west, declaring its presence in Sicily to both Syracuse and Carthage. That Athenian politics were focused on the west at the same time as elsewhere is further confirmed by the fact that Athens secured access to the Ionian Sea by conquering Naupactus and expanding its influence in the Corinthian Gulf.[27] Athens' involvement in Sicily and Italy intensified immediately after the retreat of the Persians and the signing of the Peace of Callias in 449 BCE, and was followed by the completion of hostilities with the Peloponnesian League.

It follows that the moment Athens gained a significant degree of control over the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea, and successfully ceased hostilities with Persia and Sparta, as the two rival powers recognised the Athenian sphere of influence, Athens looked to the west and began to intervene more intensively in the Sicilian conflicts. [28]

This specific expansion of Athenian influence in the West was probably part of a larger plan promoted by Pericles to show Athens as a leading Pan-Hellenic power. This can

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[24]Christian Meier, *Athens. A portrait of the city in its golden* age, (New York: Metropolitan Books), p. 450; Donald Kagan, *The outbreak of the Peloponnesian War*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969), p. 226; Domenico Musti, *Storia greca, Linee di sviluppo dall'età micenea all'età romana*, (Bari: Editori Laterza), 2011 (1st edition 1989), p. 352.

[25]Philip Matyszak, *Expedition to disaster*, (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2012), p. 71.

[26]Rahe, *Sparta's first Attic War*.

[27]Meier, *Athens*, p. 419-420; Thucydides, 104-105, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). See also Strassler, *The Landmark Thucydides*.

[28]Rahe, *Sparta's first Attic War*., p. 201, 228; Donald Kagan, *Peloponnesian War*, pp. 156-157, p. 174.

be seen by the fact that in 448 BCE Athens proposed that a conference be held with the aim of reinstating the old Pan-Hellenic alliance.[29] However, Sparta and its allies refused to participate, considering the initiative to be a pretext that the Athenians would use to impose their rule on those Greeks who were not yet subject to it. The first conflict between Athenian and Spartan hegemony ended with the peace treaty of 446 BCE: with Athens agreeing to abandon its attempt to extend its hegemony into the mainland; and Sparta accepting Athens' status as ruler of the seas.[30] So, although the war had ended in a compromise, looking at the result in qualitative terms, and always in terms of the neorealist balance of power, one could say that Athens was, at least in part, victorious: Athens was the growing power, and the one using its historical momentum to strengthen and expand.[31] Sparta was the power which was attempting to defend the status quo, but failed to limit the rise of Athens, and by officially recognising Athenian domination of the seas and of Asia Minor, Sparta merely held it back in mainland Greece, accepting an equilibrium.[32]

After these positive events for Athens, Pericles continued his westward-looking policy and established the new colony of Thurii in Southern Italy in 444/443 BCE.[33] This city was inhabited by citizens drawn from throughout the Delian League, and in reality functioned as a western base for the alliance. The founding of Thurii does not seem to have been of secondary importance to Athenian foreign policy, or to have been a merely symbolic move made to strengthen certain links with Italian cities, or simply to create a centre for trade. This is shown by the fact that as soon as Athens was free strategically and was able to turn its gaze in other directions, it implemented this policy by founding its own city in the west as an addition to the alliances it had already begun to form there. The fact that the Thurians were viewed as Pan-Hellenic is also in line with the Athenian communications policy of presenting its leadership as being Pan-Hellenic, and as a hegemony that was a direct continuation of the anti-Persian struggle, in which Athens had defended the freedom of all Greeks.[34]

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[29]Plutarch, *Parallel Lives, vol. I and II, Pericles*, 21, pp. 373-375. Thucydides omits this episode from his history, perhaps because he thought it was unimportant to his narrative, that is, the Athenian proposal was indeed just a pretext, not worth mentioning in a history that aimed to explain the real causes of the war.

[30]Rahe, *Sparta's first Attic War*, p. 228.

[31]Hanson, *A war like no other*, p. 30; Kontantinos Koliopoulos, *Η Στρατηγική Σκέψη. Από την αρχαιότητα έως σήμερα [Strategic thought, from ancient times to the modern world]*, (Athens: Ποιότητα, 2008), p. 197.

[32]Platias & Koliopoulos, *Thucydides on strategy*, p. 48.

[33]Kagan, *Peloponnesian War*, p. 226.

[34]Donald Kagan, 'Pericles and the defense of empire', in Victor Davis Hanson (ed), *Makers of Ancient Strategy. From the Persian Wars to the Fall of Rome*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), pp. 31-57; Domenico Musti, *Storia greca, Linee di*

Approximately a decade later, on the eve of the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians, still led by Pericles, formed a military alliance with two Greek cities in Sicily and Southern Italy, Leontini and Rhegium.[35] This alliance was in addition to Athens' existing military alliance with Egesta. As well as the quantitative element to this move, the increase in the number of Athens' allies, we can also detect a geographical element which indicates an organised expansion and consolidation of Athens' strategic presence in Sicily. When viewed together, Rhegium, at the southern tip of the Italian peninsula, Leontini and Egesta formed a zone that covers and controls most of Sicily, i.e. the northern, central and eastern parts of the island, with the Carthaginians in the west and Syracuse with Akragas and Gela on the southern coast. Rhegium and Messina (at the northern tip of Sicily), had long been the two cities that controlled the Messina Straits, the strategic strait between mainland Italy and Sicily, which was one of the most critical geographical points in the ancient world, as it was also later in history.[36]

We can see therefore that before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War Athens was creating its own sphere of influence in Sicily, and that Athens was in competition with the two other great powers in that region, that is the largest Greek city of the West, Syracuse, and the Carthaginians, who were limited at the western part of Sicily. Indeed, Athens had already established a colony on mainland Italy, which supported the area of Sicily allied to Athens, as well as ensuring Athenian control of the Straits in opposition to both Greek cities, and the other cities and tribes in Italy.

These actions prove that Athens had a keen interest in the West, an interest which was not only limited to establishing diplomatic and trade relations with the cities there, but extended to the methodical promotion and establishment of Athenian political and military power. This was achieved gradually and steadily over a period of 30 years, and at the same time as Athens was consolidating and further strengthening its hegemony in Greece, and maintaining Athenian dominance of the coast of Asia Minor and the eastern Mediterranean.

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sviluppo dall'età micenea all'età romana, [Bari: Editori Laterza, 2011 (1st edition 1989)], pp. 346-347, pp. 354-355; Kagan, *Peloponnesian War*, pp. 230-239.

[35]Meier, *Athens*, p. 583; Kagan, *Peloponnesian War*, p. 231; Domenico Musti, *Storia greca, Linee di sviluppo dall'età micenea all'età romana*, [Bari: Editori Laterza, 2011 (1st edition 1989)], p. 352.

[36]Sotirios F. Drokalos, *Έλληνες εναντίον Καρχηδονίων [Greeks versus Carthaginians]*, (Athens: Γνώμων Εκδοτική, 2017).

The continuity of Athenian strategy between Pericles and Alcibiades

Historians and strategic analysts often see the Sicilian campaign as an overly daring idea of Alcibiades, but this does not reflect Pericles' foreign policy or strategic thinking.[37] Perhaps strategists hold this view because they look mainly at the stance taken by Pericles during the initial phase of the Peloponnesian War, and not at the foreign policy he and Athens had pursued for decades before the war. This is why Alcibiades' critics believe that he changed Athens' grand strategy. In fact, the decision to pursue the campaign in Sicily, and the rationale behind it, were fully embedded in the grand strategy of maritime expansion that Athens had followed consistently since the Persian Wars, and which were in complete alignment with the specific actions it had put into practice in the years immediately preceding and after the Peloponnesian War.

Pericles' way of thinking in 431 BCE was dictated by the extraordinary circumstances of the massive Peloponnesian invasion of Attica, so it cannot be taken as a general and non-time-specific measure of comparison. The campaign in Sicily began in 415 BCE, which is six whole years after the Peace of Nicias had been signed. It is therefore wrong to judge Alcibiades' stance, and the decision taken by the Ecclesia, solely on the basis of the strategy Pericles and Athens followed during the extraordinary circumstances of the first period of the Peloponnesian War (431-421 BCE). The previous, and much longer-lived strategy, better reflects Athenian foreign policy during a period of stability, and should also be taken into account.

The main point from which a structural analysis should start, is that Pericles' grand strategy was not one of coexistence with Sparta. The democratic faction, led by Themistocles, and Ephialtes before him, did not, at any point, intend or attempt to establish a stable, international-transnational order that would include Sparta[38]. On the contrary, they tried to expand Athenian hegemony by maintaining a permanently hostile attitude towards the city on the Eurotas.[39] Objectively, Sparta was their main adversary, the primary obstacle to a smooth expansion of Athenian power and sovereignty throughout both the Greek world and the wider Mediterranean, rather than a state with which they could work to establish a balanced consensus. Indeed, beyond the pretexts, the deeper, structural cause of the war, as neorealist theorists would say, was that this trend towards growth in Athenian strength would completely upset the balance of power, with the result that Sparta itself would also become

[37]First of all Thucydides himself. In modern times, for example, Platias & Koliopoulos, *Thucydides on strategy*, p. 85, p. 147; Giampiero Giacomello – Gianmarco Badialetti, *Manuale di studi strategici*, (Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 2009).

[38]Aristotle, *The Athenian Constitution*, 23.3; 25.1; 27.1; Rahe, *Sparta's first Attic War*, pp. 142-143.

[39]For example, Plutarch, *Parallel Lives*, *Pericles* 21.

subordinate to Athens - if it did not first intervene to stop that growth.[40] Thucydides understood and wrote about this, creating a fundamental concept in the study of International Relations, while his distinction between underlying and proximate or precipitating causes is mentioned as a "historiographical pathbreaker".[41]

For the Athenians, this positive trend for Athens had to be realised, to be translated into a tangible change in the international order of things. Inevitably, this led to a push and an expansion of Athenian power and influence, which made the subjugation of the Peloponnese itself a practical possibility. Like any other hegemony, from a neorealist viewpoint, Athenian hegemony and expansionism came from structurally objective facts. Democratic Athens needed to expand if it wanted to ensure its survival, especially as it represented a form of government that was at odds with both the Persian Empire and the classical Greek oligarchies, that were often associated with, or were at least friendly towards, Sparta.[42] The existence of Spartan hegemony was a constant threat. It made it harder for Athenian power to spread, in both economic and political terms, and supported smaller states in their resistance to Athenian influence.[43]

There is a further, often overlooked, fact which again changes the picture. The campaign of 415 BCE was not Athens' first campaign in Sicily following the start of the Peloponnesian War - other campaigns had preceded it. And even if they were not as large as the 415 BCE campaign with its 134 ships, the forces mobilized were by no means insignificant.[44] The importance of Sicily and Italy for the Athenians can be seen in Athens sending 20 triremes to Sicily at the urging of Leontini, Rhegium and other Ionian cities at the end of the summer of 427.[45] This took place during the initial phase of the war with Sparta, at the same time as Peloponnesian raids were continuing in Attica, and while Athens was continuing its military operations on other fronts in Greece.

Athens' allies had been involved in a war with Syracuse and other Doric cities, which were within its sphere of influence. Athens intervened in favour of its allies in order

[40]Thucydides, I, 23, 6 . See also Strassler, *The Landmark Thucydides.*
[41]Lisa Kallet, 'The Pentecontaetia' in *The Oxford handbook of Thucydides*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 64.
[42]See also Donald Kagan, 'Pericles and the defense of empire', pp. 31-57.
[43]Hanson, *A war like no other*, pp. 12-15.
[44]Ibid., p. 205.
[45]Donald Kagan, *The Archidamian war* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974), pp. 229-234; Marie-Francoise Baslez, *Πολιτική ιστορία του αρχαίου Ελληνικού κόσμου [Histoire politique du monde grec antique (3e édition)]*, [Athens: Εκδόσεις Πατάκη, 2013 (1st edition 2004)], p. 167.

to hinder the movement of grain from Sicily to the Peloponnese, and, as Thucydides explicitly states, to make an initial attempt to impose Athenian sovereignty over Sicily.[46] When Thucydides' narrative reaches the great campaign of 415 BCE, he reiterates that the Athenian goal was to establish influence over the whole of Sicily rather than simply the pretext of supporting its allies.[47] Also, during those years the Athenians made wider efforts to secure control of the shores of the Gulf of Corinth, as a passage to Italy and Sicily.[48]

This first war on Sicilian and Italian soil has historically remained in the shadow of the simultaneous conflicts that took place in Greece. However, it was by no means an unimportant or minor conflict. The Athenians, who lost their general Haroiadis in this first war in Sicily, sent 40 additional triremes a year later, and their troops remained there until 424 BCE.[49] The conflicts during this first Sicilian war were mainly centred around the strategic area of the Messina Straits. Rhegium was an ally of the Athenians and functioned as their base, while the two rivals fought to secure control of Messina, the Aeolian Islands, and the area of Locris, a city which was allied to Syracuse and Sparta, and a traditional rival of Rhegium. Control of the Straits of Messina was the "prize" the two warring factions both wanted.[50] After Athenian troops withdrew, the war in Sicily continued and the Syracusans finally prevailed.

In this way, we can see that the Athenians had been systematically promoting their expansion to the West for decades. In addition, this specific policy was so important to them that they continued with it, and even sent troops to further their cause, during the most difficult and extraordinary conditions Athens had faced since the Persian Wars. The Athenians did all of that while following Pericles' defensive strategy. This should not be a surprise, since in addition to the events described above, and the conclusions that can be drawn from them, Plutarch also stated in the Life of Pericles that political factions promoting the Athenian conquest of Sicily and the expansion of the naval empire to the west had existed in Athenian politics from as early as 450 BCE. Indeed, Plutarch states that there had been talk of attacks, even on Carthage and Etruria, since that time, although Pericles managed to restrain them.[51]

Viewing the Athenians' actions in the West over a period of decades reveals that many Athenians had already supported a large, expansionist military operation in Sicily and to the West before the Peloponnesian War. It becomes clear that the great Sicilian

[46]Thucydides, III, 86. See also Strassler, *The Landmark Thucydides*.
[47]Thucydides, VI, 6.1. See also Strassler, *The Landmark Thucydides*.
[48]Hanson, *A war like no other*, p. 98.
[49]Ibid., p. 203.
[50]Thucydides, III, 88, 90, 115; IV, 1, 24, 25. See also Strassler, *The Landmark Thucydides*.
[51]Plutarch, Parallel Lives, *Pericles* 20-21.

campaign was an implementation of a strong, entrenched trend in Athenian society, and was not the paradoxical and irrational idea of an over-ambitious man – Alcibiades – who swept the Athenian citizens along with him, in contravention of Pericles' and Athenian strategy up to that point. This is evident from the writing of Thucydides himself, who states that almost all the speakers in the Ecclesia had spoken in favour of the great campaign of 415 BCE before it was implemented, and with only a few exceptions such as Nicias.[52] Also, the prospects both of strengthening Athens and of the potential individual gains and benefits had caused such a frenzy that Thucydides stresses that some of those who had not agreed to the plan did not oppose it for fear they would be accused of acting against the interests of their homeland.[53]

Therefore, it is wrong to say that Alcibiades swept the Athenians with him into the campaign in Sicily, when he had simply emerged as the leading figure of a movement that was clearly dominant in Athens at that time, long before he had become involved in politics. In fact, Plutarch states that it was a certain Demostratus who was the most active in agitating for the war.[54]

It is also clear that this tendency to expand westwards was in line with practical interests and was based on logical strategic reasoning, both in terms of Athens' general perspective, and in particular, the confrontation with Sparta. Pericles' strategy during the first phase of the Peloponnesian War is not incompatible with Alcibiades' strategy; they both had exactly the same grand strategy – the expansion of the Athenian maritime empire. The ultimate goal of both leaders was to promote a wider Athenian hegemony in the both Greek world and in the Mediterranean.

As neorealist theorists would argue, from the moment that Athens became identified with naval power, it was natural for its expansion to be focused to the west. It was also logical for Athens to seek to establish a stable modus vivendi with the Persian Empire once Athens had confined it to the Asian mainland. With the Eastern Mediterranean littoral under Athenian rule, and the Persians contained beyond the coast of Asia Minor after open hostilities had ceased, Athens could only expand westward. Athenian expansion to the west would lead to Sparta coming under Athenian control, as the resources and abilities that Athens acquired as a result of westward expansion would completely upset the balance of power within Greece, with Athens decisively and crucially becoming stronger than Sparta. A number of structural factors, therefore, gave Athens the impetus to expand to the West, something which meant that it had to bring Sicily under its control in this most critical phase of Athenian strategy.

[52]Thucydides, VI, 15.1 . See also Strassler, *The Landmark Thucydides*.
[53]Thucydides, VI, 24. 3-4. See also Strassler, *The Landmark Thucydides*.
[54]Plutarch, *Parallel Lives*, *Nicias*, 12.6.

The specific timing of the campaign was not by definition wrong or misjudged due to the concurrent war with Sparta. In 415 BCE, the Athenians probably considered that the Peloponnesian War had already ended in a positive way for them, and that Sparta had come off worse in the Peace of Nicias.[55] Evidence of this appears in the speech Nicias made to the Ecclesia.[56]

Looking at events from this point of view, the Athenian campaign in Sicily no longer appears to be mistimed; it took place at the moment structural realism would expect. That is, when the conditions resulting from Athens' success in halting Spartan efforts to stop Athenian expansion had stabilised. The Sicilian campaign came at a time when Athens could put into action a plan it had been promulgating for decades, a plan which would also lead to Sparta coming under Athenian control once and for all. It should be emphasised that even Nicias did not rule out this expansion, but suggested that the Athenians should not move on to new conquests at that specific time because they should first consolidate and secure their dominance over the areas they already controlled.[57] Sparta's move on the chessboard of strategy and history had been pushed back, at least in part, and it was now the time for Athens to make its move. According to a leading realist scholar, states tend to make their most daring offensive moves when they most feel fear, and of course that is how the Athenians would have felt during and after the great Peloponnesian invasion of Attica.[58]

On the causes of Athens' defeat

The prevailing view among scholars is that Athens fell into the error of overextension.[59] That is, it tried to expand beyond its capabilities, causing it to collapse.[60] The Sicilian campaign in particular is often seen as the turning point of the war: "after Sicily the balance of power had shifted".[61] However, in this particular case, there was an immense driving force for Athens to create a Mediterranean empire

[55]Peter Hunt, 'Thucydides on the first ten years of war' in *The Oxford handbook of Thucydides*, pp. 139-141.

[56]Thucydides, VI, 10.2, VI, 11.5. See Strassler, *The Landmark Thucydides*.

[57]Thucydides, VI, 10.5. See also Strassler, *The Landmark Thucydides*.

[58]John J. Mearsheimer, *The tragedy of great power politics*, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), pp. 42-43.
Platias & Koliopoulos, *Thucydides on strategy*, p. 85, p. 147; Philip Matyszak, *Expedition to disaster*, (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2012), p. 15; also Mike Roberts & Bob Bennett, *The Spartan supremacy, 412-371 BC*, (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military), 2014.

[60]For a broad historical presentation of the concept of overextension, Paul Kennedy, *The rise and fall of the great powers. Economic change and military conflict from 1500 to 2000,* (New York: Random House, 1987).

[61]Platias & Koliopoulos, *Thucydides on strategy*, pp. 107-108.

when it was a realistic possibility.[62] The Athenian defeat in Sicily was the result of details, and if there had been a different result, then the road to domination over Sparta would have been wide open. [63] And even after failure in Sicily, the Athenians still had the opportunity of winning the war, or at least of not being completely defeated in 404 BCE.

It is therefore important to emphasise that the Athenian campaign in Sicily had a real and significant chance of success. The Athenians came very close to victory in Sicily, but it is also clear that, after victory had slipped from their hands, they had the chance to disengage and return to Athens without unacceptable losses.[64] The great catastrophe that happened was anything but inevitable. On the contrary, it would not have happened but for a series of mistakes and unfortunate circumstances that intervened to lead the Athenian expedition to disaster.

There is therefore no basis for regarding the Sicilian campaign as a strategic mistake per se, a war lost before it had begun. Instead, it must be seen as a war that could have been won by Athens, but was lost due to a series of tactical errors, misfortunes, misplaced calculations and, of course, by the enemy being strengthened significantly when Alcibiades defected to Sparta and the latter sent help to Syracuse.

The Sicilian catastrophe weakened Athens significantly and caused it many difficulties. After Sicily, many cities which had been subject to Athenian rule rebelled. However, it should be emphasised that seven years later, in 406 BCE, it was the Spartans who sued for peace, after their Persian supported fleet had been destroyed at Arginusae.[65] If the Ecclesia had then voted in favour of peace, and had not instead decided to continue the war and demand Sparta's submission, the winner of the Peloponnesian War would probably have been Athens. But this did not happen as the Athenians refused Sparta's request, while at the same time Athens was executing its victorious generals for not collecting the bodies of dead Athenian sailors in the midst of a storm after the naval battle had ended.[66] In the end, the Spartan victory came from an amateurish and unforgivable mistake made by the Athenian generals at Aegospotami.[67] This was against the advice of Alcibiades who was watching events from his land in eastern Thrace after appearing at the last moment, seemingly out of nowhere, and at

[62]Rahe, *Sparta's first Attic War*, p. 217.
[63]Hanson, *A war like no other*, pp. 212-216.
[64]Ibid., pp. 218-220.
[65]Aristotle, *The Athenian Constitution*, 34; and Xenophon, *Hellenica* I, 6. 28-34 (London: Penguin Classics, 1979).
[66]Xenophon, *Hellenica* I, 6. 35; I, 7, 1-34.
[67]Xenophon, *Hellenica*, II, 1. 26-28.

the height of the drama, as Jacqueline de Romilly might say, only to point out to them that they were in danger of destroying themselves.[68]

It is therefore not clear if the catastrophe in Sicily was the main cause of the final Athenian defeat. Thucydides himself, on closing Book VII, gives his reader the impression that the Sicilian expedition had sealed Athens' fate, while he writes in Book VIII about the Athenian recovery.[69] The fact is that even after defeat in Sicily, Athens had a chance to win the war. In one sense it did indeed win militarily at the naval Battle of Arginusae, but simply did not show the political maturity needed to capitalise on that victory, which resulted in a second phase that ended in a final military defeat. Also, as far as the Sicilian campaign is concerned, it should be remembered that the failure was preceded by a very unexpected and strange event, namely Alcibiades being convicted of sacrilege.

The condemnation of the triumphant Athenian generals after Arginusae, and that of the leader of the ongoing Sicilian campaign, ended up causing incalculable and irreparable damage to the city. This served both vested interests and the aspirations of individuals and factions.[70]

As for the assessment that the campaign in Sicily was the main cause of Athens' defeat, and that Alcibiades was primarily responsible for it, one could contest that it is based on a partial reading of Thucydides, which takes into account only some of that historian's claims while omitting others. Thucydides writes that at the end Pericles was proved right to think that Athens should avoid both expanding its dominance and avoid engaging in other wars against the Peloponnesians.[71] He also claims that most Athenians did not really understand that a war against Syracuse and Sicily would not

[68]Jacqueline de Romilly, *Alcibiade, ou les dangers de l'ambition*, (Paris: Èditions de Fallois, 1995); Xenophon, *Hellenica* II, 1. 25.

[69]Andrew Wolpert, 'Thucydides on the Four Hundred and the fall of Athens', in *The Oxford handbook of Thucydides*, p. 181.

[70]The Athenian constitution and its lack of a Roman style Senate or professional judiciary probably played a role in those events. For the Athenian constitution: Aristotle, *The Athenian constitution*,; also Luciano Canfora, *Il mondo di Atene*, (Bari: Editori Laterza, 2012); Claude Mossé, *Regards sur la démocratie athénienne*, (Paris: editions Perrin, 2013); R. K. Sinclair, *Δημοκρατία και συμμετοχή στην αρχαία Αθήνα [Democracy and participation in Athens]*, (Athens: Ινστιτούτο του βιβλίου – Α. Καρδαμίτσα, 2008; 1988); Gabriella Poma, *Le istituzioni politiche della Grecia in età classica*, (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2003); for the Roman constitution Gabriella Poma, *Le istituzioni politiche del mondo romano,* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2009; 2002).

[71]Thucydides, II, 65. 7; II, 65.13. See also Strassler and Hanson, *The Landmark Thucydides*

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be easier than the one against Sparta and the Peloponnese.[72] However, Thucydides mentions too that the cause of the Sicilian disaster was not a strategic miscalculation, but domestic rivalries.[73] In addition, he blames Alcibiades, not because the latter was in favor of invading Sicily, but because Thucydides thought that Alcibiades' attitude made the majority of the Athenian citizens suspect him of wanting to become a tyrant. Accordingly, they gave power to others, who soon brought Athens to its knees, despite their being inferior to Alcibiades in leadership and military talent.[74] Furthermore, Thucydides underlines that the Athenians were nevertheless capable of fighting back against their Greek enemies and their Persian allies after the disaster in Sicily, and that Athens eventually lost the war only because of internal conflicts.[75]

The arguments presented here do not contradict Thucydides, but do contradict the prevailing modern interpretation of his classic work, which considers the Sicilian expedition to have been a salutary example of strategic overextension. In either case, when thinking about Thucydides' strategic judgements we should keep in mind that he was writing at a time when the Athenians were furious with Alcibiades, and already feeling nostalgic for the glorious pre-war era associated with Pericles and other great leaders. The same is true for the great orator Isocrates, who also held a condemnatory view on the Sicilian expedition half a century later. This can be seen in his oration 'On the Peace'.[76] On the other hand it was Isocrates who introduced the idea of a great Greek campaign, under Athenian and then Macedonian leadership, to conquer the Persian Empire, which was finally implemented by Alexander the Great; a more difficult operation than was conquering Sicily.

Conclusion

The Sicilian expedition of 415 BCE ended in disaster for Athens, and it seriously damaged its relative power in the international system of that time. Nevertheless, the decision to invade Sicily was neither adventurist nor strategically ill-thought, but was the expected product of a reasoned, decades long, Athenian grand strategy. Creating a powerful navy and with that a maritime empire was the best way for Athens to confront both the Persian threat and Spartan hegemony, and by expanding its empire towards the west Athens could increase its power to a degree that Sparta could never reach. A successful conquest of Sicily would indeed have altered the balance of power to Athens' advantage in a decisive manner, as it was to do later for Rome.

[72]Thucydides, VI, 1.1. See also Strassler, *The Landmark Thucydides* .
[73]Thucydides, II, 65.10. See also, *The Landmark Thucydides*.
[74]Thucydides, VI, 15.3-4. See also Strassler, *The Landmark Thucydides* .
[75]Thucydides, II, 65.12 . See also Strassler, *The Landmark Thucydides* .
[76]Emily Greenwood, 'Thucydides on the Sicilian expedition', in *The Oxford handbook of Thucydides*, pp. 193-194.

Of course, the strategic choice to invade Sicily had risks. But it was no more risky than other strategic choices to be found in military history, which instead are recorded as game changing genius strategic moves. In order to accomplish a great achievement, one often has to take on risks that may end in failure. Moreover, the risk taken by the Athenians with the Sicilian expedition was not an exaggerated one, even after the obliteration of its "Sicilian" fleet. Athens remained the dominant power in the Aegean for another decade, and after destroying the Spartan fleet at Arginusae, had another opportunity to win the war.

In sum, the Sicilian expedition was in line with structural factors, it was not an irrational choice, it had serious chances of success, it was not fatal, and it could have increased Athenian influence to unprecedented levels. Although an enormous failure, the Sicilian expedition should not be seen as an outright strategic mistake.

Sustaining Britain's First 'Citizen Army': the Creation and Evolution of Reinforcement Policy for Kitchener's New Armies, 1914-1916

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ABSTRACT
Expansion of the British Army through Lord Kitchener's New Armies has dominated the historiography of the First World War, generating a substantial amount of work on local, regional, and national recruitment. Though important, it has drawn attention away from Kitchener's efforts to create a reinforcement system capable of sustaining it. Therefore, this article will redress this imbalance by exploring the creation and evolution of reinforcement policy for Kitchener's New Armies between 1914 and 1916. It will demonstrate that the reinforcement system underwent a chaotic expansion and, overall, could not meet the demands of industrial warfare.

Lord Kitchener's decision to ignore the Territorial Force (TF) and expand the British Army through the New Armies in August 1914 has been the subject of extensive research, with historians focusing on how Britain's first 'Citizen Army' was created. Peter Simkins' seminal work remains the foremost social history of recruitment for the United Kingdom, demonstrating the near collapse of War Office recruitment machinery and the immense level of public support needed to continue the expansion of the British Army.[1] Subsequent historians have narrowed their focus onto specific localities and investigated the local, regional, and national responses to war and recruitment, as part of a growing 'nation in arms'.[2] This research has though

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DOI: 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v8i1.1604
[1]Peter Simkins, *Kitchener's Army: The Raising of the New Armies, 1914-1916,* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988).
[2]Ian F. W. Beckett, 'The Nation in Arms, 1914-18', in Ian F. W. Beckett and Keith Simpson (eds), *A Nation in Arms: a social study of the British army in the First World War,* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985), pp. 1-36; John Beckett, 'Patriotism in Nottinghamshire: Challenging the Unconvinced, 1914-1917', *Midland History,* Vol.

concentrated on the creation of the New Armies and overlooked how Kitchener attempted to create a reinforcement system. Although Alison Hine's recent research has considered how Kitchener and the War Office responded to the problem of reinforcing the British Army during industrial warfare, it remains a relatively unexplored topic.[3] This is critical, as a robust reinforcement policy capable of supplying timely, trained reinforcements, was vital for maintaining the strength of the British Army. Without it, it would have been impossible to sustain successive British offensives from 1915 and, specifically, the quasi-strategy of attrition adopted by the Commander-in-Chief, General Sir Douglas Haig, from the summer of 1916.

Thus, the aim of this article is to assess how Kitchener and the War Office attempted to create a reinforcement policy and system that was capable of sustaining the New Armies overseas. Specifically, the analysis will focus upon the provision of other ranks for infantry battalions, as they suffered the bulk of casualties. Officers do not feature within this study as the required documentation needed to reconstruct this, the Military Secretary's papers, were destroyed in 1941. Nevertheless, this analysis will demonstrate that the reforms implemented between 1914 and 1916 were haphazard and short-sighted, which failed to create a system capable of supplying the necessary reinforcements. This stands in contrast to Hine's interpretation, which portrays the development of reinforcement policy as a relatively steady process that obtained greater efficiency. Whilst it could not resolve the overarching problem of manpower, the changes implemented demonstrated a continued willingness to adapt in light of experience.[4] Yet, it will become clear that the reinforcement system, though affected by the availability of manpower, was simply incapable of meeting the demands of

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39, Iss. 2 (2014), pp. 185-201; Timothy Bowman, William Butler and Michael Wheatley, *The Disparity of Sacrifice: Irish Recruitment to the British Armed Forces, 1914-1918,* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2020); Clive Hughes, 'The New Armies', in Ian F. W. Beckett and Keith Simson (eds), *A Nation in Arms: A social study of the British Army in the First World War,* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985), pp. 99-126; Catriona Pennell, *A Kingdom United: Popular Reponses to the Outbreak of the War in Britain and Ireland,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Edward M. Spiers, 'Voluntary Recruiting in Yorkshire, 1914-1915', *Northern History*, Vol. 52, Iss. 2 (2015), pp. 295-313; Patrick Watt, 'Manpower, Myth and Memory: Analysing Scotland's Military Contribution to the Great War', *Journal of Scottish Historical Studies*, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 (2019), pp. 75-100; Bonnie J. White, 'Volunteerism and Early Recruitment in Devonshire, August 1914 - December 1915', *The Historical Journal,* Vol. 53, Iss. 3 (2009), pp. 641-666; Derek Rutherford Young, 'Voluntary Recruitment in Scotland, 1914-1916' (PhD Thesis, University of Glasgow, 2001).

[3]Alison Hine, *Refilling Haig's Armies: The Replacement of British Infantry Casualties on the Western Front, 1916-1919,* (Warwick: Helion and Company, 2018).

[4]Ibid.; pp. 89, p. 142, p. 294 & p. 297.

industrial warfare until 1916 once conscription and the Training Reserve had been introduced. Furthermore, this article will expand our historical understanding of how the distinctive image of New Army units, framed within Peter Simkins' 'Four Armies' concept, began to break down.[5] The historiography correctly notes the demise of separate local military identities, particularly within 'Pals' Battalions, after the introduction of conscription and the extensive casualties suffered at the Somme. However, it is evident upon closer analysis that this process began in 1915, once New Army battalions were deployed overseas and received reinforcements from the reserve.[6]

Despite the small size of the British Army upon the outbreak of war, pre-war military reform and planning had already considered the need to provide reinforcements to an expeditionary force. The Secretary of State for War, Richard Haldane, had considered this problem in 1906 and replaced the Militia with the Special Reserve (SR) and Extra Reserve (ER) in 1908. He had informed the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1906 of the need to create a large reserve, able to cover six months of wastage during a continental war, which the War Office, based upon recent experiences of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, estimated at 65 to 75 per cent, per annum. Thus, line regiments had one SR battalion for each pair of regular units and, in peace, recruited and trained men as part-time reservists. Men received six months of full-time training and, in the event of a general mobilisation, were recalled and used alongside regular reservists to form a regimental reinforcement pool.[7] The ER, numbering 27 battalions across selected regiments, had a less clear role. Primarily, they were seen as a way of quickly sending reserve units to garrison parts of the British Empire to relieve regular battalions for active service. They could also be used to train recruits as reinforcements.[8] Despite criticism that the changes made to the Militia were limited,

[5]Peter Simkins, 'The Four Armies, 1914-1918', in Ian F. W. Beckett and David Chandler (eds), *The Oxford History of the British Army,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 235

[6]David French, *Military Identities: The Regimental System, the British Army, & the British People c.1870-2000,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 277-278; Hew Strachan, *The Politics of the British Army,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 207-208.

[7]The National Archives (hereinafter TNA) CAB37/86/11, Memorandum on peace strength of regular army, 1 February 1907; TNA CAB38/12/30, Memorandum on organisation and administration of military forces, 18 June 1906; TNA CAB38/12/34, 89 Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) meeting, 28 June 1906; TNA CAB38/13/10, 95 CID meeting, 21 February 1907; Edward M. Spiers, *Haldane: an Army Reformer,* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1980), p. 77 & pp. 85-86.

[8]TNA WO33/505, Final report on organisation of the SR and ER, 14 December 1910.

as the SR had similar recruitment trends, it had been designed as a mechanism capable of organising, training, and drafting men to regiments during war.[9]

Thus, when Kitchener created the first six New Army divisions (K1) by creating service battalions for each regiment on 12 August 1914, there was a reinforcement system in place. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether Kitchener planned to expand the role of the SR and the ER to support the New Armies when they took to the field. Clearly, there were efforts to expand the SR during the first two months of war. On 30 August, the Army Council temporarily increased the establishment of the SR battalions from 557 to 2,000 all ranks and, after completion of the 12 divisions that formed the Second and Third New Armies (K2 and K3), they would expand to 2,600.[10] Despite the difficulties posed by the breakdown of War Office recruitment machinery, the SR and ER had expanded from a pre-war strength of 61,425 to over 162,000 by 26 September 1914.[11] A figure even more impressive when considering the 485 officers and 31,888 other ranks that had been drafted to the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) during the same period.[12]

Nevertheless, this process was probably done to relieve pressure on regimental depots. Regimental depots were overwhelmed during the recruitment boom of early September and, with service battalions vastly overstrength, the SR and ER units could take on additional recruits.[13] This argument is supported by Kitchener's original plan to dispatch eight reserve battalions to the BEF in late August and, subsequently, to use the SR and ER to form the Second New Army on 9 September.[14] Although no precise reason was given, the deteriorating situation overseas impressed upon Kitchener that the BEF needed reinforcement within the near future. Despite the difficulties experienced in obtaining accurate casualty reports throughout the first few months of war, it was estimated by the Adjutant General of the BEF, Lieutenant-General Nevil Macready, that the army had suffered an estimated 15,000 casualties during the Battle

[9]Timothy Bowman and Mark Connelly, *The Edwardian Army: Recruiting, Training, and Deploying the British Army, 1902-1914* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 52, p. 116 & pp. 120-121.

[10]TNA WO293/1, Army Council Instruction (ACI) 288, 30 August 1914; TNA WO162/6, Chronology of mobilisation and expansion, 1914-1918; TNA WO163/44, 38 Army Council Meeting, 18 September 1914.

[11]1914 (Cd. 7252), *The General Annual Report on the British Army for the Year ending 30 September 1913*, p.108; TNA WO114/25, Army strength return, 26 September 1914.

[12]J. E. Edmonds, *Military Operations: France and Belgium, 1914, Volume II,* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1925), p. 467.

[13]Simkins, *Kitchener's Army*, p. 68.

[14]TNA WO163/44, 17 and 30 Army Council Meeting, 26 August and 9 September 1914.

of Mons on 26 August.[15] Furthermore, a separate request from the Inspector-General of Communications, Major-General F. S. Robb, arrived on 4 September, asking for several SR battalions to release regular battalions on the Line of Communication for frontline service.[16] Thus, the SR and ER, with its core of a special and regular reservists, were the obvious choice to reinforce the BEF, as they had a modicum of professional training. Nevertheless, within a few days of this, Kitchener became aware of the vital role played by the SR within the reinforcement system, and the matter was promptly dropped. Afterwards, Kitchener reverted to the dual position of using the SR to sustain and expand the New Armies. He announced on 13 September that the SR would recruit up to 2,600 and use men from each reserve unit to form a service battalion for the Fourth New Army (K4).[17] Although Kitchener stipulated in October that no recruits would be taken from reserve battalions once they reached a strength of 1,500, he had ordered up to 42 per cent of each reserve unit's strength to be transferred across to the New Army.[18] This was critical, as it jeopardised the long-term sustainability of each regiment's reinforcement pool. The monthly wastage rate for infantry on the Western Front, predicted at seven per cent in the *Field Service Regulations, 1909,* had quadrupled to 28 per cent during the first 12 weeks of war.[19] Although these figures were unavailable at the time, the scale of the crisis would have been known, as the War Office were responsible for organising the dispatch of drafts.

Nevertheless, K4 began to be created from late October and each battalion received up to 1,100 men from the SR and ER. Yet, hopes to fully create another six divisions proved overly optimistic. As the Adjutant General at the War Office, Lieutenant-General Henry Sclater, noted in November, most SR and ER battalions lacked the strength to create a fully manned service unit without dropping below the minimum manpower limit.[20] Unsurprisingly, this reflected local and regional recruitment patterns. For instance, the 3 North Staffordshire Regiment, based in Lichfield near the fruitful recruitment area of Birmingham, transferred 810 men to the newly formed 10 North Staffordshire Regiment, whilst others, especially regiments in rural localities, struggled. The 3 Dorsetshire Regiment, situated in the small market town of

[15]TNA WO95/43, 3 Echelon war diary, 20-21 September 1914; WO95/3972, Inspector-General of Communications (IGC), Adjutant and Quartermaster General Branch (AQMG) war diary, 25 October 1914; Nevil Macready, *Annuals of an Active Life, Volume I,* (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1924), pp. 204-205.
[16]TNA WO95/3972, IGC AQMG war diary, 4 September 1914.
[17]TNA WO163/44, 34 Army Council meeting, 13 September 1914; Hine, *Refilling Haig's Armies,* p. 49.
[18]TNA WO162/3, Memorandum regarding SR, ER and K4, 8 October 1914.
[19]*Field Service Regulations, 1909, Part II* (with 1912 amendments), (London: HMSO, 1912), p. 56; TNA WO159/2, First report on wastage, 1 January 1915.
[20]TNA WO162/4, Interview notes with Sclater, 28 November 1914.

Dorchester, could only provide the 7 Dorsetshire Regiment with 65 men by 26 December 1914.[21] Overall, 29 SR and ER battalions were eventually ordered not to produce a service unit for K4, which included all 21 battalions being formed by the Irish Regiments.[22] This was due to the recruitment situation in Ireland, where the recruitment boom of September was limited to urban localities and had rapidly declined in October.[23]

However, the War Office did note that several regiments had grown beyond the practical limits of the pre-war reinforcement structure. After a review, the Adjutant General, Lieutenant-General Henry Sclater, announced in November 1914 that a reserve battalion and regimental depot at full strength, roughly 2,600 and 300 all ranks respectively, could support up to six regular and service battalions in the field. Although it is not clear what calculations this was based on, the report is an important milestone as it represents the first evaluation of the reinforcement system. Altogether, it drew attention to 17 English and Welsh Regiments that had expanded beyond the limits noted above, with the Northumberland Fusiliers and the Cheshire Regiment over by four and three battalions each, respectively. Altogether, Sclater's solutions were sensible; each regiment with seven battalions should expand their depot accommodation to house 1,000 recruits, whilst those above eight should create an additional ER battalion.[24] Although the report offered a definitive structure for the reinforcement system, the War Office ignored it.

Even more uncertain was the situation in Ireland where, following the Haldane reforms of 1906-1908, each Irish regiment had a higher number of reserve units compared to their British counterparts. As the Volunteer Force had not been established in Ireland as it had in the rest of the United Kingdom in 1859, each Irish regiment had three or four Militia battalions. Haldane had not intended to extend the TF, SR or ER to Ireland and planned to retain a proportion of the Irish Militia to undertake home defence. However, under parliamentary pressure, he converted the Irish Militia into the SR and, in addition to the eight battalions needed for the latter, proposed to convert another 14 into ER units.[25] It is clear that these decisions were guided by political concerns, as

[21]TNA, WO95/5460, 10 North Staffordshire Regiment service digest, 31 October 1914; TNA WO114/25, Army strength return, 26 December 1914; C. T. Atkinson, *The Dorsetshire Regiment, Volume II,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 119; Simkins, *Kitchener's Army*, pp. 59, p. 66 & p. 70.
[22]TNA, WO293/1, ACI 280, 25 October 1914.
[23]Bowman, Butler and Wheatley, *The Disparity of Sacrifice*, pp. 10-11.
[24]TNA, WO162/3, Report on regiments requiring an increased reserve establishment, 26 November 1914.
[25]Hansard, House of Commons Debate (HC), 10 June 1907, vol. 175, cc. 1135-1136, 1158 and 1177; Hansard, HC, 17 June 1907, vol. 176, cc. 182; William Butler, *The Irish*

the War Office committee designed to consider the formation of the SR in 1907 did not know about the creation of the ER before it was announced in Parliament.[26] Regardless of the reasoning, the ER defaulted onto its secondary role of training and drafting reinforcements on the outbreak of war. This created an unwieldy reinforcement system for all Irish regiments and, in most cases, led to a near parity between frontline and reserve battalions. For instance, the ratio of four active and three reserve battalions for the Leinster Regiment was wasteful and, 'simply meant that there were three organizations doing work which could, with no less efficiency, with more uniformity, and considerably less expense, have been performed by one.'[27] Indeed, 3, 4 and 5 battalions of the Leinster Regiment only had 922, 477 and 648 other ranks respectively in October 1914, and could have been managed by one reserve battalion.[28] Despite the problems this posed, Sclater failed to comment on this in his report and, against all logic, Kitchener confirmed the role of all Irish ER battalions as training reinforcements.[29] Whilst Kitchener probably saw these units as a small reservoir of available Irish reinforcements, a sensible course of action would have been to amalgamate these battalions.

Notably, these problems did not affect the TF, which had their own, separate, reinforcement system until 1916. Whilst an analysis of this falls outside the remit of this article, it is important to note that, in comparison to the New Armies, the TF had a logical reinforcement system. After it was decided that TF battalions could serve overseas in August 1914, provided 60 per cent of a unit's strength undertook the Imperial Service Obligation, another unit was needed to undertake its home defence duties. Therefore, Kitchener ordered a duplicate unit to be formed, which was created from a nucleus of Territorials who had not volunteered for overseas service. These units, known as the second line, were to assume home defence duties and draft reinforcements to their sister battalions overseas. A similar process was carried out again in November 1914, when a third line of TF battalions were formed to supply replacements to their corresponding first and second line units. As Ian Beckett and Keith Mitchinson have argued, this did create problems that undermined the effectiveness of the Territorial reinforcement system. Notably, the pledge, which

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Amateur Military Tradition in the British Army, 1854-1992, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016), pp. 12-21; Robert Stoneman, 'The Reformed British Militia, c.1852-1908' (PhD Thesis, University of Kent, 2014), pp. 241-242.

[26]TNA WO33/439, Final report of War Office committee on the SR, 26 October 1907.

[27]F. E. Whitton, *The History of the Prince of Wales's Leinster Regiment (Royal Canadians): Part II, The Great War and The disbandment of the Regiment* (Aldershot: Gale & Polden ltd., 1924), p. 173.

[28]TNA WO114/25, Army strength return, 24 October 1914.

[29]TNA WO162/3, Memorandum on the role of the SR and ER, 27 November 1914.

guaranteed the legal integrity of Territorial units, stopped serviceman from being posted to other battalions of the same regiment without their consent. This inherent lack of flexibility was exacerbated by its home defence duties, which disrupted training and led to home service personnel, numbering 82,588 in August 1915, remaining in second and third line TF units until May 1915. It must be noted, however, that the TF did not have a functioning reinforcement system on the outbreak of the war. Although the Territorial Reserve was created in 1910 with an establishment of 100,000, it had recruited a mere 483 officers and 1,186 other ranks by September 1913. Furthermore, a number of the problems experienced, including those noted above, can be attributed to the contradictory role and legal status of the TF before the outbreak of War. Considering this, the Territorial reinforcement system, which had to be rapidly created from August 1914, was far more logical than the one created for the New Armies.[30]

Yet, the most disastrous decision made by Kitchener was the creation of the Second Reserve and Local Reserve in 1915, which were designed to support service and Pals battalions of the New Armies, respectively. The origin of these decisions can be traced back to 1914 and early 1915, when the War Office undertook an extensive analysis of casualties on the Western Front to predict a new set of wastage rates. The first three reports, published in January and April 1915, covered the first three, five and six months of the war, whilst the last was circulated two months later and provided a detailed snapshot of permanent and temporary wastage over a nine month period in the BEF. Notably, the latter estimated that infantry battalions suffered, on a monthly basis, a permanent and temporary wastage rate of 10.1 and 14.1 per cent respectively, with 70 per cent of the latter returning to duty at some point.[31] Whilst an overestimation, as trench warfare reduced the annual number of casualties, the War Office sensibly used the conclusions of the second wastage report to assess the number of reinforcements needed, per annum, to support a proposed field force of 1,100,000, which represented all British, Dominion, Indian and naval formations with,

[30]1914 (Cd. 7254), *The General Annual Return of the Territorial Force For the Year 1913*, p. 129; TNA WO70/50, 'Chronological summary of the principal changes in organisation and administration of the TF since mobilisation'; Ian F. W. Beckett, 'The Territorial Force', in Ian F. W. Beckett and Keith Simpson (eds), *A Nation in Arms: a social study of the British army in the First World War,* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985), pp. 130-139; Hine, *Refilling Haig's Army,* pp. 59-60, pp. 62-64 & pp. 67-70; Keith W. Mitchinson, *Defending Albion: Britain's Home Army, 1908-1919,* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp 17-19, pp. 93-94 & pp. 98-101**;** Keith W. Mitchinson, *The Territorial Force at War, 1914-1916,* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p. 41, pp. 72-74 & pp. 178-180.

[31]TNA WO159/2, First, second and third report on wastage, 1 and 14 January and 16 April 1915; TNA WO159/4, Fourth report on wastage, 23 June 1915.

or earmarked for, the BEF. Overall, it stated a total of 420,000 regular and New army personnel were needed in the reserve at all times to meet an annual wastage of 1,054,200. Specifically, 298,000 infantry recruits needed to be trained as reinforcements every four months to meet a yearly infantry wastage of 894,000.[32]

However, based on the figures provided, it became clear that the number of reinforcements available for all arms, roughly 203,000, fell short of the proposed total. To remedy this, the report outlined that the service battalions of K4 were to be repurposed as reinforcements, which equated to just under 52,000 all ranks in mid-February.[33] Though positive, the War Office failed to assess how they could recruit and train a staggering 894,000 infantry replacements, per annum, within a voluntary recruitment model. Recruitment figures had rapidly dropped from 462,901 men in September 1914, to 87,896 in February 1915, with no prospect of a lasting resurgence.[34] Furthermore, there was no estimation about how long British formations needed to be sustained for, and whether recruiting could be balanced against competing demands, primarily those of industry.

As a result, Kitchener merely believed more recruits were needed and continued to try and expand the British Army, considering additional New Armies as late as June 1915.[35] Admittedly, he may have been influenced by his initial opinion that Britain's full military might would not be deployed until 1917, which would have limited its exposure to attrition.[36] However, this viewpoint was losing weight as soon as the New Armies began to be deployed overseas and a second front was opened on the Gallipoli Peninsula in April 1915. Overall, the lack of forethought over these important questions were critical and had attracted criticism by the summer. Notably, the Duke of Northumberland, President of the County TF Association, confided in Lieutenant-General Henry Wilson that Kitchener's organisation was a, 'great show up… as regards the continual sending out of fresh formations instead of replenishing the existing formations at the seat of war. The A.G.'s [Adjutant General's] department are at their wits ends – they cannot replace casualties at this rate'.[37]

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[32]TNA WO159/2, Report on manpower requirements of British Forces serving overseas, no date, but February or March 1915.
[33]Ibid.; TNA WO114/26, Army strength return, 15 February 1915.
[34]*Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War* (London: HSMO, 1922), p. 364.
[35]TNA WO152/4, Memo from the Chief of Imperial General Staff to Kitchener, 15 June 1915.
[36]Simkins, *Kitchener's Army,* p. 38.
[37]Hampshire Record Office (hereinafter HRO), The Royal Green Jackets Regimental Archive (hereinafter TRGJRA), 170A12W/D/1125a, Letters from Duke of Northumberland to Lieutenant-General Henry Wilson, 19 and 25 August 1915.

Indeed, the true extent of the problem became clear when evaluating the number of service battalions amalgamated or disbanded before the Battle of the Somme. For instance, eight battalions from both 9 and 15 (Scottish) Divisions were amalgamated in May 1916. Thus, 6 and 7 Royal Scots Fusiliers, 7 and 8 King's Own Scottish Borderers, 10 and 11 Highland Light Infantry, and 8 and 10 Gordon Highlanders were, after 10 to 12 months of active duty, amalgamated. Similarly, 9 Royal Munster Fusiliers was disbanded in May 1916 after six months on the Western Front, with personnel used to shore up other battalions of the regiment.[38] Although some discretion must be granted due to the unprecedented nature of the situation, it is clear that there was a theoretical, but not practical, understanding of how a force this size could be sustained.

Rather than feeding recruits into the pre-existing reinforcement system, Kitchener decided in April 1915 that K4, bar five battalions, should be converted into a separate organisation called the Second Reserve. Whilst the SR and ER would continue to draft reinforcements to all battalions of the regiment, the Second Reserve, consisting of 75 battalions, would supplement this output by supplying men to service battalions of K1, K2 and K3.[39] This was exacerbated by the creation of the Local Reserve in June 1915, which was designed to reinforce the Pals battalions of the newly dubbed Fourth and Fifth New Armies (K4 and K5). In December 1914, Kitchener had sensibly ordered civilian and private authorities administrating Pals battalions to recruit an additional two 'depot' companies, numbering 250 men each, as reinforcements. Six months later, Kitchener proposed that they should be formed into 68 'Local Reserve' battalions by amalgamating depot companies of the same regiment. They would supply reinforcements to their corresponding Pal battalions and recruitment for the local reserve would continue to be organised by their sponsors, which would help to sustain their specific character and identity.[40]

Notably, Hine argues both of these changes were important to the development of reinforcement policy, as SR battalions were overworked and the Second and Local Reserve provided New Army formations with their own source of reinforcements. Whilst noting this was a timely decision, as New Army divisions were about to embark for overseas service, her analysis does not expand upon these reforms and simply states that the system worked until altered in 1916. It only needed the recruits to train and, as part of her overarching argument, suggests that the root of the problem

[38]TNA WO95/3967, IGC war diary, 18 April 1916; TNA, WO95/3968, IGC war diary, 20 May 1916; Hine, *Refilling Haig's Armies*, p. 109.
[39]TNA WO293/2, ACI 96, 10 April 1915.
[40]Ibid., 4 June 1915; HRO TRGJRA, 170A12W/D/3636-D/3637, History of the 19 (Reserve) King's Royal Rifle Corps; TNA WO293/1, ACI 13, 2 December 1914

was the broader manpower situation. Whilst true, Hine makes insufficient use of important archival material and, as a result, does not consider the broader ramifications of these decisions.[41] Indeed, the Second and Local Reserve expanded the number of reserve battalions from 101 to 244, which bore no relation to Sclater's original recommendations.[42] For instance, the Northumberland Fusiliers, after excluding the TF, went from one to nine reserve units in the space of several months. Although additional reserve battalions were needed to support their two regular, seven service and 12 Pals battalions, the expansion that took place was more than double what was theoretically needed. This, in turn, plunged the reinforcement system into chaos, as the massive duplication of reserve battalions ensured that the resources needed for training, consisting of instructors, equipment, and training facilities, were inadequate. Whilst 10 (Reserve) North Staffordshire Regiment was fortunate in obtaining some rifles in March 1915, they did not have access to a rifle range for several more months. Others, such as 17 (Reserve) Rifle Brigade, lacked basic equipment until the summer of 1916.[43]

Overall, these decisions had provided the War Office with an opportunity to reorganise the reinforcement system to meet the circumstances of individual regiments. Instead, it created a convoluted reinforcement system that led to each part actively competing against one another for a dwindling number of recruits. Despite a limited resurgence between March and June 1915, enlistments steadily dropped over the summer of 1915 to 71,617 in September.[44] From an official perspective, the Second Reserve was penalised, as the War Office prioritised recruits for the SR if it was below a strength of 2,085. As the latter rarely attained this strength throughout 1915 due to consistent drafting, it received the bulk of new recruits, which led to the Second Reserve shrinking in size from 43,866 other ranks in April to 32,594 in November.[45] Rather than reconsider the size and organisation of the reinforcement system, the War Office continued to propose *ad hoc* measures to resolve these problems. For instance, it suggested any understrength reserve battalion could organise a recruiting party within its home command or, if below its establishment by a significant margin, the entire country. Whilst this gave units of the Second Reserve an opportunity to recruit additional manpower, it had to compete against the SR, ER, Local Reserve and TF, which were doing the same. 10 (Reserve) North Staffordshire Regiment had some

[41]Hine, *Refilling Haig's Armies,* pp. 50-51, p. 60, pp. 98-99 & p. 142.
[42]TNA WO114/27, Army strength return, 13 December 1915
[43]Imperial War Museum (hereinafter IWM), Document 13802, Training report on 17 (Reserve) Rifle Brigade, 20 June 1916; TNA WO95/5460, 10 (Reserve) North Staffordshire Regiment service digest.
[44]*Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War,* p. 364.
[45]TNA WO114/26, Army strength return, 26 April 1915; TNA WO114/27, Army strength return, 8 November 1915; TNA WO293/2, ACI 145, 15 April 1915.

success but struggled to recruit large numbers of men, as they had to contend with other reserve battalions. Captain J. Best and a recruitment party managed to recruit 150 men in Stoke-on-Trent through canvassing over the Summer of 1915. Yet, in the following Autumn, the same group obtained less than 80 men, as other units were vying for recruits within the city.[46] Indeed, between September and October 1915, recruitment marches, rallies and speeches had also been held for 3/5 North Staffordshire Regiment and 11 (Reserve) North Staffordshire Regiment. In addition, the Army Service Corps had a recruitment office in the city and there was a large recruitment drive by the commanding officer of 25 (Reserve) Middlesex Regiment, Colonel Sir John Ward, M.P., to obtain recruits for three new pioneer battalions. Adding to this was a number of regional recruitment marches, which included soldiers representing the Royal Field Artillery, Sherwood Foresters (Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire Regiment), Manchester Regiment and Royal Army Medical Corps.[47]

Altogether, this was an inefficient, duplication of effort, especially as the Second Reserve lacked the resources needed to compete against the Local Reserve. Although Hine is correct to note that the latter had a smaller recruitment pool to tap due to the unique identity of most Pals Battalions it supported, it did have the support of their sponsor.[48] For example, 22 (Reserve) King's Royal Rifle Corps was supported by their parent organisation, the British Empire League, throughout 1915 and even into 1916, once conscription was introduced.[49] They organised recruitment campaigns in regional and national newspapers, which advertised the pioneer battalion it supported, 20 King's Royal Rifle Corps. Notably, the campaign was selective, targeting a number of mining communities, such as those in Durham, Somerset and Wiltshire, who were more likely to have the artisans and workers needed for a pioneer battalion. Furthermore, organising bodies could offer additional benefits to make enlistment more appealing. The British Empire League offered each recruit an additional pay of 2d. a day and private billeting in London, whilst the Tyneside Irish Committee in Newcastle offered men, with an 'above average' education, the opportunity to become an NCO upon enlistment into 34 (Reserve) Northumberland Fusiliers.[50]

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[46]TNA WO95/5460, 10 (Reserve) North Staffordshire Regiment service digest.
[47]British Newspaper Archive (hereinafter BNA), *Staffordshire Sentinel*, 14, 21 and 30 September, and 4, 8 and 27 October 1915.
[48]Hine, *Refilling Haig's Army*, p. 50.
[49]IWM, Document 13802, Training report on 22 (Reserve) King's Royal Rifle Corps, 20 June 1916.
[50]BNA, *Bath Chronicle and Weekly Gazette,* 20 November 1915; BNA, *Newcastle Journal,* 25 August and 22 October 1915; BNA, *Somerset Gazette*, 12 November 1915; BNA, *Western Gazette*, 17 December 1915; BNA, *Wiltshire Times and Trowbridge Advertiser*, 20 November 1915.

Collectively, this ensured that the Second Reserve was never strong enough to fully support the service battalions of K1, K2 and K3, which led to the SR and ER supplying a large proportion of their reinforcements from early 1915. For instance, 3 Cameronians (Scottish Rifles) drafted an estimated 843 men to service battalions of the regiment in 1915, which included 250 other ranks to 9 Cameronians (Scottish Rifles) in October, after the battalion had suffered 333 casualties at the Battle of Loos.[51] In September 1915, 3 Norfolk Regiment dispatched 721 all ranks to 7 Norfolk Regiment, which equated to 40.1 per cent of its yearly, drafting total, of 2,423.[52] This distinction is important, as it expands our understanding of how specific military identities within Peter Simkins' 'Four Armies' concept began to break down. Principally, Simkins has argued that the British Army was formed of three distinct armies by the end of 1915: the regular army, the New Armies, and the TF, each with their own formations and characteristics. This, he claims, began to breakdown in 1916 due to mounting casualties and the introduction of conscription through the Military Service Acts of 1916. The latter conscripted men for general service, who, forming part of Simkins' 'fourth army', were used to fill up depleted battalions. As a result, regular, New Army and Territorial identities were diluted, which removed or blurred many of the differences between them.[53] Whilst this concept is illustrative of broader recruitment trends, it is clear from the analysis above that the blending of these separate identities began as soon as New Army formations were deployed overseas. The Second Reserve was simply incapable of creating a dedicated stream of reinforcements to the New Armies and, as a result, service battalions received a large proportion of their reinforcements from the same source as the regulars, the SR and ER. Whilst this diluted the distinctive identity of New Army battalions, it did lead to the development of a broader, regimental identity. This is supported by James E. Kitchen's analysis of 54 (East Anglian) Division and its experiences in the Sinai and Palestine. After suffering devastating casualties at the First and Second Battles of Gaza in the Spring of 1917, the local identity of Territorial battalions quickly eroded as conscripts began to arrive in large numbers. Despite this, as Kitchen rightfully claims, this was subsequently transcended by a universal identity based on the regimental ethos of the battalion, as soldiers could identify with its broad and inclusive traditions.[54] Although occurring under different circumstances, the identity of New Army

[51]TNA WO95/1744, 9 (Scottish) Division AQMG war diary, divisional casualty report for 25-29 September 1915; TNA WO95/5459, 3 Cameronians (Scottish Rifles) war diary, January - December 1915.

[52]F. L. Petre, *The History of the Norfolk Regiment, 1685-1918, Volume II,* (Norwich: Jarrold and Sons, Ltd., 1923), p. 117.

[53]Simkins, 'The Four Armies', pp. 235-255.

[54]James E. Kitchen, *The British Imperial Army in the Middle East: Morale and Military Identity in the Sinai and Palestine Campaigns, 1916-1918,* (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), pp. 135-138.

battalions underwent a similar process in 1915, as original members of each unit were replaced with reinforcements that had a common, shared experience, based upon their training in the regimental reserve.

Although the Pals Battalions of K4 and K5 do not precisely fit this model, as most were not deployed until early 1916, there is evidence to suggest their original identity began to fade before the Battle of the Somme. Whilst Peter Simkins has recently identified some factors that may have cause this, such as the granting of commissions to middle class men from Pals battalions akin to TF 'class corps', the organisation of the Local Reserve is not mentioned.[55]As stated, a large proportion of Local Reserve battalions had been formed by merging one or more depot companies of different Pals battalions from the same regiment. However, due to the promise that men would only serve within a specific battalion, only affiliated depot companies within each reserve unit were, theoretically, liable to reinforce their associated Pals battalion. For example, 19 (Reserve) King's Royal Rifle Corps was formed of depot companies from 16 and 17 King's Royal Rifle Corps, which were sponsored by the Church Lads Brigade and the British Empire League, respectively. As a result, only three companies supplied 16 King's Royal Rifle Corps, with another two for 17 King's Royal Rifle Corps.[56] Therefore, each service battalion was only supported by roughly 500 to 750 men. Once these initial reinforcements were absorbed, it would take months before additional reinforcements were available. It took time to recruit men or, as will be discussed, receive conscript replacements, which then, under the War Office training syllabus, needed 12, and then 14, weeks of instruction before they could be drafted.[57]

Thus, the Local Reserve struggled to sustain Pals Battalions on the frontline. Returning to the previous example, 19 (Reserve) King's Royal Rifle Corps had, within a short period of time, begun to run out of reinforcements for 17 King's Royal Rifle Corps. The demand for drafts had started several months before deployment and only increased after March 1916, once it began frontline service on the Western Front. Yet, the British Empire League, trying to supply multiple units, were unable to provide an adequate number of recruits to cover those drafted, which quickly led to a lack of trained reinforcements for the battalion. With their affiliated depot companies depleted, the War Office were forced to break their pledge and draft soldiers

[55]Peter Simkins, 'The Raising of the New Armies: Some Further Reflections' in Peter Liddle (ed.), *Britain Goes to War: How the First World War Began to Reshape the Nation,* (Barnsley: Pen and Sword Military, 2015), pp.103-105

[56]HRO TRGJRA, 170A12W/D/3636-D/3637, History of the 19 (Reserve) King's Royal Rifle Corps.

[57]Australian War Memorial (hereinafter AWM), AWM4 1/66/2, Report on Australian Imperial Force Depots in the United Kingdom, July 1916 – April 1917; IWM Document 13802, Report on number of recruits with over three months training, 15 May 1916.

associated with the Church Lads Brigade to 17 King's Royal Rifle Corps. Although this caused considerable anger and frustration among men and officers, this practice continued until all recruits were supplied through conscription. [58]

In other cases, the role of Pals battalions may have been changed to reduce their exposure to attrition and the need for reinforcements. For example, a proposal to break up 19 Lancashire Fusiliers was made in May 1916. Although no reason is given, the battalion only had one depot company affiliated to it, which numbered 195 all ranks before it was merged into 21 (Reserve) Lancashire Fusiliers in August 1915. Although the latter reached a strength of 1,059 by March 1916, this represented the total number of reinforcements available to 15, 16 and 19 Lancashire Fusiliers.[59] Although the proposal to disband the battalion was rejected, it was redesignated as a pioneer battalion two months later, which was similar to how Territorial battalions with an inadequate supply of reinforcements were utilised. Indeed, 1/1, 1/2 and 1/3 Monmouthshire Regiment was, after being amalgamated together in May 1915, able to resume their separate identities from August by becoming Pioneer battalions.[60] Thus, the Local Reserve of 68 battalions was, in reality, a collection of independent reinforcement companies, that were too small to reinforce anything more than routine wastage. As a result, the unique identity of some Pals battalions began to fade upon deployment and the Battle of the Somme, though devastating, simply sped up the process of dilution underway.

However, Kitchener and the War Office remained oblivious to these systematic problems and were adamant that the difficulties experienced arose from a lack of manpower, as the reinforcement system had dwindled in size to 154,171 fit recruits by 3 January 1916.[61] They War Office did not conduct a full review of manpower policy and the reinforcement system and, instead, focused its energies on obtaining additional recruits. The Derby Scheme, launched in late 1915, was a last-ditch attempt to maintain the British Army under voluntary recruitment. Although 1,150,000 single men were willing to serve between October and December, only 343,000 were considered immediately available.[62] Deemed a failure, it was closely followed by the introduction of conscription for all men aged 18 to 41, which was achieved through the Military

[58]HRO TRGJRA, 170A12W/D/3636-D/3637, History of the 19 (Reserve) King's Royal Rifle Corps.
[59]TNA WO95/441, Fourth Army AQMG war diary, 22 May 1916; TNA WO114/57, Army strength return, 26 July 1915; Hine, *Refilling Haig's Armies,* p. 109; J. C. Latter, *The History of the Lancashire Fusiliers, 1914-1918, Volume I,* (Aldershot: Gale & Polden Ltd., 1949), p. 131.
[60]TNA WO95/647, Second Army AQMG war diary, 6 August 1915.
[61]TNA WO114/28, Army strength return, 3 January 1916.
[62]Beckett, 'The Nation in Arms', p. 12

Service Act and Military Service Act (No. 2) of January and May 1916, respectively. Nevertheless, the War Office's aim to conscript 967,000 men between January and June 1916 was unrealistic and, though 205,000 men were conscripted for general service by April, they had predicted an intake of 682,000, which, in their opinion, created a (somewhat artificial) deficiency of 477,000.[63]

Due to this, the War Office continued to blame the shortcomings of the reinforcement system on the broader manpower situation.[64] However, the introduction of conscription did provide the War Office with complete power over the manpower it received. Whilst the supply of recruits was too small to bring the reserve to full strength and meet the demands of the British Army, the War Office attempted to devise a method of distribution that mitigated some of these problems. By considering the strength of all reserve battalions, the number of active units they supported and the overall size of each reserve section, recruits could be economically distributed to create a consistent output of trained reinforcements.[65] To achieve this, conscripts were called up to their local regimental depot and, according to guidelines circulated by the War Office every month, distributed to reserve battalions across each home command.[66]

Though simple, the method of distribution was incredibly inefficient. Rather than create a steady stream of manpower to reserve battalions, most units did not receive recruits until they were depleted and, akin to the recruitment spike of 1914, were inundated at short notice. For instance, 15 (Reserve) Rifle Brigade received few men during the first three months of 1916 and was reportedly 'drained dry'. However, between the 15 April and 2 May, the battalion received 646 new recruits. Unsurprisingly, this process was incredibly disruptive and the Inspector-General of Infantry, Major-General G. G. A. Egerton, argued this undermined training within each reserve battalion. Specifically, he noted that 14 (Reserve) Middlesex Regiment, which had received 750 men in one week, could not effectively organise them, as, 'a battalion with only 250 serviceable rifles cannot assimilate and train such a mass of men sent to it at one time.' Simultaneously, battalions with good commanding officers and training staff were left, 'pining for work to do', as they had not received recruits for weeks.

[63]TNA WO162/28, Reports on results of conscription, 15 March and 8 April 1916.
[64]TNA WO33/881, 176 and 177 Army Council meetings, 6 and 15 April 1916.
[65]TNA WO162/6, Chronology of mobilisation and expansion, 1914-1918.
[66]For examples, see; TNA WO293/4, ACI 212 and 378, 26 January and 18 Feburary1916.

Thus, the unequal distribution of conscripts delayed training and undermined the supply of reinforcements overseas.[67]

Overall, it became clear once the Battle of the Somme begun that the reinforcement system could not fully support the British Army. Whilst able to dispatch an impressive 106,552 men to the BEF in July, it is notable that only 37,478 recruits across the SR, ER, Second Reserve and Local Reserve were recorded as trained and fit for general service on 26 June 1916.[68] As a result, the War Office officially resorted to using partially-trained reinforcements of at least nine weeks training, and promised to send just over 30,000 to the BEF by the middle of July.[69] Despite this, reinforcements became scarce and the War Office and Adjutant General in France, Lieutenant-General G. H. Fowke, resorted to transferring men between regiments to make up shortfalls.[70] Comments about this practice began to circulate within the BEF by August, with the General Officer Commanding Fourth Army, General Sir Henry Rawlinson, requesting an explanation for why drafts were being sent to the wrong regiments.[71]

Whilst this does not represent a complete collapse of the reinforcement system, as argued by Hew Strachan, the immense difficulties experienced did force the War Office to carry out substantial reforms.[72] Announced in August and coming into existence on 1 September, the Training Reserve overhauled and simplified the chaotic system. The SR, ER, and parts of the third Territorial line were retained as the primary mechanism of the reinforcement system. Recruits obtained through conscription would be channelled into regimental reserves from their depots, which were drawn from their corresponding recruitment area. If unable to obtain a sufficient number, surplus recruits from neighbouring regimental reserves and areas would be redistributed to ensure all remained at, or near to, full establishment. Once achieved, the surplus of recruits was distributed across 112 battalions of the Training Reserve, which were drawn from an amalgamation of Second and Local Reserve battalions. Most importantly, the Training Reserve were liable to train and supply reinforcements to any regiment, and it met demands for drafts when there were not enough men

[67]IWM Document 13802, Reports on 14 (Reserve) Middlesex Regiment, number of recruits with over three months training, and 15 (Reserve) Rifle Brigade, 9-10, 15, and 23-24 May 1916.
[68]TNA WO95/26, Adjutant General war diary, 31 July 1916; TNA WO114/29, Army strength return, 26 June 1916.
[69]AWM AWM4 1/66/2, Report on Australian Imperial Force Depots in the United Kingdom, July 1916 – April 1917; TNA WO95/26, Adjutant General war diary, 28 June 1916; Hine, *Refilling Haig's Armies,* pp. 108 and p. 117.
[70]TNA WO95/4185, 8 and 29 Infantry Base Depot war diary, July - October 1916.
[71]TNA WO95/441, Fourth Army AQMG war diary, 8 August 1916.
[72]Strachan, *The Politics of the British Army*, pp. 207-209.

available in the SR or ER to do so.[73] Although these changes did not affect Irish Regiments, which continued to rely upon the SR, ER and, for the 36 (Ulster) Division, an additional six reserve battalions, these reforms were instrumental in creating a simple and flexible system capable of producing trained reinforcements. [74] Indeed, every regiment, regardless of its size and the broader manpower situation, had access to replacements, whilst valuable resources needed for training, such as rifles and specialist equipment, were concentrated, with the best commanding officers and instructors from the reserve selected to lead and instruct recruits.[75]

Curiously, Hine claims that these reforms were implemented to refine reinforcement processes and mirror the changes made to the reinforcement system in France by General Headquarters (GHQ) between May and July 1916. Specifically, reinforcements were to be organised by regiment, rather than individual battalion, when arriving at the Infantry Base Depots in France. Whilst this provided GHQ with additional flexibility to replenish depleted battalions, as reinforcements could be directed from these larger, regimental manpower pools, it is unlikely that this would cause wholescale reform in the United Kingdom, as reinforcements from reserve units could simply be filtered into this new structure.[76] Rather, it was a belated realisation within the War Office that the haphazard reinforcement system built up since 1914 could not properly function under the strains of industrial warfare.

Despite the importance of these changes, the broader historiography has failed to assess this and, instead, focused on whether the Training Reserve undermined regimental integrity and, by extension, the local identity of battalions. Indeed, J. G. Fuller and Clive Hughes, among others, claim that the Training Reserve effectively transformed the New Armies and, more broadly, the British Army, into a nationalised army that drew on a generalised manpower pool.[77] David French has echoed these

[73]TNA WO293/5, ACI 1528, 6 August 1916; Hine, *Refilling Haig's Armies,* p. 142.
[74]TNA WO114/30, Army strength return, 4 September 1916.
[75]IWM Document 13802, Report on third line Home Counties Division and 7 Training Reserve Brigade, 14 and 26 September 1916.
[76]TNA WO95/26, Adjutant General war diary, 12 May 1916; TNA, WO95/3969, Letter from Deputy Adjutant General, Major-General Sir Edward Graham, to Adjutant General, Lieutenant-General G. H. Fowke, 10 June 1916; Hine, *Refilling Haig's Army*, pp. 110-113 & p. 142.
[77]HRO TRGJRA, 170A12W/D/3636-D/3637, Official History of the 19 (Reserve) King's Royal Rifle Corps and 109 Training Reserve; J. G. Fuller, *Troop Morale and Popular Culture in the British and Dominion Armies, 1914-1918,* (Oxford: Oxford University press, 43-44; Hughes, 'The New Armies', p. 114; Helen, *Citizen Soldiers: The Liverpool Territorials in the First World War,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 58.

arguments, claiming initial attempts to maintain localised recruitment were dropped due to mounting casualties and, by creating the Training Reserve, the War Office had purposefully dismantled links between regiments and local communities.[78] As Helen McCartney states, this is based upon various assessments of unit composition, which demonstrates the dilution of local identity across British units from 1916. Indeed, Ian Beckett's analysis of various Territorial units, such as 1/1 Buckinghamshire Battalion, demonstrated a steep decline in local identity after the Somme, whilst Kitchens' research, as mentioned, records a similar process occurring in 54 (East Anglian) Division in the Middle East from 1917.[79]

The War Office did, however, go to great lengths to preserve local and regional identities within each regiment. As argued by McCartney, Hine and Mitchinson, the SR, ER and Territorial reserve units remained the primary method of training and drafting recruits, whilst the system of allocation, described above, ensured that conscripted manpower was channelled according to their local and regional ties into the appropriate reserve battalion. The Training Reserve did not supplant this and was only utilised once these traditional sources had been depleted. Although these changes diluted local identity across Territorial and New Army units, it did enable a number of regiments to sustain a broader, regional identity. As McCartney demonstrates, 1/6 and 1/10 King's (Liverpool) Regiment had lost their local identity by 1918, with only 42 and 68 per cent of men enlisting in Liverpool and the surrounding areas, respectively. Yet, it had strong regional ties, as 70 and 87 per cent of men had enlisted in Lancashire. Admittedly, some regiments, such as the Buckinghamshire battalions, struggled to replicate this, as it depended upon a number of factors, including the geographical composition of each home command and size of regional populations within it. Nevertheless, McCartney's research proves that the War Office did attempt and, in part, succeed at maintaining regimental ties with regional localities.[80]

In conclusion, the reinforcement system underwent colossal changes under Kitchener and the War Office between 1914 and 1916. The alterations made were far from effective and, overall, failed to create a system capable of sustaining the New Armies overseas. Its expansion was chaotic, and the decisions made by Kitchener were increasingly reactive to the deteriorating recruitment situation, rather than a search for an effective organisation. Instead of gradually expanding the SR and ER to support the New Armies, as proposed in November 1914, Kitchener created the Second and Local Reserves in 1915 to recruit and train reinforcements for service and Pals

[78]French, *Military Identities*, pp. 277-278.
[79]Beckett, *The Territorial Force,* pp. 146-151; Kitchen, *The British Imperial Army in the Middle East*, pp. 135-137.
[80]Hine, *Refilling Haig's Armies*, pp. 142-144; Mitchinson, *The Territorial Force at War*, p. 206; McCartney, *Citizen Soldiers,* pp. 58-74.

battalions, respectively. Although this secured additional recruits for the reserve, these changes divided the reinforcement system into competing parts that vied over a dwindling number of recruits. The Second Reserve lacked the manpower and resources needed to fully support the service battalions of K1, K2 and K3, whilst the illogical organisation of the Local Reserve ensured it could only support Pals battalions for a short period of time. This was a significant duplication of effort that, ultimately, contributed to the breakdown of the New Armies distinctive image from 1915, as both regular and service units frequently received reinforcements from the same part of the reserve. Thus, rather than a blurring of identities from 1916, as argued in the existing historiography, a broader, regimental identity, based on a common, shared experience in the SR and ER, had been forming since 1915. Despite this, the War Office continued to blame the problems of the reinforcement system on the broader manpower situation. Although an important factor, this focus ensured no meaningful changes were implemented until the Battle of the Somme had begun, when it became clear that the reinforcement system could not properly function. Thus, the Training Reserve was introduced in September 1916, which rationalised the system and redistributed vital resources needed for training. Although it has been accused of destroying, or damaging, regimental links, every regiment had, regardless of its size, access to reinforcements. It granted the reinforcement system the flexibility needed to function under the ceaseless strain of industrial warfare, which enabled it to continue sustaining the New Armies and, more broadly, the British Army, until the armistice in November 1918.

Henning von Tresckow in Poland in 1939: The Future anti-Hitler *Frondeur* and the Origins of the Holocaust

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ABSTRACT
This article analyses the activities of Brigadier General Henning von Tresckow during his time as a front-line German divisional senior staff officer in Poland in 1939. Tresckow is known for his key role in the military element of the conspiracy which attempted the putsch on 20 July 1944. Latterly historians have shown that from 1941 Tresckow was complicit in atrocities in the Soviet theatre. This article demonstrates that Tresckow's awareness of atrocities began in Poland. His unit, neighbouring army formations, and SS-police Einsatzgruppen perpetrated anti-Semitic excesses presaging the Holocaust. The article's findings cast new light on the mental trajectories of Tresckow and other leading 1944 frondeurs.

Introduction

The military and civilian conspiracy against Hitler which culminated in the abortive putsch on 20 July 1944 holds totemic status in narratives of the Third Reich. Brigadier General Henning von Tresckow occupies a salient position among the plotters.[1] In 1941 he was head of operations in Army Group Centre (AG Centre), third in command of the largest German force in the Soviet Union. That autumn, he and associates initiated active dissent. In 1943 Tresckow recruited Colonel Claus Schenk Count von Stauffenberg, who was to earn fame as the would-be assassin of the *Führer*. When the coup failed Tresckow killed himself. Had it succeeded, he was to be head of the Reich's police. Today in Germany's public sphere Tresckow and Stauffenberg share pre-eminence as military paladins of 'the resistance'. Both have undergone global

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DOI: 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v8i1.1605
[1]Linda von Keyserlingk-Rehbein traces links among them*: Nur eine 'ganz kleine Clique': Die NS-Ermittlungen über das Netzwerk vom 20. Juli 1944,* (Berlin: Lukas, 2018).

secular beatification: in the movie *Valkyrie* in 2008 Kenneth Branagh played Tresckow alongside Tom Cruise as Stauffenberg.

This article reconstructs Tresckow's actions in Poland. Drawing on unexplored or little-known German, Polish, and Jewish sources, it offers new data for the evolving historiography of the 20 July conspiracy. In Germany the interpretations are laden with particular sensitivities. For decades the orthodoxy held that the wartime military had been honourable, and that the atrocities were down to the *SS* and police. This doctrine was enabled by a compact to deceive, the notorious Himmerod memorandum, struck by senior ex-*Wehrmacht* men with the Federal Republic's first Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer.[2] The 'clean *Wehrmacht*' era saw accounts that were silent on many illegalities. For Tresckow and many others, they dominate to this day.[3] By the mid-1990s new generations of German researchers had 'rediscovered' the military's crimes, albeit just in the Soviet theatre. In their home country they were vehemently attacked for their iconoclasm but succeeded in finally exploding the 'clean *Wehrmacht*' delusion.[4]

Tresckow's reputation had also benefited from another canonical view, one specifically embracing the conspirators. For convoluted psychological and political reasons, it was desirable for the *frondeurs* to have acted because of revulsion at anti-Semitic crimes. Mendacious survivors and credulous writers combined to produce a long-dominant narrative: Tresckow and staff, and by extension Stauffenberg and others, started to

[2]Jens Brüggemann, *Männer von Ehre? Die Wehrmachtgeneralität im Nürnberger Prozess 1946/46: Zur Entstehung einer Legende,* (Padeborn: Schöningh, 2018), pp. 403-04. See also Mark M. Hull's review, *Journal of Military History*, 83 (October 2019), pp. 1337-39.
[3]Bodo Scheurig, *Henning von Tresckow: Ein Preusse gegen Hitler* (Frankfurt: Ullstein, 1987). Peter Hoffmann, *Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg und seine Brüder,* (Stuttgart: Deutsche-Verlags-Anstalt, 1992), trans. as *Stauffenberg: A Family History, 1905-1944,* 3rd ed., (Montreal: McGill-Queens's University, 2008), is the classic but flawed biography of Stauffenberg, reissued in 2017 as *Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg: Die Biographie*, (Munich: Pantheon, 2017). Though dating to 'clean *Wehrmacht*,' Hans Mommsen, *Alternatives to Hitler: German Resistance under the Third Reich,* trans. Angus McGeoch, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton, 2003) remains the leading conspectus. Mommsen conceded that many (unnamed) military *frondeurs* were complicit in crimes - pp. 238-52.
[4]Wolfram Wette traces the *Wehrmacht's* image in *Die Wehrmacht: Feindbilder, Vernichtungskrieg, Legenden,* (Frankfurt: Fischer, 2002), trans. by Deborah Lucas Schneider as *The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 2006). A bibliography of 'clean *Wehrmacht*' is in David K. Yelton, 'Older German Officers and National Socialist Activism: Evidence from the German Volkssturm', *Journal of Military History*, 83 (April 2019), pp. 455-85.

conspire actively when, from late 1941 behind the army in the east, *SS*-police *Einsatzgruppen* (*EG*) task forces went over to killing Jews *as such.* They had earlier murdered 'only' among the Soviet 'elites' (which included many Jews). As addressed later, the demise of 'clean *Wehrmacht*' orthodoxy led German scholars to show that from the outset AG Centre itself committed widescale atrocities against many Soviet nationalities, Jews included. Tresckow oversaw murders pursuant to 'criminal orders' that mandated the killing of commissars and others and expunged legal responsibility. AG Centre actively sustained 'its' *EG*. Tresckow's experiences in 1939 as presented here fill the last major gap in his record and shed further light on his evolution towards active dissidence. As also elaborated upon below, in Germany the prevailing official narrative on the opposition diverges in key aspects from the understanding of many German and international scholars.

Poland in 1939: the invasion system

Tresckow's actions in 1939 must be seen in context. He was part of an invasion machine revolutionary in its motives, aims, and behaviour. Hatred of the Poles was prevalent among all classes in Germany in a manner difficult to imagine today. 'The invasion', Timothy Snyder has noted

> was undertaken on the logic that Poland did not, had not, and could not exist as a sovereign state. Soldiers taken prisoner could be shot, since the Polish Army could not really have existed as such. Once the campaign was over, what began was not an occupation, since by Nazi logic there was no prior polity.[5]

National Socialism of course also reinforced contempt for Poland's Jews, who at 3.5 million formed one-tenth of the population.

German atrocities during and after the fighting were both centrally directed and spontaneous. While unprecedented in Europe, in the West they were largely forgotten in the 'clean *Wehrmacht*' era. German accounts presented the campaign as basically 'normal', on the lines say of France in 1940. In the first decade of this century Alexander Rossino and Jochen Böhler published ground-breaking work which began a new 'western school'. This built on the extensive Polish literature.

The *Wehrmacht* invaded on 1 September 1939 with five land armies comprising sixty-six divisions, and sundry auxiliaries. They progressively occupied the western part of

[5]Timothy Snyder, *Black Earth: The Holocaust as History and Warning,* (London: The Bodley Head, 2015), p. 105.

the country.[6] In formal terms the *Wehrmacht* ruled until 25 October. The literature suggests that in this period perhaps 50,000 Polish soldiers and Polish and Jewish civilians were put to death beyond combat and bombing.[7] A large proportion of these deaths can be put down to the military, either through direct action or via various forms of facilitation noted below. Notwithstanding overlaps and rivalries, the invasion machine functioned as a unitary force. Böhler has reported how the five armies each worked with a rearward head of civil administration, appointed by Hitler. These were designated *Chef der Zivilverwaltung* (CdZ) and were tasked with directing *EG* killing teams and similar entities.[8] The atrocities were also 'integrated': they were committed by the German army, by embedded *SS* units, by *EG*, by the civilian police, and by various militias. The literature explains how these formations interacted closely in 1939. On the *EG* specifically, German archive-based research now complements the early Polish accounts.[9]

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[6]The Soviets invaded eastern Poland on 17 September pursuant to the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. Some 570,000 Polish POWs and civilians were detained, 320,000 were deported to the *Gulag.*

[7]Alexander Rossino, *Hitler Strikes Poland: Blitzkrieg, Ideology and Atrocity,* (Lawrence, KS: Kansas, 2003); Jochen Böhler, *Auftakt zum Vernichtungskrieg: Die Wehrmacht in Polen 1939,* (Frankfurt: Fischer, 2006), trans. as *Zbrodnie Wehrmachtu w Polsce,* (Kraków: Znak, 2009); Daniel Brewing, *Im Schatten von Auschwitz: Deutsche Massaker an polnischen Zivilisten 1939-1945,* (Darmstadt: WBG, 2016); Martin Winstone, *The Dark Heart of Hitler's Europe: Nazi Rule in Poland Under the General Government,* (London: Tauris, 2015); Jochen Böhler and Stephan Lehnstaedt, eds., *Gewalt und Alltag im besetzten Polen 1939-1945,* (Osnabrück: fibre, 2012); Stephan Lehnstaedt, *Okkupation im Osten: Besatzungsalltag in Warschau und Minsk 1939-1944,* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2010), trans. by Martin Dean as *Occupation in the East: The Daily Lives of German Occupiers in Warsaw and Minsk,* (New York, NY: Berghahn, 2016); Roger Moorhouse, *First to Fight: The Polish War 1939* (London: The Bodley Head, 2019); Robert Forczyk, *Case White: The Invasion of Poland 1939,* (Oxford: Osprey, 2019); Stephan Lehnstaedt, ed., *Schuld ohne Sühne: Deutschland und die Verbrechen in Polen im Zweiten Weltkrieg,* (Berlin: Metropole, 2021).

[8]Jochen Böhler, 'German Preparations of Administration and Police Forces to War with Poland in 1939,' in Marek Deszczyński and Tymoteusz Pawłowski, eds., *Kampania polska 1939 r.: Polityka-społeczeństwo–kultura,* 2, (Warsaw: Neriton, 2014), pp. 233-43; Jochen Böhler, 'Ordinary Clerks or Trailblazers of Destruction? The 'First Wave' of Civil Administration and Their Implementation of Nazi Policy During the German Invasion of Poland in 1939,' *Dapim: Studies on the Holocaust*, 29, 1 (2015), pp. 17-40.

[9]Kazimierz Leszczyński, 'Działalność Einsatzgruppen Policji Bezpieczeństwa na Ziemiach Polskich w 1939 r. w Świetle Dokumentów', *Biuletyn Głównej Komisji Badań Zbrodni Hitlerowskich w Polsce,* 22 (1971); Maria Wardzyńska, *Był Rok 1939: Operacja niemieckiej policji bezpieczeństwa w Polsce,* (Warsaw: IPN, 2009); Klaus-Michael

The literature cited here and other Polish and German sources indicate the dimensions of the atrocities perpetrated by the German army.[10] There are accounts of over thirty known episodes of shootings of POWs, with over 3,000 killed. Hysteria known as *Freischärlerwahn* or *francs-tireurs* madness led soldiers to murder purported 'partisans' without due process. Some 573,000 POWs fell into German hands and perhaps 15,000 perished in the early period.[11] 'Small-scale' outrages against Jews, such as beard-cutting, were the norm. Army crimes against civilian Poles and Jews included robberies, rapes, village burning, mass arrests, shootings, and numerous cases where people were burned alive.[12]

The army sustained the *EG* which were tasked mainly with the murder of Poland's 'elite' (see below). Its own secret military police (*Geheime Feldpolizei, GFP*) joined in. The *EG* in turn were deployed to support the army and for repressions initiated by the CdZ. Historians know of over 700 massacres of civilians, with more than 16,000 dead.[13] Military police (*Feldgendarmerie)* and *EG* marshalled POWs and civilian internees. As elaborated upon below, the *EG* maltreated Jews and with army aid expelled them to Soviet-held terrain. Mass detentions led to 13,000 civilian deaths

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Mallmann, Jochen Böhler and Jürgen Matthäus, *Einsatzgruppen in Polen: Darstellung und Dokumentation,* (Darmstadt: WBG, 2008), trans. by Ewa Ziegler-Brodnicka as Böhler, Mallmann, and Matthäus, *Einsatzgruppen w Polsce*, (Warsaw: Bellona, 2009). See also a version by Matthäus, Böhler, and Mallmann issued by the US Holocaust Memorial Museum as *War, Pacification and Mass Murder, 1939: The Einsatzgruppen in Poland,* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014); Stephan Lehnstaedt and Jochen Böhler, *Die Berichte der Einsatzgruppen aus Polen 1939,* (Berlin: Metropol, 2013); Böhler, 'Preparations', pp. 233-43; Böhler, 'Clerks', pp. 17-40; Brewing, *Im Schatten,* pp. 158-75.

[10]Szymon Datner, Janusz Gumkowski and Tadeusz Leszczyński, *War Crimes in Poland*: *Genocide1939-1945* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Zachodnie, 1962); Waldemar Grabowski, 'Raport: straty ludzkie poniesione przez Polskę w latach 1939-1945,' in Wojciech Materski and Tomasz Szarota, eds., *Polska 1939-1945: Straty osobowe i ofiary represji pod dwiema okupacjami,* (Warsaw: IPN, 2009), pp. 19-21; Szymon Datner, *Zbrodnie Wehrmachtu na Jeńcach Wojennych Armii Regularnych w II Wojnie Światowej,* (Warsaw: MON, 1964); Apoloniusz Zawilski, *Bitwy Polskiego Września,* (Warsaw: Znak, 2009). Early deaths among the 420,000 POWs in camps cannot readily be tallied. Around 130,000 had severe or minor wounds, numerous of the perhaps 10,000 who succumbed did so needlessly.

[11]Grabowski in 'Raport' presents current knowledge on major categories of losses.

[12]For anti-Jewish excesses see for example Rossino, *Hitler Strikes*, pp.191-226, and Böhler, *Auftakt,* pp. 25-45 and 181-199.

[13]See for example Brewing, *Schatten,* p.157.

(also see below). Finally, the CdZ implemented the liquidation of the Polish state, an act illegal in international law. The army allowed them and their minions to embark on large-scale theft or destruction of Polish governmental and Polish and Jewish property. By the end of 1939 the 'non-combat' murder toll in German-run Poland was at least 100,000.[14]

Legal flux

The German invasion system operated in a state of legal flux. This circumstance is also crucial background for Tresckow in 1939. Poland and Germany were both party to the Hague Convention of 1909 on the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague), and the two Geneva Conventions of 1929 on POWs (Geneva). These were embedded in German military law and were held to apply despite the absence of declared hostilities. Departures from them occurred in phases. As seen above, the entire machine was primed for illegality.[15] 'Enabling legislation' followed. The most striking involved the *EG*. These were ordered to murder the Polish elite, officials, businessmen, academics, teachers, and the like. This state-mandated enormity was then revolutionary beyond the Soviet sphere. As recorded earlier, the *EG* in 1939 have been documented comparatively recently by non-Polish researchers.[16] This contrasts with *EG* activities in the Soviet Union, where their successors had 'their' Nuremberg trial, and have been studied exhaustively for their role in the Holocaust. As in 1941, the *EG* for Poland were organised by Heinrich Himmler's right-hand man *SS-Gruppenführer* Reinhard Heydrich. There were five initially, one per army, manned by the *Sicherheitspolizei* (Security Police or *Sipo*) and *Sicherheitsdienst* (Security Service or *SD*). While guided by the CdZ, in operational terms the *EG* started under the military, their ostensible task being to assure rearward security. Under the head of the General Staff, General Franz Halder, the Army High Command (*Oberkommando des Heeres*, OKH) joined in the planning. 'Special' dispensations from OKH on 9 August 1939 enjoined the army to supply the *EG*. Elaborations told divisional logistics and

[14]Forczyk, *Case White,* p. 333, puts total civilian deaths during the fighting at 150,000, In a recent contribution (2021) Stephan Lehnstaedt has the EG murdering 60,000 by the end of 1939: Stephan Lehnstaedt, 'Vergessene Schuld, verweigerte Sühne' in Lehnstaedt, ed., *Schuld ohne Sühne,* pp.7-20.

[15]Andreas Toppe, *Militär- und Kriegsvölkerrecht: Rechtsnorm, Fachdiskurs und Kriegspraxis in Deutschland 1899-1940,* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2008), pp. 11, 251-2, 296-99, 301, 431; Böhler, *Auftakt,* pp. 151-52. Polish forces conformed to Hague and Geneva: see Forczyk, *Case White,* p. 241.

[16]Notably Mallmann, Böhler and Matthäus, *Einsatzgruppen;* Matthäus, Böhler, and Mallmann, *War, Pacification;* and Lehnstaedt and Böhler, *Berichte.*

intelligence leaders to deploy and oversee the *Sipo-SD* teams. The army's *GFP* were to help the *EG*.[17]

Senior generals became aware of the real task of the *EG* at the latest at a briefing from Hitler on 22 August, but divisional leaders had to learn in the field. During the campaign OKH, subordinate commands, and Heydrich himself gave further instructions on army-*EG* interaction. On 21 September Heydrich issued a notorious order (*Schnellbrief*) to his *EG* on Jews in areas to be annexed. Widely seen as the first formal move in the Holocaust, it ordained that the EG, working with the military and CdZ, should concentrate or clear the Jews out (*freimachen*). The order was copied to OKH, the five armies, and the CdZ. On 30 September, in case the instruction had not penetrated, Heydrich ordered his *EG* heads at once personally to advise (*mündlichen Vortrag*) the army commanders and reiterated the need to work with the military.[18] There were other illegal edicts from OKH and from the *Wehrmacht* High Command (*Oberkommando der Wehrmacht*, OKW). For example, in mid-September OKH consigned isolated POWs in a large swathe of Poland to death by deeming them to be *francs-tireurs*.[19] Commanders would add their own instructions, such as those to burn villages or to forgo trials for purported 'partisans'.[20] All this set the climate for the countless spontaneous crimes committed by junior officers and men.

The initial approach to POWs was in conformity with the Geneva Convention but as we have seen there were numerous infringements. The Hague Convention applied to civilians and was also widely violated. Orders, illegal under Hague, mandated reliance on locals for food and basic medical help. Germans usually had priority for the transport of wounded, also contrary to Geneva and instances of overcrowding, starvation and disease abounded. The head of OKW, General Wilhelm Keitel, illegally mandated the segregation of Jewish POWs. There is much evidence of resultant maltreatment. On 30 November Germany abrogated Geneva for other-rank prisoners: some 60,000 Polish POWs of Jewish ethnicity were ultimately consigned to the ghettos and murdered, while the ethnic Poles were converted to slave labour and suffered resultant privation and high mortality.[21]

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[17]www.germandocsinrussia.org, Bestand 500, Findbuch 12451, Akte 387, Gen St d H, 6. Abt.(II), Sonderbestimmungen zu den Anordnungen für die Versorgung, 9.8.1939 (Sonderbestimmungen), accessed November 2018, various days; Rossino, *Hitler Strikes*, pp. 17-19.

[18]National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD, (hereinafter NARA), T-501, Roll 230, 5 AOK material Aug.-Oct.1939.

[19]Böhler, *Auftakt*, pp. 151-52.

[20]See for example Rossino, *Hitler Strikes,* pp.153-69.

[21]Datner, *Zbrodnie*; Rüdiger Overmans, 'German Policy on Prisoners of War, 1939 to 1945', in Jörg Echternkamp, ed., *Germany and the Second World War*, (Oxford: Oxford

Many accounts of 1939 overlook the widespread incarceration of entire civilian communities. This major crime under Hague was probably driven by irrational fears of mass resistance. 'Special' orders from OKH on 9 August mandated that

> All men capable of bearing arms of Polish and Jewish nationality in the age range 17-45 are to be interned and treated as POWs (however, to be kept separately from them) as soon as the military situation permits.[22]

They were repeated by various army, corps, and divisional commands. Implementation usually involved gruelling forced marches. Most internees were kept in POW pens, but some were placed into temporary *Interniertenlager.* Contemporaries termed these 'concentration camps'.[23] Food and water were widely denied, sanitary facilities were primitive or non-existent, disease was rife. Women and children, and old men, were also often arrested, and some internees were sent to Germany. Most victims were released after some weeks, but many were held on and subjected to compulsory labour. In the area where Tresckow's division was operating internments did not cease until 3 October. They melded with army-assisted expulsions of Jews to Soviet-run territory, and of Poles from areas annexed by the Reich. Tresckow complained that POWs and internees overburdened his division's *Feldgendarmerie*, and that feeding them off the land was difficult.[24] As many as 300,000 Polish and Jewish civilians were detained, and we can estimate that 13,000 died.[25]

University Press, 2014), 9/2: pp. 748-56; Böhler, *Auftakt,* pp. 9,169; Freiburg im Breisgau, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv (BA-MA), RH/21-3.16, XV AK Besondere Anordnungen für die Versorgung; Shmuel Krakowski, *The Fate of Jewish Prisoners of War in the September 1939 Campaign,* (Yad Vashem: Shoah Resource Center, n.d).

[22]Sonderbestimmungen.

[23]Andrzej Zientarski, *Obóz dla internowanych w Lipce,* (Łodź: OKBZH, 1979); Böhler, *Auftakt,* pp. 39.

[24]www.germandocsinrussia.org, Bestand 500, Findbuch 12477, Akte 740, 228. Inf. Division, Abt. Ia, Erfahrungsbericht, undated, early October 1939, geh. Ang. II, p. 15 and geh. V, p. 17 (Erfahrungsbericht).

[25]Overmans reported that 200,000 civilians were held 'in error' or as 'suspicious elements'. He was unaware that the detentions were ordered for 'security' reasons by the OKH in its Sonderbestimmungen. Regarding the total, Overmans later suggested 292,000 (pers. comm., 26 July and 8 August 2018) so with those shipped to Germany, the number detained would have exceeded 300,000. Long-distance marches, catastrophic conditions, and forced labour justify application of a typical early-period death rate for much fitter POWs, 4.2% at Kielce. This yields the tentative estimate of 13,000 deaths.

Methodology

Our knowledge of many events in Tresckow's purview derives from Jewish records. Among essential sources is Michał Grynberg's account of the Ciechanów region (*Regierungsbezirk Zichenau*) annexed by the Reich. Grynberg drew on credible eyewitness reports (the same event is sometimes described by more than one observer) but details can be imprecise. A special place is held by Emanuel Ringelblum's archive recovered from the ruins of the Warsaw Ghetto, now in the Warsaw Jewish Historical Institute, *Żydowski Instytut Historyczny* (ŻIH). This contains poignant accounts by witnesses who knew they were doomed. Credible too, if unspecific at times, are the township memorial books published in New York City and Israel in the 1960s, many in Yiddish. Other sources include websites such as those of the *Polin* Museum of the Polish Jews in Warsaw, and of Yad Vashem, the World Holocaust Remembrance Centre in Israel. Andreas Schulz on *Regierungsbezirk Zichenau* gives context, while *The Yad Vashem Encyclopedia of the Ghettos During the Holocaust* has thumbnail summaries for some townships.[26]

Locations of German army units are deduced from surviving orders and reports. At army group and army levels they are reliable, but formations sometimes failed to reach designated targets as ordered. Corps and divisional material is more granular, so the records of Tresckow's division in the Polish military's *Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe* (CAW) are valuable. Wojciech Zalewski's monumental atlas of the fighting in 1939 is a fine complement.[27] Polish histories use surviving orders, reports, and accounts by participants. They are believable, many being written by senior officers shortly after the fighting. In 1939 the spate of unprecedented measures occasioned some 'embarrassed' reticence on the part of the German forces. In contrast to the Soviet theatre, the army rarely recorded misdeeds other than roundups of civilian Poles and

[26]Michał Grybnerg, *Żydzi w rejencji ciechanowskiej, 1939-1942,* (Warsaw: PWN, 1984); Tadeusz Epstein, ed., *Archiwum Ringelbluma: Konspiracyjne Archiwum Getta Warszawy,* Inwentarz, (Warsaw: ŻIH, 2011) (Ringelblum Inwentarz) and Magdalena Siek, ed., Tom 8*: Tereny wcielone do Rzeszy: Gdańsk-Prusy Zachodnie, Rejencja Ciechanowska, Górny Śląsk,* (Warsaw: ŻIH, 2012) (Ringelblum); Andreas Schulz, 'Regierungsbezirk Zichenau', in Wolf Gruner and Jörg Osterloh, eds., *Das 'Grossdeutsche Reich' und die Juden: Nazionalsozialistische Verfolgung in den 'angegliederten Gebieten',* (Frankfurt: Campus, 2010), trans. as *The Greater German Reich and the Jews: Nazi Persecution Policies in the Annexed Territories 1935-1945,* (New York, NY: Berghahn, 2015); Guy Miron and Shlomit Shulhani, eds., *The Yad Vashem Encyclopedia of the Ghettos During the Holocaust,* (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2009); **Janusz Szczepański,** *Społeczność żydowska Mazowsza w XIX-XX wieku,* (Pułtusk: Wyższa Szkoła Humanistyczna im. Aleksandra Gieysztora, 2005).

[27]Wojciech Zalewski, *Atlas Kampanii Wrześniowej 1939 roku,* Tom I, II, V, (Warsaw: Taktyka i Strategia, 2009-13).

Jews. The *EG* reported daily by radio to Berlin but they too occluded many actions.[28] This also contrasted with the Soviet campaign. A detailed and critical examination of the surviving records must often be applied to suggest which German unit (or mix of them) was responsible for a documented atrocity.

Heydrich lamented on 2 July 1940,

> During the Polish engagement… the directives shaping the actions of the police were unusually radical (*for example, the order to liquidate numerous members of the Polish elite, which encompassed thousands*) so that the whole army leadership… could not be apprised'. (Italics added.)

He went on

> If you compare the deeds, plundering and excesses [*Ausschreitungen*] of the army to that of the SS and police, the SS and police definitely do not appear worse.[29]

As pointed out by Jochen Böhler, in referencing these radical actions of the army, Heydrich was alluding to phenomena peculiar to 1939. A few senior army men complained of specific *EG* outrages but most simply wanted to maintain discipline and some themselves issued criminal commands.[30] By 24 September the *EG* killings were universally known, and the C-in-C of the German army, General Walther von Brauchitsch, felt compelled to order all troops in Poland to eschew participation (*Teilnahme*) in the shootings.[31]

Tresckow's march to Modlin

In 1939 Tresckow was a member of the tight-knit command team in 228 Infantry Division (228ID). German doctrine was for the divisional commander (in this case Major General Hans Suttner) to work closely with three key officers. Tresckow was Suttner's deputy and ran the division's operations. He was designated First General Staff Officer or *Erster Generalstabsoffizier*, also called *Ia* ('*Eins a*'). The others were the quartermaster, *Zweiter Generalstabsoffizier* or *Ib,* and the intelligence officer,

[28]Lehnstaedt and Böhler, *Berichte.*

[29]Böhler, *Auftakt*, pp. 214, 239; Leszczyński, 'Działalność Einsatzgruppen', pp. 175-76; Matthäus, Böhler, and Mallmann, *War, Pacification*, p. 156; Mallmann, Böhler, and Matthäus, *Einsatzgruppen,* pp. 104-08.

[30]Pers. comm. 16 October 2020. A well-known case was that of General Johannes Blaskowitz, commander of Eighth Army and later C-in-C in Poland, who famously complained to Hitler. His point was that shooting Poles and Jews would not yield the desired suppression. Blaskowitz had illegally suspended trials for 'partisans'.

[31]BA-MA,RH/20-10/6, O.Qu. 10 AOK, BAV 24.9.1939.

Abwehroffizier or *Ic/AO*. All four were enmeshed in regular, standard mimeographed communications. They shared planning, decision making, and contacts with superior echelons and neighbouring units. Based on corps directives, Tresckow produced divisional daily orders, signed by Suttner or by himself. 'Special orders on supply' (*Besondere Anordnungen für die Versorgung,* BAV) emanated from each army's *Oberquartiermeister* (O.Qu). Suttner as divisional commander, Tresckow as the *Ia* and the *Ib* absorbed them before the *Ib* passed them on within 228ID. This command system was set out in the General Staff handbook issued by OKH. It should be noted that the *Handbuch* also summarised German and international legal prescripts, notably Hague and Geneva.[32]

228ID was raised comparatively late from 16 August as a 'third wave' unit in East Prussia. According to his biographer Scheurig, Tresckow put the division together and 'practically' led it.[33] Certainly the *Handbuch* ordained that he was to run the division's movements, oversee supplies, and support and deputise for the commander as needed. As seen below, he personally issued many divisional orders and reports. The division was initially in XXI Corps in Third Army, part of Army Group North under General Fedor von Bock. Third Army was commanded by Lieutenant General Georg von Küchler and was tasked with traversing the approximately 130-200 kilometres from East Prussia to Warsaw. Having started to the west of Third Army, by 9 September a significant part of Fourth Army, under Lieutenant General Günther von Kluge, had moved through East Prussia to the left flank of Third Army.[34] With the rest of the divisional command team, Tresckow was among intended recipients of the OKH dispensations on mass internment, including on 18 August a Third Army BAV that ordered internees to be delivered to forces at the disposal of the CdZ (i.e. *EG* or regular police). He would also have been privy to an OKH order of 21 August telling divisional *Ic* intelligence officers (thus all senior divisional officers) to oversee 'their' *EG*.[35]

[32]Oberkommando des Heeres*, Handbuch für den Generalstabsdienst im Kriege,* (Berlin: OKH, 1939), pp. 30-31, 36, 102-16.
[33]Scheurig, *Tresckow*, p. 82.
[34]Piotr Zarzycki, *Suplement do Września 1939: Ordre de Bataille Armii niemieckiej, słowackiej i sowieckiej wraz z obsadami personalnymi* (Warsaw: Historyczna, 2014), pp. 3-73; Andrzej Aksamitowski and Wojciech Zalewski, *Mława 1939*, (Warsaw: Taktyka i Strategia, 2015); Zawilski, *Bitwy,* pp. 181-217; https://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gliederungen/Armeen/4Armee-R.htm
[35] NARA, T-312, 3 AOK, BAV 18.8.1939; Rossino, *Hitler Strikes*, pp. 17-19

Tresckow's route across Poland traversed territory strewn with small towns populated largely by Jews, known from the Yiddish as *shtetls* or *stetls*.[36] Here the army displayed extreme versions of the anti-Semitic fervour recorded across Poland. Grynberg recalls that the aim was to remove Poles and Jews from territories targeted for annexation, so the behaviour was unusually vicious. It was standard for the military to mete out beatings to Jews and Poles, to deny food and water, to enforce pointless labour, and to kill at random.[37] Army units specifically targeted Jews, stealing Jewish goods, destroying dwellings and shops, desecrating *Torah* scrolls, and immolating synagogues. Polish and Jewish men were marched off, and many treks became death marches. The first half of September saw 13,000 Poles sent to work in East Prussia.[38] As recounted below, *EG* units intermixed with Third and Fourth Army units, complemented the actions by the army. Dozens of criminal actions are recorded but only occurrences indicative of Tresckow's experiences are highlighted.[39]

Tresckow's division first fought for Grudziądz. It then swung southeast and moved on Modlin. On 6 September it was attached to II Corps in Fourth Army. 228ID perpetrated its own crimes and, as described below, was in the midst of other army units and *EG* responsible for many excesses. As the advance progressed (see Map 1) there were outbreaks of *francs-tireurs* madness. Four Hundredth Infantry Regiment (IR400), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Eberhard Schöpffer, was one of three regiments in 228ID. It perpetrated shootings and village burnings as early as 4 September, albeit with attempts by junior officers to restrain 'rabid' behaviour.[40]

Mass detentions of civilians continued: II Corps noted on the 8th that there was a new camp for internees south of Grudziądz. On 10 September Bock ordered his army group to burn entire villages if precise targets were not available. In this early criminal

[36]Eva Hoffman, *Shtetl: The History of a small Town and an extinguished World,* (London: Faber, 2009).

[37]Rossino, *Hitler Strikes*, pp.191-226; Böhler, *Auftakt,* pp. 25-45, 181-199; Grynberg, *Żydzi,* pp. 27-35; Epstein, ed., Ringelblum Inwentarz; Siek, ed., Ringelblum; Schulz, 'Zichenau'; Miron and Shulhani, eds., *Encyclopedia*;**;** Janusz Szczepański, '**Ż**ydowscy mieszkańcy Mazowsza w okresie międzywojennym', *Rocznik Mazowiecki*, 21 (2009), pp. 127-39.

[38]Agnieszka Dzierżanowska and Dariusz Pawłoś, 'Polacy na Robotach Przymusowych w Trzeciej Rzeszy (Metody Rekrutacji, Sposób Traktowania, Liczebność)' in *Polska 1939-1945*, p. 133.

[39]Grynberg, *Żydzi,* pp. 27-35; Epstein, ed., Ringelblum Inwentarz; Siek, ed., Ringelblum; Schulz, 'Zichenau'; Miron and Shulhani, eds., *Encyclopedia*;**;** Janusz Szczepański**, '**Żydowscy mieszkańcy Mazowsza w okresie międzywojennym', *Rocznik Mazowiecki*, 21 (2009), pp. 127-39.

[40]Böhler, *Auftakt,* p.129.

order Bock repeated the instruction that military-age civilian Poles and Jews 'be very speedily detained and taken away'. [41]



Map 1. German 228th Infantry Division in Poland, 1939. A denotes the area annexed by the Reich, B the *Generalgouvernement*, C the Soviet zone. The division's occupation area bordering the Soviets is in grey. Scale: approx. 10 km to 1 cm. *Source: Author.*

As 228ID and flanking units advanced, settlements in their path were subjected to depredations. When correlated with Jewish sources, the division's own records and those of II Corps provide us with evidence of these events.[42] Sierpc was a town of

[41]Datner, Gumkowski, and Leszczyński, *Crimes,* pp. 14-17; Böhler, *Auftakt,* pp. 128-30, 152; NARA, T-314, II AK Abt. Qu., BAV 8.9.1939.

[42]Grynberg, *Żydzi,* pp. 33; CAW, 152-60, 228. Inf. Division, Abt. Ia, Divisionsbefehl für den 10.9.1939 (Divisionsbefehl Drobin), Divisionsbefehl für die Fortsetzung des

some 15,000 (one-third Jews). Thirty-second Infantry Division (32ID) in II Corps was a few kilometres to 228ID's right and was first in. Second Corps' HQ joined 32ID there on 9 September. Jewish residents were beaten and the synagogue burned. A Jew who tried to dowse the flames was shot and Ringelblum records how the cry went up: '*Noch einmal, der Hund lebt noch'* (again, the dog is still alive). On 10 September 228ID was just four kilometres away when 600 Poles and Jews were arrested and Sierpc became the site of a 'concentration camp' holding over 1,000 civilian Poles and Jews. The next day 228ID passed through Sierpc as it advanced to Drobin and Raciąż. At Drobin the divisional *Feldgendarmerie*, in accordance with Bock's orders, assembled hundreds of civilian male Poles and Jews who were marched thirty-seven kilometres back to Sierpc and kept for six days. The divisional military police must have been stretched, for the following day the division's BAV stipulated that new internees and POWs were to remain with the troops.

On 11 September, the division passed through Płońsk (Tresckow annotated the order). This settlement had over 10,400 inhabitants, 47% Jewish.[43] This time the 217th Infantry Division (217ID), the reserve division of Third Army, had arrived first, on its way from Mława. On 5 or 6 September the Jews in Płońsk had met with robberies and abuse and on the 8th some were killed by army men. 'Security units' from 217ID were still in Płońsk on 9 September before being replaced by 32ID's *Feldgendarmerie.* Further east was Nasielsk, where the Jews totalled around one-half of the 6,000 inhabitants. At the end of the first week of September 217ID, which had advanced nearby towards the river Narew, was responsible for the abuse of Nasielsk's Jews, for 'storage' of them in their synagogue, and for shoving them out of the *stetl.*[44] It should be noted that Second Corps HQ itself passed through Płońsk before reaching Nasielsk on the 12th.

German records indicate that on 11 September 217ID was near Serock, where Jews formed some 46% of the 5,400 inhabitants.[45] As no other German unit was close, we can attribute the crimes in Serock to the 217th: the synagogue was desecrated, and the *Torah* was burned and thrust into a latrine. Ringelblum has horrendous accounts

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Vormarsches, 11.9.-13.9.1939 and Ergänzung des Divisionsbefehls für den 12.9.1939; II/27, Abt.Ib, BAV 12.9.1939; 228. Inf. Division, Abt. Ib, BAV, 15.-20 .9.1939, various days, courtesy of Andrzej Wesołowski; NARA, T-314, II AK Abt. Qu., BAV for 8.-13.9.1939, II AK Ia Korpsbefehl for 9.-10.9.1939; Ringelblum, pp. 155-59, 181-85 (account of Cwi Klejnman), 200-03; www.drobin.pl, accessed 4 March 2020, various days; *Gal-Ed: Memorial book to the Community of Racionz*, ed. Ephraim Tsoref, n.d. (copy in ŻIH), pp. 35-39; Miron and Shulhani, *Encyclopedia,* p. 600.

[43]Szczepański, 'Żydowscy mieszkańcy', p.129.

[44]Ringelblum, pp. 155-57

[45]Szczepański, 'Żydowscy mieszkańcy', p. 129.

of beatings, forced labour, and a simulated burial alive. Described in Ringelblum as a 'concentration camp', on the 12th some of Serock's Jewish population were crammed into their synagogue, including women and children, so crowded that there was standing room only. A number of beatings followed.[46] On the 13th and 14th Tresckow with the 228th's command and the bulk of the division moved through Nasielsk and Serock to the river Narew. The Serock Jews would have still been incarcerated in the synagogue as the division passed through.

In Tresckow's ambit

Other army units in Tresckow's area also perpetrated outrages. Notable was the *Panzer-Division Kempf* (*Kempf*) armoured division in I Corps, named for its commander, Brigadier General Werner Kempf. It comprised embedded *SS* including the *SS-Standarte Deutschland* motorised infantry regiment. Anti-Semitic outrages including multiple killings are recorded at Ciechanów (14,000-plus inhabitants, over 4,600 Jews), and Pułtusk (15,500, 6,400 Jews).[47] So too for Przasznysz, Krasnosielc, and Goworowo.[48] Ostrów Mazowiecka was also a scene of mass executions.[49] Third Army's *EG*, *EG* V, followed closely behind the advancing troops. It perpetrated the usual killings of 'elite' Poles. Also, as Böhler reports, '*EG* V in particular embarked on a reign of terror [of] shootings, looting, arson and systematic expulsion [of] the Jewish population'. After the first week in September *EG* V teams were based for periods in Mława, Ciechanów, Przasznysz, Raciąż, Płońsk, Pułtusk, Serock, and Ostrów.[50] The *EG* worked closely with the army. In Grudziądz, where it overlapped with Tresckow and

[46]Ringelblum, p. 158.

[47]Zalewski, *Atlas*; Aksamitowski and Zalewski, *Mława,* pp. 27-69; Grynberg, *Żydzi*, p. 30; Benjamin Apel in Jizkor-buch fun der Ciechanower Jidiszer Kehile (Tel-Aviv, 1962); Miron and Shulhani, *Encyclopedia,* p. 117; Janusz Szczepański, *Dzieje Pułtuska,* Tom II*, 1795-1989*, (Pułtusk: Wydawnictwa Akademickie, 2017), pp. 340-42; Warsaw, Polin Museum of Polish Jews, Virtual Stetl: Pultusk, accessed 25 October 2019; Ringelblum, pp. 153-54 (account of Cwi Klejnman).

[48]Grynberg, *Żydzi,* pp. 152-60; Böhler, *Auftakt,* pp. 227-30*;* Ringelblum, pp. 148-60; Rossino, *Hitler Strikes*, pp. 105-6. Küchler complained after Goworowo and urged Bock to disband *Kempf*. Kempf became Stauffenberg's commander in *6. Panzer Division*. Ironically in 1948 when Küchler was sentenced to 20 years for crimes in the Soviet theatre Kempf gave exculpatory evidence.

[49]Grynberg, *Żydzi,* pp. 152-60; *Jizkor-buch fun der Jidiszer Kehile in Ostrow Mazowieck*, (Tel-Aviv,1960), accounts of Tuwia Makower (ex-secretary of the *Kehilla* or Jewish community of Ostrów), Jakub Widelec, Benjamin Goldsztajn, Jehuda Gutgold, et al.; Schulz,'Zichenau'.

[50]Matthäus, Böhler, and Mallmann, *War, Pacification*, pp. 36, 235; Lehnstaedt and Böhler, *Berichte*, pp. 50-301; Böhler, 'Ordinary Clerks'; Mallmann, Böhler, and Matthäus, *Einsatzgruppen,* pp. 56, 163, 235.

228ID's movements, it took hostages at the army's behest and prepared to expel Jews. In Mława, a sizeable place of 19,600-plus including over 6,100 Jews, it massacred and burned. Jews from Mława and Przasznysz were expelled under agreements on 'emigration' with army commanders when Third Army's HQ and part of *EG* V were both in Przasznysz (9 to 13 September).[51] In that period in Pułtusk the *EG* made mass arrests of Poles and Jews. Jews were forced out across the Narew and many drowned. On the 13th, II Corps with Tresckow's division passed back to Third Army, and on 14 September Third Army's orders noted with approval that 'police' were active in respect of '*suspicious persons*' (italics added) and were interning Poles and Jews. Later *EG* V was 'controlling' refugees pursuant to an order (*Anweisung*) from Third Army, while *Feldgendarmerie* were corralling civilian Poles and Jews of military age. Jewish men were marched thirty-three kilometres from Serock to Pułtusk by the *EG*, the stragglers were killed. There followed a death *run* of forty-two kilometres to Ciechanów, whence the survivors were expelled.[52]

From mid-September rear echelon troops from 228ID and other units besieging Modlin were traversing the few metalled roads to Nasielsk, Płońsk, Raciąż, and Drobin. This was a major supply axis, doubtless also drawn on by the *EG*. Second Corps had moved to Zegrze, where it remained for the siege. For a time *EG* V had an offshoot in Zegrze while its HQ was a few kilometres distant at Serock. Tresckow with 228th's command was in Wieliszew during the siege, only a few kilometres from Zegrze and from *EG* V's base. During this period the *EG* continued to murder and steal.[53] There was further interaction between *EG* V and army in the guise of *Panzer-Division Kempf* in Płońsk, scene of a massacre of Poles and Jews, and in Raciąż. Both townships saw expulsions when the route for expellees led through 228ID's positions.[54]

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[51]Lehnstaedt and Böhler, *Berichte*, pp. 50-301; Zalewski, *Atlas.*

[52]**Szczepański, *Dzieje,*** pp. 340-42; Lehnstaedt and Böhler, *Berichte*, pp. 50-301; Rossino, *Hitler Strikes*, pp. 103-09; Ringelblum, pp. 157-78 ; Schulz, 'Zichenau', p. 265; Miron and Shulhani, *Encyclopedia,* p. 623.

[53]CAW, II/2/7, 228. Inf. Division, Abt. Ib, BAV 12.-28.9.1939, various days; NARA, T-314, II AK Abt. Qu., BAV for 8.-13.9.1939, various days, II AK Ia Korpsbefehl für den 10.9.1939; Lehnstaedt and Böhler, *Berichte*, pp. 50-301; Zalewski, *Atlas;* Ringelblum, p. 143*;* Prince Maciej Radziwiłł, grandson of Prince Konstanty Radziwiłł of Zegrze, pers. comm., 2 September 2020.

[54]https://www.yadvashem.org/yv/en/exhibitions/communities/plonsk/during_holocaust.asp accessed October 2019, various days; Tomasz Stempowski, "Bezinteresownie wyznaczony cel': Udział niemieckiej Tajnej Policji Państwowej w represjonowaniu ludności polskiej, eksterminacji Żydów oraz zwalczaniu konspiracji na ziemiach polskich wcielonych do Rzeszy Niemieckiej od września 1939 r. do grudnia 1943 r. w albumie SS-Oberscharführera Hermanna Baltruschata' in Jacek Sawicki and Jochen Böhler, eds., *Kariera SS-Oberscharführera Hermanna Baltruschata 1939–1943*: *Album*

During *Yom Kippur* (22-23 September) there was a pogrom plus desecrations of the *Torah* in the supply *stetl* of Drobin. Army logistics people were using Drobin as a base and *EG* V were active in the area, so either or both could have been responsible. Third Army HQ and part of *EG* V were together in Ostrów when other obscene *Yom Kippur* 'celebrations' were staged.[55] From the 22nd to the 28th further thousands of Pułtusk Jews were shunted across the Narew, first by *EG* V, then by EG IV attached to Fourth Army. Vaginas were searched for valuables, beatings, drownings, and mass shootings ensued, then a trek of over thirty kilometres to Wyszków accompanied by the usual killings of stragglers.[56] On 29 September, just after its excesses at Pułtusk, *EG* IV bivouacked alongside elements of 228ID in Jabłonna. This *EG* was on its way to 'pacify' Warsaw. That day too *EG* V reported to Berlin that its 'arrests of the Polish educated class, priests etc., continued'. It went on report: 'Jews were pushed over the demarcation line in large columns'.[57] Towards the end of September Third Army HQ troops witnessed an 'undisciplined' second major expulsion by *EG* V of Jews from Mława.[58] In the period to 2 October *EG* V boasted of making over 1,300 arrests and, given its standing orders from Hitler and Heydrich and its previous record, it is reasonable to assume that many if not most were shot.[59]

The Fall of Modlin

From 14 September 228ID with other units invested Modlin, a strong fortress system at the confluence of the Vistula and Narew. Modlin's garland of 19th century forts were supplemented by modern defences. With Warsaw, it formed a redoubt for Poland (see Map 1). The 24,000 defenders, latterly commanded by Brigadier General Wiktor Thommée, held a perimeter approximately fifteen kilometres by fifteen, including the towns of Zakroczym and Nowy Dwór Mazowiecki (Map 2). The Germans were under Lieutenant General Adolf Strauss, commander of II Corps, and numbered up to 70,000. Over the following two weeks 228ID and *Panzer-Division*

fotograficzny funkcjonariusza Einsatzgruppe i Geheime Staatspolizei na ziemiach polskich wcielonych do Rzeszy, (Warsaw: Niemiecki Instytut Historyczny, 2014), pp. 72-75; Jochen Böhler, 'Die heile Welt des Eduard Schmidt' in Böhler and Lehnstaedt, eds., *Gewalt*, pp. 89-116.

[55]*Jizkor-buch fun Ostrow;* Ringelblum, pp. 142-43; Grynberg, *Żydzi,* p. 32.

[56]Szczepański, *Dzieje,* pp. 340-42; https://sztetl.org.pl/en/towns/p/599-pultusk accessed October 2019, various days; Ringelblum, pp. 153-54, account of Cwi Klejnman.

[57]Lehnstaedt and Böhler, *Berichte*, p.271.

[58]Böhler, *Auftakt*, pp. 219-20. Bizarrely, Küchler urged that EG V be withdrawn. The matter escalated but Heydrich and Hitler took no action.

[59]Lehnstaedt and Böhler, *Berichte,* pp. 50-301.

Kempf made repeated unsuccessful assaults supported by heavy artillery and carpet and dive bombing attacks by the *Luftwaffe*.[60]



Map 2. Siege of Modlin 14-29 September 1939, synthesis. *MODLIN TWIERDZA* is the core fortress with Nowy Dwór to its southeast. The Polish perimeter includes forts (Roman numbers) and concrete emplacements (Arabic). Zakroczym and Fort III are connected by anti-tank and wire defences. Polish designations include DP for *dywizja piechoty*, infantry division, and pp for *pułk piechoty*, infantry regiment. The bulk of 228ID is to the East as '*228 DP*', 32ID is '*32 DP*". At A., 228ID deployed IR400, anti-tank and reconnaissance units *Panzerabwehr-Abteilung 228* and *Aufklärungs-Abteilung 228*, and part of *Artillerie-Regiment 228.* Polish units at B. were principally 8th Infantry Division, at C. 32nd Infantry Regiment, at D. 56th Infantry Regiment, at E. elements of 8th and 30th Infantry Divisions. Zakroczym to Olszewnica Nowa is approx.16 kilometres. *Source: Author, after Ryszard Gołąb, with permission.*

[60]Initial reliance solely on Tresckow's division suggests that there was a great underestimation of Modlin. The 228th, *Kempf,* and 32ID were ultimately bolstered by elements of XV Corps and X Corps, and by 300-plus aircraft. Ryszard Bochenek, *Twierdza Modlin,* (Warsaw: Bellona, 2003), pp. 331-418; Ryszard Gołąb, *Ilustrowana Monografia Miasta Nowego Dworu Mazowieckiego z Historią Twierdzy Modlin,* (Nowy Dwór Mazowiecki: Burmistrz Miasta Nowy Dwór Mazowiecki, 2006), pp. 312-51; Zawilski, *Bitwy*, pp. 619-31, 728-33; Janusz Ledwoch, *Polskie Pociągi Pancerne* (Warsaw: Militaria, 2021), pp. 36-37.

From mid-September Warsaw was also under siege. Given the exhaustion of supplies and to avoid more civilian suffering, Warsaw's command signed a cease fire on 27 September at 1400, pending negotiation of a surrender. In consequence, before 0100 on 28 September the two sides at Modlin also agreed a ceasefire, from 0600 that day. It was agreed that the Poles were to hoist white flags and negotiations for a handover on the 29th were to follow. Using Andrzej Wesołowski's account supplemented by further Polish, Jewish, and German records it can be seen that the fall of Modlin saw crimes involving II Corps, *Kempf,* 32ID, the divisional command team of which Tresckow was a member, and 228ID as a whole. II Corps was grossly derelict in failing to advise its formations of the ceasefire, and of its confirmation by the Poles via a flag II Corps HQ saw clearly on the citadel. The temporary absence of additional white flags on outlying forts was used to justify attacks by *Kempf,* 32ID, and IR400, which continued even after local flags were seen. Although ready to surrender the Poles naturally, and legally, resisted.[61]

At 0615 *Kempf* and elements of IR400 assaulted Fort I and Zakroczym. *Kempf* claimed to have heard of the ceasefire only at 0645 and reported that it saw no flags. Further east 32ID began to shell Fort III before 0600, at 0545 it too advanced. Its *Kriegstagebuch* or war diary claimed that II Corps advised it of the ceasefire at 0700. Fort III had raised its flag soon after 0630, Fort I followed. *Kempf* persisted in bloody assaults after it reported seeing local flags at 0840-0850. It penetrated Fort I as late as 0906 hours while in 32ID's area fighting continued even later.[62]

The flawed German communications were highlighted by a Captain in 6th Company in IR400, which with 3rd Company was attacking alongside *Kempf*. This officer initially claimed ignorance of the ceasefire. However, when he saw white flags *überall* before 0800 he halted but Third Company carried on, suffering further casualties. The Captain shouted to a Polish officer, whereupon firing ceased. The German telephoned IR400's

[61]Andrzej Wesołowski, 'Kapitulacja Modlina we wrześniu 1939 r. w świetle materiałów niemieckich', *Rocznik Archiwalno-Historyczny Centralnego Archiwum Wojskowego* 2/21 (2009): pp. 133-68; Andrzej Wesołowski, '36. Pułk Piechoty Legii Akademickiej w obronie odcinka „Pomiechowek" (14-28 września 1939 r.)', *Niepodległość i Pamięć*, 16/2 (30), 2009: pp. 178-83; Zawilski, *Bitwy,* pp. 728-33; Herbert Drescher, *Warschau und Modlin 1939: Berichte und Dokumente,* (Pforzheim: self published, 1991), p. 868; BA-MA, RH 19 II/3, Kriegstagebuch AOK 3.

[62]Wesołowski, 'Kapitulacja'; Wesołowski, '36. Pulk Piechoty'; Zawilski, *Bitwy,* pp. 728-32*;* Adam Rzadkowski, '2 Dywizja Piechoty Legionów' in *Wielka Księga Piechoty Polskiej 1918-1939,* (Warsaw: Edipresse, 2016), pp. 31-2; Włodzimierz Parfieniuk, '32 Pułk Piechoty' in *Zarys Historii Wojennej Pułków Polskich w Kampanii Wrześniowej,* (Pruszków: n.d).

command, which in turn interrogated the 228ID HQ. Only then did IR400 learn of the armistice. This sequence of events confirms an extraordinary degree of negligence at II Corps, compounded by culpable insouciance by 228ID HQ and Tresckow. The division remained silent vis à vis its IR400 even after II Corps had belatedly advised it of the ceasefire and Polish agreement. Third Army later praised the 'heroic' capture of the forts, which were of course surrendering.[63]

The aftermath of Modlin

Following the final surrender~~ed~~ of Zakroczym and Fort I, *Kempf* murdered hundreds of men of the Polish army. The Zakroczym massacre was arguably the greatest crime against the Polish military in 1939. In the absence of German records, we rely on the accounts of survivors who described the piecemeal shootings. The consensus among Polish historians is that 500 POWs plus 100 Polish and Jewish civilians were killed. Wesołowski concludes that

> For understandable reasons there is no mention of [all] this in the report by Adolf Strauss to Third Army, made on 30 September... Instead, he stressed that the defenders had delivered extraordinarily tough resistance [*ausserordentlich hartnäckigen Widerstand*], which caused high levels of casualties among the attackers.[64]

The men in IR400 fighting alongside *Kempf* and possibly other 228ID units would have seen the murders, if not participated in them. On 29 September IR400 with its fellow IR356 occupied Nowy Dwór. The town originally had over 9,400 inhabitants, 4,300 of

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[63]BA-MA, RH 37/3094, Mit der 6. Kompagnie des Schöpffer-Rgt (IR400) von Elbing bis Warschau (Polenfeldzug 1939); Parfieniuk, '32 Pułk'; CAW, 228. Inf. Division, Abt. Ia, 28.9.1939, Divisionsbefehl für die Besetzung des Ostteils der Festung Modlin am 29.9.39 with Bedingungen für die Übergabe von Modlin signed by Tresckow (Divisionsbefehl Modlin), courtesy of Andrzej Wesołowski; Andrzej Wesołowski, pers. comm., 14 April 2018. Tresckow's Divisionsbefehl Modlin was distributed later on the 28th. This did not preclude II Corps and 228ID giving advice before 0600 on the 28th, and during the final combat that morning.

[64]Datner, *Zbrodnie,* pp. 76-77; Wesołowski, 'Kapitulacja'; Gołąb, *Monografia,* pp. 350-51, 452-53; Zawilski, *Bitwy,* pp. 728-32; Grynberg, *Żydzi,* pp. 152-60; Parfieniuk, '32 Pulk'; Drescher, *Warschau und Modlin*, p. 870; Ringelblum, pp. 145-47. Sources include Lieutenant Colonel Bronisław Laliczyński's report to Thommée ('numerous hundreds'), and Colonel Ludwik Czyżewski. Ringelblum records murders of 150 'defenders of Zakroczym' and of 15 local Poles and Jews including children, and notes that Zakroczym was put to the torch. The commander of *SS-Standarte Deutschland, SS Standartenführer* Felix Steiner, was also responsible for later crimes. He became famous around Berlin in 1945. He was arrested but escaped trial.

them Jews. Many remained. The order to the division for that day, personally signed by Tresckow, illegally distinguished between POWs and male Polish and Jewish civilian prisoners (*Zivilgefangene*) aged from 17 to 50 (sic). In Nowy Dwór 228ID troops randomly killed Jews, plundered, closed Jewish institutions, and razed buildings including the synagogue. They drove Jews to forced labour, including cleaning latrines by hand. On 3 October II Corps ended mass internment.[65]

Tresckow continued to serve in 228ID until 22 October. On 9 October the division joined XXVI Corps in Third Army and the next day it began to occupy an area some sixty-five kilometres by forty-five encompassing Przasznysz, Ostrołęka, and Wyszków, with the German-Soviet line as eastern boundary (see Map 1). 228ID was to 'pacify' the area and secure the demarcation line.[66] The previous day Hitler had decreed the annexation of about one-half of the area to the Reich, as part of *Regierungsbezirk Zichenau*. On 12 October Hitler went on to order the formation of a rump German-run Polish territory termed *Generalgouvernement* (GG), to embrace the rest of the area which 228ID was occupying. In the meantime, military rule continued, for the *Führer's* decrees did not come into force until 26 October. 228ID HQ with Tresckow as senior staff officer ordered divisional components such as local *Ortskommandanturen* to support *Landräte* administrators under the CdZ establishing themselves in Przasznysz, Ostrołęka, Maków, Ostrów, and Pułtusk. Divisional HQ also issued dispositions on Jews. 228ID was expected to facilitate expulsions, and to help in blocking attempts to (re) enter. With other relevant units it had received an order from OKH of 30 September via II Corps which noted, 'The aim is to prevent undesirable Polish elements, especially Jews, crossing into German-occupied territory...' Robberies and displacements eastwards of Jews from Ostrołęka and hinterland began on 6 October. This embraced some 7,000 people in the division's area. Ostrołęka itself was thereupon declared *Judenrein*, free of Jews. From 15 October divisional HQ was in Ostrów, and during the month Ostrów's 6,000 remaining Jews were also driven to the Soviets. Expropriations and expulsions also began of Poles from the future Reich area to the GG. By the end of 1941 those displaced were to total around 91,500.[67] During Tresckow's time as a senior officer in 228ID Polish and

[65]Divisionsbefehl Modlin; Miron and Shulhani, *Encyclopedia*, p. 531; *Pinkas Nowi-Dwor,* (Tel-Aviv, 1965), accounts of A. Goldbroch, and W. Szlamowicz; unpublished Aneks (Annex) to Ringelblum, courtesy of Magdalena Siek of ŻIH*;* Böhler, *Auftakt,* pp. 216-21; NARA, II AK, Abt. Qu., BAV 2.10.1939.

[66]Böhler, 'Ordinary Clerks'; CAW, 11/2/4, 228. Inf. Division, Abt. Ia, Divisionsbefehl 9.-17.10.1939, various days (Occupation Divisionsbefehle); NARA, II AK, Abt. Qu., BAV 29.9.-10.10.1939, various days, and Abt.Ic, 30.9.1939 (OKH Blockage order).

[67]BA-MA, Pers. 6/1980, AOK 2, Henning v. Tresckow, Beurteilung zum 1.4.1944; Occupation Divisionsbefehle; OKH Blockage order; Maria Wardzyńska, *Wysiedlenia ludności polskiej z okupowanych ziem polskich włączonych do III Rzeszy w latach 1939-*

Jewish culture was suppressed, churches and synagogues closed, and systematic theft proceeded of governmental assets and Polish and Jewish private property. From 20 October, with Tresckow still formally in post, 228ID was ordered to central Warsaw where until May 1940 it was the principal army unit in the Polish capital.[68] During this period the German regime pursued extreme terror and exploitation of Poles and Jews, and laid plans to establish the Warsaw Ghetto.[69]

Reconstructing the trajectory

Scholars continue to grapple with the factors which drove the *frondeurs* to dissent and Tresckow's path has been notably controversial. This account of 1939 fills the last major gap in the historical record. In Poland 228ID and the units around it perpetrated a range of crimes. The anti-Jewish acts were prolific and homicidal, even by the tragic measure of that year, and were harbingers of the Holocaust. Brauchitsch's order to the army to avoid *EG* shootings shows that many of the events were universally known. Given Tresckow's shared contacts with neighbouring entities and superior echelons, his network of peers in other divisions and his logistics men and despatch riders criss-crossing the hinterland we cannot doubt that Tresckow knew exactly what was happening.

We lack direct evidence of his involvement in criminality – in large part due to the prevailing *omertà* or code of silence – but in contrast, indirect signs abound. As senior staff officer Tresckow shared responsibility for the actions of his division. He was duty bound to have it support the *EG*, and there is no evidence of demurral. Divisional dispositions, some signed personally, locate his unit alongside atrocities. He ordered his people to Drobin where they forced civilian Poles and Jews to trek for thirty-seven kilometres.[70] He admitted failure to feed POWs and civilian captives.[71] He failed to

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1945, (Warsaw: IPN, 2017), p. 428; Witold Sienkiewicz and Grzegorz Hrycuk, eds., *Wysiedlenia, wypędzenia i ucieczki 1939-1959, Atlas ziem Polski,* (Warsaw: Demart, 2008), p. 63; Böhler, *Auftakt*, pp. 216-17.

[68]Szczepański, *Społeczność,* p. 398; Bogumił Rudawski, *Grabież mienia w Kraju Warty 1938-1945,* (Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, 2018), pp. 20-35; Grynberg, *Żydzi,* pp. 30, 33-35; https://sztetl.org.pl/en/towns/o/53-ostrow-mazowiecka accessed 31 October 2019; Lehnstaedt and Böhler, *Berichte,* p. 271; Schulz, 'Zichenau', pp. 267-68; Böhler,'Ordinary Clerks'; CAW, 11/2/4, 228. Inf. Division, Abt. Ia, Divisionsbefehl 9.-17.10.1939; Wardzyńska, *Wysiedlenia,* pp. 140-321; Lehnstaedt, *Okkupation*, pp. 89, 278-9.

[69]Krzysztof Dunin-Wąsowicz, *Warszawa w latach 1939-1945,* (Warsaw: PWN, 1984), pp. 45-67, 280-83.

[70]Divisionsbefehl Drobin.

[71]Erfahrungsbericht.

inform his fighting troops of the Modlin ceasefire.[72] He directed troops from the Zakroczym mass-murder site to Nowy Dwór where he ordered his people to detain civilians and where they perpetrated a pogrom.[73] His division carried out the instruction by OKH to block Poles and Jews returning from Soviet-occupied Poland.[74] Tresckow's HQ ordered 228ID to work with CdZ entities which were unlawfully liquidating the Polish state, stealing, running ethnic cleansing, and preparing for German colonisation.[75]

Although hardly exculpation, Tresckow may have been insensitive to the revolutionary nature of the events of 1939.[76] John Horne and Alan Kramer, and Isobel Hull, have shown how Germany's military culture held a predilection for extreme violence, and was obsessed with purported civilian resistance. Robert Citino has deconstructed the single-minded 'German way of war'.[77] Rossino, Böhler, and others confirm that in 1939 *Freischärlerwahn*, POW shootings, and mass civilian arrests were a continuation the German military 'tradition' in which Tresckow was embedded. They and other

[72]BA-MA, RH 37/3094, Mit der 6. Kompagnie des Schöpffer-Rgt (IR400) von Elbing bis Warschau (Polenfeldzug 1939); Wesołowski, 'Kapitulacja Modlina'.
[73]Divisionsbefehl Modlin, *Pinkas Nowi-Dwor;* Aneks (Annex) to Ringelblum,
[74]OKH Blockage order.
[75]Occupation Divisionsbefehle.
[76]Scheurig, *Tresckow*, pp. 79, 83, 87. In 1939-40 the *frondeurs'* putative Interior Minister Fritz-Dietlof Count von der Schulenburg ran ethnic cleansing in Upper Silesia: Poland was to be cleared of Poles and Jews and peopled with Germans. In later putschist thinking the Reich was to retain Austria, Alto Adige, Sudetenland, and western Poland. A rump Poland and a Czech neo-*Protektorat* were to be German puppets. Matthew Olex-Szczytowski, 'The German Military Opposition and National Socialist Crimes, 1939-1944: The Cases of Stauffenberg, Tresckow, and Schulenburg', *War in History* 28 (2), April 2021, pp. 380-404; Hoffmann, *Brüder*, p. 357; Hans Rothfels, 'Zwei aussenpolitische Memoranden der deutschen Opposition (Frühjahr 1942)', *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* (VfZ) 4 (1957), pp. 388-97; 'Geheime Denkschrift Goerdelers vom 26.3.1943 für die Generalität bestimmt, über die Notwendigkeit eines Staatstreiches' in anon. ed., *20. Juli 1944,* (Freiburg: Herder, 1961), p. 70; Gedenkstätte Deutscher Widerstand, *Scheitern des Umsturzes: Auslandskontakte*, (Berlin, n.d.).
[77]John Horne and Alan Kramer, *German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial,* (New Haven, CT: Yale, 2001), pp. 13, 33, 49, 64, 74-76,103,123-29,132,135,158,162-67; Isobel Hull, *Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany,* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell, 2005), pp. 33, 93-130, 208-62; Robert Citino, *The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years War to the Third Reich,* (Lawrence, KS: Kansas, 2005), pp. 256-67.

scholars also note that hatred of Poles and Jews was widespread in German society and in the military.[78]

It should be noted that during other stages of his career Tresckow was aware of criminality and collaborated. Before the war he went along with increasingly vicious anti-Jewish policies (Jews were excluded from the then *Reichswehr* in early 1934) without any sign of protest.[79] From late 1940 Tresckow was with AG Centre's staff in Poznań, in an annexed part of Poland where the elite had been liquidated, 280,000 Poles had been robbed and expelled, and 460,000 Jews had been robbed and thrust into ghettos. The remaining Poles were subjected to extreme terror and German colonisation was in full swing. Then for months prior to the attack on the Soviets, AG Centre's HQ with Tresckow was in Warsaw. Alongside atrocious repression of the city's Poles, another 460,000 starving Jews had been crammed into its notorious ghetto. Obscenely, this functioned as a semi-obligatory 'tourist' destination for the German military.[80] None of this appears in conventional German accounts of Tresckow and his confrères.

As noted earlier, latterly German scholars have contested the once-canonical notion that Tresckow began to conspire in 1941 in 'shock' at *EG* shootings of Jews as Jews. These massacres might have served as an extra trigger, but his record in the Soviet theatre renders it unlikely that they were a major motivator. What we now know

[78]Timothy Snyder, *Black Earth*, p. 105; Rossino, *Hitler Strikes,* pp. 1-28,153-226; Böhler, *Auftakt,* pp. 154-80. Tresckow's widow implied his insensitivity when reporting his (partial) knowledge of EG atrocities only, not his or the army's. Scheurig, *Tresckow,* p. 83.

[79]A collection of essays was recently supported by the Federal German government: Ekkehard Klausa, *Das wiedererwachte Gewissen: Konservative im Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus,* (Berlin: Lukas, 2019). Klausa is indulgent on the anti-Semitism of conservative conspirators, who sought exclusion and expulsion for Germany's Jews: 'Ganz normale Deutsche. Das Judenbild des konservativen Widerstandes', pp. 97-120. In 'Preussische Soldatentradition und Widerstand: Das Postdamer Infanterieregiment 9 zwischen dem 'Tag von Potsdam' und dem 20. Juli 1944', pp. 81-96, he absolves the 'aristocratic' regiment that spawned Tresckow, Schulenburg, and other *frondeurs,* 9th Infantry (né Prussian 1st Foot Guards). Its enthusiasm for Hitler is unremarkable, its crimes in the Soviet Union go unmentioned.

[80]Agnieszka Łuczak and Aleksandra Pietrowicz, *Polityczne oczyszczenie gruntu: Zagłada polskich Elit w Wielkopolsce (1939-1941)/Politische Flurbereinigung: Die Vernichtung der Polnischen Eliten in Grosspolen (1939-1941),* (Poznań: IPN, 2009), p. 9; Sienkiewicz and Hrycuk, eds., *Atlas Ziem*, pp. 64-65; Lehnstaedt, *Okkupation,* pp. 89, 278-79,292; Mion and Shulani, eds., *Encyclopedia*; Tomasz Szarota, *Okupowanej Warszawy Dni Powszednie,* (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1988); Wardzyńska, *Wysiedlenia*; Rudawski, *Grabież,* pp. 20-35.

about Tresckow in Poland in 1939 (and 1940-41) reinforces the import of his 'Soviet' experiences after the invasion. His actions that year when head of operations in AG Centre were the subject of a vehement 'Tresckow debate', which came to a head in 2010.[81] After seventeen contributions, many in the *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, German researchers showed that AG Centre's own massacres were ordered and reported through Tresckow's team. Field Marshal Fedor von Bock, the AG commander, and Tresckow initialled 'their' *EG*'s death tallies.[82] Bizarrely, though, the dispute was silent on Soviet POWs. During Tresckow's time as its head of operations, AG Centre began killing perhaps a million of them via exhaustion, starvation, exposure, and disease.[83] If during the 2010 debate there was, perhaps unsurprisingly, no allusion

[81]The culmination is in Manuel Becker, Holger Löttel and Christoph Studt, eds., *Der militärische Widerstand gegen Hitler im Lichte neuer Kontroversen: XXI Königswinterer Tagung der Forschungsgemeinschaft 20. Juli*, (Berlin: LIT, 2010). A summary is in Olex-Szczytowski, 'Military Opposition'.

[82]Notable contributions included Klaus Arnold, 'Verbrecher aus eigener Initiative? Der 20. Juli 1944 und die Thesen Christian Gerlachs', *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht*, 1 (2002), pp. 20-3; Johannes Hürter, 'Auf dem Weg zur Militäropposition. Tresckow, Gersdorff, der Vernichtungskrieg und der Judenmord. Neue Dokumente über das Verhältnis der Heeresgruppe Mitte und der Einsatzgruppe B im Jahr 1941', VfZ, 3 (2004), p. 533; Felix Römer, 'Das Heeresgruppenkommando Mitte und der Vernichtungskrieg im Sommer 1941', VfZ, 3 (2005), pp. 451-60; Johannes Hürter and Felix Römer, 'Alte und neue Geschichtsbilder von Widerstand und Ostkrieg. Zu Hermann Graml's Beitrag 'Massenmord und Militäropposition'', VfZ, 2 (2006), pp. 301-22; Felix Römer, ''Im alten Deutschland wäre solcher Befehl nicht möglich gewesen'. Rezeption, Adaption und Umsetzung des Kriegsgerichtsbarkeitserlasses im Ostheer in 1941/42', VfZ 1 (2008), pp. 53-99; Felix Römer, *Der Kommissarbefehl: Wehrmacht und NS-Verbrechen an der Ostfront 1941/2*, (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2008), pp. 108, 335, 452-66, 561; Felix Römer, 'The Wehrmacht in the War of Ideologies: The Army and Hitler's Criminal Orders on the Eastern Front', in Alex J. Kay, Jeff Rutherford, and David Stahel, eds., *Nazi Policy on the Eastern Front: Total War, Genocide, and Radicalization,* (Rochester NY: Rochester, 2012), pp. 73-100; Johannes Hürter, 'Militäropposition und Judenmord bei der Heeresgruppe Mitte im Sommer und Herbst 1941' in Becker, Löttel and Studt, eds., *Widerstand,* pp. 135-60; Günther Gillessen, 'Tresckow und der Entschluss zum Hochverrat: Ein Nachschau zur Kontroverse über die Motive' and Johannes Hürter, 'Entgegnung auf Günther Gillessen,' VfZ, 3 (2010), pp. 365-89; Danny Orbach, 'Criticism reconsidered: The German Resistance to Hitler in Critical German Scholarship', *The Journal of Military History* 75 (2011), pp. 1-26.

[83]Christian Gerlach, 'Die Verantwortung der Wehrmachtführung: Vergleichende Betrachtungen am Beispiel der Sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen' in Christian Hartmann, Johannes Hürter and Ulrike Jureit, eds., *Verbrechen der Wehrmacht: Bilanz einer Debatte*, (Munich: Beck, 2005), pp. 40-49. Up to 3.3 million Soviet POWs perished.

to Poland in 1939 or later, there was also no mention of Tresckow's subsequent career. Shortly before the failed putsch of July 1944, in March 1944, while Chief of Staff in Second Army, his subordinates contributed to the deaths of up to nine thousand civilians out of over forty thousand they had herded into camps. Then, in June 1944, Tresckow signed orders for the deportation of some fifty thousand Polish and Ukrainian children for slave labour and 'germanisation'.[84]

Conclusions

The academic historiography has developed, but public faith in Germany in the unalloyed virtue of the leading military *frondeurs* stays strong. Officialdom commemorates the putsch in a manner underscoring its role as psychological and political counterweight to the crimes of National Socialism.[85] The spirit of the 'clean *Wehrmacht*' lingers and there are differences between aspects of the official narrative and the understanding of many German and international specialists.[86] The prevailing tenor was seen in 2019 when a major new biography of Stauffenberg concluded that the goal of the conspirators was to preserve the power of the Reich, not to save its victims. This conclusion would be unremarkable outside Germany, but the author, Thomas Karlauf, took withering fire from some German academics and in the serious media.[87] Tresckow is similarly defended. His public persona remains that of decent Prussian officer, reactionary but 'not too much so'. This was seen in 2019 in the

[84]Dieter Pohl, *Die Herrschaft der Wehrmacht: Deutsche Militärbesatzung und einheimische Bevölkerung in der Sowjeunion 1941-1944,* (Munich: Fischer, 2011), p. 328; Christian Gerlach, 'Männer des 20 Juli und der Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion' in Hannes Heer and Klaus Naumann, eds., *Vernichtungskrieg: Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941 bis 1944*, (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1995), p. 139.

[85]Defence Ministers Ursula von der Leyen and Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, and Chancellor Angela Merkel, showed this in speeches in 2018-20. Memorial sites such as the *Gedenkstätte Deutscher Widerstand* in Berlin are exclusively hagiographic. Federal, *Land*, and city governments support exhibits, literature, and symposiums troubling in their historical selectivity. See Notes 55, 63, 64, and 65.

[86]See David Stahel, 'The Battle for Wikipedia: The New Age of 'Lost Victories'', *Journal of Slavic Military Studies,* 31, 3, (2018), pp. 396-402. Stahel reports worrying repeated alterations to Wikipedia entries revivifying the 'clean *Wehrmacht*' myth.

[87]Richard Evans expressed it in 'Sein wahres Gesicht', *Süddeutsche Zeitung Magazin*, 4, 21 January 2009, pp. 8-10, and was duly attacked. In *Stauffenberg: Porträt eines Attentäters*, (Munich: Blessing, 2019) Karlauf deploys Max Weber: Stauffenberg is a pragmatic *Verantwortungsethiker,* not moralising *Gesinnungsethiker*. Acerbic criticism of Karlauf is exemplified in Hans-Christoph Kraus, 'Ein zeitgemässtes Bild Stauffenbergs? Bemerkungen zu einer neuen Biographie', lecture on 4 July 2019 at a symposium at the *Militärhistorisches Museum* in Dresden**,** supported by the premier and *Land* of Saxony.

Bundeswehr's 75th anniversary exhibition at its *Militärhistorisches Museum* in Dresden (MHM).[88] On 20 July 2020 Defence Minister Kramp-Karrenbauer hailed Tresckow as the opposition's 'leading military thinker'.[89] It remains to be seen whether the evidence-based perspectives of academic historians can come to modulate the accepted public perception.

Meanwhile, Tresckow's experiences set forth here should aid researchers further to deconstruct the *fronde* and its motivational drivers. With him, as with Stauffenberg, Schulenburg, and most others, analysts might follow Evans and Karlauf and address the overriding desire to maintain German hegemonic power in Europe.[90] New insights may also come from studies of the continuities between earlier events and the military culture of the Third Reich. Following on from Horne and Kramer, and Hull, German and international scholars are exploring these continuities. This entails placing the Holocaust in global context and recognising the colonial nature of the army's actions in Poland and the Soviet Union in 1939-44. Many scholars have suggested that such aspects have been underplayed in German historiography.[91] Another dimension to consider is legality. As we have seen, the 'clean *Wehrmacht'* trope continues to animate

[88]The catalogue and related essays is Magnus Pahl and Armin Wagner, eds., *Der Führer Adolf Hitler ist Tot. Attentat und Staatstreichversuch am 20. Juli 1944,* (MHM der Bundeswehr/be.bra: Dresden, 2019). Wagner suppresses Tresckow's complicity in 1941 in 'Der 20. Juli 1944: Persönliche Annäherung- Historische Aufarbeitung-Tradition', pp. 11-17. So does the catalogue, p. 123. Pahl contends that Stauffenberg first heard of EG excesses against Jews in May 1942, forgetting the conspirator's documented experiences in 1939 in Poland and in 1941 in Soviet terrain: 'Brillant oder Dilettant? Der Offizier Stauffenberg', pp. 21-31. There is silence on the military's actions in Poland, and on the political and territorial aims of leading *frondeurs* such as Carl Friedrich Goerdeler, Ulrich von Hassell, and Adam von Trott zu Solz.

[89]The *Bundeswehr* runs international missions from its *Henning-von-Tresckow* base in Potsdam. Recent state-supported but one-sided works on Tresckow include Uta von Arentin, *Freiheit und Verantwortung: Henning von Tresckow im Widerstand,* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2015), and Sigrid Grabner and Hendrik Röder, eds., *Henning von Tresckow: Ich bin der ich war*, (Berlin: Lukas, 2017).

[90]Evans, 'Sein wahres Gesicht'; Karlauf, *Porträt.* David Stahel in *Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 253, 388, 395, shows that by the middle of 1941 decision makers in in AG Centre and OKH were very aware that victory was not certain.

[91]Steffen Kläver, *Decolonizing Auschwitz? Komparativ-postkoloniale Ansätze in der Holocaustforschung,* (Berlin: DeGruyterOldenbourg, 2019); Jürgen Zimmerer and Michael Rothberg, 'Enttabuisiert den Vergleich!', *Die Zeit*, 14/2021, 30 March 2021; A. Dirk Moses, 23 May 2021, https://geschichtedergegenwart.ch/der-katechismus-der-deutschen/

the official narrative. It may be uncomfortable for exponents to concede that Tresckow and some confrères *prima facie* committed grave crimes in Hague and Geneva terms, but that is what the record suggests.[92] Had he lived Tresckow would have qualified for arraignment by Allied 'Nuremberg' courts in Germany and Poland for crimes against humanity (involving civilians) and war crimes (against the military), committed directly and under command responsibility.[93] The changing stance of Federal German justice is also relevant. As Annette Weinke and Kerstin Hofmann have reported, for decades it was derelict in pursuing Nazi crimes. They describe how the entity through which the *Länder* still do so, *Zentrale Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen zur Aufklärung nationalsozialistischer Verbrechen* (Ludwigsburg), was subjected to legal sabotage and court-room casuistry.[94] In contrast, in recent years

[92]Col. Winfried Heinemann, chief of staff in 2013-16 of the *Bundeswehr* history unit Zentrum *für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften*, believes that junior officers were ineligible for 'Nuremberg', and that circumstantial evidence did not apply: pers. comm., 12 February 2019. To the contrary, US, British, French, and Polish 'Nuremberg' courts alone tried over 8,200 Germans of all ranks upwards from army private, (*SS*) *Mann*, (*Waffen-SS*) *Schütze,* and equivalents. Paweł Machcewicz and Andrzej Paczkowski, *Wina, Kara, Polityka. Rozliczenia ze zbrodniami II wojny światowej,* (Kraków: ZnakHoryzont, 2021), pp. 109-110,113,115, 273-4.

[93]Evidence from both Poland and the Soviet theatre would have met requirements. *Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals selected and prepared by The United Nations War Crimes Commission,* (London: HMSO, 1949), *XV*: pp. 197-99 ('Rules of Evidence'), also 6-8, 62-63, 78, 143-47, and *XI*: p. 60; *Trials of the War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council law No. 10, October 1945- April 1949,* (Washington, DC: US Government, 1950-52),*11*: pp. 689, 1286-88; Andrew Clapham, 'Issues of Complexity, Complicity, and Complementarity: From the Nuremberg trials to the dawn of the International Criminal Court', in Philippe Sands, ed., *From Nuremberg to the Hague: The Future of International Criminal Justice,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 55; Andrzej Paczkowski, 'Crime, Treason and Greed. The German Wartime Occupation of Poland and Polish Post-War Retributive Justice', in Magnus Brechtken, Władysław Bułhak, and Jürgen Zarusky, eds., *Political and Transitional Justice in Germany, Poland and the Soviet Union from the 1930s to the 1950s,* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2019), pp. 143-47; Machcewicz and Paczkowski, *Wina,* pp. 42-117, 150, 241, 247-99.

[94]From 8 May 1960 Ludwigsburg was blocked from pursuing *Wehrmacht* and other accomplices to crimes committed in Poland before 5 December 1939, due to a Hitler-era edict plus later enactments. Annette Weinke, *Eine Gesellschaft ermittelt gegen sich selbst: Die Geschichte der Zentralen Stelle Ludwigsburg 1958-2008,* (Darmstadt: WBG, 2015), pp. 159, 168, 171; Kerstin Hofmann,*'Ein Versuch nur - immerhin ein Versuch'. Die Zentrale Stelle in Ludwigsburg unter der Leitung von Erwin Schüle und Adalbert Rückerl (1958–1984),* (Berlin: Metropol, 2018);

German judges have radically gained in robustness. Verdicts have been delivered in respect of people 'merely' present where killings occurred, such as low-ranking camp guards. By its standards today German jurisprudence might also have placed Tresckow and other leading military putschists in the dock.[95] These are, of course, hypotheticals but the conspirators have always been judged in the round. After all, Tresckow was to be chief of the German police. His co-plotter and *prima facie* multiple criminal Schulenburg was to be Minister of the Interior. These and other *frondeurs* were expecting to negotiate as political and moral equals with the administrations of President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill.

https://amthauer-rechtsanwaelte.de/die-entwicklung-der-strafverfolgung-von-ns-verbrechen/ accessed March 2021, various dates.

[95]In a pers. comm. on 1 April 2021 the Ludwigsburg head, *Oberstaatsanwalt* (Senior State Attorney) Thomas Will, advised that '[Today] it is […] impossible to prove that someone was involved in a concrete crime'. […] If at all, we can hope to charge people with complicity'. He aims to apply recent precedents to *Wehrmacht* murders of Polish and Soviet POWs, and to the EG in Poland and the Soviet Union. 'We are testing in the case of a still-living Einsatzgruppe member who was in today's Ukraine [...] whether [the precedents apply] to persons known to have belonged to a given Einsatzgruppe, in subordinate roles, without command authority, whom we cannot prove to have joined in any particular killing.'

British Army Cold Weather and Mountain Warfare Training in the Second World War

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ABSTRACT
While the British Army fought the Second World War in the temperate climes of Europe, the deserts of North Africa and the jungles of Malaya and Burma it devoted considerable resources to training and equipping troops to fight in cold weather and mountain warfare. This article will review three different scenarios where the British Army sought to develop units to fight in this specialised environment, the methods they utilised, and the lessons learned from each attempt.

Introduction

Throughout history armies have developed to fight in the conditions particular to their home country. Tactics, equipment and conditioning for North Europeans were very different than for the Berber tribes of Africa or the Sepoys in the jungles of India. Given the scope and breadth of the British Empire its armies have found themselves deployed to almost every environment imaginable. Unlike the French, Germans and Italians, while the British Army has found itself fighting in cold weather and at altitude on numerous occasions, prior to the Second World War it had not implemented any formal, large scale training for regular troops operating in those environments. The British expected any fighting during a second world conflict to be with mechanised forces in western Europe or in the jungles of the Far East. As events unfolded, other 'minor' theatres, like Scandinavia and the desert, became important. While historians have studied how the British adapted to fight in jungles and deserts, there has been little coverage of how Britain developed a cold weather and mountain warfare capability almost from scratch, committing at one point to the training and equipping of two divisions specifically for combat in cold weather and mountainous terrain. The introduction to the 1944 Military Training Pamphlet on Snow and Mountain Warfare states:

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DOI: 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v8i1.1606

> It is wrong to suppose that there is any type of warfare that is "normal." The climate, the topography and the soil in each theatre of war, present their own set of problems, and troops must be prepared to fight and work in the tropical jungles, in arid deserts, in open plains, in fertile enclosed fields, and in mountains. Sound basic training, first-class leadership, a receptive mind and keenness on their job, will enable British soldiers in the future, as in the past, to adapt themselves to unaccustomed surroundings and to climatic extremes.[1]

How the British army developed this 'sound basic training' is what this article seeks to explore. The official histories, of the Second World War in general, and more specifically on the campaigns in the Arctic, do not deal with the detail of military training for those troops who deployed. Recent scholarly works, such as Lunde and Kiszely's excellent assessments of the Norwegian campaign identify the lack of training and preparation as elements which led to the failure of allied operations.[2] However, there has been little detailed work on the lessons learned from the unsuccessful campaigns and how the British Army sought to address its deficiencies in training, equipment and preparation to fight in one of the most hostile environments in the world.

Whilst cold weather and mountains are often grouped together, the challenges proposed by both are very different. At an individual level, the skills and physical capabilities required to move quickly and efficiently over deep snow are different from those required to scale mountains. Similarly coordinating artillery, armour and infantry in open terrain requires a different approach to narrow defiles and scree slopes of mountains in non-arctic conditions.

Before exploring the developments that took place during the Second World War it is necessary to identify the baseline of cold weather and mountain warfare training in the British Army prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Europe. In 1916 a Mountain Warfare School had been established by the Indian Army in Abbottabad in what is now Pakistan, and at the time was a major garrison of the Northern Army Command.

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[1]Imperial War Museum (hereafter IWM) LBY WO 1676 Military training pamphlet no. 90: snow and mountain warfare. Part II: Mountain warfare - blackshod operations 1944 (provisional).

[2]Henrik O. Lunde, *Hitler's Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940,* (Casemate: Newbury, 2009); John Kiszely, *Anatomy of a Campaign: The British Fiasco in Norway, 1940* (Cambridge Military History: Cambridge, 2017).

This school would seem a likely place to find such training. However, the School was quick to point out that

> the name "Mountain Warfare" does not express really what is taught. But it is a convenient name. The school teaches "Transborder fighting on the North West Frontier of India." Mountain Warfare proper will hardly be touched on as there is so little time.[3]

The syllabus, designed for British officers undertaking an Imperial Policing role, contained lectures on 'uncivilised enemies', 'salients and reentrants' and 'reconnaissance' which were all useful for the trans-border fighting being undertaken, but were not necessarily transferable to combat with a modern, mechanised enemy in western Europe.[4] While the British Army had fought against the Bolsheviks in the arctic snow around Murmansk and Arkhangelsk in 1918 and 1919 there is no evidence that the lessons learned formed any part of the corporate knowledge of the Army when war broke out again 20 years later.

The spur for wider scale training and deployment of specialist troops for this environment was the Soviet invasion of Finland on 30 November 1939. This short, but brutal, winter war saw the Finns employ mobility as a significant tactical advantage against the Russians who, encumbered by heavy weapons and armour, were forced to stay close to the roads. The Finns' exploited this weakness, outmanoeuvring and encircling the Russians using the mobility of skis and snowshoes, sledge dragged artillery and machine guns and a willingness to use terrain and climate as part of their arsenal. The Finns placed a premium on physical mobility, intellectual flexibility and improvisation.[5] Western journalists working in Helsinki introduced a new word to the wider world – *motti*. By encircling and reducing Russian units through surprise and mobility, the Finns achieved notable success. While this captured the imagination of the press and their readers, the tactics pitted Finnish forces, which lacked large numbers of tanks and artillery pieces, against static defences and though usually successful, *motti* was costly in terms of Finland's most precious resource, its troops. The true success of the Finns in the early years of the war with the Russians was not these *motti* attacks, but the underlying use of mobility and exploitation of terrain, logistics which ensured troops were rotated through front line saunas to ensure

[3]IWM LBY 92/1259 Mountain Warfare School, Abbottabad [synopsis notes on the manuals with handwritten additions by Lieutenant I.M. Sparrow].
[4]IWM LBY K.06/2617 Mountain warfare lectures and demonstrations by Captain Charles Beattie Anderson KOSB whilst attached to 2/54 Sikhs, Mountain Warfare School, Abbottabad, 1918.
[5]Pasi Tuunainen, *Finnish Military Effectiveness in the Winter War, 1939-1940* (Palgrave Macmillan: London, 2016), p. 91.

hygiene, the provision of hot food and careful maintenance and care of weapons and equipment in freezing temperatures.[6] While unable to defeat the numerically superior Soviets the heavy losses in men and materiel they inflicted were noted by the watching Americans and British who, attracted to the ideal of an underdog, suddenly began to appreciate the need for specialist troops to operate in this environment. David Bradley, an American skier, was a military observer in Finland and reported his observations back through the chain of command to the Army Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War.[7] In the UK the conflict attracted little attention in the military where it was considered a sideshow to operations in France, but there was significant interest amongst politicians who recognised 'Finland had at present the sympathy of the whole world, and if she collapsed, the blame would be laid at the doors of ourselves and the French.'[8]

In Britain, Churchill had long been lobbying for action to be taken against the Swedish iron ore shipments to Germany. Initial plans were based around mining the Norwegian Leads to force the shipments further out into the high seas where the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force could interdict them. These plans were held up due to a reluctance amongst British decision makers to so blatantly violate Norwegian neutrality and territorial waters. Churchill saw the Finnish war with Russia as a way to take more direct action against the Swedish ore exports by sending troops, ostensibly to join the Finnish resistance. However, the main goal was for these troops to occupy the Swedish ore fields themselves.[9]

To begin assembling a force to undertake this mission the army turned to men already trained in skiing and working in the cold and so on 5 February 1940 the 5 (Special Reserve) Battalion Scots Guards was formed under Lieutenant Colonel J. S. Coats, late of the Coldstream Guards. Amongst the senior officers of the unit was considerable experience of mountains and the cold. Coats was a British bobsleigh champion. The adjutant Captain W.D.M. Raeburn was a polar explorer and the Medical Officer Lieutenant E.H.L. Wigram had been involved in two unsuccessful attempts to scale Everest. Another volunteer for the unit, who we will return to later, was Lieutenant Q. T. P. M Riley of the RNVR. Riley had previously been involved with two expeditions to Greenland and another to British Graham Land in Antarctica and so was well versed in moving and living in the cold. He had even written to The Times on the subject of British involvement in Finland to suggest the Government contact the Scott Polar Research Institute for advice on travelling and equipment in different

[6]William R. Trotter, *The Winter War,* (Aurum Press: London, 2003), pp. 145-147.
[7]Jenkins McKay, *The Last Ridge*, (Random House: New York, 2005), loc 361.
[8]Kiszely, *Anatomy of a Campaign,* p. 52.
[9]Martin Gilbert, *Churchill, A Life* (Pimlico: London, 2000), p. 630.

polar environments.[10] On being accepted into the unit he was given the rank of Colour Sergeant and was assigned to start sorting out the necessary equipment for the cold and mountains. Volunteers for the unit quickly flooded in from across the services, however those men with previous skiing experience tended to come from the upper class and the unit therefore ended up with a considerable number of commissioned officers - far more than was required. By 29 February, some 269 officers and 462 other ranks, plus 37 civilians, had volunteered for the unit. Of those volunteers 20 officers were appointed, 168 officers were selected to serve as other ranks while drawing officer pay and 352 other ranks were admitted.[11] This high proportion of officers caused a number of issues. In a report on the unit it was noted:

> The skiing experiences of personnel have been gained from hotels. Very few had slept under canvas in snow conditions. Only about one in five knew how to use a primus stove or how to fit skins to skis. Perhaps one man in fifty had used snowshoes. Only one man in the Battalion had done any sledge man-hauling. Only four in the Battalion were experts at man-management under arctic conditions.[12]

There were also issues on the military side in that 'one sixth, though in most cases excellent skiers, had either no military experience at all or else in some branch of the Service other than the Infantry and, therefore, could not shoot.'[13]

The unit was to be ready and equipped for overseas service by 1 March, which did not give Coats much time to prepare his troops. Poorly equipped with the military necessities such as weapons (the unit was only equipped with the No. 4 service rifle and no other heavy or specialist weapons, radios etc,) the unit nicknamed the 'Snowballers' embarked for France to train in Chamonix. Since the 19th century the Chasseurs had been France's specialist mountain troops, established to prevent Italian incursions through the Alps. The value of this training was limited as the Commanding Officer of the 199 Battalion of Chasseurs, their host unit and a reserve formation, had forbidden his troops from leaving the valley due to the risk of avalanche. Despite these limitations the men got to experience sled handling, specialist casualty evacuation techniques and the advantages of the carbine over the standard battle rifle in

[10]'Help for Finland' *The Times,* 26 January 1940
[11]The UK National Archives (hereinafter TNA) WO 166/4110 Figures from unit strength return, part of official war diary of unit.
[12]TNA WO 166/4110 Report of Colonel Coats on the birth and demise of the 5 (S.R.) Battalion Scots Guards, document reference C.R.S.G.1/678 (Henceforth referred to as Birth and Demise.)
[13]Ibid.

mountains and dense woodland. Some of the training was of questionable value, however. Mike Calvert, who would go on to become a famous Chindit, noted:

> We spent a hectic time climbing mountains and rushing down them again on skis, and it wasn't until sometime afterwards that I discovered the land we were supposed to fight over in Finland was dead flat. Presumably the need to get us ready and away was so urgent that no one had enquired what sort of country we would find out there.[14]

The Guards returned hastily to Britain with orders to join a French force of 50,000 volunteers being sent to Norway to help the Finns fight off renewed Russian attacks.[15] From their barracks they travelled to Glasgow where they were hours from embarkation when, following the surrender of Finland, their orders were cancelled, and the battalion was disbanded. Despite its brief existence, there were some useful lessons learned, and Coats produced a report in which he stated that

> It is possible that one month's intensive training would produce a battalion capable of movement in any but the most difficult and mountainous country, provided that the rejection of the few obviously unfitted was permitted.[16]

Also tasked to support the Finns in their struggle against the Soviets had been 49 (West Riding) Division. They were then stood up again when Germany invaded Norway in April 1940. The British had become interested in Norway early in the conflict, however the issue of Norwegian neutrality prevented attempts to agree a strategic approach. The Altmark incident on 16 February saw sailors from *HMS Cossack* board the German supply ship *Altmark* in Norwegian territorial waters. After a brief skirmish they released 299 British sailors from captivity, despite Norwegian assertions they had previously searched and cleared the vessel. The incident had implications for both the British and the Germans. For Hitler the events proved the British would not respect Norwegian neutrality. Similarly, the British felt that Norway could not be relied on to enforce its neutrality and therefore action would need to be taken, with the laying of sea mines and earmarking troops to occupy key ports as part of Plan 'R.4'.[17] Prior planning meant that the Germans beat the British to the punch with the launch of Operation WESERUBUNG, under the guise of protecting Norwegian neutrality from a proposed Anglo-French invasion. Of the six German

[14]Mike Calvert, *Fighting Mad,* (Pen and Sword Military: Barnsley, 2004), loc 452.
[15]David Erskine, *The Scots Guards 1919-1955,* (Naval and Military Press: Uckfield, 2006), p. 25.
[16]TNA WO 166/4110 Coats, Birth and Demise.
[17]M. J. Pearce & R. Porter, *Fight for the Fjords,* (University of Plymouth Press: Plymouth, 2012), p. 33

Divisions allocated to WESERUBUNG, two were mountain trained and equipped and consisted of a mix of German and Austrian troops, while the rest had no specialist training for the environment in which they were going to operate.[18] The force Britain was to send against them, in Churchill's own words:

> lacked aircraft, anti-aircraft guns, anti-tank guns, tanks, transports and training. The whole of North Norway was covered with snow to depths which none of our soldiers had ever seen, felt or imagined. There were neither snow-shoes nor skis - still less skiers.[19]

On the allied side, whilst the original plan for operations in Scandinavia included specialist ski troops, like the Snowballers, the troops who actually deployed were of a very different background. The 49th was a Territorial Division, and most of its troops had only received seven months continuous training of any kind at the time they embarked for Scandinavia. Ironically, given their destination, some of their training had been postponed due to the severe winter in the UK.[20] Two of its brigades, the 146th and 148th embarked and landed at Narvik and Namsos and their deficiencies in training and equipment soon became apparent. The troops allocated to the task had no special instruction in fighting and surviving in arctic conditions, while their issued maps were Norwegian holiday brochures.[21] Cold weather clothing was issued, indeed troops were carrying 'three kit bags per man, to carry the seventeen items of special clothing, thirty-five pieces in all – the scale of issue as for winter garrison in Tientsin plus items got ready for Finland.'[22] However, this was designed to allow troops to survive in the cold, not fight in it, and one British commander noted 'if they wore all these things they were scarcely able to move at all, and looked like paralysed bears.'[23] On the equipment front Lunde notes 'they had no skis or snowshoes. However, since they did not know how to use them, it made little difference.'[24] Some sharp actions were fought in the snows of Norway but the allied effort was ultimately doomed and ended in withdrawal. The litany of mistakes and miscalculations that led to defeat in Norway is lengthy, but the importance of sending troops adequately trained and equipped to operate in the cold and the mountains was one of the lessons that was certainly learned, and the relationship formed with the Norwegians was to pay dividends later.

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[18]Lunde, *Hitler's, Pre-emptive War,* p. 77.
[19]Winston Churchill, *The Gathering Storm,* (Rosetta Books: New York, 2013), p. 547.
[20]TK Derry, *History of the Second World War: The Campaign in Norway,* (The Naval and Military Press Ltd: Uckfield, 2004), p. 63; TNA WO 166/4426 Lincoln's War Diary.
[21]Jonathon Riley, *From Pole to Pole: Life of Quintin Riley, 1905-80,* (Bluntisham Books: Huntingdon, 1989), p. 103.
[22]Derry, *The Campaign in Norway,* p. 149.
[23]Adrian Carton de Wiart, *Happy Odyssey* (Pen and Sword: Barnsley, 2011) loc 2095.
[24]Lunde, *Hitler's Pre-emptive War*, p. 277.

Following the evacuation from Norway, 146 Brigade returned to Britain, before being sent to Iceland. Again, with his desire to see Iceland secured to act as a base for flying boats and as a refuelling station for ships operating in the area, Churchill had a hand in this. Iceland had been 'invaded' on 10 May 1940 by a force of Royal Marines under Colonel Robert Sturges with orders to land 'as a precaution against German invasion' and 'as preliminary to the establishment of a naval and air base.'[25] The Marines were too few to adequately garrison the island and handed the responsibility over to the Army. 146 Brigade were to join the Division's 147 Brigade and they were followed by the 70 Independent Brigade, which was the sole surviving combat effective unit of the 23 (Northumbrian) Division. To reflect their new area of operations the 49th adopted the Polar Bear as their divisional badge.[26] The climate and lack of adequate accommodation began to condition the troops to the difficulties of operating in arctic conditions and given the open spaces and need to keep the troops active route marches and field firing exercises were common. A Force Tactical School was established at Reykjavik in November 1940, but the priority in terms of formal training was leadership and discipline rather than training specific to their conditions. Indeed, the military action assigned to be studied by all officers during that first winter period was the Gallipoli campaign, when a review of their recent actions in Norway may have been of more relevance. The arrival of the first winter snows, and the presence of free Norwegian forces, led to ski training for the British troops both as a form of physical exercise and mobility training. Eighteen Norwegians had arrived in Iceland by varied means and, determined to make a contribution to the war effort under the Norwegian flag, established the 'Norwegian Company, Iceland.' In November the Company became an official unit of the Royal Norwegian Army and was reinforced by 27 further troops fresh from training in Scotland. This small force included Lt Colonel Stenersen who would later go on to help instruct the US Army through its own Winter Warfare Department. By December 1940 70 Brigade had ski reconnaissance platoons, supervised and trained by two Norwegian instructors, in each battalion. Their war diary also notes:

> A beginning has also been made in learning the tactics of mountain warfare for here again admirable facilities are at all unit's doorsteps. Progress must, of course, be slow if for no other reason than that there are few who have experience of this somewhat specialised form of warfare.[27]

[25]DF Bittner, *The Lion and White Falcon: Britain and Iceland in the World War II Era,* (Archon Books: Hamden, 1983), p. 46.
[26]Patrick Delaforce, *The Polar Bears: Monty's Left Flank,* (Chancellor Press: London, 1999), p. 13.
[27]TNA WO 176/304 Appendix "B" to War Diary 1940 - Training December 1940. 70 Brigade War Diary (Henceforth referred to as 70 Brigade War Diary.)

This training continued on an informal basis until a visit by Churchill on 16 August 1941 whilst returning from talks in the United States. He noted at that time

> The important thing is not so much to reduce our troops in Iceland (C) but to make it a training ground for Alpine units…..I regard the creation of these Alpine Units as a vital feature in our inner organisation. I ask that this may be taken up with the utmost vigour.[28]

Clearly Churchill still saw an offensive through Norway as both possible and desirable and that any such attempt would need troops trained to operate in those conditions. He remained convinced that the British should return to Norway and urged his Generals to draw up plans for this eventuality. Operations AJAX, MARROW and JUPITER were the result but all were opposed by the Chiefs of Staff as being distractions from ongoing operations in the Mediterranean and North Africa.[29] However Churchill got his way in Iceland, and an Operation Instruction was accordingly issued by the War Office on 27 November 1941 that set out the formation of 49 Mountain Division and that it

> …must be prepared and will be trained to operate in:-
>
> (i) Mountainous country in arctic or snow conditions.
> (ii) Non mountainous country in arctic or snow conditions.
> (iii) Mountainous country with or without snow conditions.
> (iv) From a road into a roadless country. This condition may also apply to (i) (ii) and (iii) above.[30]

In response a Specialist Training School, Skogar Camp, was established to teach aspects of surviving and fighting in arctic conditions. This ranged from basic cooking and hygiene to climbing and sledging, dog handling and the maintenance and operation of combustion engine powered vehicles in cold weather. Information was sought from the Soviets on operating equipment such as artillery in cold weather and US and captured German Field Manuals were consulted to ensure Best Practice was followed where possible. Specialist instructors were brought in and Lieutenant Riley appears again, bringing his wealth of cold weather experience to the officers and senior NCOs

[28]TNA PREM 3/230/2 Prime Minister's Personal Minute to C.I.G.S. 19th August 1941
[29]Christopher Mann, *British Policy and Strategy towards Norway, 1941-1945,* (Palgrave: Basingstoke, 2012), p. 73.
[30]70 Brigade War Diary.

on Iceland.[31] Alongside the Specialist Training School was the Force Tactical School, teaching combat techniques and troop handling in arctic and alpine conditions through lectures, cloth model exercises and Tactical Exercises Without Troops (TEWTs).[32] Many of the units established their own training centres, and 70 Brigade had theirs at Hvitanes in Hvalfjord where a company from each battalion rotated through for one week under the instruction of Norwegian experts. The training was obviously dependent on having both the time and weather conditions to undertake it. For the Durham Light Infantry, part of 70 Brigade and based in the west of Iceland, both of these factors were in abundance and they were able to make the most of their time in becoming proficient in what Churchill sought. The 1/6 and 1/7 Duke of Wellington's Regiment, located as they were near Reykjavik, found themselves without snow and occupied building the airfield, which took priority over their training. The resultant level of expertise across the three brigades stationed on Iceland was therefore varied. Iceland also served as an excellent proving ground for much of the experimental equipment that was being developed. The results of field trials of rations, clothing, load carrying equipment and boots was fed back to allow for refinements and improvements.[33]

Given that Churchill's directive was issued in August 1941, it seems odd that in December 1941 70 and 49 Brigades were informed that they would be returning to the UK to undertake further training as part of 49 Mountain Division. The 70th left for the UK in December and began training with pack mules in the hills and mountains of Wales, while for the troops that remained winter warfare training was prioritised over all other training, based on Force Training Instruction No 29. Reaching the same conclusions as Lt Col Coats had earlier, the units began to assess those individuals who could not meet the standards required and the first batch of men 'unfit for mountain warfare' were sent to other units.[34] The basic level of fitness for all troops on completion of training was to be able to carry a load of 80 pounds for 7 hours over rough and hilly country and still be sufficiently fit at the end of the day to fight.[35] This standard was clearly higher than that required of a normal infantryman of the time, hence the priority to identify those who could not perform at this level. Unlike units

[31]Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives (hereafter KCLMA) GB0099 Riley Winter Warfare School Synopsis of Lectures.
[32]TNA WO 199/827 Report on Training of 70 Inf Bde Grp in Mountain Warfare.
[33]TNA WO 176/329 1/6 Duke of Wellington's Regiment War Diary, March 1942.
[34]CN Barclay, *The History of the Duke of Wellingtons Regiment, 1919-1952,* (William Clowes: London, 1953), p. 187.
[35]TNA WO 176/340 Notes on Training in Winter and Mountain Warfare with special reference to training, living and moving in Winter conditions. Appendix A to 1/5 W Yorks Training Instruction No 10 dated 23 Feb 42.

such as the Commandos and Paratroopers these men were not volunteers for special service, but Territorial Infantry converted to a specialised role.

The need to remove those individuals who could not meet these higher standards was underlined by Riley in his lecture to the Royal Institute of International Affairs in October 1942. As he put it,

> A man may not be as good a shot as his next number, but it doesn't impede the good shot; a bad skier in a platoon may easily upset a whole unit; their speed of advance and general mobility is that of the worst man.[36]

147 Brigade left for the UK in April 1942 once US troops arrived to take over the garrison in Iceland and the final units of the Polar Bears, 146 Brigade who had served on Iceland for over two years returned home. As the troops returned to the UK so too did the responsibility for training the British Army in cold weather and mountain warfare. A Mountain and Snow Warfare Training Centre was established at Braemar commanded by Frank Smythe, the noted climber with three Everest expeditions under his belt.[37] The approach here was different from that operated in Iceland. The man with first-hand experience of the quality of training delivered in Iceland was Major-General Curtis who had commanded the garrison in Iceland. In late February 1942 he wrote a report to the War Office on his thoughts on the training delivered at the various schools in Iceland and the shortfalls as he saw them. The report was somewhat critical, and Curtis states

> As a general criticism, the School did not succeed in returning personnel to their units full of enthusiasm to destroy Germans, despite natures obstacles. It did succeed in filling a limited number of students with an enthusiasm for the "exploring" and "sporting" site of the arctic and mountain living and moving.[38]

The document, which contains a number of suggestions on how training could be more practically delivered, was copied to the Commandant of the Winter Warfare School for him to benefit from these lessons learned. One of these recommendations was that a higher percentage of soldiers be included on the training staff, and a directive

[36]KCLMA GB0099, Riley "Arctic Warfare" Lecture delivered to the Royal Institute of International Affairs at Chatham House, 13 October 1942 by Commander Q Riley.
[37]Maurice Isserman and Stewart Weaver *Fallen Giants: A History of Himalayan Mountaineering from the Age of Empire to the Age of Extremes,* (Yale University Press: London, 2008), p. 226.
[38]TNA WO 199/826 Note from Major General, Commander, Iceland (C) Force to Under Secretary of State (M.T.1) IF/102/14/3/G.

was drafted to seek those officers with experience of fighting, not just adventuring, in arctic and alpine conditions.

The lessons learned from Iceland were combined with those from a more unlikely setting. A Middle Eastern Mountain Warfare School had been established outside Tripoli, with mountain and rock-climbing schools based in Lebanon. This was not planned and arose through the personal efforts of former British Olympic skier Captain WJ Riddell, who happened to be stationed in the region as a political officer, and who took it upon himself to develop the capability.[39] These schools took small units of Commonwealth troops, including specialist units such as the SAS and the Long Range Desert Group, through the basics of moving and surviving in mountainous conditions, and gradually built up to training entire battalions at a time. The ski syllabus consisted of four phases:

> Phase 1 (One week) Early essentials and technique
> Phase 2 (Two weeks) Control
> Phase 3 (Four weeks) Slow continuous running and short distance patrols with light loads
> Phase 4 (Twelve weeks) Fast continuous running and long-distance patrols with heavy loads.[40]

Also based at the school were medical staff such as Captain L.G.C.E Pugh, RAMC. An international skier in his own right, he carried out physiological work on the conditioning and dietary requirements of mountain troops which was fed back to the War Office. This supplemented conditioning work undertaken by Lt Colonel Head who visited the Harvard Fatigue Laboratory and sought advice from Canadian publications to identify a fitness test to determine those troops best suited for mountain warfare. In addition, prominent medical civilians such as E Arnold Carmichael FRCP provided input into conferences convened by the War Office on the topic of mountain warfare.[41]

At all times the British Army was receptive to advice from civilian specialists, foreign experts and 'gentlemen adventurers' to establish effective training and doctrine. That the Army was willing and able to allocate troops of battalion size to over four months of training indicates some understanding of the importance of specialist training. However, the training was again centred on movement rather than combat, and no

[39]ADM Cox, 'The Lebanon: Some memories of Mountain Warfare Training during World War II' *Alpine Journal,* 1992, pp191-197.
[40]James Riddell, *Dog in the Snow,* (Michael Joseph Ltd: London, 1957), p. 58.
[41]See TNA FD 1/6471 for reports from the Medical Research Committee and Medical Research Council on Mountain Warfare.

attempts were made to conduct military exercises or integrate the different arms to operate together in the cold or mountainous terrain.

Despite their previous experience 49 Division was not to be the sole practitioner of mountain and arctic warfare in the British Army. 52 (Lowland) Division returned from France and became part of the south of England's defences against a German invasion. In May 1942 this role was put aside as they returned to Scotland and were designated to become trained as a Mountain Division like the 49th. It seems odd that despite the 49th's previous experience the War Office determined:

> 52 Div will re-organise as a Mountain Division adhering as closely as possible to the normal organisation…52 Div will carry out all the necessary preliminary experiments and will be responsible for producing the detailed organisation of a Mountain Division. 49 Div will adopt this organisation when it has been approved by the War Office.[42]

The creation of a second Mountain Division was despite a War Office committee recommending in April 1942 that rather than form a Mountain Division the system should be to rotate cadres from a number of divisions through the Mountain Warfare school so that at any point there would be units available in the UK who could quickly be deployed in an Arctic and Mountain Warfare role.[43]

The primary motivation for 52 Division taking the lead in this area seems to be their proximity to the newly established Mountain Warfare Training Centre, their close working with the Norwegian brigade which was embedded with 52 Division, and their being near the centres set up to train the Commandos. The mountains and hills of Scotland certainly provided more access to snow than the 49 Division had in North Wales and the Lowlanders took their new task with enthusiasm. The directive establishing the 52nd as a Mountain Division was explicit in that its role was to be carried out from the sub-arctic, as in Norway, to the sub-tropical, as in Africa.[44] It is interesting that the directive was re-written several times to accurately codify what was required of the Division, with the final drafting being provided by the Division's senior staff itself.[45] The emphasis was on physical fitness and the fundamentals of mountain warfare. Three ski training centres were set up in Scotland, Canadian Army

[42]TNA WO 199/825 Minutes of meeting on Preparation of a force for operation in Mountainous and Near Arctic Conditions 4 November 1942.
[43]TNA WO 199/826 Memorandum on the Organisation of Forces required to operate in Arctic and Mountainous country.
[44]TNA WO 199/826 Training of 52 Div ref HF.16069/9/G(Trg).
[45]TNA WO 199/827 Directive to GOC 52 Division on the organisation and training of the Division for a Mountain Warfare role.

dog-sled handling experts were brought over and regular exercises were held with the Norwegian contingent acting as enemy forces to break up the monotony. The importance of the Norwegian component was recognised, with the Chief of the General Staff instructing Scottish Command that the Norwegians were to be given priority only below 52 Division for the allotment of special equipment for winter warfare.[46]

In November 1942 it was directed that 52 Division would complete training for Mountain Warfare in Snow Conditions and would be available for operations by 15 April 1943. Similarly, 49 Division would complete training for 'mountain warfare not in snow conditions' by 1 May 1943. By February 1943 this position was changed, and it was determined that there was no need for two full mountain trained divisions, and 49 Division converted back to a normal line infantry role. This left 52 Division as the sole Mountain Division and they continued to train and exercise for this role. Instructional pamphlets on mountain and cold weather warfare were obtained from the US and Canadian forces and distributed throughout the Division. Of particular interest here is a report by Lt Colonel Wedderburn who was on a six month visit to the US Mountain Troops. He identified a number of issues which were relevant to the training of British troops. He noted:

> So far as winter warfare is concerned, the US Army has found that the best results in training are achieved not by having courses for instructors, but by equipping whole units and after preliminary instruction in the use of their equipment and the general principles of winter war fare, taking them out in the snow for unit training.[47]

The British had already arrived at the same conclusions, with the switch from the 'train the trainer' approach adopted in the schools of Iceland to the larger scale, structured Divisional level training of 52 Lowland. The need for specialist training beyond the Division was recognised, and in order to address a specific vulnerability identified by 70 Brigade with regards flank protection and skirmishers the Lovat Scouts were earmarked in December 1943 for training in mountain warfare, in a new school established in the Canadian Rockies by Smythe who had since left Braemar.[48] Drawing on the lessons of Tunisia and Sicily a recommendation was made in November 1943

[46]TNA WO 199/825 Memo from GCHQ Home Forces to Scottish Command HF/16069/G.(Trg).
[47]TNA WO 199/826 Memorandum on Mountain and Snow Warfare in the United States Army.
[48]TNA WO 199/826 Training Directive - Lovat Scouts 43/Trg/3379(MT1); Tony Smythe, *My Father, Frank,* (Vertebrate Digital, 2013), loc 4907.

that a parachute battalion carry out training in 52 Division's training area in the winter of 1943 to provide them with additional capability.[49]

Large scale exercises in the form of GOLIATH I in November-December 1942, GOLIATH II in October 1943 and SNOWSHOE in March 1944 tested men, equipment and staff combining infantry, armour and artillery in exacting conditions to establish that the Division was combat effective.[50] The presence of this Division in Scotland and their activity did not go unnoticed by the Germans who had to consider the possibility of an invasion of Norway just as the allies were planning for their landings in Normandy. The British made the most of this through FORTITUDE NORTH, the part of the deception plans to cover the Normandy landings. Significant planning was still being undertaken to land British forces, along with US and Norwegian contingents and even Russian troops through Finnmark under the titles RANKIN A through C.[51]

Even so, at this time German forces in Norway consisted of three entire Corps and the British troops would have faced a difficult challenge dislodging them from their positions. Immediately after the landings in France 52 Division lost their mountain speciality and became an Air-Portable Division. If this was because there was no longer an appetite to invade Norway, then the unit could have been gainfully employed elsewhere. In May 1944 General Alexander was lobbying for the division to be transferred to Italy where it would be joined by 4 Indian Division which already had some experience of operating in the mountains and would be redesignated as a Mountain Division.[52] This request was turned down. It was almost inevitable that after two years of intensive training to fight in the mountains and a sudden re-roleing to air-portability 52 Division were finally to go into battle as infanteers in the low-lying terrain of the Netherlands, albeit still proudly wearing their Mountaineer flashes.

Though there was now no longer a designated Mountain Warfare Division there was still fighting to be done in the mountains, and in Italy plans were being made in 1944 for future needs and how to address them. The need for some element of mountain and cold weather training had already been identified and in December 1943 a Mountain Warfare school had been established in Sepino in Italy.[53] The mission for

[49]TNA WO 199/826 Memorandum to G.H.Q Home Forces G(S.D.) 20/Misc/2147.(Air.2.).
[50]George Blake, *Mountain and Flood: The History of the 52nd (Lowland) Division,* (Partizan Press: Nottingham, 2007), p. 53.
[51]Mann, *British Policy,* p. 179.
[52]TNA WO 204/7401 Message from AAI to V Corps/Eight Army AFHQ 28th May 1944.
[53]TNA WO 169/13767 War Diary, Snow Warfare School, 1943.

this school was not to train large scale formations, but to train instructors who could take the skills back to their units. The main syllabus topics were: living under conditions of snow and severe weather; and moving in small parties (ie patrols) under these conditions – though it was noted that the first essential for mountain training was 'general hardening' as had previously been identified in Iceland.[54] The school began its first course on 28 December 1943 and moved to Terminillo in October 1944, continuing to process Commonwealth and US troops on courses before returning them to their units to share their knowledge and experience. There were however differences of opinion over the actual employment of Mountain troops in Italy. While Alexander in May of 1944 saw the value of specialised troops when he asked for the transfer of 52 Division, by September his Eighth Army commander, Lieutenant-General Oliver Leese, considered that the formation of a special Mountain Force was 'not considered either desirable or necessary.'[55] The memo explained that if they were still facing the enemy in the mountains come the winter then the best course of action was to maintain contact with as few troops as possible and use the time to train the rest of the troops for the Spring and that the Army Commander 'is very averse to any scheme which would divert his forces from this object.' While there was enthusiasm for training troops to operate in the cold and the mountains this did not seemed to be matched with the will to employ these troops in combat in those environments. There was therefore no need for large scale training, but use could be made of those few specialists who had passed through the Italian school. As it was, the British switched their attention to the coast allowing the Americans, and the newly arrived US 10 Mountain Division to put their training to the test.

The US Army approach to Mountain Warfare was initiated by the National Ski Patrol in 1940, who lobbied the War Department, and General Marshal personally, for the creation of a specialised unit of ski troops. While their interest was also sparked by the Russian war with Finland, it was the Italian invasion of Greece which seemed to spur the US Army to revisit the idea of developing specialised Mountain troops. Lt Col LS Gerow of the US General Staff Corps wrote of the Italian action and the need for specialised troops 'such units cannot be improvised hurriedly from line divisions. They require long periods of hardening and experience, for which there is no substitute for time.'[56] In November 1941 the Ski Patrol finally succeeded when 87 Mountain Infantry Battalion, later a Regiment, was activated.[57] Their approach was to take trained and experienced mountaineers and skiers and turn them into soldiers, and initial recruiters

[54]TNA WO 169/13767 Formation Authority and objects of school, reference 2022/35/G (Trg).
[55]TNA WO 204/7374 COS/1028 Memo from Lt Gen GOC Eight September 1944.
[56]Peter Shelton, *Climb to Conquer: The Untold Story of World War II's 10th Mountain Division Ski Troops,* (Scribner: New York, 2003), p. 25.
[57]McKay, *The Last Ridge*, loc 627.

were told to look out for 'large men with a high degree of physical stamina, above average intelligence and an education.'[58] While this core unit was able to develop equipment and tactics there was only a finite number of men with the necessary skills and more and more of the volunteers turning up for training had never climbed or worn skis before reporting to Camp Hale in Colorado. They were attracted to the unit by the elite appeal of a specialised unit, where 'None but real He-Men need apply' as well as Hollywood films such as the Warner Brothers 1943 film Mountain Fighters filmed at Camp Hale.[59] Yet despite this the physical requirements to join the Mountain Division, as opposed to a regular Infantry Division, were exactly the same.[60] These additional troops were necessary as the decision was taken to expand the unit into a Division of three regiments, adding 85 and 86 Regiments, and the now famous 10th Mountain Division was reformed. Alongside the training undertaken by the unit was the development of equipment suitable for mountain warfare, including refinements to sleeping bags, stoves and climbing ropes to reduce the burden to be man packed through difficult terrain.[61] After three years of intensive training and participation in Operation COTTAGE in the Aleutians, the unit deployed to Italy where its skill and experience was put to good use in the battles for Riva Ridge and Mt. Belvedere. In much the same way as the capabilities and potential of the 52 Division were never truly understood by the British, despite their success in Italy the 10th Mountain were described as 'an unprecedented force of elite soldiers that the army didn't know how to recruit, train or employ, and they were inserted into a campaign American strategists were never completely sure they wanted to fight.'[62]

During the war the British had identified the need for specialist training and equipment for troops to operate in the harsh climate of the mountains and arctic. It was identified that not all troops were capable of withstanding the punishing regime of operating at altitude and that units must have the ability to remove those weak links. Though not volunteer units, the higher standards demanded and special unit patches installed a sense of superiority in both 49 Division and 52 Division. A vast array of lessons were learned which is reflected in the progression from one training pamphlet for the British Army on Mountain Warfare in 1943 to five full volumes by the end of 1944. The 1944 manuals, covering a general survey, mountain warfare - blackshod operations, mountain warfare - training for blackshod operations, whiteshod training and operations and techniques for moving and living in mountains contain along with more

[58]Albert H. Meinke, *Mountain Troops and Medics: A Complete WWII Combat History of the US Tenth Mountain Division,* (Trafford: Victoria, 2002), p. 57.
[59]McKay, *The Last Ridge,* loc 295.
[60]AB Feuer, *"Packs On!" Memoirs of the 10th Mountain Division,* (Praeger: Westport, 2004), loc 137.
[61]Ibid. loc 126.
[62]McKay, *The Last Ridge*, loc 4347.

general information.[63] They reflected that there were a host of issues to be mastered in order to be able to operate in the cold and mountains and that 'all ranks will therefore be trained mentally, physically, militarily and technically (if tradesmen.)'[64] The difficulties of operating artillery and radios in mountains, of ensuring traffic through mountains is effectively managed by provost services and the packing and handling of mules was all covered in detail along with lessons on musketry and callisthenics. The distilled learning of the links with the Norwegians, the training in Iceland from the 'adventurers' and the lessons hard learned in the glens and mountains of Scotland, the cedars of Lebanon and the mountains of Italy became a part of formal British Army training and doctrine.

Throughout the conflict the British Army adopted a number of approaches to training troops to operate in cold and mountainous conditions. Starting with those who had experience with the conditions and transferrable skills from their civilian lives, they then tried the 'train the trainer' approach to pass on information through officers and NCOs to teach to their men. They finally arrived at the optimal approach, to train an entire large-scale unit, with integrated supporting arms though they lacked the commitment to deploy them in the arena for which they had trained. Whilst the size of the British Army ruled out the luxury of one, let alone two, specialised Mountain Divisions the lessons learned by the 5 Scots Guards, 70 Brigade, and 49 and 52 Divisions, and a host of other units were not lost and would inform the British Army's operations in that specialist environment for years to come.

[63]IWM LBY WO 1676 The pamphlets define blackshod operations as those undertaken by normal troops that require some special training, while whiteshod are as above but above the snow line. The term mountaineer was reserved for specially organised and trained troops. Military training pamphlet no. 90: snow and mountain warfare. Part II: mountain warfare - blackshod operations 1944 (provisional).
[64]IWM LBY WO 1676 Military training pamphlet No 90 Part II p2.

Learning to Fail? Wartime Adaptation and Special Force in Burma, 1942–1944

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ABSTRACT
This article considers wartime tactical adaptation and its relationship with operational performance and outcomes during the Second World War. Specifically, it examines Long Range Penetration Groups (LRPG) facing the Imperial Japanese Army in Burma during two major operations to reveal how adaptation may decrease combat effectiveness and contribute to operational failure. This conclusion challenges contemporary assumptions about adaptation during conflict and suggests some of the costs when adaptation fails. It raises new questions about what circumstances and in what ways tactical adaptation may contribute to operational success or failure during mid-to-high intensity combat, relevant for contemporary theorists and practitioners.

Introduction

When the audit of warfare reveals military shortcomings, how should forces respond to be effective and successful? In 2011, Williamson Murray emphasised how 'the problem of adaptation in war represents one of the most persistent, yet rarely examined problems that military institutions confront'.[1] This pursuit to understand wartime adaptation benefitted from increased attention since the mid-2000's, delivering new insights and creating a growing subfield with strong practical relevance.[2]

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DOI: 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v8i1.1607
[1]Williamson Murray, *Adaptation In War: With Fear Of Change,* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 1.
[2]Theo Farrell, Frans Osinga, and James Russell, eds., *Military Adaptation in Afghanistan,* (Stanford, California: Stanford Security Studies, 2013); Adam Grissom, 'The Future of Military Innovation Studies', *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 5 (October 2006), pp. 905-934; Frank G. Hoffman, *Mars Adapting: Military Change During War,* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2021); Raphael D. Marcus, *Israel's Long War with Hezbollah: Military Innovation and Adaptation Under Fire* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2018); James Russell, *Innovation, Transformation, and*

Research often drew upon historical studies that addressed wartime change, to include examples from the Second World War.[3] However, in 2020 one of the subfield's primary contributors noted how contemporary studies continued insufficiently to explain this phenomenon, specifically how 'less studied by historians and social scientists is how rival military organisations at war adapt to the demands of their conflict as well as each other'.[4]

This omission combines with significant practical relevance as wartime adaptation may be considered an 'essential attribute for successful militaries, and may become even more important during future conflicts'.[5] In response, this paper addresses a paradox insufficiently examined thus far: In what circumstances may wartime tactical adaption reduce battlefield effectiveness and contribute to operational failure? Based on new archival research of primary sources at the Imperial War Museum, London, the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives at King's College London, The National Archives, Kew, published and unpublished items at the British Library, and existing source material, examining the evolution of Long Range Penetration Groups (LRPG) provides insights with implications both conceptual and practical about this topic of enduring

War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005–2007, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2011); Caitlin Talmadge, *The Dictator's Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes,* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2015).

[3]John Buckley, *Monty's Men: The British Army and the Liberation of Europe, 1944–45,* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2013); Terry Copp, *Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy,* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014), second edition, originally published 2003; Michael D. Doubler, *Closing With The Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944–1945,* (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1994); Robert Engen, *Canadians Under Fire: Infantry Effectiveness in the Second World War,* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2009); Charles Forrester, *Monty's Functional Doctrine: Combined Arms Doctrine in British 21st Army Group in Northwest Europe, 1944–45,* (Warwick, England: Helion & Company Limited, 2015); Russell A. Hart, *Clash of Arms: How the Allies Won in Normandy,* (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001); Peter R. Mansoor, *The GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumphs of American Infantry Divisions, 1941–1945,* (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1999).

[4]Theo Farrell, 'Military Adaptation and Organisational Convergence in War: Insurgents and International Forces in Afghanistan', *Journal of Strategic Studies* (25 May 2020), p. 2.

[5]David Barno and Nora Bensahel, *Adaptation Under Fire: How Militaries Change in Wartime,* (Oxford University Press, 2020), p. 3.

interest.[6] It also delivers broader suggestions about some of the costs when adaptation fails to improve operational performance.

British failures during the Japanese invasion of Burma and a subsequent debacle in Arakan revealed low readiness, a lack of mobility, an inability to fight in the jungle, and poor small-unit skills. A new idea emerged aimed at restoring speed and mobility to attack the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) that was spread thin across the jungle: to create new units for LRP that could raid, attack, isolate Japanese units, and force their withdrawal.[7] Over the next two years an initial brigade-sized group evolved into the 20,000-member Special Force with a new combat purpose, representing a significant adaptation that shaped battlefield performance during its two wartime operations. These changes displayed a clear tactical adaptation, considered to be 'changed methods, techniques, or procedures to make people, units, or equipment suitable for new combat purposes or different combat conditions in a repeated or shared manner'.[8] The results, however, were two costly battlefield failures. If success is considered 'the ability to achieve assigned missions with acceptable expenditures of material and human resources according to planned times', then how the LRPG conducted wartime adaptation contributed to failed operations as measured by goals, time, and costs.[9] Therefore, the example of wartime adaptation by the Special Force indicates important risks associated with wartime change: how tactical adaptation may contribute to failure, and how additional changes may exacerbate costs.

Assessment and Change

New concepts for LRP emerged in 1942 and evolved into the form they would take a year later on Operation Longcloth. The unit deployed independently to disrupt Japanese lines of communication and induce IJA consolidation on rear positions.[10] Led by Colonel Orde Wingate, his 1942 draft paper 'Notes on Penetration Warfare' argued that long range penetration could deliver 'great value' but that Burma

[6]George Wilton, 'Forgotten Chindits – 23 British Infantry Brigade', *British Journal of Military History*, Vol. 6, Issue 3 (November 2020), pp. 85-127.

[7]Raymond Callahan, 'The Prime Minister and the Indian Army's Last War', in Kaushik Roy, ed., *The Indian Army in the Two World Wars,* (Boston, Massachusetts: Brill, 2012), p. 325.

[8]Definition from Brett Potter Van Ess, 'Wartime Tactical Adaptation and Operational Success: British and Japanese Armies in Burma and India, 1941–45', PhD Thesis, King's College London, 2019.

[9]Modified from 'combat effectiveness' in Mansoor, *The GI Offensive in Europe*, p. 3.

[10]Simon Anglim, 'Orde Wingate, "Guerrilla" Warfare and Long-range Penetration, 1940-44', *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (September 2006), pp. 241-262; Donovan Webster, *The Burma Road* (New York: Perennial, 2003), pp. 81-110.

Command lacked an organization to conduct it effectively.[11] By operating small columns directed through wireless communications and resupplied from the air, forces could attack vital points and deliver 'fatal blows' to the IJA.[12] During May and June, Wingate presented the ideas which would underlie future operations. First, that IJA troops behind the front lines would be inferior to forward troops and would be vulnerable to attack. Second, that a force with sufficient preparation could penetrate IJA forces, could coordinate with each other by radio, and seek resupply from the air. Third, that attacking IJA lines of communication would 'tie up a disproportionate number of enemy troops', and cause a disproportionate impact in the theatre.[13] In September 1942, Wingate refined the concept, with columns to act independently for indefinite periods.[14] Columns would infiltrate 200–300 miles and concentrate attacks to lure Japanese defenders into pursuit, followed by columns dispersing to 'lead the enemy punitive columns on a wild goose chase' and compel 'very considerable enemy forces' to withdraw from forward positions'.[15] With IJA units forced to protect their 'long and vulnerable lines of communication', the LRPG would force significant disruptions across IJA units and command.[16]

It was political and high level military lobbying and endorsement that facilitated the new LRP concept, rather than any institutional military mechanism being used to consider, test, or implement these new ideas. First, 'that Wingate was in India at all was Wavell's doing'.[17] the Commander-in-Chief India who worked previously with Wingate and summoned him to Burma.[18] Wavell decided 'to give [Long Range Penetration] a trial', and in mid-1942 he approved forming 77 Indian Infantry Brigade to do it.[19] Also, Wingate drove events with his advocacy of LRP concepts, 'strategic manifestos' and 'advocacy of long-range penetration'.[20] Wingate's techniques proved

[11]Imperial War Museum London (hereinafter IWM), Wingate Burma Box Papers Box I item 2, 'Orde Wingate Notes on Penetration Warfare—Burma Command 25/3/42 draft paper', pp. 1-2.
[12]Ibid., p. 2.
[13]Frank McLynn, *The Burma Campaign: Disaster into Triumph 1942-45,* (London: Vintage Books, 2010), p. 81; Christopher Sykes, *Orde Wingate,* (London: Collins, 1959), pp. 367-369.
[14]IWM Wingate Burma Box Papers Box I item 11, 'Orde Wingate 77 Indian Infantry Brigade', 22 September 1942, p. 1.
[15]Ibid.
[16]Ibid.
[17]Callahan, 'The Prime Minister and the Indian Army's Last War', p. 325.
[18]Louis Allen, *Burma: The Longest War 1941-1945,* (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., 1984), p. 119; Anglim, 'Orde Wingate', pp. 241-242.
[19]Callahan, 'The Prime Minister and the Indian Army's Last War', p. 325.
[20]Anglim, 'Orde Wingate', pp. 248.

successful as he gained access 'far beyond what his rank and achievements warranted'.[21] When presenting his concept at conferences in 1942, senior leaders responded coolly to Wingate's ideas but his advocacy and lobbying would gain core believers to shape the new force.[22] Subsequently, Wavell allotted forces to be re-designated as LRP Groups, and in July 1942 they moved into central India to train.[23]

The new 77 Indian Brigade possessed 3,000 personnel across three battalions supplemented by a commando company.[24] One battalion came from 13 King's Liverpool Regiment which had previously conducted coastal defence and garrison duties, another came from a recently recruited Gurkha Rifles unit, and the final unit from the Burma Rifles which had retreated into India in 1942. A supplement came from the Bush Warfare School and became the 142 Commando Company, 'by far the best and most experienced' of the troops.[25] The others were less prepared. During late 1942 'the majority of 77 Indian Infantry Brigade needed remedial basic work in addition to specialized instructions in the tactics of LRP'.[26] Training emphasised the core skills required for the new mission of deep penetration with different tactics to those of conventional British and Indian units, although the platoon-level skills would not be completely new since jungle columns would resemble 'infantry fighting in conditions of poor visibility without supporting arms'.[27] Training took place in Patharia and Sagar, with support from Central India Command although the brigade was autonomous and not under its command. The specialised, rigorous, eight-week training emphasised jungle warfare, small-unit techniques, core capabilities, and physical fitness for cross-country movement.[28] Trainers used tactical exercises and sand pits to teach basic infantry skills and remedy 'the mistakes in minor tactics' seen

[21]McLynn, The Burma Campaign, p. 87.
[22]See Allen, Burma, p. 119; McLynn, The Burma Campaign, pp. 81-82; David Rooney, Burma Victory: Imphal, Kohima and the Chindit Issue, March 1944 to May 1945, (London: Arms and Armour 1992), p. 108; Sykes, Orde Wingate, p. 367.
[23]O.C. Wingate, Report on Operations of the 77th Indian Infantry Brigade in Burma February to June 1943, (New Delhi: The Manager Government of India Press, 1943), p. 2; S. Woodburn Kirby, The War Against Japan: India's Most Dangerous Hour, (Uckfield, East Sussex: The Naval & Military Press Ltd, 2004), p. 244, originally published 1958.
[24]Wingate, *Report on Operations*, 2. Uniquely, 77 Indian Brigade had almost no Indian troops, it was deliberately mislabelled to confuse the IJA. Of the original eight columns, the sixth was disbanded to fill losses in others. See Julian Thompson, *The Imperial War Museum Book of the War in Burma 1942-45,* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 2002), p. 63.
[25]Tim Moreman, *Chindit 1942-45*, (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2009), p. 10.
[26]Moreman, *Chindit*, p. 13.
[27]Wingate, Report on Operations, p. 3.
[28]Allen, *Burma*, pp. 122-129; McLynn, *The Burma Campaign*, pp. 84-89.

against the IJA.[29] Uniquely, the 77 Indian Brigade trained largely independently from GHQ India. It also lacked a single, formal doctrine. The core tenet of training was long marches to build endurance, mental toughness, and practice in moving through the jungle undetected.[30] Specialized training progressed from sections to platoons to columns, repeating drills to inculcate immediate dispersal during a firefight, patrolling techniques, pre-arranged attacks, booby traps, and river crossings.[31] In September, 2,000 members conducted a five-day brigade exercise,[32] followed by additional training to refine jungle tradecraft, and a final brigade exercise near Jhansi in December.[33] In January 1943 the 77 Indian Brigade moved to the border and prepared to enter Burma.[34]

Operation Longcloth – February to June 1943

Four goals shaped Operation Longcloth. Firstly, to destroy the railways near Indaw and cut the Mandalay-Myitkyina line. Secondly, to divide the IJA 18 and 56 divisions to isolate 18 Division. Thirdly, to harass the IJA, specifically units of 18 Division. Finally, if conditions permitted, to cut the Mandalay-Lashio railway. With these aims, the troops formed seven self-contained columns consisting of 306 to 369 men divided into Northern and Southern groups.[35] The smaller Southern Group, with columns 1 and 2, aimed to distract IJA defenders from the other group by crossing the Chindwin River and simulating a larger force.[36] The bigger Northern Group included brigade HQ and Columns 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8.[37] It aimed to destroy the Mandalay-Myitkyina railway at

[29]Wingate, Report on Operations, p. 6.
[30]Moreman, *Chindit*, pp. 14-15; Webster, *The Burma Road,* p. 92.
[31]Webster, *The Burma Road,* p. 93; Moreman, *Chindit*, pp. 16-17.
[32]Wingate, Report on Operations, p. 7; McLynn, The Burma Campaign, p. 89.
[33]Philip Stibbe, *Return Via Rangoon*. (London: Leo Cooper, 1995), pp. 33, 41-42.
[34]Ibid., p. 46; Basil Collier, The War in the Far East 1941–1945, A Military History, (London: Heinemann, 1969), p. 325; Webster, The Burma Road, p. 93.
[35]Collier, The War in the Far East, p. 326. Columns consisted of 306-369 men, approximately 15 horses and 100 mules, as well as four anti-tank rifles, two mortars, two heavy machine guns, nine light machine guns, and two light anti-aircraft machine guns. Southern Group (No. 1) contained LRP Group HQ and commander Lieutenant Colonel L.A Alexander, with Column 1 (Major Dunlop), Column 2 (Major A. Emmett) and 142 Commando Company (Major J.B. Jeffries). Northern Group (No. 2) included brigade headquarters (Brigadier Wingate), Group headquarters (Lieutenant Colonel S.A. Cooke), Column 3 (Major Calvert), Column 4 (Major Bromhead), Column 5 (Major Fergusson), Column 7 (Major Gilkes), Column 8 (Major Scott), 2nd Burma Rifles (Lieutenant Colonel L.G. Wheeler), and Independent Mission (Captain Herring) which may be considered a human intelligence scout team.
[36]Kirby, The War Against Japan: India's Most Dangerous Hour, p. 311.
[37]Ibid.

several points and isolate two IJA divisions from resupply; to harass IJA forces to the northwest of Mandalay near Shwebo; and cut the Mandalay-Lashio railway.[38] Of Japan's four divisions in Burma, the operation targeted 18 Division, on the road from Taunggyi to Kengtung in the Shan States.[39] The division had positioned its three regiments for defence around Indaw, the Hukawng Valley, and Myitkyina, using garrisons, forward outposts, and regular patrols from those locations.[40] It had fought sporadic engagements with local insurgents and suffered few battlefield casualties.[41] Overall, 18 Division was a standard IJA unit: battle-tested, with past success but some erosion of capabilities from sustained deployment.[42]

On 14 February and the next four days the Columns crossed the Chindwin River at multiple points and headed into the IJA-held jungle. As the 1,000 strong diversionary Southern Group progressed toward Kyaikthin, 'problems presented themselves almost immediately' when the IJA ambushed them during an attempt to sabotage a train station.[43] Following initial mishaps and an IJA attack against Column 2 that proved devastating, about half the group were forced to retreating to India.[44] Concurrently, the main thrust of the Northern Group 'had been largely successful in evading the Japanese' and began to attack.[45] Firstly, Column 3 moved 100 miles and in early March,

[38]Allen, *Burma*, p. 17.
[39]Kirby, India's Most Dangerous Hour, p. 309.
[40]Jon Diamond, *1943-44 Chindit Versus Japanese Infantrymen* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2015), pp. 11, 17.
[41]Ibid.
[42]For 18 Division background, see Edward J. Drea, *In the Service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army* (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2003), pp. 10, 20; Combined Arms Research Library, N14290.99, *Organization of the Japanese Army,* (United States War Department Military Intelligence Division, Far Eastern Unit: 31 January 1944), p. 5, p. 9; Combined Arms Research Library, N20384.6, *Japanese Recruiting and Replacement System,* (United States War Department Military Intelligence Division. Washington DC: July 1945), p. 99. For operations in Malaya and Singapore, see Allen, *Burma*, p. 133; Collier, *The War in the Far East,* pp. 192-193; T.R. Moreman, *The Jungle, The Japanese and the British Commonwealth Armies at War 1941-1945: Fighting Methods, Doctrine and Training for Jungle Warfare,* (New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 25; H.P. Wilmott, *Empires in the Balance: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies,* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1982), pp. 330-332. For Burma invasion, see Allen, *Burma*, p. 59; Willmott, *Empires in the Balance,* p. 442; Bill Yenne, *The Imperial Japanese Army: The Invincible Years, 1941-1942,* (New York: Osprey Publishing, 2014), p. 282.
[43]Webster, *The Burma Road,* p. 94.
[44]Ibid., pp. 94-95; Allen, *Burma*, p. 128.
[45]Callahan, p. 66.

demolished two bridges as well as approximately 70 sections of the railway line.[46] Separately, Column 4 moved slowly, Wingate relieved the commander, and in early March the column was decisively ambushed by IJA forces while attempting a river crossing.[47] Half the column quickly 'fell to panic' as the IJA killed half of the defenders and destroyed most of the communications, causing the remaining fifteen members to retreat to India.[48] Column 4's other half pushed east, became lost, and would 'struggle back to India, having stumbled hundreds of miles'.[49] Separately, in early March, Column 2 was seen and attacked by an IJA company with subsequent confusion creating a 'disaster'.[50] Thus, by late March two columns had been lost but the LRPG had pushed over 200 miles into IJA-held Burma and demolished several points of the railway connecting Mandalay and Myitkyina, one of the primary objectives.[51]

Next the LRPG transitioned to the operation's second stage as five of the original eight columns moved east of the Irrawaddy River to cut the Mandalay-Lashio railway. With the defenders now alerted, the columns evaded some of the pursing Japanese when crossing the mile-wide Irrawaddy, with Column 3 barely escaping and forced to abandon wounded personnel.[52] Critically, this movement across the river caused the columns to leave the cover of the jungle and enter the plains, a dry, hot, open area that exposed them and proved 'far less suited' to their tactics.[53] It also alerted more of the IJA which moved to confine and destroy the columns using the roads, rivers, and mobile forces.[54] The IJA's 18 Division began to trap the columns operating in the waterless forests accessible to IJA units by road and track.[55] Reinforced IJA battalion sweeps and regimental manoeuvres isolated the retreating columns, and forced them to divide into smaller units, and systematic movements become impossible for the columns.[56] By late March the columns were struggling to sustain themselves so they ceased operations and began returning to India.[57] The force dispersed into small teams with some parts evading the Japanese for the next two months.[58]

[46]Moreman, *Chindit*, 40.
[47]Webster, *The Burma Road,* pp. 96.
[48]Ibid.
[49]Ibid., p. 97.
[50]Wingate, Report on Operations, 31.
[51]Callahan, *Burma*, 66.
[52]Kirby, India's Most Dangerous Hour, p. 315.
[53]Moreman, *Chindit*, 41.
[54]Kirby, *India's Most Dangerous Hour,* p. 318.
[55]Ibid., p. 319.
[56]Allen, *Burma*, p. 135.
[57]Wingate, Report on Operations, 47.
[58]Column 7 retreated to China. Wingate, *Report on Operations*, 53.

Overall, Operation Longcloth was 'an expensive failure'.[59] Of the original 3,000 personnel only 2,200 returned, with 'most of them unfit for further [LRPG] operations'.[60] Afterwards, the IJA quickly repaired the damage. The units did penetrate IJA held territory and cut the first railway for a while but delivered few other tangible gains despite many personnel and resources being lost. The operation failed to force the IJA units to consolidate, failed to cut the second railway, and failed to harass Japanese defenders to any significant degree. After crossing the Irrawaddy River into the Burmese plains, the LRPG struggled to manoeuvre – supposedly a core skill of the Column and mission – much less deliver any significant damage to the railway infrastructure or to defending IJA units. Within a short period of time the IJA repaired its lines of communication suffered only a 'negligible' number of casualties.[61] The operation 'had no immediate effect on Japanese disposition or plans' with the defenders neither consolidating rear forces nor withdrawing forces from the IJA's forward defences.[62] For the IJA, 'the counter-measures they had adopted were successful' and caused significant casualties, while also forcing columns to disperse and to withdraw.[63] While outsiders cited alleged benefits in morale, propaganda, and creativity, in reality 'even Wingate's own supporters admitted that the operation was a failure'.[64] The Columns had been increasingly isolated and were unable to match IJA battalion firepower. Vulnerable to encirclement, after luring the IJA into attack - as had been planned - it produced the opposite outcome and 'proved the undoing' of Operation Longcloth.[65]

Adaptation had addressed broader shortcomings in jungle skills, immobility, and an inability to counter IJA offensive tactics, but the LRPG proved unable to achieve their goals while suffering a high cost in lives and resources. Eventually, the mobile units lost their mobility; harassing units against IJA infrastructure proved unable to cause significant damage; the Columns were outmatched by IJA firepower; and small groups were forced to disperse in an improvised withdrawal. If using a cost-benefit measure of objectives attained and resources expended, it is hard to disagree with criticisms of the mission as 'achieving nothing of strategic value, suffering heavy casualties (one third

[59]William J. Slim, *Defeat Into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma and India, 1942-1945,* (New York: Cooper Square Press, 2000), p. 162, originally published 1956.
[60]Callahan, *Burma*, p. 67.
[61]Slim, *Defeat Into Victory*, p. 162.
[62]Ibid.
[63]Kirby, *India's Most Dangerous Hour,* p. 328.
[64]McLynn, *The Burma Campaign,* p. 157.
[65]John Costello, *The Pacific War 1941-1945,* (New York: Harper Collins, 1981), p. 395; Slim, *Defeat Into Victory,* p. 162; Allen, *Burma*, p. 135.

of the force deployed) and teaching nothing of specific tactical value to the regular army'.[66]

Special Force and Change

During 1943, Wingate expanded the size and his ambitions for a second LRP mission into Burma. Tactics were changed to infiltrating by air using gliders, and transport planes.[67] The aim was also changed, to establish fortified positions and to lure IJA units 'into situations where they could be destroyed in detail' or forced to retreat.[68] For this new mission, the LRPG consolidated several units from outside Fourteenth Army and expanded into a six-brigade force with 20,000 members, re-designated as 3 Indian Division. It also became known as the 'Special Force'.[69]

Again, personal advocacy and high level political and military endorsement enabled that expansion. Wingate advocated this increased role based on his 'highly coloured report' on the operation that 'exaggerated his success'.[70] Prime Minister Winston Churchill asked Wingate to join him at the Quadrant Conference where, despite some resistance, Wingate secured an expanded LRPG and mission.[71] With endorsement and authorisation, the newly-promoted Major General Wingate expanded the LRPG. 77 Indian Brigade reformed in August 1943 at Jhansi where 111 Indian Brigade was also formed.[72] Critically, the LRPG received 70 British Infantry Division in early October, adding an infantry battalion to each brigade and expanding each brigade from six

[66]Moreman, *The Jungle*, p. 77.
[67]IWM Wingate Chindit Papers, Box II, Para.8, 'Minutes of Conference Held at HQ Fourteenth Army and Air HQ Bengal – 3 Dec. '43'; IWM Wingate Chindit Papers, Box IV Letter AX.866, 'from Air Minister to AHQ India of 22 Sept. 1944'. Both cited in Anglim, 'Orde Wingate', pp. 254-255, footnote 104.
[68]Anglim, 'Orde Wingate', pp. 255, 257.
[69]The brigades were 77th Indian, 111th Indian, 14th British, 16th British, 23rd British, and 3rd West African. In Collier, *The War in the Far East,* p. 400. Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, *A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War,* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 229.
[70]Callahan, 'The Prime Minister', p. 326; Wingate, *Report on Operations*.
[71]Webster, *The Burma Road,* pp. 106-108; Rooney, *Burma Victory,* pp. 112-114; Callahan, 'The Prime Minister', pp. 326-328.
[72]The UK National Archives (hereinafter TNA) WO 203/4204, 'Despatch by General Sir Claude J.E. Auchinleck, G.C.B, G.C.I.E., C.S.I., D.S.O., O.G.E., A.D.C., Commander-in-Chief in India covering the period 21st June 1943-15th November 1943, Copy No. 35', 22 November 1945, p. 25.

columns to eight.[73] Finally, 3 West African Brigade arrived in India and joined the Special Force in November 1943.[74]

In considering the lessons learned from Longcloth, the Special Force never possessed a formal doctrine. Internal assessments of the first operation identified lessons, needs, and proposed changes, but failed to question any of the underlying assumptions regarding deep penetration. Instead, Wingate's post-operation report concluded that the first mission validated the theory underlying LRPG: it 'prevented a number of developments' and 'upset the enemy's plans'.[75] It recommended that 'when Long Range Penetration is used again, it must be on the greatest scale possible'.[76] This expanded concept would also require new ways of fighting.

The Longcloth concept of mobile columns evolved into brigade-controlled strongholds supported by mobile columns that aimed to employ defensive tactics for offensive effect. Longcloth had revealed the dangers in attacking IJA defensive positions since columns lacked sufficient firepower.[77] Now, in addition to fighting the IJA units as the columns manoeuvred in the open, the LRPG would induce the Japanese 'to attack us in our defended positions' and therefore reverse the firepower imbalance.[78] A stronghold would be a forward base with an airstrip defended by a garrison and two mobile columns and all supported by air.[79] A core area 500 yards in diameter within a larger defensive area and an airstrip aligned with the local terrain would reduce accessibility and provide all-round firepower. After arriving by air and securing the

[73]Ibid.

[74]Thompson, *The Book of the War in Burma,* pp. 232. For an order of battle see Rooney, *Burma Victory* pp. 115-116. 16 Brigade (Fergusson) with eight columns of British troops; 77 Brigade (Calvert), with twelve columns total, six British and six Gurkha; 111 Brigade (Lentaigne) with four British columns and one Gurkha; 14 Brigade (Brodie), with eight British columns; 23 Brigade (Perowne) with three regiments, trained as a LRPG but removed from the division and Special Force before the second operation; 3 West African Brigade (Gillmore), with six columns from across the 6, 7, and 12 battalions of The Nigeria Regiment.

[75]Wingate, Report on Operations, 57.

[76]Ibid.

[77]IWM Major WVH Martin 91/9/1 Wingate's Training Memorandum and Notes, 'O.C. Wingate, 'Special Force Commander's Training Memorandum No.8, "The Stronghold"', 1, 20 February 20 1944.

[78]Ibid.

[79]IWM Wingate Chindit Papers, Box II, 'Minutes of Conference'; IWM Wingate Chindit Papers, Box IV, AX.866. Both cited in Anglim, 'Orde Wingate', pp. 254-255, footnote 104. Discussion of Strongholds and changed techniques from IWM 91/9/1, 'The Stronghold', and Anglim, 'Orde Wingate', pp. 255-256.

area, engineers would prepare an airstrip, followed by flying in the brigade with artillery, anti-aircraft guns, and an infantry battalion for the garrison. Floater columns would patrol externally to detect IJA units and provoke them into attacking through restricted approaches. The defending forces could reinforce the columns and fight outside the base. If IJA attackers reached the base, defenders could hold and lure additional IJA divisional assets for their destruction.[80] At these strongholds, about 8,000 men would form 'a network of larger, more heavily manned and more permanent' bases.[81] The stronghold concept was not unprecedented, as the British Army had used fortified positions in a system of boxes held by brigades in North Africa during 1941, but in Burma the Special Force strongholds would be inserted behind enemy lines and had different operational goals.[82]

Inside the Special Force, the leadership produced reports, directives, and pamphlets regarding lessons from the past and prescriptions for the future. Ideas emerged within the organisation and were disseminated under division authority, using an inward-focus that made few external contributions for units in conventional jungle operations.[83] This independence cut both ways, as GHQ India training documents made 'surprisingly little reference to LRP methods'.[84] Instead, Special Force 'jealously guarded independence from GHQ India' which meant that lessons and ideas remained within the Special Force.[85] Its 50-page commander's pamphlet outlined 'the theory and principles' of LRPG with subsequent chapters addressing details like the column, 'its day to day routine in operations' and specific technical problems.[86] The Special Force Commander's Training Notes, aimed 'to throw additional light on the various problems', provided a general overview of LRPG, their purpose, and concept of

[80]IWM 91/9/1 'The Stronghold'; Wingate Chindit Papers Box II, 'No.1 Air Commando Close Support Forecasts – period 14/25th March, 1944 – Note by Commander Special Force'; and cited in Anglim, 'Orde Wingate', pp. 256, footnotes 112 and 113.
[81]Webster, *The Burma Road,* p. 107.
[82]See Anglim, 'Orde Wingate', pp. 256; Anglim also cites PRO, WO 231/126, Military Training Pamphlet No.52 – Forest, Bush and Jungle Warfare against a Modern Enemy, in pp. 24–26.
[83]Moreman, *The Jungle*, 9.
[84]Ibid.
[85]Ibid.
[86]IWM, Major WVH Martin 91/9/1 item 1, 'Shorthand, handwritten title 'Force Commanders Pamphlet on First LRP – Burma', on cyclostyled copy of Major-General O.C. Wingate's original Long Range Penetration (LRP) memorandum', undated, written following the 1943 Chindit operations, p. 1.

operations,[87] and addressed specific tactical situations like bivouac security, weapons, resupply procedures, and ambush techniques.[88] The directives and pamphlets discussed ways to improve procedures and some new techniques, but failed to alter Special Force's underlying principles or concepts. Internal assessments identified lessons, needs, and proposed changes, yet failed to question the underlying assumptions regarding LRP as a whole.

To incorporate the new tactics, Special Force conducted a 20-week training program in Central India during late 1943.[89] It emphasised the new techniques developed internally and was implemented separately from the broader changes occurring in other parts of the Indian Army during the same period.[90] Special Force training included new requirements for coordinating air supply, animal husbandry, river crossing, and continued to emphasise individual hardiness and marching. Training culminated in a three-week exercise in December, 'during which we marched 200 miles and chased runaway mules over another 200, swam rivers and carried heavier packs than we ever carried in Burma', followed by a 'large scale conference for all Special Force officers'.[91] This training reflected a learning process that was distinct from other, larger training and doctrine reforms underway across the Indian Army in 1943 and later applied effectively through 1945. While the Indian Army developed new tactics for jungle fighting to counter Japanese tactics, notably IJA defensive bunker systems and countering infiltration attacks, Special Force evolved largely independently, and in contrast to the Indian Army's employment of new offices and staff using the newly-formed Infantry Committee, Director of Infantry, and new official doctrine such as *Army in India Training Memorandum*. The Special Force focused on its

[87]IWM, Major WVH Martin 91/9/1 item 2, *Special Force Commander's Training Notes No. 1*, 'Lecture No. 1, General Rules for the employment of Forces of Deep Penetration in modern warfare', p. 1.

[88]IWM, Major WVH Martin, 91/9/1 item 3, *Special Force Commander's Training Notes No. 2*, 'Lecture Security in Bivouac'; IWM, Major WVH Martin 91/9/1, item 4, *Special Force Commander's Training Notes No. 3*, 'Infantry Anti-Tank Projector (PIAT)'; IWM, Major WVH Martin 91/9/1 item 5, *Special Force Commander's Training Notes No. 4*, 'Supply Dropping'; IWM, Major WVH Martin 91/9/1 item 5, *Special Force Commander's Training Notes No. 5*, 'Supply Dropping Drill'; IWM, Major WVH Martin, 91/9/1 item 7, *Special Force Commander's Training Notes No. 6*, 'Employment of Aircraft with Troops of Deep Penetration'; IWM, Major WVH Martin 91/9/1 item 8, *Special Force Commander's Training Notes No. 7*, 'The Column in Ambush'.

[89]Thompson, The Book of the War in Burma, p. 235.

[90]For an assessment about these changes, see Van Ess, 'Wartime Tactical Adaptation and Operational Success'.

[91]IWM 80/49/1 'Captain N. Durant, transcript (20 pp. photocopy) of letter to home', p. 2.

new techniques independently of the wider shifts and reforms underway elsewhere and was free from those obligations due to its comparative autonomy. The final preparations for Operation Thursday took place from December 1943 to February 1944 when 'training was spasmodic' with rehearsals, practice firing, and long marches.[92]

Operation Thursday – February to July 1944

Operation Thursday's objectives were to cut the communications of the IJA's 18 Division, harass its rear, prevent reinforcement, and inflict general damage and confusion.[93] It would use multiple brigades from 3 Indian Division including 77 and 111 Indian brigades, 14, 16, and 23 British brigades, and eventually 3 West African Brigade. The first units would be inserted by gliders behind the IJA forces to block resupply to the IJA's 18 Division and attack any other nearby Japanese forces.[94] With one overland and three aerial insertions at points surrounding Indaw, the Special Force would attack three objectives: Indaw, the Mandalay-Myitkyina railway, and the Bhamo-Myitkyina road.[95] Specifically, in the first wave, 16 British Brigade would march inland from Ledo, destroying an IJA garrison at Lonkin on the way to Indaw, where it would seize two airfields and establish a nearby stronghold. 77 Brigade would be inserted by glider into two landing zones and then march to seize the nearby railway and form a stronghold. 111 Brigade would fly by glider into two landing zones and move south of Indaw, to protect 16 Brigade by using road blocks and demolitions to prevent Japanese reinforcements from Mandalay.[96] 3 West African, 14 and 23 brigades would form a second wave to be flown in later for an attack on Indaw.[97]

On 10 February 16 Brigade embarked on the 300-mile march to the Mandalay-Myitkyina railway to prepare airstrips for the following two brigades.[98] The first thirty miles took nine days due to difficult terrain, poor conditions, and failing communications.[99] One column did attack the IJA garrison at Lonkin but 'this diversion achieved very little' and it 'caused further delay'.[100] Eventually, 16 Brigade arrived at Indaw and established the 'Aberdeen' stronghold, but this late arrival would cause

[92]Ibid., p. 3.
[93]Slim, *Defeat Into Victory,* p. 259.
[94]Rooney, *Burma Victory,* p. 121.
[95]Slim, Defeat Into Victory p. 267; Thompson, The Book of the War in Burma, p. 237.
[96]Thompson, The Book of the War in Burma, p. 238.
[97]Ibid., p. 245.
[98]Collier, *The War in the Far East,* p. 418.
[99]TNA WO 172/4395 16 British Infantry Brigade HQ, 1944 January, May–December, '16 Infantry Brigade Operations in Burma, February', May 1944; Thompson, *The Book of the War in Burma,* p. 239.
[100]Rooney, *Burma Victory,* p. 128.

future problems.[101] On 5 March, 77 Brigade began flying to the landing zones 'Piccadilly' and 'Broadway'. After some initial mishaps, caused largely by trees, ditches, and overloaded gliders, the brigade arrived and began to construct the Broadway stronghold.[102] From 6 to 8 March, 111 Brigade's 1,200 men were flown in to the 'Chowringhee' landing zone.[103] 77 Brigade experienced some early success as it constructed and reinforced the Broadway stronghold while sending out columns to attack IJA infrastructure north of Indaw. By 13 March the brigade had cut the rail and road communications supplying the IJA's 18 Division and elements of the 31 Division near Kohima.[104] The brigade then began to create a defensive position at Mawlu, to include a landing strip and a drop zone, named White City. Forces moved into positions, which 'we were to occupy for the next seven weeks'[105] against multiple IJA attacks.[106] Separately, 111 Brigade struggled. Within five days it suffered from a poor river crossing which split the brigade; a supply drop went awry; and the brigade failed to reach its railway objective south of Indaw which prevented its support to 16 Brigade.[107]

Having established the Aberdeen stronghold on 20 March, members of 16 Brigade moved to attack Indaw.[108] Concurrently, in late March 14 Brigade and 3 West African Brigade were flown in by gliders and transport aircraft, with parts of 14 Brigade landing at Aberdeen and moving to attack away from Indaw.[109] Tired and unsupported,[110] 16 Brigade's attack 'proved disastrous' after its leading columns were surprised by IJA defenders on 26 and 27 March.[111] Attackers 'blundered into Japanese outposts' and struggled as '16 Brigade turned out to be ill-disciplined and poorly trained and ended up firing on each other during the battle'.[112] Columns failed to coordinate or concentrate attacks, resulting in weak assaults conducted piecemeal.[113] Units failed to

[101]Allen, *Burma*, pp. 330-332.
[102]TNA WO 203/1829 77 Indian Infantry Brigade: Operations in Burma 1944 February-August, 'R.G.K. Thompson, Report on Air Operations 77 Brigade North Burma' 5 March to 25 June 1944.
[103]Rooney, *Burma Victory,* p. 126.
[104]Ibid.
[105]IWM 80/49/1, Durant letter to home, 6.
[106]Ibid., pp. 9; Rooney, *Burma Victory,* p. 127.
[107]Rooney, *Burma Victory,* p. 127.
[108]Ibid., p. 128.
[109]Costello, *The Pacific War,* p. 464.
[110]TNA WO 172/4395, 16.
[111] Rooney, *Burma Victory,* p. 129; WO 172/4395, 3.
[112]McLynn, *The Burma Campaign*, pp. 287-288.
[113]Ibid., p. 288.

seize the airfields or supply stores, and had difficulty maintaining coherence.[114] A separate column fought the IJA near Lake Indaw and lost most of its ammunition, heavy weapons, and radios.[115] A third column reached the airfield east of Indaw but, alone, the column was too weak and had to abandon the airfield. Thus, the brigade had failed in the Indaw attack, a critical goal, and the exhausted 16 Brigade required evacuation.[116] Special Force had failed to seize the Indaw airfields, to occupy the area, to prevent IJA reinforcements, or destroy the road or railway south of Indaw.[117] Aberdeen was also abandoned.[118]

Wingate's death on 24 March caused Special Force to change commander but the operation continued.[119] The remaining three brigades roamed near Indaw and fought local engagements, but IJA attacks eventually forced the abandonment of White City. On 6 April an IJA Independent Mixed Brigade attacked 77 Brigade by shelling the airstrip and employing infantry assaults, causing six days of 'confused battle' as the defenders, attacking IJA infantry, and counter-attackers fought each other.[120] On 15 - 18 April the IJA 'launched a most determined attack' that penetrated the perimeter', reaching a nearby hill which was barely repulsed.[121] Fighting ultimately repelled the IJA brigade, but left 77 Brigade severely weakened.[122] Two weeks later White City was abandoned, and in early May many of the remaining men from 3 West African, 77 and 14 brigades moved northward to the Blackpool stronghold near Hobin to join 111 Brigade.[123] With a weakened force and a new commander, the move to Blackpool signalled what 'was really the end of the Chindits'.[124] Before it was possible to build

[114]Collier, *The War in the Far East,* p. 420.
[115]Rooney, *Burma Victory,* p. 129.
[116]Slim, *Defeat Into Victory,* p. 270. 16 Brigade withdrew to India, but some remained under 77 Brigade command until 22 April. IWM, Private Papers of Colonel F O Cave OBE MC item 1/11 Document 10558, 'Diary of Colonel F.O. Cave', 17 April 1943-10 May 1944, p. 87; TNA WO 172/4395.
[117]Rooney, *Burma Victory,* p. 131.
[118]TNA WO 203/138 3 Indian Division: Situation Reports 1944 March – July, '3 Ind Div Own Tps SITREP No. 38 to 1900 hrs 7 May, from FOURTEENTH ARMY'.
[119]Costello, *The Pacific War,* p. 465. Wingate was replaced by Major General W.D.A. Lentaigne, who was the 111 Brigade Commander.
[120]TNA WO 203/138 3 Indian Division: Situation Reports 1944 March, '3 DIV OWN TPS SITREP 19 to 1200 hrs 18 APR'; quote from Rooney, *Burma Victory,* p, 135.
[121]Thompson, *The Book of the War in Burma,* p. 256; WO 203/138, '3 DIV OWN TPS SITREP 19 to 1200 hrs 18 APR.
[122]Jesse Shaw, *Special Force: A Chindit's Story,* (Gloucester, England: Alan Sutton, 1986), p. 187; see also Rooney, *Burma Victory,* p. 135.
[123]Slim, *Defeat Into Victory,* p. 270.
[124]Rooney, *Burma Victory,* p. 136.

Blackpool into a full stronghold, the 'Japanese attacked in strength'.[125] Special Force brigades became increasingly factionalised, and by mid-May the columns 'were in considerable disarray'.[126] Over the next few weeks the brigades struggled, fighting the IJA near Blackpool and eventually this rendered them 'combat ineffective' and Blackpool was abandoned.[127] After a command reorganisation on 17 May, Special Force units were used in a standard infantry role in fighting near Mogaung where they managed to cut the railway to Myitkyina. This effort rendered 77 Brigade 'no longer an effective fighting force' after it had suffered 800 dead and wounded, with only about 300 'who could walk, let alone march'.[128] Casualties and exhaustion had rendered the remaining units 'not fit to continue operating'.[129] The Special Force was finally withdrawn with 77 Brigade in July, leaving only the 3 West Africa to patrol and 111 Brigade to consolidate.[130]

Overall, the Special Force suffered approximately 3,606 casualties with 1,034 killed and 2,572 wounded, losing approximately one-fifth of its total strength. In addition, 'most of those who survived never fought again' due to sickness and malnutrition.[131] This loss of over 20% rendered the survivors combat ineffective, and by the end of Operation Thursday the force 'was so reduced by casualties and sickness… that its rehabilitation became impossible'.[132] The Special Force would not conduct another long-range penetration, and in February 1945, the Long-Range Penetration Groups ceased to exist.

Operation Thursday must be considered a failure. The Special Force 'failed to produce the results its creators hoped for' when it proved unable to achieve the critical objectives near Indaw, notably securing the airfields.[133] All the strongholds and blocks were abandoned earlier than planned after they proved to be unsustainable, and events in general failed to develop as predicted. The Special Force's multiple brigades, essentially the equivalent of two divisions, delivered no significant setbacks to the IJA forces in northern Burma. Rather, the force spent a large amount of time and effort moving, establishing positions, and trying to survive as setbacks accumulated and cascaded. Only one brigade achieved its specific objectives, 77 Brigade, but even that

[125]Ibid.
[126]McLynn, *The Burma Campaign,* pp. 342, 344.
[127]Millett and Murray, *A War to be Won*, p. 230.
[128]McLynn, *The Burma Campaign,* p. 352. Allen*, Burma*, p. 369.
[129]Slim, *Defeat Into Victory,* p. 280.
[130]TNA WO 203/138, 3 Indian Division: Situation Reports, 1944 March – July, '3730 SITREP from 3 Ind Div to Main & Adv 11 Army Gp'.
[131]McLynn, *The Burma Campaign,* p. 360.
[132]Kirby, *India's Most Dangerous Hour,* p. 446.
[133]Kirby, India's Most Dangerous Hour, pp. 444-445.

proved unsustainable. 16 Brigade, unsupported, failed in the critical attack against Indaw's airfields which had to be abandoned. 111 Brigade also failed to establish an effective block against the IJA. The insertion of the second wave produced no significant improvements. Unable to coordinate, the three brigade attack at Indaw, the brigades had to fight alone or as smaller columns. Almost immediately 111 Brigade had to split after the failed river crossing, and 16 Brigade fought only once as a brigade sized unit at the disaster near Indaw. Inserting 3 West African Brigade and 14 Brigade failed to improve inter-brigade cooperation or the division's ability to combine effects. These failures indicated larger problems regarding adaptation between the first and second operation. Critically, the Special Force had sacrificed mobility when it adopted the new strongholds but did so without gaining sufficient capability to repel attacking IJA units. This new role rendered Special Force more vulnerable to IJA firepower while also removing one of their key advantages - moving speedily and unnoticed. The IJA identified the force's units faster than expected, could repulse attacks, and could attack the strongholds with greater effect than predicted. Adapting its doctrine to incorporate the stronghold concept reduced Special Force's overall effectiveness and exacerbated its ability to react to setbacks.

Conclusions

The Special Force's adaptations in 1943 and 1944 indicate how concepts that develop in isolation within a unit may contribute to failure. Put simply, planners predicted incorrectly. Then, without a rigorous evaluation of their beliefs or assumptions, inappropriate ideas were incorporated and contributed to future battlefield losses. Prior to the first operation there was no comprehensive vetting of ideas outside the brigade, and only a limited evaluation of ideas within. 77 Indian Brigade did not participate in any formal institutional mechanism for information collection, integration, evaluation, or assessment outside of the unit. There was an initial resistance to LRP as a concept in the summer of 1942 at GHQ India and 'a long wrestle with authority', but once LRP had been endorsed by the Commander in Chief, Wavell, the brigade prepared for operations autonomously and with its core concepts and doctrine unchallenged.[134]

Without a formal doctrine or any external participation by it in wider doctrinal development underway elsewhere at the time, the LRPG trained independently with their own processes and without any systematic assessment from a higher authority.[135] This autonomy allowed ideas and decisions to be considered and disseminated through the brigade, primarily by the commander, Wingate, with his directives addressing specific needs rather than reflecting a deeper reconceptualisation of LRP. Additionally,

[134]Sykes, *Orde Wingate*, p. 368.
[135]Moreman, *Chindit*, 12-13.

the brigade exercises held in September and December 1942 occurred without any significant external evaluation or higher level assessment.

Findings from the LRPG's evolution into Special Force and its second operation suggest how the absence of an external, higher authority to assess information may contribute to adapting badly and lead to battlefield failure. After facing setbacks in the first operation related to insufficient relative firepower against the IJA's 18 Division, the resulting prescription from Special Force of strongholds with floater columns proved incorrect (or too difficult to execute). Even when expanded to an enlarged division there was still no comprehensive vetting of LRP ideas from outside the unit. Avoiding the formal doctrinal change occurring in other parts of the Indian Army, LRPG command led its own evaluation with recommendations issued via intra-unit training memorandums that supported the LRPG's core tenets while expanding their role, purpose, and mission.[136] Once the stronghold concept was endorsed, there was limited external formal review despite the significantly increased requirements in personnel, resources, and air assets. The concept of defensive strongholds supported from air was not completely flawed. From mid-1943 the Indian Army began adapting the defensive box concept used in North Africa into a larger defensive pivot system supported by mobile strike forces, and this was implemented effectively against IJA infiltration and encirclement in Arakan in 1944 at the Battle of the Admin Box.[137] However, the variant used by Special Force brigades with 300 men columns as a strike force proved inappropriate to achieving its goals.

If future conflicts develop into a race to recover from surprise, the case of Special Force warns of the cost of adapting poorly. It also shows the critical risk during rapid wartime change from not learning what causes failure. The two operations of the LRPG indicate how the absence of an external authority that assesses, evaluates, and oversees the implementation of new ideas may cause organisations to rely on their own untested concepts which can contribute to an unnecessary loss in lives and resources. Future military planners and decision makers would be well-served by remembering the example of Special Force where flawed wartime adaptation exacerbated failure.

[136]IWM 91/9/1, 'The Stronghold'.
[137]Carter Malkasian, *A History of Modern Wars of Attrition,* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2002), p. 106.

Lieutenant-Colonel James Leslie Kincaid and the Emergency Response to the 1944 Eruption of Mount Vesuvius, Southern Italy

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ABSTRACT
The 1944 eruption of Vesuvius occurred at the height of the Second World War. A successful emergency relief operation was launched by the Allied Control Commission and was led by an American officer, Lt. Col. (James) Leslie Kincaid. In this paper we both describe the operation and evaluate its effectiveness pointing out, inter alia: the importance of well-trained and experienced personnel; the need for expertise across a wide range of specialisms; the ability to both empathise with victims, but at the same time lead and strongly direct a successful military operation and work harmoniously and effectively with allies.

The most recent eruption of Vesuvius occurred in March 1944, and given the exigencies of war, it is remarkable that its chronology and volcanological characteristics are so well known. Knowledge of the eruption is almost entirely due to the diligence and devotion to science of Professor Giuseppe Imbò, who was at the time the Director of the *Reale Osservatorio Vesuviano.*[1] In the years immediately following the Second World War several lengthy papers were published by Imbò and his colleagues and, although knowledge of the 1944 eruption has been further advanced by more recent research, his papers published in the 1940s and early 1950s

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DOI: 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v8i1.1608
[1]Roberto Scandone, 'Giuseppe Imbò: Volcanologist in difficult times', *Volcano News* 15, (1983), no page numbers.

remain the basis of all subsequent eruption narratives with a chronology of events given in Appendix 1.[2]



Figure 1: Geological map of Vesuvius, showing the course of the 1944 eruption.[3]

[2]Giuseppe Imbò, 'L'attività eruttiva vesuviana e relative osservazioni nel corso dell'intervallo interuttivo 1906-1944 ed in particolare del parossismo del Marzo 1944', *Annali Osservatorio Vesuviano* V (1949), pp. 185-380; Giuseppe Imbò, 'Sismicità del parossismo vesuviano del marzo 1944', *Annali Osservatorio Vesuviano* VI, I (1955), pp. 59-268; Roberto Scandone, Lisetta Giacomelli and Paolo Gasparini, 'Mount Vesuvius: 2000 years of volcanological observations', *Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research* 58 (1993), pp. 5-25; Benedetto de Vivo, Roberto Scandone and Raffaello Trigila, 'Recent volcanological researches on Vesuvius', *Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research* 58 (1993), pp. 1- 3; P. Fulignati, P. Marianelli, N. Métrich, R. Santacroce, R. and A. Sbrana, 'Towards a reconstruction of the magmatic feeding system of the 1944 eruption of Mt. Vesuvius', *Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research* 133 (2004), pp. 13-22; Paul Cole and Claudio Scarpati, 'The 1944 eruption of Vesuvius, Italy: Combining contemporary accounts and field studies for a new volcanological reconstruction', *Geological Magazine* 147, 3 (2010), pp. 391- 415.

[3]From David K. Chester, Angus M. Duncan, Philip Wetton and Roswitha Wetton, Journal *of Historical Geography* 33, Fig. 1 (2007), pp. 172, Copyright permission Elsevier.



Figure 2: Isopachs of Tephra (Ash) Distribution.[4]

Until the 2000s the ways in which people living on the slopes of Vesuvius coped with the effects of the 1944 eruption had not been fully reported. Information was limited to newspaper accounts, a contemporary report by H. Bentley and J. R. Gregory, published privately and only available to researchers visiting archives in the U.S.A., U.K. or Italy, and an Italian work of 1994 entitled *Vesuvio 1944: Le ultima eruzione*.[5] *Vesuvio 1944*, published locally, uses additional archive material from Italy, includes some excellent photographs from British and American sources and successfully builds upon Bentley and Gregory's pioneering account.

More than a decade ago, the present authors completed a study of the 1944 eruption, which was based on an investigation of archival sources, accounts provided by surviving

[4]Based on: R. Scandone, F. Iannone, F. and G. Mastrolorenzo, 'Stima dei Parametri Dinamici dell'eruzione dell 1944 del Vesuvio', *Bolletino Gruppo Nazionale di Vulcanologia* 2 (1986), pp. 487-512; Chester et al., *Journal of Historical Geography* 33, pp. 172; and additional cartography for this paper.

[5]H. Bentley and J. R. Gregory, *Final Report on the Vesuvius Emergency Operation,* (Headquarters, Naples Province: Allied Control Commission, 1944); Angelo Pesce and Giuseppe Rolandi, *Vesuvio 1944: L' ultima eruzione*, (Private Publication: San Sebastiano al Vesuvio, 1994); Angelo Pesce and Giuseppe Rolandi, Vesuvio 1944: *L' ultima eruzione,* (San Sebastiano al Vesuvio: Private Publication, 2000, 2nd ed.).

military personnel involved in the emergency operation, and information compiled from the town councils (*comuni)* of the settlements that were affected.[6] Recently, further archival research has allowed the authors to assess the damage caused by the eruption and to reconstruct the responses to it.

Figure 3: Lt. Colonel (James) Leslie Kincaid.[7]

During this research a further story of exceptional leadership emerged – that of American Army officer, Lieutenant Colonel (James) Leslie Kincaid, who commanded the allied emergency operation both during and immediately after the eruption. In March 1944 Kincaid was a 59 year old reserve officer who had no previous knowledge of volcanic eruptions, but possessed a rare combination of extensive military experience, highly relevant civilian management expertise, and well-honed leadership skills. In common with many older American military administrators including his

[6]David K. Chester, Angus M. Duncan, Philip Wetton and Roswitha Wetton, 'Responses of the Anglo-American military authorities to the March 1944 eruption of Vesuvius, Southern Italy', *Journal of Historical Geography* 33 (2007), pp. 168-196; David Chester and Angus Duncan, 'Escape from Vesuvius', *History Today* 59, 8 2009), pp. 43-49.

[7]James Leslie Kincaid (1884-1973) as photographed in 1939. Reproduced by permission of Syracuse University Libraries.

deputy Major Harry Hershenson, Kincaid had attended the School of Military Government at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville.[8] Modelled on the politico-military courses the British War Office held at the *Intelligence Training Centre* at the University of Cambridge, the *School of Military Government* was set up in Charlottesville late in 1941 immediately following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour and by May 1942 was training its first intake of students. Courses ran for four months, included older reserve officers such as Kincaid and Hershenson, and concentrated on the future administration of Germany, Italy and Japan, with experts seconded from the military, government service and academia. Syllabi were strongly influenced by the *Field Manual for Military Government (FM27-5)*, which was largely based on the lessons that had been learnt during the American occupation of the Rhineland in 1918.[9]

Following the successful invasion of Sicily in 1943, it soon became clear that *FM27-5* was not a particularly helpful guide because it assumed peaceful conditions similar to those that were faced in Germany in the years immediately following World War I, whereas in Sicily and later in mainland Italy, war was still actively being waged, and there was also a pressing need to eliminate the *fascist* legacy. In December 1943 *FM27-5* was revised to make all actions of military government subordinate to the overall war aims of defeating the enemy, establishing a new government without *fascist* taint, and police action to maintain law and order and establish control over organised crime, including the black market.[10] As will be seen, the efforts to control organised crime and the black market were largely unsuccessful.[11] Although the revised version of *FM27-5* defined the context under which Kincaid was required to operate, he never used its more draconian powers.

Following guerrilla action by partisans, Naples fell to the allies on 1 October 1943, but by March 1944 the situation there was far from being militarily or administratively secure. Retreating German forces had destroyed much of the urban fabric of Naples. By March while there was no immediate threat of starvation or prospect of major epidemics, an estimated 800,000 people still depended on the Allies for their day-to-day survival, and a crime-syndicate dominated black-market controlled most aspects

[8]See Appendix 2 for summary biographic details of the key actors in the 1944 events.
[9]Carl J. Friedrich (ed.), *American experience in military government in World War II,* (New York: Rinehart, 1948); Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the occupation of Germany, 1944-1946*, (Washington DC: Center of Military History, United States Army,1975).
[10]George C. S. Benson and Maurice Neufeld, 'American military government in Italy', in Carl Joachim Friedrich (ed.), *American experience in military government in World War II*, (New York: Rinehart, 1948), pp. 111-147.
[11]Norman Lewis, *Naples 44: An Intelligence Officer in the Italian Labyrinth*, (London: Eland. 2002).

of food and welfare distribution.[12] March 1944 was a difficult time in the Italian campaign because the Allied advance had been halted well to the north of Vesuvius at Monte Cassino and Anzio, and wounded soldiers plus refugees flooded into Naples and the other towns and villages of the region.

As recently as January 1944, the administration of occupied areas had been reformed and an *Allied Control Commission* (ACC) assumed sole responsibility for the liberated areas of southern Italy. The senior British officer, Lt. General Sir Noel Mason-Macfarlane, was the Chief Commissioner of the ACC (see Appendix 2). The ACC was structured into regions, which were themselves sub-divided into provinces and in March 1944 the Commissioner of the Naples Province was Lt. Col. Kincaid, and his immediate superior was the Regional Commissioner Lt. Col. Charles Poletti (see Appendix 2).[13] As the appendix shows, the life of James Leslie Kincaid is well documented in files compiled by archivists at Syracuse University, and the New York Military Museum and Veterans' Research Center. By March 1944 Kincaid had already demonstrated many of the personal qualities which would ensure that his command of the emergency would be successful. As Provincial Commissioner he was fortunate in that the talented team he commanded, and his style of leadership avoided many of the pitfalls that were endemic within the ACC. Politically the ACC has been pilloried for not fully purging the country of *fascism* and instead supported a system of government that left many of the country's ills intact, especially unstable government and the persistence of organised crime. In addition, and of greater relevance to the volcanic emergency, ACC personnel have often been disparaged as comprising a mixture of over-aged ineffective senior commanders and junior officers who were the poorer products of Officer Training Units.[14] This was not the case with Kincaid's command (as can be seen in Appendix 2). In addition, there was often intra-allied criticism with American officers expressing the opinion, for instance, that the British were over-represented at senior levels within the chain of command. This was a consequence of the practice whereby an officer's rank reflected the importance of the appointment rather than his seniority and/or efficiency.

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[12]Charles R. S. Harris, *Allied Military Administration of Italy,* (London, HMSO, 1957); Norman Lewis, *Jackdaw Cake: An autobiography*, (Hamilton: London, 1985); Kenneth V. Smith, *Naples-Foggia. Brief histories of the U.S. Army in World War II*, (Washington DC: Center of Military History, 1992), vol. 8.

[13]The city of Naples and its port remained under the direct control of the *Allied Military Government* (AMG).

[14]Maurice F. Neufeld, 'The Failure of the AMG in Italy', *Public Administration Review* 6, 2 (1946), pp. 137-148; Richard Lamb, *War in Italy 1943-1945: A Brutal Story*, (London: John Murray, 1993); Isobel Williams, *Allies and Italians under occupation: Sicily and Southern Italy 1943-45*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013)

On the British side many questions were raised over the style of command exercised by the Regional Commissioner, Lieutenant Colonel Charles Poletti, Kincaid's immediate superior. Neither issue had an adverse effect on the emergency operation with Kincaid maintaining firm personal control of his command. Apart from a 'duty visit', Poletti had no active involvement in the events that followed the eruption.[15] At the provincial level all the key officers were American, and Kincaid managed to foster excellent relationships with his British allies.[16] In fact an appendix added to Bentley and Gregory's report contains a letter of appreciation sent to Kincaid from a senior British officer.[17]

Four features characterised the successful emergency response:

1. Accurate information based on reconnaissance and clear scientific advice.
2. The ability to deploy large numbers of troops who had clearly defined
3. Contingency plans should the eruption take an unexpected course.
4. Provision of aid in the immediate aftermath of the eruption.

These are considered in turn below.

The provision of accurate information[18]

From the beginning of the eruption Kincaid's planning was based on accurate information. On Saturday afternoon (18 March), he convened a staff meeting to discuss the eruption and early on the 19 March ordered Lt. Colonel Guy Warren (see Appendix 2), and Capt. John Lummus to reconnoitre the area above Torre del Greco and Torre Annunziate and report on the situation (see Figure 1 for locations). Warren and Lummus had to abandon their transport because of falls of tephra (volcanic ash) that had been deposited by winds coming from the north north-east. Proceeding on foot, they found that the southern lava flow was advancing at a rate of about 300 metres/hour. They reasoned that if this rate continued, then Torre del Greco would be engulfed in less than 15 hours. A similar mission was undertaken by Kincaid and Lt. Col. John Warner. They climbed the mountain in order to observe the northern lava flow, which they believed was threatening the town of Cercola, see Figures 1 & 2, and at 10.00 am they recorded that the flow was circa 150 metres wide, 4 to 5 metres thick, and had already slowed to circa 6 metres/hour. They concluded that San Sebastiano, rather than Cercola, was immediately at risk.

[15]David K. Chester, Angus M. Duncan *et al.,* 'Responses of the Anglo-American military authorities', pp. 181-2.
[16]Bentley and Gregory, *Final Report*, pp. 26-28.
[17]Ibid., pp. 26-28 and Appendix.
[18]Many of the details in this section are from: Bentley and Gregory, *Final Report*, pp. 5-27.

Kincaid kept abreast of developments in San Sebastiano and Massa di Somma by locating his headquarters near to the flow-front on the metal bridge that connected the two towns and later, after the bridge had been destroyed by lava, he requisitioned the town hall (*Municipio*) in Cercola and made this his forward base. During the eruption Kincaid was supplied with information both by Professor Imbò and by his own subordinates: especially Warren, who commanded the San Giuseppe to San Giorgio sector; and Cantor, who was in charge of an area from Portici to Terzigno. On the 22 March, when communications to the east and southeast flanks were severely impeded by thick tephra deposition, Kincaid's devolution of command to trusted senior officers meant that firm control over the emergency operation was maintained.

In early March 1944 Professor Imbò had no transport, no photographic film, nor even alcohol to preserve his seismological charts. Much of the *Reale Osservatorio Vesuviana* had also been requisitioned by meteorology staff of the United States Army Air Force (USAAF), with Imbò and his wife, who was a research assistant, and a single seismograph accommodated in a basement room. Once the eruption began, the professor's essential role as a conduit of scientific knowledge was acknowledged. The professor received a limited stock of film, supplies of alcohol and a staff car. He was soon supplying vital information to the allies.[19]

Deployment of Personnel

A frequent complaint made of the allied war effort in Italy was that there were too many non-combatant military personnel, with the ACC in particular being perceived as chronically overstaffed. Harold Macmillan, at the time Churchill's personal representative in Italy, estimated that in 1944 some 1,400 officers and a total of 4,000 allied personnel were employed in administering those parts of Italy under ACC control. Macmillan believed this to be excessive especially when compared with the staffing levels adopted in countries under British colonial administration.[20] In fact it soon became apparent to Lt. Col. Kincaid that he did not have enough personnel under his command to mount an effective emergency response and, in addition to deploying his entire provincial staff, had to request the temporary attachment of a further 89 American and British officers. Following the eruption, a total of 65 officers

[19]Elena Cubellis and Giuseppe Luongo, 'L' eruzione del marzo 1944', in Giuseppe Luongo (ed.), *Mons Vesuvius: Sfide e catastofi trap aura e scienza,* (Napoli: Stagioni d' Italia), pp. 273-294; William Hoffer, *Volcano: The search for Vesuvius,* (New York: Summit Books, 1982), pp. 177-180; Roberto Scandone et al., 'Mount Vesuvius: 2000 years of volcanological observations', pp. 5-25.

[20]Harold Macmillan, *War Diaries: Politics and War in the Mediterranean January 1943-May 1944,* (London: Macmillan, 1984), pp. 352-3.

were named for special commendation, together with 45 non-commissioned officers and 11 United States Red Cross nurses.[21] At the height of the eruption even these enhanced numbers proved insufficient and, through Captain Arthur Carter his liaison officer at the Royal Air Force (RAF) base in Portici (Fig. 1), Lt. Col. Kincaid was forced to request additional help from Group Captain Stuart Culley the officer commanding this facility. Culley willingly supplied troops and much needed transport.[22]

Throughout the eruption small detachments of soldiers and officials were billeted in towns and villages in the region affected, both to react to local needs and report on the eruption to Kincaid.[23] On two occasions far higher concentrations of troops and much more elaborate organisation of human resources were required. The first occurred at the climax of the eruption, between 20-24 March (See Appendix 1). At 10.30 am on the 20 March, Kincaid was forced to promise transport to the people of San Sebastiano and Massa di Somma should the need for evacuation arise and by 11.00 am 15 trucks were on standby, together with detachments of *Carabinieri* (Italian para-military police) and RAF/USAAF personnel.[24] Evacuation soon commenced, but by nightfall the decision had been taken that Cercola was also threatened. On 21 March even more troops and *Carabinieri* were required, together with a further 200 trucks. Food distribution centres for evacuees were established, with several of these being operated by the American Red Cross.

On 22 March, wind-driven explosive plumes 2 to 4 kms in height caused tephra to fall on the east and southeast flanks of the volcano (See Appendix 1 Phase 2) and destroyed a large number of American aircraft at Poggiomarino airfield.[25] It is fortunate that the USAAF personnel had no need for assistance in vacating their base

[21]Bentley and Gregory, *Final Report,* Appendix.
[22]Ibid., pp. 26-27.
[23]Pesce and Rolandi, *Vesuvio 1944*, pp. 70.
[24]Royal Air Force Museum, Hendon London, Report on the eruption of Vesuvius March 1944, effect in respect of certain Royal Air Force Units, and the action taken by the Royal Air Force, in manuscript; James Troy Johnson, History of the 316th Fighter Squadron 1942-1945, http://www.bytebabble.com/JTJ-website/index.html Accessed 1 June 2021.
[25]Poggiomarino is also referred to as Terzigno or Vesuvius airfield. 88 B25 Mitchell bombers were badly damaged, but there is considerable doubt in the records about whether 14 were eventually repaired. Poggiomarino airfield was never used again and the total loss is estimated at $US 25 million. Maxwell Air Force Base Alabama, Air Historical Research Agency Archive, Robert F. Mc Rae, *Vesuvius and the 340th*. Available online from the 57th Bomb Wing Association website, http://57thbombwing.com/340th_History/340th_Diary/15_March1944.pdf Accessed 1 June 2021.

because Kincaid's command was still heavily involved in evacuating people and salvaging materials from Massa di Somma, San Sebastiano and Cercola. Around lunchtime the northern flow halted, but almost immediately reports were passed to headquarters at Cercola that the southern flow was advancing again. The rapid re-deployment of troops and transport was required to enable 250 people to be evacuated to Castellammare di Stabia, south-south-east of Torre Annunziata.

On 23 March, Kincaid concluded that Cercola was no longer in danger, and gave its people permission to return to their homes and again provided transport. During this phase of the emergency, and despite two thirds of San Sebastiano being destroyed, Kincaid's command had managed to supervise the evacuation of around 7,000 people from Cercola, between 1,500 and 1,800 from San Sebastiano, slightly fewer than 2,000 from Massa di Somma, and more than 750 who were threatened by the southern flow.[26] The vast majority of evacuees were accommodated with families and friends in nearby villages, leaving the ACC to find limited additional accommodation. Overall evacuation was a great success, the only loss of life being the possible suicide of a man from San Sebastiano who suffered severe clinical depression following the destruction of his home, and the report of the death of two children killed by the explosion of a tanker that came into contact with the active lava flow.[27]

A second episode in which a greater concentration of human and non-human resources was required was during and after Phase 3 of the eruption (see Appendix 1), when a thick blanket of tephra covered the south-eastern and eastern flanks of the volcano.[25] On 22 and 23 March Kincaid became increasingly concerned about the towns of Poggiomarino, San Giuseppe and Terzigno where the living conditions of the people were rapidly deteriorating to a level that had not been seen since the final days before liberation. Accounts from service personnel show that these and other towns were almost cut off by drifts of tephra, and at the RAF base in Portici orders were given for supplies of food, water and fuel to be covered over to prevent contamination.[28] The area to the east and southeast of Vesuvius was termed the 'dust

[26]Bentley and Gregory, *Final Report*, pp. 14, 18; F. Marciano, A. Casale and F. Cordella, *Cenni di storia Civile e Religiona*, (Massa di Somma: Edizioni Comune, 1998).

[27]A total of 24 people were killed by volcanic ash - induced roof collapse in the Terzigno, Pagani and Nocera areas during Phase 3 of the eruption. A further two deaths occurred, when 2 children were killed by an explosion when a tanker came into contact with the active lava of the northern flow of Phase One of the eruption. Elena Cubellis, Aldo Marturano and Lucia Pappalardo Cubellis, 'The last Vesuvius eruption in March 1944', pp. 95-121.

[28]Bishop (Lieutenant) Michael Mann, personal communication, 13 March 2005; Polly Powers-Stramm, 'My favorite veteran recalls Mount Vesuvius erupting', *Savannah Morning News*, November 10.

bowl' by allied troops and Kincaid had only 38 officers and 37 enlisted men in the towns and villages within this area, but in the days that followed additional personnel and material resources flowed into this region. Bulldozers and 30 trucks were deployed to clear drifts of tephra, some of which were more than 1.2 m deep.[29]

Contingency Plans

One notable feature of the emergency was the development of contingency plans should the eruption have taken an unexpected and more serious course. Although it is not possible to determine whether prompted by Kincaid or acting on his own initiative, within the British archives there are a number of telegrams signed by the Chief Commissioner of the ACC, Lieutenant-General Mason-Macfarlane to his superiors.[30] These telegrams include not only accounts of the measures being undertaken by Kincaid's command, and reports about the manner in which the eruption was developing, but also show wider concerns. One telegram from Mason-Macfarlane, to Lieutenant-General James Gammell - Chief of Staff to the Commander of the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations - reveals that plans were drawn up to allow civilian refugees to be evacuated to Sicily by rail and sea should the eruption have become more serious.[31] It is clear from this telegram that there had been an earlier exchange of correspondence, which has not survived in the archives, beginning as early as the 19 March. Arrangements had been made in Sicily to receive refugees, and Mason-Macfarlane was concerned that no ships had yet arrived in Naples. Pesce and Rolandi do mention the names of the ships that would have been used, implying that planning had reached an advanced stage.[32] An operation of this scale would have placed a severe strain on allied logistical capabilities, and more particularly on Kincaid's command.[33] It is fortunate that the plan was never implemented.

A second example of contingency planning occurred towards the end of the eruption. On 24 March officers at the RAF base in Portici became concerned that heavy falls of tephra were about to make roads to the base impassable and the possibility of a second

[29]Bentley and Gregory, *Final Report*, pp. 26; Pesce and Rolandi, *Vesuvio 1944*, pp. 70, 182.
[30]UK National Archives (hereinafter TNA) WO 204/2225/121623, Lieutenant General Sir Noel Mason-Macfarlane, Chief Commissioner, telegrams to his superior, 1944, telegrams 2481,2526,2584,2493.
[31]Lieutenant-General James Gammell (1892-1975). At the time of the eruption the Commander of the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations was General Sir Henry Maitland-Wilson (1881-1964), who had succeeded General Dwight Eisenhower in January 1944; TNA WO 204/2225/121623, telegram 2493.
[32]Angelo Pesce and Giuseppe Rolandi, *Vesuvio 1944: L' ultima eruzione,* (San Sebastiano al Vesuvio: Private Publication, 2000), 2nd ed.
[33]Ibid., pp. 66-67.

evacuation by sea was investigated.[34] Timely action by Kincaid and his team, who began to clear roads using bulldozers and manual labour, meant that once again evacuation was not required.

Post-eruption responses[35]

Most reconstruction occurred after January 1946, when the area was once more under full Italian sovereignty, but the initial stages were under ACC control and took place whilst Kincaid was still in command. Again, the results are impressive. In the towns of San Sebastiano and Massa di Somma, tents were supplied for the homeless, water and food were provided and the Italian authorities were encouraged to classify buildings into two categories: those that were only fit for demolition; and those that could be repaired.[36] Officers of the ACC initiated some rehabilitation in Massa di Somma and San Sebastiano, and these settlements shared schemes of financial aid and medical support with the badly affected towns located on the east and southeast flanks of the volcano. From 27 March and even before the close of the eruption, an ACC financial team under Major Rogers had decided how much aid was required and specialist troops under the command of Captain Mackenzie gave advice on matters concerning sanitation and hygiene.[37]

For the 'dust bowl towns' of the south-eastern and eastern flanks, intervention by the ACC was urgently required. Blankets of tephra had virtually cut off many settlements and servicemen have left vivid accounts of the severity of the conditions facing military personnel and the civil population alike.[38] As already mentioned, in the towns of Poggiomarino, San Giuseppe and Terzigno, Kincaid's command acted quickly to restore communications by means of the rapid re-deployment of troops and earth-moving equipment, but following the emergency even more aid was forthcoming. A major problem in the 'dust bowl' was that drifts of tephra had destroyed crops and the population faced the prospect of eventual starvation. The ACC quickly assessed

[34]Archives and Records Management Syracuse University Library, Information file on James Leslie Kincaid; New York State Military Museum and Veterans Research Center Saratoga Springs, Information file on James Leslie Kincaid.

[35]There are many photographs of the 'clean up' operation within archive collections and a large number are reproduced by Angelo Pesce and Giuseppe Rolandi in their book. Reference should also be made to: Central University Libraries, Southern Methodist University, Melvin C. Shaffer Collection https://www.smu.edu/Libraries/digitalcollections/mcs Accessed 14 June 2021.

[36]Pesce and Rolandi, *Vesuvio 1944*, pp. 72.

[37]Bentley and Gregory, *Final Report*, pp. 21, 24, 26.

[38]Bishop (Lieutenant) Michael Mann, personal communication, 13 March 2005; Polly Powers-Stramm, 'My favorite veteran recalls Mount Vesuvius erupting', *Savannah Morning News*, November 10.

the situation and calculated that food was required for around 20,000 people, that there was a particular requirement for green vegetables, and that without forage many farm animals would die. Transport of food from Naples had to be arranged and in each *comune* (local authority area), Kincaid established a relief organisation to ensure fair distribution. Sometime later, agricultural experts were brought in to advise on land restoration and re-planting. Seeds were imported and supplied to farmers and land was restored by deep-digging in order to bring topsoil to the surface. It was found that with careful management a fertile soil could be produced and normal cropping was usually resumed within two years.[39]

Evaluation

Following the eruption Kincaid received many honours, and several of his key staff were also decorated. Kincaid's deputy, Major Hershenson for example, was awarded the army Legion of Merit, and he was also decorated by the Pope. The appendix of Bentley and Gregory's report also contains letters of commendation to Kincaid from, amongst others: the Head of the Italian Government (Marshall Badoglio); his superiors within the ACC; several *sindaci* (mayors), and clergy of the towns affected.

Although there has been some criticism that Kincaid's team could have used weather forecasts more effectively, it is difficult to find any further fault with the operation.[40] In March 1944 weather data were collected at Capodichino airfield near to Naples and during the climax of the eruption on 21 and 22 March (Appendix 1 – **Phase 2**), it is clear that no simple correlation was present between conditions near to sea-level and those found at heights of 2 to 4 km, which caused tephra to be deposited on the south-eastern and southern flanks of the volcano. On 21 and 22 March a complex frontal system passed over Vesuvius from the northwest, and although weather data from Capodichino and other stations were used to produce aviation forecasts, they were not used by Professor Imbó, or Kincaid and his staff, to predict those sectors which would have been affected by tephra fall.[41]

Kincaid and his officers moved quickly in response to the threat posed by the eruption by using all the military and civilian resources they could muster. The efficiency and effectiveness of the response was due to two additional factors. First, the ACC comprised experienced service personnel who were on active service and were accustomed to uncertainty, rapidly changing situations, and having to improvise and act decisively to implement orders in a highly disciplined manner. All these military

[39]Bentley and Gregory, *Final Report*, pp. 23-24.

[40]David Chester, Angus Duncan, Philip Wetton and Roswitha Wetton, 'Responses of the Anglo-American military authorities', pp. 183-195.

[41]Weather forecasting was at the time the responsibility of the allied military authorities, not Professor Imbò.

virtues were successfully exploited by Kincaid. As senior representative of the occupying powers and using the provisions of the revised *Field Manual for Military Government*, Kincaid could have forced the population to comply with his orders but there is no evidence that this was ever required. In fact, his orders were fully discussed and agreed with the *sindaci* and other officials before they were implemented.

Somewhat counter-intuitively, anti-social behaviour, panic and crime do not usually occur during and immediately following catastrophes. Studies of disasters have shown that the presence, or absence, of anti-social behaviour usually depends upon whether it is endemic within a given society before it is affected by a disastrous event.[42] Naples and the region of Vesuvius have well deserved reputations for lawlessness, but in 1944 crime was externalised and largely involved trading in contraband allied stores and war *materiel*.[43] It was also organised in part by crime syndicates, and there was no evidence of increased crime in the villages affected by the eruption, either during or immediately following the eruption, a feature that greatly assisted Kincaid and his staff in successfully responding to the eruption. In fact, testimony to the contrary points to increased community solidarity within village communities, which were at the time populated by a relatively small number of extended families.[44]

Secondly, the characteristics of the particular eruption allowed Kincaid's approach to succeed. Kincaid was fortunate that the eruption developed slowly and affected only a limited area, so giving the ACC time to plan palliative measures and put them in place. Though it cannot detract from its success, Kincaid's approach should not be viewed as a model of how to respond to a future eruption. Next time Vesuvius erupts the situation will probably be very different, since the 1944 eruption may well have marked the termination of a distinct cycle of volcanic activity. Although there is still debate, it is generally accepted by Italian volcanologists, that the next eruption is likely to mark both the onset of a new cycle and will be more violent.[45] A large explosive

[42]Christopher Dibben and David Chester, 'Human vulnerability in volcanic environments: The case of Furnas, São Miguel, Açores', *Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research* 92 (1999), pp. 33-150 (also see references)

[43]David K. Chester, Christopher J.L. Dibben and Angus M. Duncan, 'Volcanic hazard assessment in western Europe', *Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research* 115 (2002), pp. 411- 435; Norman Lewis, *Jackdaw Cake: An autobiography*, pp. 153, 202.

[44]Bentley and Gregory, *Final Report*, pp. 25-27.

[45]F. Barberi, C. Macedonia, M.T. Pareschi and R. Santacroce, 'Mapping the tephra fallout risk: An example from Vesuvius (Italy)', *Nature* 344 (1990), pp.142-144; Anon, *Dipartimento dell Protezione Civile, Pianificazione Nazionale d'Emergenza dell'Area Vesuviana,* (Naples: Prefettura di Napoli, 1995).

event, similar to that of 1631, is often invoked as the most likely future scenario.[46] This would affect a far larger population than was the case in 1944 and it is estimated that more than 700,000 people could be at risk. Details of current emergency plans are complex but are based on a twin-track approach of pre-eruption evacuation of entire villages to other parts of Italy, and a long-term goal to use financial incentives to reduce population numbers.[47]

Responding to civil emergencies is a task occupation forces may be called upon to carry out from time to time, hopefully without jeopardising military effectiveness. Several features of the response to the 1944 eruption are of more general military significance. By March 1944 the people of southern Italy were broadly sympathetic to the allied cause, yet the only Italian personnel used were limited numbers of *Carabinieri* and fire-fighters, because as a matter of policy the allies were unwilling to use other indigenous forces which were thought to be too closely associated with Mussolini's *Fascist* regime.[48] This meant that, although the effects of the emergency were spatially restricted in extent, affecting only a few settlements, and limited numbers of people, Kincaid had to deploy large numbers of service personnel successfully to respond to the disaster. Overstretch could have occurred if evacuation to other parts of Italy had been required. This eventuality would have meant, either that combat troops would have had to be deployed away from the front possibly putting the campaign at risk or prolonging it, or else the policy regarding *fascist* taint would have had to have been changed. As occupations in Afghanistan and Iraq show, questions over how much trust to place in - and autonomy to give to - local forces may be complicated by uncertainties over conflicting loyalties.

A second feature of more general significance concerns the number of specialists that are required when an occupation force takes full responsibility for a society. The 1944 emergency demanded, *inter alia*, finance experts, medical staff, agronomists, logistical specialists and security personnel and it is notable that many officers, including Col. Kincaid, had gained their experience in civilian occupations (see Appendix 2). The Vesuvius emergency response highlights the vital roles played by experienced older

[46]Mauro Rosi, Claudia Principe and Raffaella Vecci, 'The 1631 Vesuvius eruption. A reconstruction based on historical and stratigraphic data', Journal *of Volcanology and Geothermal Research* 58 (1993), pp. 151-182; Alwyn Scarth, *Vesuvius A Biography*, (Harpenden: Terra, 2009), pp. 133-172.

[47]David K. Chester, Christopher J.L. Dibben and Angus M. Duncan, 'Volcanic hazard assessment in western Europe', *Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research* 115 (2002), pp. 411-435; Alwyn Scarth, *Vesuvius A Biography*, pp. 295-301.

[48]John Lada 1976, *Preventive Medicine in World War II. Volume VIII Civil Affairs/Military Government Public Health Activities,* (Washington DC: Medical Department United States Army, Office of the Surgeon General Department of the Army, 1976).

officers, reservists with specialist skills and with training in military government and operations.

Finally, a senior officer commanding an allied as opposed to a single nation occupation force has to possess personal qualities that facilitate efficient and harmonious joint action. In Lieutenant Colonel Kincaid the ACC possessed such an officer and, moreover, one who had been decorated by the British 1918, and one who was shown great respect and trust by all his subordinates, regardless of nationality. The 1944 Vesuvius emergency emphasises the point that appointments to such commands require as much care as appointments to combat units.

Appendix 1: Chronology of the 1944 Eruption

See Figures 1 and 2 for locations.

Phase 1 involved lava effusion from Saturday 18 March through to Tuesday 21 March.

Weather: 18 March 18°C, wind 24-32 km/hr from the east north-east and cloudy. Photographs show clear conditions.19 March. 20 March 15°C, winds 15-23 km/hr from the west, low cloud base and intermittent rain. 21 March 11°C, winds 15-23 km/hr from the south. Intermittent rain and snow at high altitudes.

The eruption started at 16.30 on 18 March, when lava spilled over the crater rim and headed towards San Sebastiano. Lava also flowed south towards Cappella Nuovo, near to Torre del Greco. Initially the flows travelled at around 300 metres/hr, but as they advanced, they slowed to about 100 metres/hr. The southern flow, which was initially perceived to be a threat to Torre del Greco, did not extend beyond 3 km. The northern flow entered a valley known as the *Atrio del Cavallo*, before flowing through a notch in the caldera wall and heading towards the towns of San Sebastiano, Massa di Somma and Cercola. The lava flow reached San Sebastiano at 03.00 on 21 March and began slowly to engulf the town, the bridge between San Sebastiano and Massa being carried away at 03.30. At 13.00 the lava spreading through San Sebastiano and Massa was travelling at between 500 and 1000 metres/hr. Though the activity during this first phase was predominantly effusive, more explosive activity also generated tephra (volcanic ash). On 19 March observers could not access the southern lava flow by vehicle from the observatory because of the thickness of tephra in this sector.

Phase 2 involved vigorous fire fountain events from the late afternoon of Tuesday 21 March through to Wednesday 22 March.

Weather: 22 March 13°C, winds 15-23 km/hr from the south, intermittent rain implied by photographic evidence (Mc Rae, 1944). Winds at height were from the northwest.

In the late afternoon (circa 17.00) on 21 March, a fire fountain began in the main crater. It is likely that this generated a convective column reaching a height of around 7,000 m by 17.30. In total there were 8 episodes of fire fountaining that had a duration of between 18 and 40 minutes. These fountains generated tephra, which was deposited principally on the south and east sectors of the mountain. On the morning of 22 March, the weather was poor, but Professor Imbò climbed the volcano to observe the lava and, though the flows were still moving, increased activity from the summit crater suggested that the eruption was moving to an explosive stage and that effusive activity was likely to decline. The northern lava flow approaching Cercola slowed and came to a standstill on the afternoon of the 22 March, but the southern flow was still active

and perceived to be threatening Camaldoli near to Torre del Greco. The final fire fountain at 07.30 on the 22 March was the most impressive and reached a height of 1 km. An American airman, Sergeant Robert McRae describes black blocks up to the size of footballs dropping on the airfield at Terzigno.

Phase 3 involved more sustained explosive activity which began during 22 March and continued through to Thursday 23 March.

Weather: 23 March 9°C, wind 15-23 km/hr from the north and northeast, dense plume to the south and southeast.

This explosive phase is considered to have involved a mixture of magmatic and phreatomagmatic activity and was accompanied by seismicity. During the evening of the 22 March there was vigorous explosive activity, and a large eruptive column (greater than 8-10 kms above the crater) developed which was accompanied by an electrical storm and seismic activity. The main issue now was tephra and not lava. Though there was light tephra fall in Portici on the west flank, winds deposited lapilli and ash along a dispersal axis to the southeast; Terzigno, Pompei and Poggiomarino being particularly badly affected. There was around 15 cms of tephra on the Naples/Pompei Autostrada between Torre del Greco and Salerno and ash was deposited as far away as Albania, some 500 kms distant. The tephra from this phase caused widespread disruption and almost all the fatalities attributed to the eruption. It is clear from contemporary photographs, that the column partially collapsed on several occasions and produced small pyroclastic flows which, because of their size and location, caused no damage.

Phase 4 activity declined to intermittent vulcanian explosions (Thursday 23 – Thursday 30 March).

Weather: 24 March 13°C, wind 15-23 km/hr from the north northwest and clear.
25 March 7°C, wind 33-41 km/hr from the north northeast, thick clouds.
26 March 9°C, wind 33-41 km/hr from the north northeast, generally clear.
27 March 16°C, wind 24-32 km/hr from the north northeast. Overcast conditions according to Pesce and Rolandi (1994).

Activity waned during this phase with the eruptive vent becoming periodically blocked by wall collapses that were cleared by explosions. Activity became increasingly restricted to the crater area and the eruption ended on 30 March. In total some 35-40 million cubic metres of magma (dense rock equivalent D.R.E.) had been erupted, in less than 12 days.

The chronology above is based on Giuseppe Imbò, 'L'attività eruttiva vesuviana e relative osservazioni nel corso dell'intervallo interuttivo 1906-1944 ed in particolare del parossismo del Marzo 1944', *Annali Osservatorio Vesuviano* V (1949), pp. 185-380; Giuseppe Imbò, *Sismicità del parossismo vesuviano del marzo 1944, Annali Osservatorio Vesuviano* VI, I (1955), pp. 59-268; Angelo Pesce and Giuseppe Rolandi, *Vesuvio 1944: L' ultima eruzione*, (San Sebastiano al Vesuvio: Private Publication 2000, second edition); Roberto Scandone, Lisetta Giacomelli and Paolo Gasparini, 'Mount Vesuvius: 2000 years of volcanological observations', *Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research* 58 (1993), pp. 5-25; Chris Kilburn and Bill McGuire, *Italian Volcanoes,* (Harpenden: Terra, 2001), pp. 52-54; John Guest, Paul Cole, Angus Duncan and David Chester, *Volcanoes of Southern Italy,* (London: The Geological Society, 2003), pp. 52-54; Robert F. McRae, *War Diary of the 340th Bombardment Group March 1944: Vesuvius and the 340th A diary of the 340th by Sergeant McRae*, (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air Historical Research Agency Archive, 2013), pp. 6; Elena Cubellis, Aldo Marturano and Lucia Pappalardo, 'The last Vesuvius eruption in March 1944: reconstruction of the eruptive dynamic and its impact on the environment and people through witness reports and volcanological evidence', *Natural Hazards* 82 (2016), pp. 95-121.

Appendix 2: Brief Biographies of Lieutenant Colonel Kincaid & Associates

Key People and Dates	Key Events
(James) Leslie Kincaid[49]	
1884	Born Syracuse, New York State
Professional career from 1908	In 1908 Kincaid graduated in law from Syracuse University and was admitted to the New York Bar in 1909. Before the First World War Kincaid practised as a lawyer and also served as a member of the Assembly of New York State (1915-16). From 1919 Kincaid changed direction and became a successful and wealthy business executive. His career focusing on the hospitality industry and, amongst other executive positions, he served as President of the American Hotels Corporation for many years. At its most successful, the Corporation directed the operation of some 50 hotels in North America, Canada and Panama. Kincaid's success and considerable wealth allowed him to acquire residences in New York City, Idle Isle Alexander Bay (Thousand Islands, New York) and Captiva Island in Florida.
Military Service 1904-1953	In 1904 Kincaid enlisted as a private soldier, he was later commissioned, and in 1916 served on the Mexican border. In 1917 he was Director of the *Federal Registration Draft Board* for New York and later Major (Judge Advocate) of the 27 Division. When posted to France, Kincaid now a Lieutenant Colonel, accepted a reduction in rank to Major in order to secure a combat command. For a successful attack on the Hindenburg line in 1918, he was awarded the prestigious Distinguished Service Cross (D.S.C.), the equally meritorious British Distinguished Service Order (D.S.O.) and was also decorated by

[49]David K. Chester, Angus M. Duncan, Philip Wetton and Roswitha Wetton, 'Responses of the Anglo-American military authorities to the March 1944 eruption of Vesuvius, Southern Italy', *Journal of Historical Geography* 33 (2007), pp.181; Archives and Records Management Syracuse University Library, Information file on James Leslie Kincaid; New York State Military Museum and Veterans Research Center Saratoga Springs, Information file on James Leslie Kincaid.

	the French, Belgium, Italian and New York State governments. He was commended by General Pershing. Between the wars Kincaid continued to serve in the New York National Guard, in 1921 being promoted Adjutant General with the substantive rank of Brigadier General. In World War II Kincaid was again called to service, but with reduced rank. This time he was a Lieutenant Colonel in the Army of the United States. He was trained in the *School of Military Government* at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville and later served as Provincial Commissioner (Naples Province) of the Allied Control Commission (ACC) from September 1943 to July 1944. Towards the end of the war, Kincaid was involved in logistical planning, and ended his service in Europe by administering commandeered hotels on the French Riviera. Kincaid was finally released from service in 1953 in the rank of Brigadier General (Army of the United States) and Major General in the New York National Guard.
1944-1953	For his service he was decorated by the Italians; made an honorary citizen of Naples and in 1953 was personally commended by the U.S. Army Chief of Staff. There were also more specific commendations following the eruption of March 1944, which are mentioned in the text.
1973	Died - Captiva, Florida.

Kincaid's Principal Associates:

Sir (Frank) Noel Mason-Macfarlane (Mason-Mac) 1889-1953[50]	Commissioned into the Royal Artillery in 1909, 'Mason Mac' showed considerable ability, gallantry, leadership and independence of thought in the First World War. Decorated with the Military Cross (M.C.) and with two bars, Mason-Macfarlane subsequently attended Staff College and later the Imperial Defence College, where his intellectual ability and skills as a linguist were noted. Service followed in India, and later as a military attaché in Hungary, Austria, Switzerland and most

[50]Ewan N. Butler, *Mason-Mac, The Life of Lieutenant-General Sir Noel Mason-Macfarlane,* (London: Macmillan, 1972).

	notably in Germany immediately before the Second World War. During the war, Mason-Macfarlane served in France as Director of Military Intelligence and as an operation commander during the retreat to Dunkirk, for which was awarded the D.S.O. Later he headed a military mission to Moscow, was Governor of Gibraltar and was appointed Chief Commissioner of the ACC in Italy from February 1944.
Lt. Col. Charles Poletti 1903-2002[51]	An American lawyer and politician who briefly served as Governor of New York before the Second World War. A first-generation Italian American, Poletti served in a variety of senior administrative roles during the war, first in Sicily and later on the mainland. At the time of the eruption, Poletti was a Commissioner for Region III of the ACC, that included the Naples Province, which made him Kincaid's immediate superior. He had no role in the day-to-day management of the emergency. A controversial figure whose style of command was questioned by Harold Macmillan, who was UK Minister Resident in the Mediterranean (1942-5) he succeeded Mason-Macfarlane as Chief Commissioner (ACC) from September 1944.
Lt. Col. John A Warner1886-1963[52]	Harvard graduate John Warner achieved early renown as a concert pianist, having studied in Paris, Vienna and Italy, but he also gained military experience in the National Guard and US Army (Mexican incursion of 1916). Later in a career change, between 1923 and 1943 he was Superintendent of the New York State Police and following this joined the Allied Control Commission (Naples) as Chief of Public Safety.
Lt. Col. Guy I Warren[53]	In common with Lt. Col. Warner, Warren was a public safety officer and during the emergency was responsible for the San-Giuseppe - San Giorgio sector. Later he was decorated with the

[51]Chester, Duncan *et al*., 'Responses of the Anglo-American military authorities', p. 181.

[52]Anon, 'Superintendent John Adams Warner', https://troopers.ny.gov/john-adams-warner Accessed 1 June 2021.

[53]Anon, 'Lieutenant Colonel Guy I. Warren receiving the Legion of Merit Medal, Rome, Italy, September 1945 | The Digital Collections of the National WWII Museum, https://www.ww2online.org/image/lieutenant-colonel-guy-i-warren-receiving-legion-merit-medal-rome-italy-september-1945 Accessed 1 June 2021.

	Legion of Merit Medal for his work in civilian affairs, especially in economics and supply.
Major Harry G. Hershenson 1899-1981[54]	Kincaid's deputy, Major Hershenson was from Chicago and like Kincaid was a lawyer by training and had attended the *School of Military Government*. Between late 1943 and early 1944 he proved himself to be a successful administrator of the city of Nola in Sicily, and by March 1944 was an experienced civil affairs officer. After the war he became an experienced and respected jurist.
Major Jesse E Cantor 1894-1969[55]	In common with Kincaid, a native of New York, a graduate in law from Syracuse University, and a soldier in the First World War. An excellent linguist (French, German and Italian). Between the wars Cantor was successful in business. After military service he became a district attorney and judge. During the eruption he was responsible for the Portici-Terzigno sector.

[54]Chester, Duncan *et al*., 'Responses of the Anglo-American military authorities', pp. 181, 182; Illinois Institute of Technology, Paul V. Galvin Library Archives, Information file on Harry G. Hershenson.
[55]Archives and Records Syracuse University Library, Information file on Jesse E. Cantor.

The Origins of Offensive Counterinsurgency During the Greek Civil War

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Abstract
The Greek Civil War is often studied as a historical event, but little attention is paid to it as a stage in counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine development. The key point of this war was that it presented the foreign armies that assisted the Greek Royalists with the opportunity to apply traditional and new tactics against the Greek communist guerrillas and learn valuable lessons. This article will trace the origins of the offensive COIN in Greece, the first step in a broader research project that will seek to determine the impact of the Greek Civil War on US Army COIN doctrine development.

Introduction

The Greek Civil War is a well-studied case in the history of the Cold War, as it is widely considered the opening act of this era. However, although it is often studied as a historical event, little attention is paid to it as a stage in COIN doctrine development. The course of the events and the outcome of the Second World War consolidated the perception that any future war would be fought by large battalions of armour and infantry supported by vast quantities of artillery and close air support to annihilate opposing forces, all backed up by unquestioning public support for the war effort.[1] Instead, the post-war period found the Western allies faced with a new type of threat, that of the communist-inspired insurgencies. The Greek Civil War was the first of this kind in the immediate post-war period and their involvement in it presented the foreign armies that assisted the Greek Royalists with the opportunity to apply

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DOI 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v8i1.1609

[1]John Nagl, *Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya to Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife,* (Westport Research Institute for European and American Studies CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002), p. 48.

traditional and new tactics against the Greek guerrillas and learn valuable lessons in terms of COIN doctrine development.

The purpose of this article is to take the first step in examining the Greek Civil War as a stage in the COIN doctrine evolution by tracing the origins of the Greek COIN doctrine. Focus will be given to the offensive principles of the doctrine, a focus suggested by the course of the events of the war, as the initial population-centric approach promoted by the US officials in Greece evolved in a largely enemy-centric campaign, where the destruction of the Greek guerrillas became the goal of the COIN effort. This shift was dictated by the constantly deteriorating military situation during the first two years of the war. That said, this article will argue that rather than reflecting an American preoccupation with population-centric COIN, the offensive tactical level of the Greek doctrine was a blend of enemy-centric German and British tactics. As such, the experience of the Greek Civil War suggests that population-centric COIN approaches are not as universally applicable as contemporary COIN doctrine/theory suggests.[2]

Toward this end, the first part of the article will discuss the key debates about COIN doctrine development. This will be followed by a brief presentation of the historical background of the civil war. This part will include an examination of the German COIN tactics, as applied in Greece during the Occupation era, and how this 'know how' was transferred to the Greek doctrine, the British role as the leader of the Greek National Army's (GNA) reorganization and training programme, and the US initiatives at the political and economic level. The third part of the article will examine the basic

[2]For more information on the good governance vs coercion debate see Jacqueline L. Hazelton, "The 'Hearts and Minds' Fallacy: Violence, Coercion, and Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare," *International Security*, 42:1, pp. 80-113; David H. Ucko and Jason E. Fritz, ISSF Article Review 87 on "The 'Hearts and Minds' Fallacy: Violence, Coercion, and Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare." Published by ISSF (13 October 2017), https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/422086/issf-article-review-87-%E2%80%9C-%E2%80%98hearts-and-minds%E2%80%99-fallacy-violence Accessed 2 June 2021; Jacqueline L. Hazelton, Author's Response to H-Diplo/ISSF Article Review 87 on "The 'Hearts and Minds' Fallacy: Violence, Coercion, and Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare.", Published by ISSF (2 January 2018), https://issforum.org/articlereviews/87-response Accessed 2 June 2021; Huw Bennett, Response to H-Diplo/ISSF Article Review by David Ucko and Jason Fritz of Jacqueline L. Hazelton, "The 'Hearts and Minds' Fallacy: Violence, Coercion, and Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare," International Security, 42:1, pp. 20-113, Published by ISSF (4 January 2018), https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/1215419/bennett-response-issf-article-review-87 Accessed 2 June 2021.

offensive principles of the Greek doctrine to determine what influence the German COIN experience and the foreign military missions that assisted the GNA had on it.

The primary source of information are the archives of the Hellenic Army History Directorate, which contain archival material regarding the planning, preparations, and execution of the military operations, the various successful or failed stages of the operations, and the distracting action of the Greek guerrillas. Further analysis will be based on US material derived from various archival sources such as the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) and the *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS) collection, which include documentation on the political, economic, and military efforts of the US officials in Washington and Athens. A number of secondary sources are used to support the main argument of this article, providing valuable insight on the issue under examination. Although this article draws from multiple primary sources, its key point is the use of Greek archival material. The Greek archives have been little used in US and British studies, a point that highlights the assertion that this article brings the Greek perspective to COIN literature, not only regarding the scholar's point of view but also in terms of primary sources.

COIN doctrine development key debates

This section will lay out the context behind the German, British, and Greek COIN doctrines, as they will be discussed later in the article. The US doctrine will not be included in this discussion given that no formal US Army COIN doctrine was available during the Greek Civil War. The US Army was in the process of writing its own COIN manual at the time of its involvement in the Greek COIN, and establishing to what extent the Greek campaign was a source of valuable lessons is a topic for an ongoing broader research project.

The beginning of German COIN strategy dates to the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), where irregular fighters supported the French Army. The Germans viewed these guerrillas as devious and reacted to their attacks with harsh countermeasures, such as the taking of hostages, collective reprisals, and executions.[3] According to John Horne and Alan Kramer this attitude, in combination with an over exaggeration of the role of the French guerrillas, continued to exert an influence on the German military until 1914, and to some extent also during the Second World War.[4] The second stepping stone in the development of the German COIN doctrine were the colonial wars in China (1900-1901), in Southwest Africa (1904-1906), and East Africa (1905-1907). According to Jürgen Zimmerer the brute force exercised in Southwest Africa,

[3]Henning Pieper, "The German Approach to Counterinsurgency in the Second World War," *The International History Review*, 37, no. 3 (2015), p. 631.

[4]John N. Horne and Alan Kramer, *German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial,* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), pp. 142-143.

that went beyond the breaking of military resistance and was aimed at women and children as well, was the first genocide in German history.[5] Finally, the pattern of colonial violence was repeated during the First World War, confirming a continuity in German military practices. Most acts of violence committed by German soldiers during the first months of the war were characterised by improvisation and were influenced by mentality and ideology, most importantly the German memory of the French guerrillas of the Franco-Prussian War.[6]

The use of brute force to suppress insurgencies, which Isabel Hull considers to be founded on a military culture of 'absolute destruction' inherent in Imperial Germany, continued to dominate German counterinsurgency doctrine throughout the Second World War.[7] The case of Greece was not an exception, although ideology rather than ethic lines played a decisive role in the German approach to end the insurrection in the country.[8] However, the focus of this article is on those offensive tactical aspects of the German COIN, as will be examined later, that eventually made it into the Greek doctrine. Although violence against civilians did play an occasional role in successful COIN operations, it never became an integral part of the Greek doctrine.

The application of brute force against civilians dominates the debate on British COIN doctrine as well. For example, Kim Wagner's study on the 1919 events in the Indian district of Amritsar, suggests that the Jallianwala Bagh massacre was the function of a colonial order that was never sufficiently confident to do without the spectacle of exemplary force. Although the official view was that the episode stood in singular and sinister isolation in the British colonial history, Wagner argues that it was neither

[5]Jürgen Zimmerer, 'Krieg, KZ und Völkermord in Südwestafrika. Der erste deutche Genozid' in J. Zimmerer and J. Zeller (eds), *Völkermord in Deutche-Südwestafrika: der Kolonialkrieg in Namimbia (1904-1908) und seine Folg*en (Berlin, 2003), pp. 52-53.
[6]Horne and Kramer, *German Atrocities, 1914*, pp. 75-77, 166-167.
[7]Isabel V. Hull, *Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany,* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005); See also Charles D. Melson, "German Counterinsurgency in the Balkans: The Prinz Eugen Division Example 1942-1944," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 20:4, (2007), 705-737; Philip Blood, *Hitler's Bandit Hunters: The SS and the Nazi Occupation of Europe* (Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2006); Colin D. Heaton, *German Anti-Partisan Warfare in Europe, 1939-1945* (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing, 2001); Ben Shepherd, *Terror in the Balkans: German Armies and Partisan Warfare* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008); Alexander Hill, *The War Behind the Eastern Front: Soviet Partisans in North West Russia 1941-1944* (London: Routledge, 2005).
[8]Mark Mazower, *Inside Hitler's Greece: The Experience of Occupation, 1941-44* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001).

without precedent nor foreign to the British way of doing things.[9] Taylor Sherman highlights the discrepancy between official rhetoric and practice during the British rule of India, and especially between 1919 and 1956, as the state power exercised through the extensive use of spectacular and arbitrary violence, would contradict the official principle of 'minimum use of force'.[10] Mathew Hughes' study on the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936-1939, confirms a continuity in the British use of indiscriminate violence by British forces, highlighting the British civil officials' acknowledgement that 'military measures were most repressive and distasteful, nevertheless, repression of this kind – and it is drastic in the extreme – is most unpleasant work but it is essential if we are to make any headway'.[11] From a period after the Greek COIN, the suppression of the Mau Mau in Kenya in the 1950s stands out as yet another example of 'singular excess'. Huw Bennett highlighted the excessive and indiscriminate violence used by the British Army to suppress the insurgency in Kenya. As the head of the East Africa Command, General George Erskine declared, upon assuming office in 1953, stern measures might need to be taken to restore respect for the law. What the General essentially meant was that the security forces would have to break, or at least bend, the law to achieve 'an atmosphere of piece'.[12]

John Newsinger moves beyond the issue of brute force and suggests that the key to the British success in COIN was its 'divide and rule' strategy, stressing the British ability to establish a large enough political base among sections of the local inhabitants prepared to support and assist in the defeat of the insurgents.[13] Of relevance to the Greek Civil War, in terms of COIN doctrine development, Andrew Mumford argues that the British were slow learners with the early phases of nearly every campaign in the post-war era marred by stagnancy, mismanagement, and confusion, concluding that the British had been consistently slow to instigate an effective strategy and achieve operational success.[14] As will be demonstrated later, this was the case in the Greek COIN as well, since the British Military Mission (BMM) had, during the early stages of

[9]Kim A. Wagner, *Amritsar 1919: An Empire of Fear & the Making of a Massacre* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019), p. 257.
[10]Taylor C. Sherman, *State Violence and Punishment in India* (New York: Routledge, 2010), p. 171.
[11]Mathew Hughes, *Britain's Pacification in Palestine: The British Army, the Colonial State, and the Arab Revolt, 1936-1939* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2019), p. 311.
[12]Huw Bennett, *Fighting Mau: The British Army and Counterinsurgency in the Kenya Emergency* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 264-265.
[13]John Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency: From Palestine to Northern Ireland* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), p. 2.
[14]Andrew Mumford, *Puncturing the Counterinsurgency Myth: Britain and Irregular Warfare in the Past, Present and Future* (Carlisle Barracks PA: US Army War College, 2011), pp. 146-147.

the war in the spring of 1946, not realized the seriousness of the threat posed by the communist guerrillas, focusing the reorganisation and training of the GNA towards conventional warfare. Finally, Robert Egnell and David Ucko identify the absence of a unified, consistent approach to COIN as the main characteristic of the British doctrine stressing the British tendency to resort to tailored response rather than fall back on template solutions.[15]

As for the Greek COIN doctrine, relatively few studies examine the Greek Civil War in terms of COIN doctrine development. For example, Christina Goulter suggests that the Greek doctrine was a product of GNA thinking and the influence of the foreign military missions assisting it has been over exaggerated in the historiography. According to Goulter, the higher-level campaign planning was performed by the Greek General Staff (GGS) and not the field units with which the bulk of the advisors were involved.[16] As such, the 'clear-hold-build' rationale of the Greek doctrine was a product of a hard learning process while fighting the war and should be attributed to the GNA's maturity that developed as the war escalated.[17]

Echoing Goulter, Spyridon Plakoudas argues that the GNA defeated the insurgents by evolving and adapting, as fixed laws in COIN do not apply. However, Plakoudas ascribes the operational improvement of the GNA to the foreign military missions which reorganised it for irregular warfare, with the formation of the Commando units, the light infantry, and the mountain warfare units, while advancing operational concepts, such as that of the constant pursuit of the guerrillas, to replace the unsuccessful tactic of encirclement.[18]

This article supports some of the above arguments while challenging others. For example, it argues that the 'clear' part of the Greek doctrine was a blend of German and British offensive tactics. Even if someone accepts that what Goulter describes as GNA inspired tactics could be, to a certain extent, what this article identifies as German originated practices, the British influence, as highlighted with the creation of the Commando units and the tactic of constant pursuit, cannot easily be ignored. Moreover, this article verifies Plakoudas' argument on the role of the military missions

[15]Robert Egnell and David H. Ucko, "True to Form? Questioning the British Counterinsurgency Tradition," in Beatrice Heuser and Eitan Shapir, eds., Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies: National Styles and Strategic Cultures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), p. 46.
[16]Christine J. M. Goulter, "The Greek Civil War: A National Army's Counter-insurgency Triumph," *The Journal of Military History*, 78 (July 2014), p. 1048.
[17]Ibid., p. 1055.
[18]Spyridon Plakoudas, *The Greek Civil War: Strategy, Counterinsurgency, and the Monarchy* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2017), pp. 89-90.

in improving the GNA's operational performance, but it challenges his position that the US advisors introduced the tactic of constant pursuit to replace that of encirclement. As this article argues, the constant pursuit principle was of British origin while encirclement was never abandoned; in fact, encirclement along with pursuit became the backbones of the Greek offensive doctrine.

Historical background

The Greek Civil War broke out in the spring of 1946 and ended in the summer of 1949 but had its roots before the Second World War. The belligerents were the Greek Communist Party (KKE) and its Democratic Army of Greece (DAG) on the one side, and the Royalist Government with the GNA and the British and US military missions assisting it on the other. The long period that preceded this civil conflict, created a highly polarised state within the country, a polarisation that was further intensified by the 'balance of power' games played between the wartime Allies. The pre-war ideological confrontation between the Greek Communists and the Royalists not only remained active during the occupation of Greece by the Axis Powers between 1941 and 1944, but it turned out that the passions and the obsessions of the past could not be overridden even in the face of a, theoretically, common enemy, the occupation forces.[19]

The wartime Allies also played their part in the development of this situation. The Soviets ostensibly respected the percentages agreement reached between Churchill and Stalin that separated the Balkans into spheres of influence.[20] This gave the UK and US 90% of the control of Greek internal affairs, and the Soviets did not encourage an armed conflict against the British. However, the Soviets did nothing to prevent their Balkan satellites from assisting the Greek Communists. The British never hid their strong interest in Greece and they were by no means willing to leave it to the Communists; in fact, it was the British, and especially Churchill himself, who torpedoed several efforts to deescalate the conflict.[21] As for the US, when the British announced in early 1947 their intention to withdraw from Greece due to financial difficulties,

[19]See Andre Gerolimatos, *An International Civil War: Greece 1943-1949* (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 2016); Mark M. Mazower, *After the War Was Over: Reconstructing the Family, Nation, and State in Greece, 1943-1960* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); David Brewer, *Greece, the Decade of War: Occupation, Resistance and Civil War* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2016).

[20]Albert Resis, "The Churchill-Stalin Secret "Percentages" Agreement on the Balkans, Moscow, October 1944," *The American Historical Review* 83, no. 2 (April 1978), p. 368.

[21]For the British stance see Athanasios D. Sfikas, "'The People at the Top Can Do These Things, Which Others Can't Do': Winston Churchill and the Greeks, 1940-45," *Journal of Contemporary History* 26, no. 2 (April 1991), pp. 307-332.

President Truman decided to actively engage the US in Greek internal affairs with the promulgation of the Truman Doctrine.[22]

German COIN doctrine

When the Greek Civil War broke out in the spring of 1946, the most recent COIN experience in Greece was that of the German Occupation forces. For that reason, a brief analysis of the basic principles of the German doctrine, as applied in Greece, will provide useful insights into the origins of the Greek doctrine. The principal axiom of the German COIN doctrine was that the ultimate objective of the fight against guerrillas would be their total annihilation and not just pursuing and pushing them out of one region. The basic rule of the German COIN operations was that encirclement, rather than frontal attack, would be the only possible way to defeat the guerrillas.[23] The prerequisites for the success of such operations were secrecy of preparations, intelligence as to the enemy situation, rapid initial movement, a methodical line of action, and firm command.[24] Another integral part of the German doctrine was aggressiveness which should be the key element for all the levels of command, from the division and regiment to the battalion and company commanders.[25]

German doctrine placed particular significance on intelligence. Accurate knowledge of the combat methods and living habits of the guerrillas and the population supporting them was a principal prerequisite for success. For that reason, efforts were made to enrol native fighters as volunteers in the specially trained guerrilla warfare units called

[22]The Truman Doctrine established the post-war US commitment to provide political, military, and economic assistance to all democratic nations under threat from external and internal authoritarian forces. For further details see Foreign Relations of the United States 1947, *The Near East and Africa: United States economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971).

[23]Encirclement was not a product of Second World War German COIN experience, rather it marked a continuity in German tactical doctrine dating back to Imperial Germany. According to Robert Citino, the German way of war had always called for short, lively, and total campaigns fought through the violent encirclement of the enemy. See Robert M. Citino, *The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years War to the Third Reich* (Lawrence: University Studio Press Kansas, 2005).

[24]Alexander Ratcliffe, *Partisan Warfare, A Treatise Based on Combat Experience in the Balkans* (Stuttgart: US Army European Command, Historical Division, Foreign Military Studies, 1953), p. 61; Blood, *Hitler's Bandit*, pp. 177-179; Heaton, *German Anti-Partisan*, pp. 143-155.

[25]Hubert Lanz, *Partisan Warfare in the Balkans* (Stuttgart: US Army European Command, Historical Division, Foreign Military Studies, 1952), p. 143.

'hunting details'.[26] Detachments composed of indigenous personnel had the advantage of a thorough knowledge of guerrilla combat methods, the terrain and the language of the country. They were less dependent on supply shipments and more mobile than regular troops. On the other hand, absolute certainty of their trustworthiness was rarely possible. These units should be commanded by experienced officers, familiar with the country, include military cadre personnel, and be organised based on political considerations. However, German doctrine noted that experience had shown that the employment of political factionists tended to increase the already intense bitterness and savagery of guerrilla warfare.[27]

This German 'know how' was transferred to the Greek doctrine through two separate sources. Firstly, during the Occupation, a considerable number of Greek Monarchist and Republican officers joined non-Communist resistance groups and became familiar with the German COIN tactics used against them. Secondly, in April 1943 when the collaborationist premier Ioannis Rallis established the Security Battalions to assist the German Occupation forces in suppressing the various resistance groups, several low and middle rank officers joined these formations and became familiar with the German tactics used to fight the Greek guerrillas.[28] After the liberation in October 1944, the Greek Government took the strategic decision to retain and utilise in the new armed and security forces the same officers.[29] This decision gave the Greek military authorities the advantage of staffing their ranks with men experienced both in guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare.[30] The admission by the Greek military authorities that

[26]Ibid., pp. 146-149; Pieper, *The German Approach*, p. 368; Oberkommando der Wehrmacht. *Warfare Against Bands* (Berlin: 6 May 1944), eds. and trans. by Audrey C. Dixon and Otto Heilbrunn, in *Communist Guerrilla Warfare,* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955), pp. 116-163.

[27]Ratcliffe, *Partisan Warfare*, p. 33.

[28]Andre Gerolymatos, "The Role of the Greek Officer Corps in the Resistance," *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora* 11, no. 3 (Fall 1984), p. 20.

[29]Giorgos Karagiannis, *To Drama tis Ellados 1940-1952 Epi kai Athliotites* (Athens n.d.), pp. 230-234; Triantafyllos A. Gerozisis, *To Soma ton Axiomatikon kai h Thesis tous stin Sigchroni Elliniki Koinonia, 1821-1975* Volume 2 (Athens-Ioannina: Dodoni, 1996), pp. 827-828; Tasos Kostopoulos, *H Aftologokrimeni Mnini. Tagmata Asfaleias kai h Metapolemikh Ethnikofrosini* (Athens: Filistor, 2005), p. 73.

[30]Members of former guerrilla groups were not only integrated into the GNA, but even held political positions within the government. For example, Napoleon Zervas, who was the leader of the second most powerful resistance group, the National Republican Greek League (EDES), was appointed Minister of Public Order on 23 February 1947. Although Zervas sold himself as the only Greek who knew how to defeat DAG given his prior experience in guerrilla fighting, his term at the ministry proved rather short. On 29 August 1947 he was removed from office under the

during 1946 the only GNA personnel familiar with guerrilla warfare tactics were those who had been members of former guerrilla groups is indicative of this fact.[31]

The British role

The British were undoubtedly familiar with guerrilla warfare and, as will be examined later in this article, during the war they pushed the GNA into adopting guerrilla style tactics. However, at the early stage of the war they had not realised the seriousness of the threat posed by the communist guerrillas, degrading it to the status of an internal security problem to be addressed by the Greek Security Forces. As a result, they initially failed to see the need for or create the specially trained and highly mobile troops necessary for defeating the guerrillas.[32] The training programme established and followed by the British Military Mission (BMM) was focused on the creation of a modern, conventional army prepared to repel any external threat in a war with clear friendly and enemy territories, a war with a front line and peaceful rear areas. In fact, the idea of creating a large, tactical army which would, theoretically, unite and represent the whole Greek nation was popular among the political and military leadership of Greece as well. Thus, the officers and the rank and file of the GNA were trained in conventional war methods for use against an external enemy. Their training included close-order drill, equipment use, outpost duties, firing various types of weapons and combat at a squad and platoon level, although it did included lectures against communism as well.[33]

The US Population-Centric Approach

When the US entered the Greek Civil War in the spring of 1947, officials in Washington and Athens adopted a population-centric approach. Their objective was to recreate confidence in the state and in the future of Greece as a western-type democracy, by removing the growing fear of inflation and increased misery through

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pressure of British and US officials due to his failure to purge the Peloponnese peninsula of guerrillas despite his claim that he could achieve that with only 500 men, and due to the discontent caused by his harsh and indiscriminately vengeful stance against the general population. As such, his influence on the development of the Greek COIN doctrine cannot be fully assessed. See Thanasis Sfikas, 'Napoleon Zervas: H Ekdikisi tou Ittimenou, 1945-1947' in *Dodoni: Istoria kai Archeologia*, vol. 34 Scientific Symposium (Ioannina: School of Philosophy, University of Ioannina 2005).

[31]Greek General Staff, *O Ellinikos Stratos kata ton Antisimmoriakon Agona (1946-1946): To Proton Etos tou Antisimmoriakou Agonos 1946* (Athens: Hellenic Army History Directorate, 1971), p. 61.

[32]Dimitrios Zafeiropoulos, *O Antisimmoriakos Agon 1945-1949* (Athens, 1953), p. 263.

[33]Konstantinos Giannakos, *H Anasigrotisi tou Ellinikou Stratou kata ti Diarkeia tou Emfyleiou Polemou kai o Rolos ton Ksenon Stratiotikon Apostolon – Ta Prota Chronia 1945-1947* Dissertation (Volos: University of Thessaly, 2013), p. 45.

social, political, and economic measures rather than excessive military means.[34] The preconditions for this goal to be met were: the political unity of all loyal Greek parties while excluding the reactionary and totalitarian right as well as the Communists; a drastic reform in government administration and tax programmes; alongside American economic and financial aid.[35]

Toward this end, in September 1947, US officials in Greece put pressure on the Greek Premier, Konstantinos Tsaldaris, leader of the Populist Party, to form a coalition government with the Liberal Party. The US officials stressed to Tsaldaris that it would be extremely difficult to maintain the support of the US public for the US economic assistance programme if the impression that this programme would strengthen certain Greek political groups rather than aid Greece as a whole prevailed.[36] As a result, Tsaldaris accepted the formation of a coalition government with Themistocles Sophoulis, the leader of the Liberal Party, assuming the premiership on 7 September 1947.

US financial assistance to Greece under the Truman Doctrine, was supplied to Greece, by the American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG) which was established to supervise and administer the programme. The principal mission of AMAG was to re-establish security, to stop inflation, to establish economic stability, and to bring hope and encouragement to the Greeks so as to resist the communist threat.[37] The joint US-Greek effort focused on issues such as balancing the budget, the balance of payments, the limiting of inflation, the establishment of institutions of a regulatory nature such as the Foreign Trade Administration and the Advisory Bank Board, an increase in industrial production, the restoration of agriculture, and the reconstruction of public works such as the national road and railroad networks.

However, the constantly deteriorating military situation in 1947, caused the US officials to reorient their approach and adopt the view that the internal security of the country should be given the same if not even more priority compared to the social, political, and economic measures then being promoted. As a result, they decided to establish on December 1947 the Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group (JUSMAPG) to assist the Greek Armed Forces in achieving internal security as soon as possible by providing stimulating and aggressive assistance in the form of operational and logistical advice.[38] When the JUSMAPG was activated, its officials

[34]FRUS 1947, p. 28.
[35]Ibid., pp. 30-31.
[36]Ibid., pp. 323-324.
[37]Ibid., pp. 219-224
[38]US Army, *History of the Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group-Greece* Volume I (Independence MO: United States Army Unit Dairies, Histories and Reports,

reviewed the Greek tactical doctrine concluding that it appeared to follow the accepted doctrines and principles employed by any modern army in conducting anti-guerrilla warfare, while commending that the doctrines and principles adopted and issued by the GGS were sound and if followed, should enable the GNA to defeat the guerrillas.[39]

Principles of Greek COIN Doctrine: Encirclement & Envelopment

Beginning with the axiom that success in COIN operations consisted neither in capturing and holding ground, nor gaining control of an area, but in destroying hostile forces, the Greek doctrine rejected direct frontal attacks.[40] Even when conducted by greatly superior numbers of organised forces, frontal attacks would achieve little more than keep the guerrillas moving from one location to another. For that reason, the doctrine posited that complete encirclement and double envelopment of the guerrilla forces should always be attempted from the outset to close avenues of escape promptly and simultaneously.[41] If no escape route was left open, the guerrillas could only fight or abandon the struggle. When complete encirclement was not possible from the outset, the form of offensive manoeuvre adopted should be one which would turn the guerrillas towards and against an impassable barrier through which there were no escape routes.[42]

The GNA operational planning staff remained faithful to the principle of encirclement throughout the war, at least in operations such as *Terminus, Dawn, Pigeon and Rocket*. Although GNA officers, such as Dimitrios Zafeiropoulos, claimed that the principle of encirclement was ill-suited for the fight against guerrillas and it was the major cause of failure for GNA operations during 1946-47, including *Terminus.* All the above operations were based on the principle of encirclement to prevent the guerrillas from escaping, to confine them within the screen, and eventually bring them to decisive battle and total destruction by the superior strength in numbers and armament of the GNA forces. According to Zafeiropoulos, the principle of encirclement failed to consider two major factors of guerrilla warfare: firstly, mistakenly assuming that guerrillas would remain in their position within the encirclement ring and fight, and, secondly, the peculiarity of Greece's mountainous terrain which in most cases made the complete encirclement of the guerrilla forces impossible.[43] Instead, he considered

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Miscellaneous Units, Records Group 407, President Harry S. Truman Library, 1952), p. 16.

[39]Greek General Staff, *Suppression of Irregular (Bandit) Operations* (Athens: Greek General Staff, 1948), p. 29.

[40]Ibid., p. 1.

[41]Ibid., pp. 1-2.

[42]Ibid., p. 2.

[43]Zafeiropoulos, *O Antisimmoriakos*, pp. 268-269.

a constant pursuit of the guerrillas as the most efficient way to eliminate them.[44] Further analysis of the GNA doctrine, and operational plans and orders, reveals that the doctrine actually applied was a combination of encirclement and constant pursuit within a constantly compressing ring.

At the beginning of 1947, the British role was upgraded to offer the GNA operational as well as training assistance. The BMM proposed a 'clear and hold' strategy to defeat the guerrillas. This strategy called for the systematic clearance of guerrilla infested areas, followed by a security force that would maintain law and order and consolidate the government authority and so relieve forces to deal with subsequent areas.[45] The 'clear and hold' strategy was adopted by the GGS planning staff and, with various refinements and modifications, remained the main strategy, even when the US assumed exclusive responsibility for assisting the GNA. The purging of selected guerrilla-infested areas and the consolidation of the security forces to prevent guerrilla re-infiltration by re-establishing government authority had been the objective of the operations planned by the joint British-Greek and later US staffs.

However, there was an inconsistency between the basic principle developed in the Greek COIN manual and the 'clear and hold' strategy promoted by the BMM and adopted by the joint planning staffs. According to the manual, success in military operations against guerrillas consisted neither in capturing nor holding ground nor in gaining control of an area; only the destruction of hostile forces constituted success.[46] The same principle was repeated in several GGS orders describing GNA tactical doctrine. For example, in January 1947, a classified order on the internal security of the country named the destruction of the guerrillas as the objective of the GNA operations noting that the holding of villages just to maintain the population's morale would not bring victory.[47] In April 1947, a GGS order regarding the tactics to be applied against the guerrillas stressed that pushing them out of a region or scattering them would not bring a successful outcome to the communist problem; instead, only their total annihilation should be pursued.[48] Another order, later that month, again stressed that capturing ground was of no significance in the type of war the GNA was fighting.[49] Finally, in May 1949, the Greek Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal

[44]Ibid., p. 269.
[45]Tim Jones, "The British Army, and Counter-guerrilla warfare in Greece, 1945-1949," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 8, no. 1 (1997), p. 89.
[46]Greek General Staff, *Suppression*, p. 1.
[47]Greek General Staff, *Civil War Archives* volume 3 (Athens: Hellenic Army History Directorate, 1998), p. 170.
[48]Greek General Staff, *Civil War Archives* volume 4 (Athens: Hellenic Army History Directorate, 1998), p. 241.
[49]Ibid., p. 303.

Alexandros Papagos, complained that GNA troops were focusing more on capturing ground instead of aiming to kill or capture the guerrillas themselves.[50] This strategy largely echoed the German COIN approach where the objective was always to destroy the guerrillas, rather than scatter or drive them away from an area. To achieve that, the German doctrine posited that 'the army should seize the initiative and throw the guerrillas on the defensive, separate them from the population, deprive them of supplies from the countryside, limit their freedom of action, encircle them, break them up, and pursue them until they have been eliminated'.[51]

The 'German' approach of encirclement, that dominated the Greek COIN manual, was the primary tactic to confine the guerrillas and bring them to decisive battle during purging operations that lasted until the end of 1947. According to Zafeiropoulos, this tactic originated from the GGS, not the BMM.[52] The British proposal included intelligence-based, air-supported offensives by highly mobile infantry, mountain artillery and reconnaissance units.[53] Eventually, the BMM approved the GGS plan that included the tactic of encirclement, despite the widespread view among its members that it was no longer effective.[54] Although Zafeiropoulos implies that after the 1947 the ill-suited tactic of encirclement was abandoned, essentially, it remained an integral part of the GNA's COIN strategy despite the different opinion of the BMM.[55]

For example, during the spring of 1948, the BMM director insisted on replacing encirclement with relentless chasing of small 'bands' in the hills.[56] However, the remaining operations against the guerrillas incorporated encirclement along with constant pursuit to bring them to battle. The plan for operation *Dawn* in the spring of 1948, was aimed at purging DAG guerrillas and their collaborators and sympathisers in the Roumeli area, with GNA forces moving on three separate fronts along an axis from northwest to southeast. The objective of the GNA forces was to drive the guerrillas into the Giona Mountain area where they could be destroyed, while another GNA Division would execute a secondary effort from the northeast to contain the enemy located in the Mount Parnassos area. At the same time, 'A' and 'B' Commando Groups would guard the mountain passes through Mount Tymfristos to prevent the

[50]Greek General Staff, *Civil War Archives* volume 13 (Athens: Hellenic Army History Directorate, 1998), p. 344.
[51]Edgar M Howell, *The Soviet Partisan Movement 1941-1944* (Washington DC: US Department of the Army, 1956), pp. 118-119.
[52]Zafeiropoulos, *O Antisimmoriakos*, pp. 268-269.
[53]Jones, *The British Army*, p. 94.
[54]Ibid., p. 99.
[55]Zafeiropoulos, *O Antisimmoriakos*, p. 268; Ioannis Bakanos, *Dimitrios St. Deligias. Stratiotika Enthymimata, 1947-1950* (Athens: Bakanos, n.d.).
[56]Jones, *The British Army*, p. 99.

guerrillas from escaping to the north.[57] Similarly, the first phase of the GNA plan for the destruction of the guerrillas in Peloponnese, codenamed *Pigeon*, ordered the purging of the northern part of the peninsula through a convergent GNA action from all directions and the destruction of the guerrillas in mount Mainalos, where they would eventually retreat under the pressure of the constantly compressing encirclement ring.[58] Finally, Operation *Rocket*, which was aimed at purging Central Greece of guerrilla forces in the spring of 1949, just before the final attack against the Grammos and Vitsi guerrillas' bases, provided for the encirclement and constant pursuit of the guerrillas, firstly, in the Roumeli area, and secondly, in the Agrafa mountains.[59] According to Papagos, the aim of this operation was to encircle the guerrillas, establish constant contact with them and annihilate them.[60]

The success of the above operations in terms of the efficiency of encirclement can only be measured in conjunction with other factors. For example, in none of them did the GNA manage to totally confine the guerrillas within an encirclement ring. Although in every case the GNA declared the operation successful, as it managed to purge the targeted area of the guerrillas, the fact that a considerable number of the DAG fighters managed to escape, especially in the case of Operation *Dawn,* questions the GNA's assessment. After the first successful GNA attempt to clear the Roumeli region in the spring of 1948, the 'hold' part of the strategy was never implemented, and the DAG guerrillas managed to re-infiltrate the region and re-organize their forces there. The cases of Operations *Pigeon* and *Rocket* are different not only because the GNA managed to encircle and destroy larger numbers of guerrillas due to the more efficient use of constant pursuit but mainly because of the sequence of the operations. The fact that the operational plan for 1949 provided for the gradual purging of the country from south to north meant that the constantly reduced number of fleeing guerrillas would be pushed further north without having the ability to re-infiltrate the purged areas in the south. In this respect, the GNA operations before 1948 that used encirclement were in practical terms unsuccessful, while the success of the 1949 operations is attributed to more than the encirclement factor. In any case, what is interesting is that the German inspired encirclement concept was never abandoned and perhaps the fact that during the autumn of 1947 the US advisors made it clear to their British counterparts that they favoured encirclement played a role in the resilience of this tactic.[61]

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[57]US Army, *History*, vol 1, p. 75.
[58]Greek General Staff, *Civil War Archives* volume 11 (Athens: Hellenic Army History Directorate, 1998), pp. 282-291
[59]Zafeiropoulos, *O Antisimmoriakos*, pp. 590-592.
[60]Greek General Staff, *Civil War*, vol 13, p. 143.
[61] Jones, *The British Army*, p. 97.

Principles of Greek COIN Doctrine: Reconnaissance & Patrolling

Another key aspect of the counter-guerrilla fight that was especially highlighted in the GNA doctrine was reconnaissance. The application of sound offensive reconnaissance was not only related to the security of GNA troops, but it also provided the commander with combat intelligence essential to sound planning and execution of the unit's manoeuvres.[62] Active and constant reconnaissance patrolling was a key element of COIN and the principal missions of the troops conducting it were the following:

a) To protect the main body of the troops from surprise, interruption, and annoyance by small hostile forces.
b) To warn the main body of every contact with the hostile forces and to clear the area of small guerrilla forces ahead of the arrival of the main body.
c) Once contact with the hostile force had been established, to maintain it; once established, the contact was not allowed to be broken until the guerrilla force had been destroyed.
d) When contact with the main guerrilla force was established, to act aggressively, if necessary, to pin it down and prevent its escape, and to secure the time and manoeuvre space necessary for the commander to move the main body to suitable directions for decisive attack, deploy it and complete the encirclement of the guerrilla forces.[63]

Once firm contact with the guerrilla formations had been established by the main body, the necessity of aggressive and decisive action with reconnaissance and combat patrols would become even more compelling. The weaker guerrilla formations, knowing that destruction was certain unless they escaped, would make supreme efforts to seek safety in flight. The very nature and extreme lightness of their equipment made it possible for them to break contact with the main body of regular troops quite rapidly and flee to another position or escape entirely. Hence, the doctrine suggested that aggressive and decisive action should be immediately taken in the form of light, highly mobile combat patrols, strong in automatic-weapons and light-mortar firepower.[64] It should be the unfailing mission of these patrols to overtake and close in upon escaping guerrilla formations, prevent them from breaking into small groups, pin them down with a withering fire and force them to give battle in position while the slower moving forces of the main body renew forward movement, select new directions of attack, and complete the encirclement and destruction.[65] For that reason, the manual suggested that offensive reconnaissance conducted by specially trained detachments (small groups of men selected for their ability to move rapidly

[62]Greek General Staff, *Suppression,* p. 8.
[63]Ibid., pp. 10-11.
[64]Ibid., p. 11.
[65]Ibid., p. 11.

across rough and steep terrain, for their physical endurance and courage, and for their initiative and determination) would invariably produce excellent results, while the use of local guides who could be trusted was invaluable.[66]

This offensive reconnaissance and combat patrolling by specially trained detachments is another common feature in both the Greek and German doctrines.[67] These 'guerrilla hunting details', or Commando units as they were called by the GNA, would conduct long-range reconnaissance to locate and destroy, whenever possible, guerrilla groups or pin them down while leading larger groups of friendly troops to annihilate them. However, it should be noted that although the use of specially trained units to conduct offensive reconnaissance and combat patrolling appears to be a common feature between the German and Greek doctrines, the actual formation of GNA Commando units should be attributed to a British initiative based on its war time Special Air Service (SAS) experience. By 1946 the need to form specially trained units to conduct offensive reconnaissance and combat patrolling had become apparent to the GNA and BMM leadership. By December 1946, the GNA took the first step towards the adaptation of unorthodox tactics with the creation of such specially trained units. The GGS initially doubted that such units could survive so deep in an enemy controlled area without support, arguing that, contrary to respective war-time SAS operations, the Greek guerrillas were natives, who in most cases enjoyed the support of locals.[68] Eventually, in December 1946, Colonel Kallinskis was ordered to form 40 commando companies, and to speed up the training process he staffed them with former Greek guerrillas and the Sacred Company, a Greek military formation which had experience of successful and effective cooperation with the SAS during the Second World War.[69]

However, the fighting record of the Commandos during the Greek COIN was rather disappointing. Except for their brilliant performance at Agios Vasileios during Operation *Pigeon* in the winter of 1949,[70] the Commandos' unsatisfactory record can be attributed to various reasons. For example, the US advisors' report on their poor

[66]Ibid., p. 7.
[67]Ibid., p. 7; Lanz, *Partisan Warfare*, pp. 146-149; Ratcliffe, *Partisan Warfare*, p. 32; US Army, *German Antiguerrilla Operations in the Balkans* (Washington DC: US Department of the Army, 1954), p. 48.
[68]Giannakos, *H Anasigrotisi*, p. 82.
[69]Tim Jones, *Postwar Counterinsurgency, and the SAS 1945-1952. A Special Type of Warfare* (New York: Routledge, 2001) p. 52.
[70]For the Commandos performance at Agios Vasileios see Ioannis L. Lefas, *O Dimokratikos Stratos Peloponnisou (Dimiourgia-Anaptiksi-Htta)*, vol. 2 (Athens: Alfeios, 1998), p. 40; Kostas I. Papadogiannis, "*H Polinekri Machi tou Agiou Vasileiou*," (2011) Online available at:< https://www.leonidion.gr/2011/02/22-1949.html> Accessed on 11 December 2020.

performance put the blame on timid leadership and improper direction rather than a weakness in the enlisted ranks.[71] The plan for Operation *Dawn* provided for the commando groups to be used to guard escape routes from the encirclement ring instead of conducting offensive reconnaissance and patrolling to infiltrate the guerrillas' areas.[72] The GNA commanders were unfamiliar with the operational capabilities of the commandos, considering them simply elite infantry units. As a result, a report to Papagos on 9 June 1949 suggested that they should be employed as the leading assault units to pave the ground for conventional infantry attack, and then infiltrate deep behind the enemy lines to destroy its headquarters etc.[73] This tactic echoed closely the German approach on the effectiveness of 'guerrilla hunting details' in this type of action - as described by the Wehrmacht General Alexander Ratcliffe in his treatise on partisan warfare in the Balkans.[74]

All in all, the use of offensive reconnaissance and patrolling was another aspect where the GNA performed rather poorly, at least during the operations of 1946-48. In their report on operation *Dawn*, the JUSMAPG advisors commented that many commanders did not seem to trust patrolling. During daylight, patrols used to advance only to the point where mortar fire could cover them. On the other hand, during the night, patrols were often avoided, even in cases where the circumstances favoured them, and when conducted they were often static, and more like ambushes. The report suggested that static patrols should be used only for guarding specific points; instead, reconnaissance patrols of small groups for gathering intelligence, and combat patrols of platoons for capturing enemies should be preferred. According to the JUSMAPG's officers, this lack of patrolling activity resulted in frequent loss of contact with the enemy. However, the US advisors stressed that contact with the enemy should be the primary target day and night and could be achieved if lower rank leaders were given more space for initiative in conducting patrols.[75]

Principles of Greek COIN Doctrine: The Attack

According to the Greek COIN manual, upon contact with the enemy, the reconnaissance patrols should remain concealed unless their presence had been discovered, or unless the guerrilla formations were attempting to flee. Such patrols should dispatch immediately to the commander who sent them out the following information: location of the guerrilla formation, its size and general composition, its actions, the time contact was gained with it, and the character of the area it occupied.

[71]US Army, *History*, vol 1, p. 141.
[72]Greek General Staff, *Civil War*, vol 7, pp. 470-471.
[73]Greek General Staff, *Civil War*, vol 13, p. 507.
[74]Ratcliffe, *Partisan Warfare*, p. 70.
[75]Greek General Staff, *Civil War Archives F.1010/B/33, F/1010/B/38* (Athens: Hellenic Army History Directorate Digital Collection).

Furthermore, directions from which the area could best be approached for attack or ambush should be provided by these patrols.[76] This was extremely important as the patrol should remain in close observation of the guerrillas at a halt and be able to guide the arriving friendly troops into the best position from which to launch an attack. If the guerrilla formation was attempting to flee before the advancing troops, any patrol gaining contact with it should open fire at once, attempt to pin it down and hold it until arrival of friendly troops. In general, the basic principle was that pursuit was a vital element in maintenance of contact and was always launched when guerrilla formations attempt to flee, day or night.[77]

The superior troops, weapons, and firepower allowed the commander of the unit in contact speedily to smother the guerrilla formation with withering fire and close in upon it. This rapid and aggressive action would leave the guerrillas with only two options, namely: decisive combat on the present position, or an immediate unplanned flight. This form of action was especially appropriate when the area to be cleared had been completely encircled by the command, and the guerrillas could only flee to another position within the perimeter. This type of action would rapidly break up the guerrilla formations into smaller groups and keep them constantly moving (combat patrols and pursuing forces should be launched forward promptly to facilitate this). Moreover, that way the guerrillas would be kept constantly confused and prevented from reorganising into groups large enough to achieve coordinated action, and eventually they would be brought to bay as a disorganised and uncontrolled mob within the perimeter, and where their destruction was certain. For that reason, the basic axiom was that once the principal guerrilla formations had started moving, they should be kept moving until they were finally brought to decisive battle. This could only be accomplished by violent, aggressive action and maintaining constant contact.[78]

This section of the Greek doctrine draws its origin from two different sources. The first part, which suggests that superior troops, weapons, and firepower allows the commander of the unit in contact to smother the guerrilla formation with a withering fire, originates from the German experience in fighting guerrillas. According to German COIN doctrine, light automatic weapons, machine guns, 20mm guns, mortars, and mountain artillery were regarded as ideal for mountain operations.[79] This superior firepower allowed the German troops to begin every attack with heavy fire against the encircled village or guerrilla pocket. When the target was located and during the process of encirclement, heavy weapons and artillery were brought up to either shell

[76]Greek General Staff, *Suppression*, p. 16.
[77]Ibid., pp. 16-17.
[78]Ibid., p. 18.
[79]D.M. Condit, *Case Study in Guerrilla Warfare: Greece During World War II* (North Carolina: US Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, 1961), p. 248.

the village or to pre-soften the massed guerrillas. This became a standard German tactical method whenever they came upon villages and towns or pockets of strong guerrilla resistance. All in all, according to the Commander of the Wehrmacht troops operating in the western part of Greece, General Hubert Lanz, German artillery was extremely effective against guerrilla strong posts, as enveloping fire combined with direct assault put murderous pressure on local redoubts. For example, when analysing the attack against Communist guerrillas in the town of Leskovic, Lanz described what he called the standard procedure used against localities in an operational area. According to the Wehrmacht General, if the locality was occupied by partisans, the German troops would not launch a frontal attack but, if possible, would envelop the town to block the partisans' escape. If the partisans continued to defend themselves, the German troops would inch closer to the town under the protection of heavy weapons. According to Lanz 'artillery and mortar fire were continued until resistance collapsed. Supported by heavy and light machine guns, the assault troops then attacked from all sides, while artillery and mortars continued shelling the town'.[80]

It is apparent that artillery, mortars, and machine guns were a pivotal element of the German attack method. It is also evident that this 'German' principle was transferred to the Greek COIN doctrine. The GNA commanders' persistence in using heavy artillery before every attack against the DAG guerrillas became a major point of frustration for the US advisors in the field. JUSMAPG attempted to remedy this over reliance on artillery fire by focusing the training programme of the GNA on close infantry-artillery cooperation as they believed that this 'German' inspired tactic was ill-used by the Greek troops. According to the US advisors, the GNA commanders relied too much on artillery fire, refusing to move their troops closer to the enemy unless the artillery covered them. For example, when the JUSMAPG field detachment commented on Operation *Dawn*, it stressed that the infantry relied mostly on air-force and artillery fire to destroy the enemy and had avoided approaching the target.[81] As a result, the GNA could not take advantage of any damage caused to the guerrillas by the air force and artillery bombing.[82] Similarly, the JUSMAPG report on Operation *Crown* noted that many commanders were unwilling to mount an attack without overwhelming air and artillery support.[83]

The second feature of the Greek doctrine attacking method, the aggressive and constant pursuit of the guerrillas, was an undeniable British contribution. In December 1946 the British proposed to the GGS the use of highly mobile infantry in offensive

[80]Lanz, *Partisan Warfare*, pp. 197-198.
[81]Goulter confirms the extensive use of artillery and airpower by the GNA during offensive operations. See Goulter, The Greek Civil, p. 1049.
[82]Greek General Staff, Civil War Archives F.1010/B/33; F.1010/B/38.
[83]US Army, *History*, vol 1, pp. 89-90.

operations against the guerrillas.[84] This proposal was repeated by the BMM director, Major General Stuart Rawlings in October 1947, advising that the bulk of the GNA should be deployed in the hills as though they were themselves skilled guerrillas, with the object of obtaining information, gaining contact with the enemy, harassing him, and destroying him.[85] This relentless chase proposal became the 'search and destroy' tactic, which along with encirclement dominated GNA COIN doctrine. The point of divergence between the German and Greek doctrines was the significance placed by the Greek doctrine on the constant pursuit of the guerrillas to destroy them.

According to German doctrine, the pursuit of the guerrilla bands that had been driven from their hiding places or had broken out of encirclement posed special problems. The vast extent of the terrain, which was usually broken by mountain ranges or forests, and the marching capabilities of the guerrillas, made the maintenance of contact with withdrawing enemy forces difficult. The manpower and time required would preclude a thorough ferreting-out of the innumerable hiding places established by the partisans. Moreover, the bands, when routed, would usually re-assemble not long afterward in the rear of the pursuing troops.[86] At this point, an interesting fact that highlights the overall German influence upon Greek COIN doctrine should be noted. A classified order to the GNA Corps commanders issued on 12 December 1946 determined that the objective of the GNA should be the total annihilation of the guerrillas through relentless pursuit and constant patrolling.[87] However, one specific part of this order was lifted almost verbatim from the German doctrine.[88] It stressed that sending troops in pursuit of guerrillas who had fled was wasteful unless the possibility of establishing contact with them was high. Instead, motorised troops or cavalry, when available, should block their flight at suitable points.[89]

In any case, the principle of aggressive and constant pursuit of the guerrillas became the key to their total annihilation, and the GNA and JUSMAPG reports on successful operations confirmed this. According to the GNA General Thrasivoulos Tsakalotos, one of the main reasons behind the successful purging of the Roumeli area during Operation *Dawn* in 1948, although that proved temporary as the guerrillas managed to re-infiltrate the area later, was the constant and restless pursuit of the guerrillas

[84]Jones, *The British Army*, p. 94.
[85]Ibid., p. 97.
[86]Ratcliffe, *Partisan Warfare*, p. 71.
[87]Greek General Staff, *Civil War*, vol 3, p. 52.
[88]Ratcliffe, *Partisan Warfare*, p. 71.
[89]Greek General Staff, *Civil War*, vol 3, p. 53.

despite the harsh weather conditions and the difficulties of the mountainous terrain.[90] Operation *Rocket* during the spring of 1949 managed to permanently purge Roumeli of guerrillas. The JUSMAPG field detachment's report on this operation praised the US supervised training programme that increased the combat effectiveness of the GNA units. This effectiveness was most noticeable in the continuous pursuit of the guerrillas during the entire campaign. Steady attrition, with continued pressure from the GNA, and insufficient guerrilla reserves to offset casualties, had an unfavourable effect on the guerrillas' morale and combat discipline. The JUSMAPG training programme managed to consolidate among the GNA troops the idea that a decisive guerrilla defeat could only be achieved when every fleeing guerrilla was pursued and annihilated, thus destroying the tactical integrity of small guerrilla groups as well as organised units. The JUSMAPG contention that continued pressure by GNA troops would force the guerrillas to assume the defensive was confirmed by the fact that during Operation *Rocket* they failed to carry out any sizeable looting or recruiting raids as they had done in the past.[91]

Conclusions

All in all, the Greek COIN doctrine was at its core enemy-centric; the primary target was to destroy the insurgents. Even though the US initial influence had a purely population-centric direction with a focus on political and economic measures that would re-establish the legitimacy of the Greek government and improve the standard of living in Greece, the brunt of the later effort was focused on the destruction of the enemy. This is not something unique to the Greek case. Prominent COIN theorists, such as David Kilcullen, while leaning towards a comprehensive approach that calls for massive involvement with the intent to transform the lives of the communities where COIN is undertaken, also admit that the ultimate goal of the campaign is the elimination of the insurgents through well-informed military operations.[92]

The research behind this article composes the first step in a broader research project which will examine the impact of the Greek Civil War on COIN doctrine development. This article is a product of the initial research into the lessons learned during the Greek Civil War and shows that several basic offensive principles, that

[90]Greek General Staff, *Civil War Archives* volume 7 (Athens: Hellenic Army History Directorate, 1998), pp. 474-475; Thrasivoulos Tsakalotos, *40 Chronia Stratiotis tis Ellados*, vol. 2 (Athens: Acropolis, 1960).

[91]US Army, *History of the Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group-Greece* Volume II (Independence MO: United States Army Unit Dairies, Histories and Reports, Miscellaneous Units, Records Group 407, President Harry S. Truman Library, 1952), pp. 34-36.

[92]Andrei Miroiu, *Classical Counterinsurgency: A Comparison of Malaya, Algeria and Romania* PhD thesis (Sydney: University of New South Wales 2014), pp. 45-46.

would subsequently be included in wider COIN doctrines, such as encirclement, patrolling, constant pursuit, and the use of heavy artillery fire, were consolidated during the Greek Civil War. Post-war US Army COIN doctrine development and the writing of the US manual took place at the time of the Greek insurgency, at a time when the US Army was involved in Greece on an advisory mission. Future research will examine if and how lessons learned in Greece influenced subsequent doctrine.

British Journal for Military History, Volume 8, Issue 1, March 2022

Anti-Imperialist Pamphleteering: Understanding Global Jihad in Wartime India, 1914-1918

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ABSTRACT
In 1914, the German Foreign Office envisaged a plan to stir up the subject populations of Britain, France and Russia. Colonial Muslims had a critical place in this plan, as contemporary Orientalist thought made the Germans believe these Muslims could easily be encouraged to rebel by a call for Jihad. In particular, the German Foreign Office believed Indian Muslims to be a disgruntled section of a subject population. The German government launched a campaign to spread jihadi propaganda to incite them into rebellion against the British imperial government. This Research Note contextualises the jihadi propaganda disseminated in India, in the broader transnational network of the German 'programme for insurrection'. It also examines how it exploited the old Wahabi network for this purpose.

Introduction

Shortly after the Ottoman empire joined the Great War, the Shaikh-ul Islam, on behalf of the Ottoman Caliph, declared *Jihad* or holy war against the Entente powers.[1] 'Turkish newspapers, containing facsimiles of five fatwas, circulated the proclamation all over the country.[2] Muslims all over the world, it was presumed, would then rise up against Christian domination by European colonisers. However, for the Ottomans the use of *Jihad* was not a novel weapon to rally Muslim subjects as they had issued official Jihad declarations (fatwa) on at least four occasions between 1768 and 1914 and a further two before 1922.[3] This came from the belief that only by embarking on *Jihad*

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DOI: 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v8i1.1610

[1]The Shaikh-ul Islam was the highest ranking religious dignitary under the Ottomans.

[2]James Campbell Kerr, *Political Trouble in India 1907-1917,* (Calcutta: Editions India, 1960), p.271.

[3]Mustafa Aksakal, 'The Ottoman Proclamation of Jihad' in Erik Jan Zürcher (ed), *Jihad and Islam in World War I: Studies on the Ottoman Jihad on the Centenary of Snouck*

could Muslims be victorious as the call for holy war would unite them through the bond of Muslim brotherhood. Nevertheless, there was a debate around the origin of this declaration of *Jihad* as some scholars perceived it to be the handiwork of Germany. Kaiser Wilhelm II indeed wanted to profit from the mobilisation of colonised Muslims in support of German war interests. However, it was apparent that despite this strong German support, the Ottoman government embarked on this war on its own account.

The formation of the Triple Entente in the late nineteenth century deepened the anxiety of the Kaiser. Prior to the Great War, Germany envisaged a new policy – namely '*Aufweigelung*' or the *'insurrection strategy*'. With this policy, they wanted to spark rebellion among the subject peoples of Britain, France and Russia. The targeted peoples included Poles, Finns, Georgians, Armenians, Serbs, Irish, Jews, Estonians and Latvians.[4] In this global plan of stirring up colonised peoples into anti-colonial resistance, Muslims held a special position. The German Foreign Office was aware that if the Ottoman Caliph called for a holy war, Muslims across the world might be prepared to fight for what Europeans perceived to be 'Islam' and 'such readiness to fight might be harnessed in the service of one of the warring camps.'[5] Consequently, an agreement was signed between the Kaiser and the Ottoman emperor on 2 August 1914. While the Ottomans agreed upon instigating rebellion amongst the Muslim subjects of the Entente powers, Germany gave the Ottomans an assurance it would protect them against any future attack by the Entente.

There were two objectives of this 'Insurrection strategy': the first was to mobilise colonial Muslim soldiers and open new theatres of combat, thus drawing Entente troops away from the Western Front battlefields; the second, was to spread unrest among Muslim civilians and destabilise established colonial governments. To achieve these aims, the German Foreign Office started their Jihad propaganda campaign. Initially, Max Von Oppenheim, a Jewish Orientalist and archaeologist, who had spent more than eleven years in Egypt, began producing anti-Entente Jihadi propaganda.

India played a pivotal role in the broader German war strategy. Many German officers and consuls had visited India before the First World War to gain an understanding of the British rule in India.[6] They were aware that if Britain were to lose India, it would weaken its international position. Therefore, they specifically targeted Indian Muslims as a potential rebellious group inside India. The German government quickly

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Hurgonje's 'Holy War Made in Germany', (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2016), p. 53-70

[4]Hew Strachan, *The First World War*, *Vol.1*, (London: Penguin, 2003), p. 698.

[5]Tilman Lüdke, 'Not Using Political Islam' in *Jihad and Islam in World War I*, p. 72-94.

[6]Lieutenant Von Schweinitz of the First Prussian Foot Guards visited the Indian Army stationed at Jhelum, Rawalpindi, Peshawar and Khyber during the pre-war period.

discovered that they could also exploit the grievances of Hindu revolutionaries who were already engaged in revolutionary campaigns against the British Raj.[7] They immediately contacted Indian revolutionaries outside India to incorporate them into the *Aufweigelung* strategy. It was agreed that the revolutionaries would organise a nationwide uprising in India; and also try to gain the assistance of sepoys in the British Indian Army.[8] In return the German government agreed to supply arms and money for this work. It was at this juncture that Germany contacted the *Ghadr* revolutionaries, based in San Francisco, and arranged with them to send arms to India[9]. The *Ghadr* revolutionaries then sent their agents to the Punjab and Bengal with the aim of spreading the word of 'revolution' to their comrades. While *ghadr* revolutionaries were spreading that news among the north Indian revolutionaries, agents of the Indian Independence Committee (Berlin) incorporated fellow revolutionaries in Bengal into the German plan. So began the large-scale preparation for a war of independence within India by mobilising anti-British Indian revolutionaries, as well as other revolutionaries all over the world.

The situation in India in 1914 was conducive to violent revolt and rebellion.[10] Meanwhile, Jihadi propaganda, published by *the Information Bureau of the East*, started

[7]From the late nineteenth century, a group of Hindu revolutionaries started to resist the oppression of the British government. Albeit it began with the murder of Plague Commissioner, Mr. Rand, soon revolutionaries started to organise themselves into secret samitis (societies). From 1905 the Bengal police reported outrages perpetrated by the Hindu revolutionaries. They participated in the 1905 anti-partition movement, which had been spurred on by the British Viceroy Lord Curzon's Partition of Bengal. Hence, it seems there was a large section of the young population of India who held extremist views and would engage in anti-British uprisings.

[8]The Indian Army consisted of a large number of Indian soldiers with British officers as well as some British regiments. British Imperial power in India rested on the prowess and loyalty of these soldiers, so revolutionaries tried to persuade the Indian troops to abandon British service and join them in the struggle for Indian Independence. In this way, the revolutionaries aimed to weaken the powerbase of the British in the subcontinent. Indeed, the Indian revolutionaries were inspired by the bravery shown by the sepoys in the 1857 rebellion, however, in this context whether the revolutionaries wanted to directly imitate the 1857 rebellion is uncertain.

[9]Bhupendra Nath Dutta, *Aprakishito Rajnaitik Itihas*, (Calcutta, Barman Publishing House, 1954), p. 5

[10]A number of revolutionaries who were involved in this programme talked about an atmosphere of revolt in India at that time. They described the ways in which samitis, or political organisations, in Bengal were secretly organising themselves. See Dutta, *Aprakishito Rajnaitik Itihas*; Satish Pakrashi, *Agnidiner Kotha*, (Calcutta, National Book

to circulate among Indian Muslims, inciting them to rise against the British. Jihadi Pamphlets, found in India, reflect this global plan for stoking rebellion. Studying these pamphlets illuminates an underrepresented aspect of the First World War by shifting the focus from the trenches of Western European battlefields to understanding it as a war fought by way of stoking a community's religious sentiment. The pamphlets bear testimony to the careful German machinations by which they tried to manipulate colonised Muslims. This note contends that analysis of these leaflets contributes to broader debates on the far reaching and globalised nature of the First World War. Furthermore, the Jihadi propagandists used the old Wahabi network in India to reach the inner strata of Muslim society. In the emergent trend of rewriting the history of the First World War, this study adds a novel perspective in unfolding the global extent of that war.

Role of the Indian Muslims in *Aufweigelung*:

In India, a group of Muslim political activists, largely from the Deoband school, responded to the call. Obeidullah Shindhi, a Moulvi of Deoband, who aspired to create a Muslim rebellion in India, crossed the border and went to Afghanistan.[11] He reached Kabul in mid-1915 where he met with the Indo-German group headed by Raja Mahendra Pratap. Meanwhile, Maulana Mahmud al-Hasan, one of Obeidullah's disciples, travelled to Istanbul and conferred with Ghalib Pasha. Ghalib Pasha handed over a copy of the fatwa urging the *mujahidins*[12] in the North-West Frontier province to join forces with the Indian Muslim activists. While on his way, Muhammad Mian, a Deoband friend of Obeidullah, who accompanied Mahmud al-Hasan, distributed copies of this fatwa, known as "Ghalibnama" both in India and among the frontier tribes.[13]

The German Foreign office despatched numerous missions to the Middle East to rally Indian soldiers against the British. Attempts were also made to form a regiment out

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Agency Ltd., 1947); Nalini Kishor Guha, *Banglay Biplobbad*, (Calcutta, A Mukherjee & Co. 1923).

[11]The Deoband School was established in 1867 at Deoband, United Provinces, and followed Wahabism as a religious doctrine. Though, it was built to impart education on Islamic Law, its main aim was to preserve Islamic learning during colonial rule. In the early, twentieth century it was notorious for preaching anti-British sentiment among its students.

[12]The term mujahidin means a person who fights in a Jihad on behalf of Islam. The Sedition Committee Report 1918, (Calcutta: New Age Publishers, 1973), p174, stated, 'in independent territory across the border of the NWFP there is a small colony of Hindustani fanatics, who go by the name of Mujahidin. The colony was found by Syed Ahmad Shah, a fervent apostle in India of the Wahabi sect.'

[13]Sedition Committee Report, p. 177. Ghalibnama, which literally means the book of Ghalib, contains the religious decree proclaimed by the Ottoman Caliph in 1914.

of the Indian Army soldiers imprisoned in Turkey, but this scheme failed, and it was alleged that this failure was due to growing hostility between the captive Hindu and Muslim soldiers. Hostility engendered by the partiality shown to the latter by the Turks.[14]

Meanwhile, Raja Mahendra Pratap, who had left India in December 1914, travelled to Geneva and met Har Dayal, the leader of Ghadr party in America.[15] Later Har Dayal accompanied him to Berlin where he had an interview with the Kaiser. Raja Mahendra Pratap was promised he would receive every assistance needed to free his country. Soon he was despatched on a mission to Kabul. Baraktulla, another *ghadarite*, also accompanied him on this mission, along with Dr von Hentig of the German Diplomatic Service.[16] Their agenda was to attack India from the North-West with the help of the Amir of Afghanistan. The mission reached Kabul on 2 October 1915 and met the Indian Muslim activists there who were willing to form an allegiance with them. On 1 December 1915 they established the 'Provisional Government of India in Kabul'. The Sedition Committee reported, 'Obeidullah and his fellow conspirators had devised a scheme for the provisional government of India after the overthrow of the British power.'[17]

This plan was foiled due to the last- minute betrayal of the Amir of Afghanistan, so the German envoys returned to Berlin. Moreover, surveillance by British spies over a large part of the Middle East soon proved fatal to this group. Nevertheless, and despite the early demise of the plan, German consuls along with Indian Muslim activists were able to spread propaganda. This is corroborated by a statement reported by James Campbell Kerr, when he stated, 'One of the leaders of anti-British plotting in Persia was Herr Wassmuss, the German Consul at Bushire, he was arrested in early 1915, and among his effects were found several copies of five different leaflets intended for Indian consumption, of which one was in English, two in Urdu, one in Hindi, and one in Marathi.'[18] However, jihadi propaganda was not limited to pamphlets, a number of newspapers were also involved in promoting the cause of *Jihad* among Indian Muslims

[14]R.C.Majumdar, *History of the Freedom Movement of India*, Vol. II, (Calcutta: Firma K.L.Mukhopadhyaya, 1963), p. 405.
[15]Raja Mahendra Pratap was a descendant of the royal family of Hathora. He was a nationalist and joined a session of the Indian National Congress in 1906. He spent most of his life abroad, fighting for India's Independence. He returned to India in 1946.
[16]The members of the ghadr party were known as ghadarite, Baraktullah was one of them. He was intrinsically related to the Insurrection plan inside India.
[17]Sedition Committee Report, p.177
[18]Kerr, *Political Trouble in India*, p. 273.

at that time. Punjabi Abu Said el Arabi was engaged in propagating the fatwa of *Jihad* by way of writing articles in newspapers, named *jehan-I Islam.*[19]

Jihad through pamphlets

Pamphlets and leaflets proclaiming *Jihad* started to appear in India prior to the outbreak of the war. A number of pamphlets were also imported from Constantinople during this time. The pamphlet shown in (Figure 1) below appeared in India immediately after the outbreak of the war.



present war is a religious one as it has been declared to be by the learned men (*ulama*) of Mecca, Medina, Turkey, Syria, Tunis and Morocco. This sacred war is a grand *Jihad* and those who give their lives in it will go to Heaven, and join the throng of angels, whilst those who refuse to fight will suffer eternal damnation. Have ye not heard the proclamation made by the Sultan of Turkey, Enver Bey and **Haji Muhammad Kaiser William,** that the Muhammadans of the world will regain the past glory of Islam? God is our helper and victory is at our door. Pitiable alike are the fate and faith of those who in submission to English influence aver that the present war is not a religious one. Brethren! The sycophants of Delhi, headed by the mulish manager of the Jumma mosque assembled in the town and delivered speeches declaring that the war was not a religious one. Unmindful of Hell they even condemned as sinners all who might oppose the British Government. O ye lovers of Islam! Do you consider that the worthless speeches of these mercenaries can have any effect as against the word of God? Never! As a reward for what benefit do the English expect assistance from us? Did not these monkeys take India upon the promise that, once a sound administration was established, self-government would be given to India? Did not these dogs promise to restore Egypt to the Egyptians after thirty years? Did not these pigs promise religious freedom? What promise has been fulfilled by them? When did they, who are ever unfaithful to their promise, give self-government to India? When did they withdraw their rule from Egypt? When did they give religious freedom?

They sold the Jumma mosque of Delhi and now they want to sell the Taj Mahal. The Cawnpore mosque was demolished and its site was never given back. Five hundred and thirty Muhammadans were killed, very few of whom found burial, the rest being thrown into the river. At Karachi they represented the Prophet as indulging in debauch and when the Muhammadans complained they took no action. Their Foreign Minister, the wretched Churchill, when denouncing the Kaiser as tyrannous and cruel, likened him to the Prophet Muhammad. What high posts will they give to Hindus and Muhammadans? They do not even respect them as much as they respect their dogs. They have ruined and dishonoured the nation by fostering dissension between Hindus and Muhammadans. They have killed education by putting impediments in the way of the creation of universities. Recently at the outbreak of war Lord Hardinge, the last Viceroy of India, he, who has lost his wife and son and who himself remains to be sacrificed, announced that the holy places of the Muhammadans would be respected, but in an English newspaper of the 4th November 1914, which is confidential and is sent to European officers only, it is stated that the cruiser *Minerva* bombarded Jeddah fifty miles from the *Kaaba* and another cruiser bombarded Jaffa thirty miles from Jerusalem. (*The curse of God be on the liars.**) We obtained this paper through a Muhammadan who is a Christian in name. Now what of the word of the cunning and dishonest English? They have restricted our religious liberty, and they have always deceived us and have ever been intent on dishonouring us. Each and every child of ours knows their cunningness. Now the time has come to earn the reward of our patience by punishing them. *Jihad* against them is incumbent on us, and by murdering them we shall obtain eternal bliss. Keep the lamp of Islam alight in your breast and help the just cause. This is the time for you to show your valour. Do not be traitors with one thing in your heart and another on your lips. Say plainly "We are Muhammadans. Islamic blood is boiling in our veins. We will sacrifice ourselves for the glory of Islam in order to attain bliss in this world and in the next." The command of God is "Fight on behalf of God." Brave men, arise, and show your skill. You are renowned for your zeal and you are a living spiritual nation. O ye inhabitants of India! Your sword has earned more glory than the guns of Krupp. The world is terror-stricken before your enormous army. Ye brave soldiers! When will your bravery prove effective? You have been born to annihilate the British, why are you waiting to be destroyed by a shell weighing 32 maunds? **O ye wise men of the police! You have suffered the hardships of slavery for long. Now be ready to serve your country.** (Written in bold letters in the leaflet.) O ye students! Your honour lies in the destruction of the British, otherwise they will employ you as grass-cutters though they have educated you for twenty years.

Ye Muhammadans of the world! go on repeating *Allah-o-Akbar* and *Bismillah* and keep yourself ready armed. Whenever you come across any Englishman, Frenchman, or Russian, attack him, crying *Allah-o-Akbar* and *Bismillah*. We have received the following message from the Sultan and Kaiser William:—

The law of religious war is that if a Ghazi kills a Christian he becomes owner of his property. Now the Sultan has pronounced that, in addition to the above reward the rank and grade of the deceased, if he be a government servant, he will bestow on the slayer after victory. Brethren! All omnipotent God, who has granted Kaiser William the boon of Islam and the glory of Alexander, who has brought the Kaiser to England through France and Belgium which he conquered in a very short time with world-thrilling guns, who has enabled the Turks to enter Egypt after capturing the Suez Canal and to hoist the Turkish flag on the summits of the Caucasus, is now about to show His kindness to India and to fulfil your aspirations, provided you arise if you are sitting and march if you are standing. You need have no fear. The star of the enemies of our faith has set. The boat of their splendour has sunk. The greatest power of all and the help of God are on your side.

*These words have been torn out of all the copies we except one so that the writer is probably an orthodox Muhammadan who is of aid of taking a course from the Quran lightly.

Figure 1: Al-Inteqam.[20]

[19] Ibid.

[20] Leaflet al-Inteqam, IB Records, 1915, WBSA, FN-286/15

Police discovered a series of leaflets circulated in Lucknow in November 1914, and a copy of the third edition, entitled 'Al Inteqam' (The Revenge), was received by Waris Husain, an oil merchant in Fyzabad, which he gave to the Deputy Commissioner of Fyzabad. Furthermore, the police obtained two copies of the same pamphlet from the Moradabad district of the United Provinces. This leaflet was also circulated in Punjab and Lahore. The government of United Provinces (UP) banned this edition immediately. Furthermore, it was discovered that this leaflet had already been sent to the editor of the *Hindustan* newspaper in Delhi for publication in their daily, where the editor published it under the heading 'Al-Inteqam'.

In March 1915 the UP Police discovered another series of pamphlets, headed *Bagawat-i-Hindh.* (Revolt in India).[21] The first leaflet of this series was entitled 'Do Jehad [sic] in the path of God'. This was written in Urdu and was lithographed in bold letters. It was seditious in nature and was immediately banned by the UP government.



DO *jehad* IN THE PATH OF GOD.

Those Englishmen who have plundered India, have demolished temples and mosques and are sacrificing human beings at the docks (*bandaron par*) are now being destroyed by God. They are being punished for their atrocities and a chance is being offered for a revenge. *Jehad* is being made on them in Arabia and Turkey. It is the duty of all Hindus and Mussalmans to turn them out of their country. They will never get such another chance and will always be sorry and regret it (if not taken).

Figure 2: Do Jehad in the Path of God Leaflet.[22]



Whereas, according to the religious decrees of the famous *Ulama* of the sacred Hedjaz and of Constantinople . . . This proclaims *jehad* between the Porte and certain powers. Therefore the sublime efforts of the ruler of the God-given Kingdom of Afghanistan are concentrated on setting the Indian soil free from the hands of England; so that the sovereignty of this country may pass into his hands. Accordingly it is announced hereby that whosoever will help the Afghan forces at that time of attack . . . Christians . . . will be awarded his adjoining lands according to the number he has killed or made prisoners. If otherwise, severe punishment will be inflicted. Therefore we forewarn and publish . . . when the aid and victory come from God myriads embrace the Divine religion . . .

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, AFGHAN FORCES.

Figure 3: Untitled pamphlet of Bagawat-i-Hind series.[23]

[21]Urdu leaflet Bagawat-i-Hind, 1915, IB Records, WBSA, FN-580/15.
[22]Urdu leaflet Bagawat-i-Hind, 1915, IB Records, WBSA, FN-580/15.
[23]Urdu leaflet Bagawat-i-Hind, 1915, IB Records, WBSA, FN-580/15

On 17 March 1915, and some two months after the proscription of the pamphlet 'Do jehad in the path of God', a Criminal Investigation Department (CID) officer of the UP Police obtained a letter sent by a man from Rampur, UP, in which he said that he had searched for the *Baghawat-i-hind* leaflets and he had found a leaflet of that nature in Rampur.[24] The leaflet was in Persian, and was in the name of Muhammad Amin Khan, a Conservancy official (jamadar) who was mentioned in connection with its circulation in Rampur.[25] This officer suggested that some of the leaflets might be recovered from his (jamadar) house. After analysing the translation of the leaflet, the UP CID decided to proscribe the leaflet. Other local governments including the Bengal Government also proscribed it on 10 April 1915 under the Press Act, 1910.



জেহাদ ।

"আগর ফিরদৌস বরুয়ে জমিনস্ত্
হামিনস্ত্ হামিনস্ত্ হামিনস্ত্ ॥"

ভাই মোসলেম চিরকাল কি নিদ্রিত থাকিবে? শত্রু তোমার ঘরে ঢুকিয়া তোমার মান ইজ্জৎ, ধন দৌলত, লুটিয়া লইয়াছে, বিশ্বাসঘাতকতা করিয়া ভারতের সিংহাসন কাড়িয়া লইয়াছে। নবাবের জাত বলিয়া যাহারা একদিন আদবসে ঝুক্‌কে তোমাকে কুর্নিশ করিত সে আজ তোমার কোচমান সহিস্ বাবুর্চ্চি খান্‌সামা বানাইয়াছে, পদে পদে লাথি জুতা মারিতেছে আর তোমরা তাহা অম্লান বদনে সহ্য করিতেছ। ধিক তোমাদের নিচাশয়তায়, ধিক তোমাদের সহ্যগুণের। এতেতও তোমাদের আক্কেল হয় না? তোমরা না হজরৎ রসুলের পদাতন? কলেমা, নামাজ, রোজা, হজ ও জাকাত না তোমাদের প্রাণ? তোমরা না আল্‌হাম্‌দো লিল্লাহে বলিয়াছ? তবে কোন প্রাণে আজ রুমের জুষমন ইংরেজের সহিত মোহব্বতে বাস করিতেছ? তোমরা না বলিয়াছ

Figure 4: Printed Bengali Jihad leaflet.[26]

[24]Urdu leaflet Bagawat-i-Hind, 1915, IB Records, WBSA, FN-580/15.

[25]In nineteenth century India a Jamadar was supposed to be an armed official of a Zamindar (landlord). Later, it was a rank used in the British Indian Army where it became the lowest rank for a Viceroy's Commissioned Officer. They either commanded Indian troops themselves or assisted the British officers in overall command.

[26]Leaflet Jehad, WBSA, 1916, FN-2171/16. 'If there is Paradise on earth, it is this, it is this, it is this. The enemy, having entered your home, is robbing you of honour, and of riches, and through treachery has snatched away the throne of India. They who once bent themselves with respect and made obeisance to you, as belonging to the race of nawabs, have now made coachmen, syces, baburchees (cooks), khansamas of you.

On 28 November 1916, it was found that a Bengali printed Jihad leaflet was widely circulating in Mymensingh town. Some copies of it were addressed to the editors of the *Basumati* and *Herald*, with the intention of getting it printed in those newspapers. However, the editors gave these leaflets to the local Police Superintendent as soon as they had received them. Due to its inflammatory and seditious nature, the leaflet was proscribed by the Provincial Government of Bengal in December 1916.[27]



Figure 5: Bengali Manuscript Leaflet.[28]

They are kicking you at every step and you are doing nothing except enduring these without the slightest demur. Fie to your meanness, fie to your endurance. Does not even all these bring you to your senses? Are not you the soldiers of the Prophet? Are not you devoted to the Islamic religious rituals? Have then can you possibly live now in amity and friendship with the English who are the enemies of Roum (Ottomans).'

[27]Extract of Ananda Bazar Patrika: Another Bengali leaflet Proscribed, 1916, Leaflet Jehad, WBSA, FN-2171/16.

[28]Letter from S.I. Dinajpur, Leaflet Jihad (A Holy War), IB Records, 1916, WBSA, FN-2301/16. If there is paradise here on earth, it is this. It is this. It is this. Ye Muhammadan brothers-awake, arise, take arms, defend yourselves and all unite together. The Kingdom of Englishmen had gone. The Sultan of Turkey who is the Caliph of whole

Another Bengali manuscript Jihad leaflet was found to be circulating in Dinajpur at the same time. One copy of was addressed to the Sub Inspector of Dinajpur. A similar manuscript was also delivered to Moulvi Yukumuddin, a leading Muhammadan cleric of Dinajpur.[29]

Analysis of the Content of the Leaflets and Pamphlets

The 'Al-Inteqam' leaflet (Figure 1) was written in Urdu and was edited by Moulvi Abul Inteqam and had been widely distributed in some district towns of the United Provinces such as Cawnpore, Lucknow and Fatehpur by February 1915. It is a call for revenge against the British rulers of India. Describing how the Muslims of the world had faced butchery at the hands of them, it condemns the 'British' as one who breached the promise to restore Egypt to the Egyptians and pledged to give religious freedom to Indian Muslims but did not fulfil it. The leaflet says the British rulers were the culprit who instigated dissension between Hindus and Muslims. It further warned the readers that in India, it was futile to expect they would give them important posts in Government offices as they treat both like dogs. This pamphlet further vilifies the British by saying in spite of, Lord Harding's promise of not harming the holy places of Islam, they had bombarded Jeddah and Jaffa. It also refers to the riot in the Kanpur Mosque. Now the time had arrived for taking revenge for all the injustices they had to bear with. This pamphlet, further, enumerates the many grievances of the Muslim subjects of British India, as it refers to the Kanpur Mosque incident in which an (uncertain) number of Muslims had died.

It also addresses the long-term demands put forward by the Indian National Congress, namely the demand for Indian self-government. Referring to the inaction of the British Raj in granting religious freedom to the Muslims, it tries to stir them up by saying that they had been oppressed at the hands of the British for too long. The importation of western education was also criticised here. By doing this, it affirmed that although the students had degrees, they would not get jobs while the British ruled because the British wanted to use them as slaves. Therefore, it is incumbent upon Muslims to root the British out of India. It further strengthens their point that they should help the Germans to destroy British rule in India. By doing so it tries not only to stoke the grievances of an already discontented section of the Muslim population but it also tries to mobilise them to push out the British.

The Sultan of Turkey (Mehmed V), Enver Bey, Haji Muhammad, and the German Kaiser

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Muhammadan world became king. The enemy who snatched away the kingdom from our hands is now in distress, so now snatch away the monarchy from their hands.

[29]Letter from S.I. Dinajpur, Leaflet – Jehad – (A Holy War), IB Records, WBSA, FN-2301/16.

Wilhelm all proclaimed *Jihad* against the Entente powers in the First World War. This leaflet is unique for its impassioned appeal to the soldiers, policemen and students in India to take part in a religious war to protect their motherland instead of being slaves at the hands of the British. Particularly interesting was that part of the leaflet suggesting that the Police force should play an important role in this *Jihad*. At this juncture, the intention to link their cause to the nationalist struggle was visibly present in this writing.

The Do Jehad in the Path of God leaflet, (Figure 2) is an Urdu leaflet that was found to be circulated in UP in March 1915. It advocated the cause of Jihad by labelling it as a God-led path of salvation. By claiming that Indian Muslims were now ready to forge an alliance with Hindus to fight against the British in India, it tried to invoke Hindu nationalist sentiment by portraying 'the Englishman' as the 'destroyer of temples' as well as mosques. Hence, framing the British as the 'plunderer' of India, the pamphlet argued that the British empire's weakened position in the war should be exploited by both Hindus and Muslims in India.

The leaflet signed by the Commander-in-Chief Afghan Forces, (Figure 3) was received by a Conservancy officer (Jamadar) in Rampur. It addresses in more detail the role of Afghanistan in the broader German 'programme for insurrection'. Without directly propagating the *fatwa*, it hinted at it. By proclaiming the news that the ruler of Afghanistan was going to attack India, it revealed the plan, hatched by the Germans. It urged that Indian Muslims should join forces with Afghans as soon as they attacked India. This pamphlet further validated the point that the propagators were aware of the plan hatched by the so-called Silk Letter Conspirators, and the Indo-German mission based in Kabul.[30] Intriguingly, this pamphlet tried to enrol Indian Muslims in their plan by announcing that whoever helped the Afghan forces in killing Christians would be awarded adjoining lands according to the number he killed or took prisoner. This pamphlet said it was obligatory for Indian Muslims to join and support the Afghan forces.

The Jihadi Leaflet in Mymensingh (Figure 4) reveals the collaboration of Hindu revolutionaries and the Germans to create a nationwide uprising in India. It begins with the famous couplet by Amir Khusrau which says, 'If there is a heaven on earth,

[30]The aims of the Silk Letter Conspirators were to attack Delhi from the North-West Frontier and foment a Muslim rising in the country as a whole. The conspirators were named after British Police got hold of some silk handkerchiefs used to pass messages. Obeidullah Shindhi, in an effort to contact Maulana Muhammad Ansari and Maulana al-Hasan, had written three letters which were to reach Mecca from Kabul by a circuitous route. Instead of reaching Sheikh Abdul Rahim in Sindh, they fell into the hands of Rab Nawaz Khan, a British Police Officer stationed at Multan.

this is it', and it ends with the words 'La Elaha Il Lillahu Mahammader Rasul Lillah' (save Allah there is no God and Muhammad is his Prophet). This pamphlet also affirmed that Bengali (Hindu) revolutionaries were already prepared to join the Muslims.[31] It promoted the idea that with the help of Hindus, Indian Muslims could win this war by driving the British out of India. Notably, this pamphlet, also invited Hindus, forgiving all the past animosity with their 'brother' Muslims to join the war. Thus, it stated, with their spontaneous participation victory over the British could be achieved. This pamphlet declared that Enver Pasha along with the Amir of Kabul and Persia would soon invade India. Muslims all over the country, therefore, should unleash a reign of terror on the British, through pillage, arson and looting. Furthermore, this pamphlet addressed the perceived plan of the German Foreign Office to attack Delhi from Kabul. *'Ekhon tomadigok bolitechi j, Rum er loskor loiya Anwar Pasha bharate asitechen, Parosyo jog diyache, Kabul er amir jog debe thik hoia giache, purbo hoite sekarone Pesware lorai badhia giyache.'*[32] (Persia had joined in, and it has been settled that the Amir of Kabul also will join in, for that reason fighting has begun in anticipation in Peshawar).[33]

The Jihadi Leaflet in Dinajpur (Figure 5) also invited Indian Muslims to rise and join the holy war. The instigator tried to stir up Muslims by awakening their suppressed sentiment by indicating that they were once rulers of the land. It provoked Indian (Bengali) Muslims by saying there might be a chance that the now-fallen condition of the Muslims of India would be uplifted if they could drive the British out from their country. It proclaimed that an opportunity had arrived in which they could fight to take power from those hands which, had once, snatched their power from their hands. As Turkey was becoming powerful, they could crush the British easily in this war, and the Muslims of India could regain their lost empire.

How did the Jihadi propaganda reach its audience?

In all of the above cases, Police and Intelligence Branch (IB) officers could not trace the persons who were involved in the production of the propaganda, because they were sent by post or were pasted on the walls in conspicuous places by elusive figures. Consequently, they initially evaded the notice of the Police. Also, it seems that the Jihadi propagandists specifically targeted Muslims living in UP, NWFP and Bengal. This was not only for their being Muslim majority provinces, but also for their active roles in the Wahabi movement. British Police and IB officers knew that although many Indian

[31]Bengali revolutionaries thought an invasion from Afghanistan, accompanied by a Muslim rebellion, would help them make India free. With the establishment of the Indian Independence committee in Berlin, Bengali revolutionaries became associated with the global Hindu-German conspiracy.

[32]Leaflet- Jehad - Holy War, 1916, IB Records, WBSA, FN-2301/16

[33]Kabita Ray, *Revolutionary Propaganda in Bengal: Extremist and Militant Press, 1905-1918,* (Calcutta: Papyrus, 2008), p. 280.

Muslims formed a loyal class from a British perspective, there might exist a recalcitrant element who would respond to the Jihad call. Tilman Lüdke has rightly suggested that the Muslim colonial populations were regarded with a great deal of apprehension.[34] Therefore, the British IB officers were always cautious and tried to prevent the circulation of *Jihadi* propaganda.

During 1914, in connection with the dissemination of a Persian pamphlet issued by the Red Crescent Society of Constantinople, Bengal IB officers reviewed some old files and found that a branch of the Red Crescent Society had been working in Cuttuck since around 1912. They further discovered that there was within India a complex and wide network forged by zealous Muslims who were sympathetic to the cause of the Ottoman Empire. Hence, it seems that this group of people and their existing network within India were being exploited by the agents of the 'Programme for Insurrection'. The Sedition Committee Report, by affirming the existence of this kind of network, stated that 'it brings to the surface secret and long forgotten currents forged during [the] 1870s.'[35] In this connection, it also referred to a relatable case, which was cited from William Hunter's book 'Our Indian Mussalmans' where he indicated the existence of a network of conspiracy among the Muslims which had kept the British administration engaged since the 1870s.[36]

Exploring, the content of this propaganda and its distribution pattern highlights the intricate networks of the insurgents and their reliance in some cases on older hubs of revolution in Central India, the North-West frontier and Eastern Bengal provinces. Lucknow and Mymensingh were both important centres during the 1857 Indian Rebellion and for the Wahabi movement. The pan-Islamists (and insurrection strategists) who wanted to wage anti-British war by inciting Muslim brethren in India relied on their old connections and networks. This was seen in the distribution of pamphlets by, and among, the hide merchants and oil merchants of the United Provinces.[37] This class of people was the targeted audience of the Jihadi propagandists because they worked as money bearers and creditors of the *mujahideens* within the nineteenth century Wahabi movement.

This was further corroborated by three discoveries. The first was in January 1917, when it was discovered that a party of eight Muslims had joined the *Mujahidin* from the districts of Rangpur and Dacca in Eastern Bengal. The second was the arrest of two Bengali Muslims in March 1917, in the NWFP with Rs. 8000 in their possession which they were conveying to support the activists of the Wahabi movement. The

[34]Lüdke, 'Not Using Political Islam', pp. 71-94
[35]Sedition Committee Report, p. 175.
[36]Ibid.
[37]Is seen in the case of the distribution pattern of the pamphlet headed 'Al-Inteqam'.

third was the flight of fifteen students from Lahore who joined the *Mujahidin* and then travelled to Kabul to join the Afghan army and wage jihad.[38]

It was in this context that Bengal and UP emerged as the hubs of disgruntled Muslim sympathisers whose Pan-Islamic sentiment could easily be stirred up. The German Foreign office, with the help of the Ottoman Empire, exploited the networks of dissident Muslims who were already prepared to wage war against the British.

Conclusion

In almost all the pamphlets, the firm belief in the victory of the Central Powers over the Entente Powers was reiterated. Moreover, these pamphlets portrayed the First World War as a religious war and addressed the Muslims of the world to take revenge for the sufferings that they had to undergo in previous wars. At the same time, they argued that Islam was under attack, so it was now incumbent among Muslims to attack the enemy. Thus, this propaganda was a deliberate attempt to arouse the religious sentiment of the Muslims by inviting them to participate in this war. However, as the reading of this propaganda reflects, the propagator wanted to legitimise the call for violence by invoking it as a religious war. Intriguingly, they portrayed the Christian Germans as their friends while other Christian Entente powers were framed as enemies of Islam.

Contrary to the Jihad propaganda spread in Anatolia by the Ottomans, in India these pamphlets were targeted at the civilian population rather than at Indian Army soldiers.[39] It further aimed for the readers to participate in Jihad by way of joining the invading force of Afghans. The Kabul mission's plan was for Afghan forces to attack Delhi from the North-West Frontier with Indian Muslims urged to join in and assist the attackers.

Approaching the question of propaganda also forces us to look into a vital question – the problem of literacy. The 1911 census suggests that less than 11% of the male population of India was literate at that time. This figure denotes literacy in both English and vernacular languages. While we should note that it was common at the time for illiterate Hindus to be able to recite familiar parts of the Mahabharata, and as the 1911 Census put it, 'there are many Muhammadans, especially in Northern India, who can

[38]Sedition Committee Report, p. 178.

[39]Mehmet Beşikçi, 'Domestic Aspects of Ottoman Jihad: The Role of Religious Motifs and Religious Agents in the Mobilization of the Ottoman Army' in *Jihad and Islam in World War I,* pp.95-116; The UK's Guardian newspaper 12 November 2017 states that some 1.3 million Indians went to war fronts across the world, and that around 400,000 of them were Muslim. They were a natural target for Jihad propaganda.

read the Koran, though they cannot write a word.'[40] How then could Jihadi propaganda reach its overwhelmingly illiterate audience? Here, the role of oral transmission of messages must be appreciated. Nevertheless, a section of Indian Muslims was already conducive to the idea of *Jihad*, although a large section of Indian Muslims remained loyal to the British crown. It was due to one of the loyal Muslims that the Silk Letter Conspirators were caught, leading to the demise of the German plan.

In spite of all the efforts of the propagandists, they failed to stir up either the Hindu population or the Muslim population of India. This attempt to merge a pan-Islamist cause with the Indian nationalist cause was a failure.

[40]Census of India 1911, Vol-I, (Calcutta, Superintendent of Government Printing, 1913), p. 291.

Jeremy Black, *Logistics: The Key to Victory*. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2021. xxxiv + 216pp. ISBN 978-1399006026 (hardcover). Price £25.

The subject of logistics in military history has grown significantly during the last 25 years with up to four new book titles now appearing each year. However, missing until now is an updated meta narrative to the classic Martin van Creveld's 1977 *Supplying War*. In this new work, Jeremy Black has done an incredible job synthesising and summarising 2000 years of military logistics history in just 200 pages. Black is motivated by four omissions in previous studies including: pre 1600 logistics, non-European warfare, non-offensive phases of warfare (defensive, insurgencies), and omissions of naval and air power logistics. Further, he is concerned about a progressive and deterministic approach that historians sometimes take whereby technology has solved logistics issues, when in fact technology can have significant adverse and unexpected side effects. He is also to be commended for taking a much broader geographic view to military history to include non-European militaries such as in China and Asia. Temporarily, he also divides the first third of the book into chapters not based on the traditional European breakdown of the time periods. Instead, he chooses events in the Near and Far East as dividing points such as the end of Ming China and the fall of Safavid Persia. The rest of the book follows a more European temporal breakdown with chapters describing the periods of the French Revolution, the age of steam, the First World War, the inter war, the Second World War, and the Cold War. He also has chapters on the future and conclusions.

Black seamlessly discusses logistics at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels with subjects ranging from war finance and production to transportation to a theatre of war to baking bread in camp. He argues (p. 182) that logistics needs to be thought of in terms of

> what really matters is the fitness of means of supplying and conveying an armed force with reference to its particular environment and situation. In many settings, complexity and technological sophistication are not advantages, either because of local ecology, the carrying capacity of the society in question, or because of the very great material costs that they impose with diminishing operational returns.

Therefore, he argues, the context is one of specifics and not necessarily linear continuity such as the basic logistics used by insurgents in the recent Afghan wars. Further, logistics now encompasses much more than food, water, and ammunition to include medical, information, and maintenance for increasingly complex weapons, and the ability to replace and resupply them. Of particular interest are his observations

that up until the end of the Napoleonic period, warfare was largely constrained by state finance, animal power, and the need to go on the offensive because of logistical constraints in supplying stationary armies. Practical application of logistics was widely uneven between nations and even the great Napoleon had three campaigns that failed because of logistics.(p 96) As widely acknowledge by many military historians, Black discusses how the industrial revolution brought significant changes to the size of militaries, weapons development, speed of movement, range, and capacity, all of which generated new problems that required time for problem solving to overcome.(p 115) These problems manifest in the industrialised warfare of the First and Second World War in which manufacturing capacity and alliances played key roles.

Black's use of sources is quite broad and is primarily a review of the secondary English literature except for the two chapters that fall within his temporal specialty of the 1700s. Here he cites primary source documents to support his points. While Black references titles right up to 2021, he does however miss a few 20th century war sources including Martin van Creveld's *Hitler's Strategy 1940-1941: the Balkan Clue* (1973), Bob Carruther's *Panzer Rollen* (2019), Kenneth L Privatsky's *Logisitics in the Falklands War* (2105), and van Creveld's expanded First World War section in the second edition of *Supplying War* (2004). The other weakness is that Black has a tendency of introducing more recent 20th century examples into previous centuries' discussions to show continuity or contrasts. This technique requires the reader to pay close attention to prevent getting lost in thinking about the more recent conflict. It appears Black is sometimes caught between wanting to discuss themes or subjects versus a temporal approach. These minor caveats aside, Black has done a great service to the military history field providing what will surely become a new classic on military logistics.

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Matthew Hefferan, *The Household Knights of Edward III: Warfare, Politics and Kingship in Fourteenth-Century England*. Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 2021. xiv + 336 pp. 2 maps. ISBN: 978-1-783275649 (hardback). Price £75.

The abundance of surviving records from fourteenth-century England continues to fuel a corresponding wealth of publications on England's military history during that period.

Boydell's estimable 'Warfare in History' series seems to have a near monopoly on them, with just one recent addition being Mollie Madden's *The Black Prince and the Grand Chevauchée* (Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 2018; reviewed in *BJMH*, Vol. 5 No. 1, 2019). Hefferan's *The Household Knights of Edward III* owes a special debt to Andrew Ayton's ground-breaking study, *Knights and Warhorses: Military Service and the English Aristocracy Under Edward III* (Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 1994; incorrectly cited here as 1999).

Hefferan's monograph analyses Edward III's household military retinue. Part royal protection detail, part standing army, part royal political faction, his household knights were, as elsewhere in Europe before and afterwards, a loyal and mobile force ready to move into offensive and defensive action quickly and decisively on direct instructions of the king. An understanding of their roles is all the more important as Edward III was such a successful and renowned military monarch – one of the great warrior kings of England. Hefferan's meticulous study of Edward's knightly household is therefore to be greatly welcomed.

Hefferan clearly sets out in his introduction what the book addresses: 'How and why were household knights retained? Who was chosen to serve in such a capacity? What functions did they perform? And what rewards did they receive for their service?' (p. 1). The introduction offers both the historical context and a very useful critical historiography of the royal affinity in medieval England. Here, Hefferan makes the convincing case for Edward III being a canny political operator as well as an outstanding general, 'an extremely capable medieval monarch who was skilled at aligning the nobility's interests with his own, both at home and abroad, which allowed him to restore the reputation of the crown after the disastrous reign of Edward II' (p. 11). Of course, paramount in this restoration of monarchical prestige was the king's military victories, Hefferan arguing that this coincided with private military retinues becoming the central element in Edward's armies.

The book is in four parts. Part one – 'The Knightly Household' – examines the mechanics of Edward's military household with a clarification of the correct terminology to be applied (this is particularly helpful as this specialised area is quite a taxonomical minefield). Most interestingly here, we see how the knights viewed their collective identity – which Hefferan logically argues existed in 'a strong collective sentiment' (p. 30) – and how this developed, surviving 'a time of significant transition' (p. 45) for the household knights after 1360. He then explores prosopographically the identities of the household knights and what drew them into service; where possible lengths of individual service is determined. At least 284 men served in the household during Edward's reign, the highest number at any one time being ninety-four during the spectacularly successful Crécy campaign. This dropped to just twenty-two in 1353, serving as a political barometer (as garrisoning levels also did). Overall, 'stability was a

key characteristic of the knightly household' (p. 55) with many long-serving knights providing 'a core of seasoned household veterans' (p. 78).

Part two – 'Household Knights at War' – shows the household in its most vital and primary function of military activity. This entailed not only their dramatic involvement in direct combat, but the no-less important logistical elements: recruiting, supplying and financing field (and sea) forces. While all this has previously been covered in great depth for Edward's reign, Hefferan adds to our knowledge by here emphasising the roles of the household knights. He rightly notes that the fourteenth-century's military "'revolution" was a slow one' (p. 94), but still takes a decidedly late medieval view on the matter, eschewing plenty of earlier medieval evidence offering an alternative take. In all this, the household basically continued to serve up to 1360 much as it always had done in the previous two centuries.

Part three – 'Household Knights and Politics' – explores governmental aspects, Hefferan emphasising Edward's ability in this sphere and his household's considerable contribution to his success, despite unavoidable frictions with the political community beyond his affinity. Hefferan considers this aspect as being of central importance to a full evaluation of Edward's kingship; despite occasional 'inevitable miscalculations' (p. 202) (e.g., the parliamentary crisis of 1340-1341), the king displayed great sensitivity and skill in utilising the household knights toward his political ends.

Finally, part four covers the rewards of service in a solitary chapter. While these were obviously substantial in terms of land, marriage, gifts, wardships, annuities, official positions and the profits of war, the best years for household knights were earlier in the reign, when land grants were more plentifully distributed. Nonetheless, as one would expect and Hefferan confirms, 'Edward III's household knights were well rewarded for their time spent in service' (p. 257). No less important, as is stressed in this section, was the prestige and honour that accompanied royal service.

Hefferan delves exhaustively into the records of Edward's knightly household which exist for just a half of the king's fifty-year reign. This book therefore offers as comprehensive an overview of the topic as we are likely to see. It makes an extremely valuable contribution to our understanding of war and politics in late medieval England and Europe while simultaneously demonstrating Edward III's mastery of kingship.

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Imogen Peck, *Recollections in the Republics: Memories of the British Civil Wars in England, 1649-1659*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. xiv+232 pp. ISBN 978-0198845584 (hardback). Price £65.00.

The civil wars across the British Isles have continued to thrive in early modern historiography. In recent years, the period has undergone a revision in how we look at the religious, social, cultural, and political impact of the wars and the various republican regimes, and their effect over the lives of its citizens across the Three Kingdoms. The wars and bloody conflict undoubtedly had a lasting impression on men and women from all levels of society, and it is here that Imogen Peck appraises the contemporary memories of the civil wars in republican England. *Recollections in the Republics* complements the recent work by Matthew Neufeld (Neufeld, *The Civil Wars after 1660*, 2013) and Edward Legon (Legon, *Revolution Remembered*, 2019) by assessing how memories of the civil wars was remembered by those who actively fought on both sides of the conflict, and the ordinary men and women whose lives were permanently altered along the way. What makes Peck's monograph innovative is that she centres her argument on the recollections of the war made during these two volatile decades, rather than focusing on memories of the war in the aftermath of the restoration and the changing fortunes of royalist supporters. Peck's research findings are based on a wide variety of primary sources, including petitions, court records, diaries, newsbooks, and material culture. Peck asserts that 'memory was a multifaceted, flexible, and dynamic resource' (p. 2), and that the aim of her monograph is to showcase how memory was constantly developed by people as a consequence of the civil wars.

Throughout *Recollections in the Republics*, Peck details how contemporary memories of the wars were remembered, collected, and shaped by parliamentarians and royalists who wanted to create a particular narrative about their activities during the conflict. In the first chapter, Peck discusses how national authorities tried to shape how the war was recounted, revealing that parliamentarian accounts emphasised 'blood guilt' so that politicians and writers like Thomas May could place the blame and accountability of the war solely on King Charles I. Peck also points out how parliamentarians argued that it was God's providence that secured their overall victory in the wars, which is developed further as a theme throughout the monograph. She also gives attention to how the Scots were blamed for their actions and 'treachery' in the conflict, which exposes deep-rooted prejudices and fractured relationships between England and Scotland at the time. Peck further charts the oral recounting of the wars in Chapter Three, which is dedicated to the ways in which the civil wars entered everyday discourse. Through legal records, depositions, and petitions, Peck examines how people processed their recent memories of the conflict, and how

memories of the war altered people's relationships within their communities, especially when illicit speeches reflected the divide between royalist and parliamentary supporters. Peck discusses that these discourses were significant as they fashioned how a person's character and loyalty was depicted, which in turn effected their social standing and status within their local communities. This is explored further in Chapter Five, when Peck focuses on the narratives and recollections about the war in petitions submitted by soldiers and widows. She argues persuasively that soldiers and widows recounted certain battles, life-changing injuries, and other war ailments they had attained to not only underscore their loyalty to Parliament and the state, but so that they persuade the authorities to provide them with pensions and financial assistance that they depended on for their survival.

Throughout *Recollections in the Republics*, Peck illustrates the mnemonic powers of written works and physical monuments in how contemporaries remembered the civil wars. In Chapter Four, Peck assesses the challenge for parliamentary victors, as well as royalist victims, to commemorate physical sites of memory during and after the wars. Peck describes in great detail how parliament struggled to impose days of thanksgiving and observation nationwide, with Gloucester and London enthusiastically embracing commemoration of those who fought in the battles from their communities, while other areas toned down any commemorations as they still reeled from the physical battle-scars that had devastated their communities. Peck deftly argues how physical commemorations of memorials of both royalist and parliamentarian soldiers were carefully phrased so that it was unclear publicly which side people fought on, though she points out that after the restoration royalists became more open about their loyalty in their memorials. Peck also focuses on how rival reminiscences were purposefully shaped in the narratives published and collated by participants in the war. In Chapter Two, Peck explores how royalists, Levellers, and advocates of the 'good old cause' endeavoured to carefully form the memory of the wars in printed texts, which included the martyrdom of Charles I. She argues that Leveller texts were used to recall how parliament had failed to deliver the reforms that they were promised and had fought for on the battlefield, which were developed further by those harking back to the years of the 'good old cause' that was not tainted by the betrayal of Cromwell and the purging of parliament.

Recollections in the Republics is a highly detailed study about how the memories of the civil wars were remembered in the mid-seventeenth century. Peck's extensive range of primary source material is utilised effectively throughout her monograph, and is a lively account about how the battles, sieges and bloodshed was remembered by men and women who survived the conflict. Peck demonstrates that by analysing the civil wars through the lens of memory studies, we can learn about how the conflicts impacted print, material culture and personal relationships. *Recollections in the Republics* will be of valuable interest to those interested in studying the civil wars through the

perspective of material culture, literature, social history, political history, and cultural history.

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Jeremy Black, *How the Army made Britain a Global Power, 1688-1815*. Oxford: Casemate Academic, 2021. 205pp. ISBN: 978-1952715082 (hardback). Price £55.

With this book prolific military historian Jeremy Black seeks to refocus attention on the military, rather than naval, dimensions of Britain's expansion as a global power, noting the lack of a single volume on this topic despite numerous excellent works examining various aspects of it. Black is successful in setting out the strengths and weaknesses of the British army and state over the long eighteenth century and in outlining the successes and failures the army met with campaigning globally. He argues that it learnt from, and built on, these experiences and that this, alongside the geographical range and near continuous service of the army's commanders and soldiery, led to Britain achieving global dominance by 1815. That it makes this argument in just over two hundred pages whilst also outlining Britain's campaigning efforts around the world and over a multitude of conflicts is the book's key achievement. In particular, Black's argument that the British successfully honed a well-disciplined musket fire and bayonet charge from the 1750s that became an essential tactical strategy in almost all the locations in which it fought is strongly reinforced throughout the volume. Yet Black is not only concerned with tactics and strategy, considering the political, social, and cultural factors that impacted the army's ability to function effectively during both war and peace time. The book recognises the role these factors played in the army's development, with specific attention given to the army's role at home and the military reforms undertaken at various times, with most emphasis given to those upon the outbreak of war with revolutionary France.

Black emphasises the importance of viewing both the role of the army in Britain's expansion and the army itself as a collective rather than as a series of individual conflicts and commanders. Yet he also seeks to demonstrate the individual experiences of some of those involved in the conflicts. Unsurprisingly, special attention is given to Marlborough and Wellington, two commanders whose service bookends the study and who Black argues shared similar leadership qualities despite operating within different contexts. But Black also seeks to provide an insight into the careers and experiences of other officers and even ordinary soldiers. He does this using

extracts from letters, journals, and memoires and through the inclusion of short biographies of select individuals within the text. The inclusion of primary material is a welcome addition that illustrates the development and implementation of the army's tactics and individual experiences of warfare. The biographies are less successfully integrated into the text, instead tending to interrupt the flow of the narrative whilst the insights they provide are frequently left unexplored. A separate chapter exploring the composition and service of the officer class and the role of family ties, patronage, and merit in developing command structures and transmitting expertise would have better served Black's argument that geographical range and continuity of experience was important for the army's increasing effectiveness over time whilst freeing up discussion of the various conflicts and campaigns.

Greater focus on the conflicts and campaigns would have increased the appeal for a general readership interested in tracing the conflicts in order to understand Britain's military development into the global power of the age. As it is, the brief outline afforded to each campaign, alongside the book's hefty price tag, likely limits its appeal to a general readership. On the other hand, despite Black's claim to offer a new perspective that 'concentrates on both the global role of the army and its central part in imperial expansion and preservation' (p. vi), there is little here that will be new to a specialist audience. The army's role in British expansion is well established, whilst numerous studies, including many of those Black includes in his list of further reading, have demonstrated the army's ability to repeatedly defeat both western and non-western enemies and to recover from defeat itself. Additionally, the slim nature of the volume prevents Black from making the most of recent scholarly interpretations when outlining the various campaigns and leads to numerous oversimplifications and inaccuracies. The difficulty of balancing a need to outline the military campaigns and consider wider institutional factors perhaps points to why there has not yet been a single volume study of the army's role in Britain's global expansion. Black's contribution does not end that wait, but it does provide a starting point for researchers to develop this whilst providing a useful overview of the development of the army throughout the long eighteenth century.

NICOLA MARTIN
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DOI: 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v8i1.1614

Matilda Greig, *Dead Men Telling Tales, Napoleonic War Veterans and the Military Memoir industry, 1808-1914*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. xv + 272 pp. 6 illustrations. ISBN: 978-0192896025 (hardback). Price: £65.00.

Dead Men Telling Tales tracks the production and development of the military memoir industry following the Napoleonic Wars. Developing upon the approaches laid down by Neil Ramsey's excellent *The Military Memoir and Romantic Literary Culture, 1780-1835* (2011), and Philip Dwyer's edited collection *War Stories: The War Memoir in History and Literature* (2017), Greig's study investigates the varied reasons behind the production of military memoirs and explores the commercial and cultural impact of military memoirs over the course of the nineteenth century. The book is divided into two parts, as the study is arranged around the memoir's journey through time. Part one deals with the veterans who were actively involved in the publication of their memoirs in the first half of the nineteenth century. Part two follows the memoirs published posthumously in the latter half of the nineteenth century.

What makes Greig's work highly appealing to scholars of the Napoleonic wars is its transnational approach. At its core, this is an examination of three case studies, concerning military memoirs published in Britain, France, and Spain. In total, the author examines more than 300 autobiographies. This impressive depth of research gives weight to the comparisons drawn between these memoirs and exposes some of the cultural differences to literary composition within each nation. It highlights the careful wording employed by veterans in each country, explaining what details were included or omitted and why. Such an insight is invaluable, providing much needed international context to the history of military memoirs. While British and French memoirs were readily bought and sold between one another, Spanish memoirs were deemed unworthy of the same attention by British and French audiences. Such findings complement the work of Gavin Daly, who in *The British Soldier in the Peninsular War: Encounters with Spain and Portugal, 1808-1814* (2013), argued for an affinity between British and French soldiers in the Peninsular Wars, and a mutual hatred of Spanish backwardness.

In the latter half of the study, Greig addresses long standing questions concerning the cultural and commercial impact of these memoirs. Readers are given a definitive picture of the military memoir industry, which was commercially successful and increasingly so in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Although the profits from sales rarely enabled veterans to live entirely on a writing career, they provided a useful source of income for their descendants they left behind. Leading publishing houses, such as John Murray or Plom Nourrit and Hachette, took a strong interest in printing them, and fake memoirs and other imitations were published. The result is a

convincing image of military memoirs as objects of commercial and cultural significance that could be managed and maintained long after the author's death. Families of veterans carefully curated their public image and editors reshuffled content to highlight certain groups or individuals over others.

The ambitious approach of the Greig's book has led to a few liberties being taken. The study calls for a more flexible definition of memoir, and one suspects this has enabled the inclusion of sources that would not be considered as memoirs in the conventional sense. At no point does Greig define what a memoir is. Memoirs written by veterans in the decades following the Napoleonic Wars are treated in the same manner as edited collections of letters published after the original author's death. The different circumstances concerning the writing and composition of these documents is not discussed in detail, despite the significant impact this may have had on the content.

A harsh critic might point out that some of the chapters maintain the transnational approach better than others. Chapter four, for instance, draws predominantly from British sources in its examination of the professionalisation of the memoir industry. Although Greig highlights that more publisher records are available in Britain than in France, this reviewer feels that a deeper comparative analysis might have been undertaken. Historians of British military culture will be fascinated, but those with a greater interest in French or Spanish veterans may feel short-changed.

Despite these slight qualms, *Dead Men Telling Tales* is an exceptional study of the military memoirs industry in the years that followed the Napoleonic wars. The ambitious transnational scope of Greig's work enables it to provide fresh and exciting insights on the commercial success and cultural impact of military memoirs over the course of the nineteenth century. It is highly recommended to those with an interest in the Napoleonic wars or nineteenth century military culture.

SIMON QUINN
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DOI: 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v8i1.1615

Włodzimierz Borodziej and Maciej Górny, *Forgotten Wars: Central and Eastern Europe, 1912-1916*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. xiii + 365pp. 4 maps + 57 figures. ISBN: 978-1108938495 (hardback). Price £61.

The translation and publication of the 2015 Polish monograph about 'our war', *Nasza wojna* by Cambridge University Press is to be welcomed. The late Włodzimierz Borodziej perhaps best known for his work on the 1944 Warsaw Uprising, and his prolific co-author Maciej Górny, historian of modern Europe, have produced an intriguing and readable account of these fateful years, enlivened by the perspectives of 'ordinary' soldiers through copious use of memoirs as yet untranslated into English and a vivid use of rare photographs. The result is a humane examination of the pity, chaos, confusion, and mean contrariness of war. Its Central European outbreak in 1914 including the patriotic fervour, chanting, songs, street demonstrations and drunken riots when 'the boundary between active support for government policy and common thuggery became completely blurred' (p. 230) is sensitively discussed. Women are also not forgotten and the discussion of 'hygiene', the politics of disease and sexual encounters in occupied Warsaw and Belgrade is powerful and compassionate: 'Neither the Germans nor the Austrians were prepared to admit that it was only after their arrival in the region that some of its civilizational deficiencies emerged' (p. 347).

The focus is deliberately comparative and incorporates the historiography of the rest of Europe. Another real strength is the geographical focus on East Central and Southeast Europe from the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 to the death of Habsburg Emperor Franz Joseph in 1916, when much of the region was under the control of the Central Powers. This allows the authors to consider the position of the combatants thematically, to decentre traditional centres of power and to look at the war from those left to deal with the mess. Examples highlight their point. In Przemyśl, the besieged population endured weeks of meagre supplies and the usually well-fed officers dined on 'horse sirloin, horse tongue and and horse roast' while the local commander Hermann Kusmanek checked on how the hungry rank and file were saluting and whether military discipline was being maintained (p. 116). The town of Sandomierz was conquered and lost on several occasions over the course of three months: 'In August 1914, the Russians withdrew … so hurriedly that they did not have time to destroy the track and bridges. This was accomplished instead by the Austrians…' (p. 249). Just weeks later Sandomierz was recaptured by the Russians who repaired the destruction, which they then destroyed before their retreat. The infrastructure was then repaired by the Austrians, and then destroyed again only to be restored by the Russians. As the authors pithily note this cycle of destruction 'provided employment and wages to locals and professionals alike'.

The book introduces some little-known contemporary texts. Sigmund Freud's disciple Sándor Ferenczi discussed the fears of men about injury and lost masculinity or the pacifist Helmut von Gerlach who attempted (unsuccessfully) to find regional patterns of violent behaviour. Included within the text are several sizeable extracts from contemporary and recent sources (such the description of 'Kakania' from Robert Musil's unfinished 1940 modernist novel series *Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften).* This format will probably work quite well for teaching (especially if students need to limit their book purchases) and it should also encourage the more curious to read further. General readers might be less taken with the change in font size and interruption to the flow of the text, but I particularly enjoyed reading an extract from Maciej Górny's chapter from the 2019 book *Science Embattled* about the 'lofty' 1917 Handbuch *von Polen,* written entirely from German sources and ignoring all Polish language ones. The extract from Christian Teichmann's 2002 dissertation on typhus and delousing was also well chosen.

Their premise that these conflicts have been 'forgotten' by subsequent generations is not unreasonable and this book is part of a wider movement to reclaim that history and to connect with this now departed generation. In the absence of states to prolong the memory of the conflicts, the past did disappear into a realm of personal reminiscence, family stories and hidden trauma. Without veterans' associations bringing old Habsburg or Imperial Russian combatants together and without the corresponding national ceremonies, public holidays and prominent war memorials, the deeds of heroes and antiheroes were too easily forgotten at least in the public sphere, only preserved in suitcases, or relegated to a few lines of rare memoirs. Since Borodziej and Górny's original monograph appeared, many other historians have tackled these 'forgotten' subjects and produced some superb studies. These include Jiří Hutečka on the experience of Czech soldiers, Alexander Watson on the fortress at Przemyśl, and Tamara Scheer on Habsburg volunteers, language use and national identity. While I found the prose a little fragmented at times, and often wanted (even) more detail and contextualisation especially on the Balkans, this book is certainly both readable and memorable. Jasper Tilbury's translation conveys much of the subtlety of the original. And it is a tribute to the authors that their research agenda from the last decade has been carried forward by other scholars into this decade.

CATHIE CARMICHAEL
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DOI: 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v8i1.1616

Robert Sackville-West, *The Searchers: A Quest for the Lost of the First World War*. London: Bloomsbury, 2021. xxi + 336 pp. 31 b/w photos. ISBN: 978-152661315-8 (hardback). Price £25.00.

The large number of individuals who visit the Commonwealth War Graves Commission (CWGC) cemeteries in Belgium and France and attend Remembrance services demonstrate that there continues to be a strong interest in commemorating those who died in both world wars. Robert Sackville-West sets out to demonstrate how the search for and the commemoration of the missing of the First World War has developed. The author has no background in military history, his previous books have addressed the history of his family and its home, Knole in Kent, although at least four family members served in the two world wars. The bibliography does not list his primary sources but it is clear from the footnotes that he has drawn on a wide range of them.

The First World War was the first time the British mobilised a citizen army. This national mobilisation, the ensuing loss of life and the associated trauma made it necessary to find new ways to remember those who had lost their lives. Over the last century, Sackville-West argues, the way this has been done has evolved because every generation's view of commemoration differs because their connection with the 1914 to 1918 conflict has become more distanced. Not only was Britain unprepared to fight the war in 1914 it was also unprepared for the large number of deaths which ensued. The War Office could not cope with the administration this involved and it took Lord Robert Cecil to take this up and create the organisation necessary to account for them. Tracing them in the chaos of war was a difficult task, especially when the nature of the action meant that the missing man's body had been obliterated and there was no trace of it. This required individuals with the right investigative skills to trace missing men. The advantage of keeping an open mind, during these investigations, meant that it was civilians rather than the military who were more likely to have those skills.

For those bereaved relatives where a body could not be found, despite substantial effort in many cases, it was particularly difficult to come to terms with their loss. Sackville-West examines the role of the Cenotaph and the Tomb of the Unknown Warrior in helping them to do this. The former he argues provided a place of pilgrimage while the latter gave closure to them as a place where their relative might lie. For many families this was not enough, and they looked to spiritualism as a way to reconnect with the dead. It is a concept that the author deals with through polite scepticism.

The establishment and work of what is now the CWGC is examined. Not only was it responsible for the graves and memorials but it provided practical support to those who wished to make pilgrimages and those who could not afford to. While it did so its work to recover the dead and give them a proper burial continued. Between the Autumn of 1921 and the outbreak of the Second World War it discovered 38,000 bodies. It is work which continues to this day and Sackville-West uses the research behind the discovery of mass graves at Fromelles as a case study to illustrate this.

This is a book which often discusses and draws on the involvement of literary figures such as Arthur Conan Doyle, Rudyard Kipling and E. M. Forster to explain and illustrate the account. However, there are a few shortcomings. It could have examined more closely the arguments and debates about commemoration. At times this book strays from the main theme, which is not always necessary. Readers may not agree with Sackville-West's analysis of the conduct of the Battle of Fromelles. Despite those caveats, it is worth reading for its value as a primer about the commemoration of those who lost their lives in the First World War.

TIMOTHY HALSTEAD
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DOI: 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v8i1.1617

Robert Lyman, *A War of Empires: Japan, India, Burma & Britain 1941-45*. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2021. 560 pp. including: 11 Maps, 28 Figures, 4 Appendices, Endnotes, Bibliography & Index. ISBN: 978-1472847140 (hardback). Price £25.00.

In recent years the canon of military history has been graced by authors such as Daniel Todman, Alan Allport, and Nick Lloyd. They have not been afraid to take on grand themes such as Britain in the Second World War or the First World War's Western Front. In doing so they delivered sound scholarship, new research, and informed perspectives when the current focus of many academic publications is vanishingly narrow.

Robert Lyman has written extensively on the war in Burma, and in his latest book has taken on the challenge of describing events that lasted from December 1941 to August 1945. Framed as a War of Empires it effortlessly moves from conflicting Grand Strategies amongst the western allies, to the relationships amongst politicians and generals, to the perspective of an Indian army Jawan fighting off a Japanese night attack at Kohima. John Kiszley's *The British Fiasco in Norway* has much in common in terms of

approach, but he only had to deal with a campaign duration of 62 days. Lyman provides a similar clarity of view in providing the context for and descriptions of the individual parts of a four year-long campaign – a significant challenge in terms of academic stamina. For this reviewer Lyman's description of the reasons for and the mechanics of the retreat from Burma in 1942 and the operations to retake it in 1945 are the best yet seen.

But this book is not a first when others have described the overall Burma campaign, with Louis Allen, Ray Callahan, and Frank McLynn preceeding it, and to which we should of course add Bill Slim, himself a key player in Burma. The Fourteenth Army is often described as the Forgotten Army but that cannot be said of the historiography of the Burma campaign when the Burma Campaign Memorial Library at the University of London's School of Oriental and African Studies holds over 2,000 documents. Nevertheless, Lyman has, like Todman, Allport and Lloyd given us a new and fresh view in a work that has allowed Lyman to display his deep understanding of the Burma campaign, its strategic context and the principal players involved.

Poverty and empathy are themes consistently rising from the text. Whether it be describing the political and military poverty of the British colonial regime in 1941/2 or the poverty in Japanese decision making in 1944/5 that, 'depended, when things weren't going well, on the lemming-like sacrifice of its soldiers to shore up poor decisions by its commanders. By the end of the campaign, the Imperial Japanese Army had lost 185,149 dead in Burma, the Allies a fraction of that – in what was a nasty, brutal war, a mere by contrast 14,326 dead.' Here we see that empathy extended to the lowly Japanese infantryman, which most post-war history consistently paints as mindlessly cruel, but one we should now see as another victim of Imperial Japan's authoritarian and militaristic society.

At a time of contentious post-colonial debate in the UK, Lyman has not shied away from analysing and providing objective views on the British in India, all 150,000 of them. Sumantra Maita's thoughtful review in The Critic notes Lyman's framing of the concurrent struggle for Indian independence as being fought between elites, while the national response from 300 million Indians was the defence of their home by an all-volunteer army of some 2.5 million, of which 1.3 million were directly involved in the war in Burma.

In terms of the book's grand theme Lyman closes with the Japanese 'believed that their attack on British possessions in South East Asia would lead to the replacement of one empire by another (theirs).' Yet in 1947 it was not Japan but a new, and because of the war a different and more modern India, that took over the Raj as a going concern.

This book is a triumph of scholarship, and better still an engagingly written one. It will, deservedly, become a classic text.

GEORGE WILTON
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Raymond A Callahan & Daniel Marston, *The 1945 Burma Campaign and the Transformation of the British Indian Army*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2020. ix+280 pp. including: Preface, Map, Figures, Bibliography & Index. ISBN: 978-0700630417 (hardback). Price £34.50.

In one respect the title is misleading, the authors do cover Burma in 1945 but there is also an excellent chapter on the Indian Army's activities in French Indochina and the Netherlands East Indies following the Japanese surrender.

Before opening the book my first thoughts were how the authors might explain some lines taken from the closing part of John Masters' 'The Road Past Mandalay'. Better known as an author of fiction, Masters was a pre-war Indian Army officer, then a Chindit, and by 1945 a staff officer in Burma with 19 Indian Division. He wrote, not only of the Indian Army's victory in Burma in 1945, but of profound change in that army, and the nation from which it came when he said:

> 'Twenty races, a dozen religions, a score of languages passed in those trucks and tanks.'
>
> 'It was all summed up in the voice of an Indian colonel of artillery. The Indian army had not been allowed to possess any field artillery from the time of the Mutiny (1857) until just before the Second World War. Now the Indian, bending close to an English Colonel over a map, straightened and said with a smile, OK George. Thanks. I've got it. We'll take over all tasks at 1800. What about a beer?'

Could Callahan and Marston explain how Masters' pre-war Indian Army of some 200,000 had become by 1945 an all-volunteer force of 2.5 million? Could they also explain how it had risen above abject defeat in 1942, and a debacle in Arakan in 1943, to successfully defend India in 1944, and by 1945 inflict on the Imperial Japanese Army the worst land defeat in its history?

We should not forget that victory in Burma in 1945 was achieved by an army of Indians. There were British too of course, and by 1945 also three divisions and two independent brigades of East and West Africans who outnumbered them. The authors give welcome space and credit to this story as well when they say, 'historical fairness requires remembering that more African divisions than British helped Slim back to Rangoon.'

Transformation appears in the title and was wisely chosen. Callahan deftly provides the campaign history in just the right amount of detail to give Marston the opportunity to operationalise his knowledge of the Indian Army. Their efforts are seamless.

How the army was retrained, not just once from a frontier force to jungle fighters, but a second time from that jungle to a combined arms manoeuvrist force is described in the book. The scale of transformation is also brought home by there being only 577 Indian Commissioned Officers in 1939 but 15,000 of the Indian Army's 43,000 in 1945; and officers with equal powers of command, opportunity, and pay, unlike those of 1939. Transformation can be seen in one of the first brigades joining the occupation force in Japan coming from the Indian Army, and with an Indian brigadier in command. Transformation indeed.

The authors have not shied away either from recording Churchill's prejudices, his unreasonable demands, his surprising lack of understanding of India and of the remote nature of the campaign. Moreover, they note that Churchill saw the campaign as justified only by the need to assuage his American ally. The work also demonstrates the viciousness of the Imperial political world, evidenced in 1943 by the political maelstrom that circled around Bill Slim following the Arakan debacle. Slim survived an attempt to sack him even though he had not directly planned or controlled the Arakan campaign – but survive he did - unlike some who had tried to scapegoat Slim to protect and advance themselves. Chapter 5 offers an excellent synopsis of Slim's unexpected sacking, and almost instant reinstatement in May 1945, following another political attack by at least one jealous superior. The authors skilfully weave such political threads through the book and it is richer for that.

The authors capably describe the extreme difficulty of fighting in the grim, unhealthy, inhospitable terrain of Burma, in terrible weather, with impossible logistics, and an enemy who really did fight to the death. They describe how, with previously hard-won air supremacy, the ground forces relied on air supply when there were no roads, or when they had been washed away, or when surrounded at Meiktila in March 1945. The authors highlight how dependent XIV Army had become on air supply by March 1945 when RAF and USAAF transport aircraft were flying 196 and 204 hours/month

respectively. Impressively, the two air forces were operating aircraft from Toungoo only four days after its capture.

Notable in the text is the ability of the Indian Army of 1945 to form ad hoc mobile columns of tanks and infantry that encircled and reduced Japanese positions. The building of all round defensive boxes at night was a tactic retained from jungle fighting, but it was combined with a new mobile flexibility, and mobile artillery, to inflict disproportionately severe casualties on the Japanese. That new flexibility says much of how Slim's army had been transformed from the defeated army of 1942, or the victorious but defensive army of Kohima and Imphal in 1944. The authors quote Slim, 'my Indian divisions after 1943 were amongst the best in the world. They would go anywhere, do anything, go on doing it, and do it on very little.' Undoubtedly there is some hyperbole but much truth also. By March 1945 Indian Officers were commanding battalions and were present at senior level in brigade and divisional staffs. Earlier British prejudices and doubts were being overcome.

As the authors say, 'World War II turned a cautious embrace of change into a torrent of adaptation. By 1945 the Indian Army was a modern force in its equipment, doctrine and tactics', and the authors had by the end of the book answered the tests set for them with this review.

Sadly this book will not become the best seller it and the authors deserve, but scholars of the war in Burma and the Indian Army will find much of value in this excellent work.

GEORGE WILTON
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DOI: 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v8i1.1619

Volker Ullrich (trans. Jefferson Chase), *Eight Days in May*. London: Penguin Books, 2021. 271 pp. 1 map, 24 black and white photographs. ISBN: 978-0241467268 (hardback). Price £25.00.

There are few Second World War topics that have attracted more public interest than the death of Adolf Hitler in the Berlin *Führerbunker* on 30 April 1945. Although this was an iconic moment, marking the end of a twelve-year reign of terror, the Second World War in Europe rumbled on for a further eight days - a period fraught with uncertainties. It was during these eight days that Germany's transition from a Nazi state began and the fate of countless millions of people began to be settled. In a

way, this is a book that the author simply had to write. His seminal two-volume biography of Adolf Hitler finished with something of a cliff-hanger – the *Fuhrer* was dead but the war had not yet ended. So, what did happen in the *Third Reich* after Hitler's death but before the *Wehrmacht* supreme commander, *Wilhelm Keitel*, signed the instrument of unconditional surrender on behalf of a defeated Germany on 9 May? And, more pertinently, do the events which occurred during this period have enduring historical significance? It is the latter question which the author seeks to address.

Aside from the increasingly futile attempts by Grand Admiral *Karl Dönitz* to maintain a semblance of Nazi government in the Baltic town of Flensburg, it seems the whole of Europe was in motion. Countless millions of displaced persons, slave labourers, soldiers and homeless families found themselves in a world devoid of certainty and fraught with new dangers. Many individuals who were complicit in war crimes and other acts of brutality shed their Nazi credentials with remarkable alacrity, later assimilating themselves into post-war society. Others, within days of Hitler's death, were already working hard to bring back a semblance of normality - starting to forge collaborations and build institutions fit for the future and organising relief for those in need.

The chapters run in date order with each one covering a 24-hour period. For the *Wehrmacht*, it was a question of facilitating the movement of combatants westwards so as to avoid the daunting prospect of becoming Soviet prisoners-of-war. The author carefully describes how tensions between the Allied leaders were managed and resolved as the fighting ceased on various fronts and those involved in the subsequent negotiations sought to apply the principle of unconditional and contemporaneous surrender. For the civilian population in Germany, news of the death of Hitler was mostly greeted with a degree of apathy. There were exceptions of course - like the mass suicides in the East German town of Demmin. Perhaps the most tragic part of the unfolding drama was the movement of concentration camp victims and slave labourers in the face of the approaching Red Army. These death marches seem to have been organised by local functionaries rather than through any centrally co-ordinated plan and the antipathy of the local population must have made the ordeal even harder to bear for those who were unfortunate enough to be amongst the victims.

The unfolding dramas in Berlin and Flensburg make for compelling reading but it is the descriptions of what was going on elsewhere that may have the most currency for readers of military history. The end of Nazi rule in Holland, Scandinavia, Northern Italy and the so-called *Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia* brought a variety of challenges, and in many instances, further tragedies. The capture of some of the Nazi leaders who oversaw the brutal occupation and exploitation of erstwhile independent countries are covered in detail. *Arthur Seyss-Inquart, Vidkun Quisling* and *Hans Frank*

faced justice for their crimes - others were able to escape retribution. The re-emergence of pre-war democratic politicians and a new generation of leaders is documented throughout the text. The situation in Germany is particularly interesting and for this reviewer it came as a surprise that in the early days of Eastern Germany as a separate entity, it was social democrats who were in the ascendency. This was to change of course, but the idea that puppet governments were immediately installed by the victorious Soviets is perhaps a misnomer. True intentions became clear within a few months, but during the initial period of occupation pragmatism trumped dogma.

Whilst this period of history has been covered before (for example by Michael Jones *After Hitler: The Last Days of the Second World War in Europe - 2015,* and in the memoirs of *Walter Lüdde-Neurath: Unconditional Surrender - 1950*), this authoritative account is particularly useful in that it presents a holistic and objective view of these tumultuous eight days. The author is adept in presenting the 'big picture' whilst holding the reader's attention with carefully chosen personal stories from friend and foe alike. The text is accompanied by detailed notes which in themselves demonstrate the extent and the quality of sources used. In May 1945, grand plans for the division of Europe were crystallised and the destiny of millions of people was determined. Erich Kästner, the renowned German poet and author, described the period as *the gap between 'no longer' and 'not yet'* - making the point that the stakes were particularly high in this short period of acute military, political and social turmoil. Clearly the death of Adolf Hitler was not the end of the story. This book is a timely reminder that the emergence of modern Germany was rooted in the dying embers of the Third Reich. Recommended.

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SUBMISSION GUIDELINES (March 2022)

General

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Articles

The journal welcomes the submission of scholarly articles related to military history in the broadest sense. Articles should be a minimum of 6000 words and no more than 8000 words in length (including footnotes) and be set out according to the BJMH Style Guide.

Research Notes
The BJMH also welcomes the submission of shorter 'Research Notes'. These are pieces of research-based writing of between 1,000 and 3,000 words. These could be, for example: analysis of the significance a newly accessible document or documents; a reinterpretation of a document; or a discussion of an historical controversy drawing on new research. Note that all such pieces of work should follow the style guidelines for articles and will be peer reviewed. Note also that such pieces should not be letters, nor should they be opinion pieces which are not based on new research.

Book Reviews
The BJMH seeks to publish concise, accessible and well-informed reviews of books relevant to the topics covered by the Journal. Reviews are published as a service to the readership of the BJMH and should be of use to a potential reader in deciding whether or not to buy or read that book. The range of books reviewed by the BJMH reflects the field of military history, taken in the widest sense. Books published by academic publishers, general commercial publishers, and specialist military history imprints may all be considered for review in the Journal.

Reviews of other types of publication such as web resources may also be commissioned.

The Journal's Editorial Team is responsible for commissioning book reviews and for approaching reviewers. From time to time a list of available books for review may be issued, together with an open call for potential reviewers to contact the Journal Editors. The policy of the BJMH is for reviews always to be solicited by the editors rather than for book authors to propose reviewers themselves. In all cases, once a reviewer has been matched with a book, the Editorial Team will arrange for them to be sent a review copy. Please do not in any circumstance submit a review without having already agreed with the Book Reviews Editor that you will review that book.

Book reviews should generally be of about 700 words and must not exceed 1000 words in length.

A review should summarise the main aims and arguments of the work, should evaluate its contribution and value to military history as broadly defined, and should identify to which readership(s) the work is most likely to appeal. The Journal does not encourage personal comment or attacks in the reviews it publishes, and the Editorial Team reserves the right to ask reviewers for revisions to their reviews. The final decision whether or not to publish a review remains with the Editorial Team.

The Editorial Team may seek the views of an author of a book that has been reviewed in the Journal. Any comment from the author may be published.

All submitted reviews should begin with the bibliographic information of the work under review, including the author(s) or editor(s), the title, the place and year of publication, the publisher, the number of pages, the ISBN for the format of the work that has been reviewed, and the price for this format if available. Prices should be given in the original currency, but if the book has been published in several territories including the UK then the price in pounds sterling should be supplied. The number of illustrations and maps should also be noted if present. An example of the heading of a review is as follows:

Ian F W Beckett, *A British Profession of Arms: The Politics of Command in the Late Victorian Army*. Norman, OK: Oklahoma University Press, 2018. Xviii + 350pp. 3 maps. ISBN 978-0806161716 (hardback). Price £32.95.

The reviewer's name, and an institutional affiliation if relevant, should be appended at the bottom of the review, name in Capitals and Institution in lower case with both to be right aligned.

Reviews of a single work should not contain any footnotes, but if the text refers to any other works then their author, title and year should be apparent in order for readers to be able to identify them. The Editorial Team and Editorial Board may on occasion seek to commission longer Review Articles of a group of works, and these may contain footnotes with the same formatting and standards used for articles in the Journal.

BJMH STYLE GUIDE (July 2021)

The BJMH Style Guide has been designed to encourage you to submit your work. It is based on, but is not identical to, the Chicago Manual of Style and more about this style can be found at:

http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/home.html

Specific Points to Note

Use Gill Sans MT 10 Point for all article and book review submissions, including footnotes.

Text should be justified.

Paragraphs do not require indenting.

Line spacing should be single and a single carriage return applied between paragraphs.

Spellings should be anglicised: i.e. –ise endings where appropriate, colour etc., 'got' not 'gotten'.

Verb past participles: -ed endings rather than –t endings are preferred for past participles of verbs i.e. learned, spoiled, burned. While is preferred to whilst.

Contractions should not be used i.e. 'did not' rather than 'didn't'.

Upon first reference the full name and title of an individual should be used as it was as the time of reference i.e. On 31 July 1917 Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), launched the Third Battle of Ypres.

All acronyms should be spelled out in full upon first reference with the acronym in brackets, as shown in the example above.

Dates should be written in the form 20 June 2019.

When referring to an historical figure, e.g. King Charles, use that form, when referring to the king later in the text, use king in lower case.

Foreign words or phrases such as *weltanschauung* or *levée en masse* should be italicised.

Illustrations, Figures and Tables:

- Must be suitable for inclusion on an A5 portrait page.
- Text should not be smaller than 8 pt Gill Sans MT font.
- Should be numbered sequentially with the title below the illustration, figure or table.
- Included within the body of the text.

Footnoting:

- All references should be footnotes not endnotes.
- Footnote numeral should come at the end of the sentence and after the full stop.
- Multiple references in a single sentence or paragraph should be covered by a single footnote with the citations divided by semi-colons.
- If citation management software is used the footnotes in the submitted file must stand alone and be editable by the editorial team.

Quotations:

- Short (less than three lines of continuous quotation): placed in single quotation marks unless referring to direct speech and contained within that paragraph. Standard footnote at end of sentence.
- Long (more than three lines of continuous quotation): No quotation marks of any kind. One carriage space top and bottom, indented, no change in font size, standard footnote at end of passage.
- Punctuation leading into quotations is only necessary if the punctuation itself would have been required were the quotation not there. i.e. : ; and , should only be present if they were required to begin with.
- Full stops are acceptable inside or outside of quotation marks depending upon whether the quoted sentence ended in a full stop in the original work.

Citations:

- For books: Author, *Title in Italics*, (place of publication: publisher, year of publication), p. # or pp. #-#.
- For journals: Author, 'Title in quotation marks', *Journal Title in Italics*, Vol. #, Iss. # (or No.#), (Season/Month, Year) pp. #-# (p. #).
- For edited volumes: Chapter Author, 'Chapter title' in Volume Author/s (ed. or eds), *Volume title in italics*, (place of publication: publisher, year), p. # or pp. #-#.
- Primary sources: Archive name (Archive acronym), Catalogue number of equivalent, *'source name or description' in italics* if publicly published, p. #/date or equivalent. Subsequent references to the same archive do not require the Archive name.

- Internet sources: Author, 'title', URL Accessed date. The time accessed may also be included, but is not generally required, but, if used, then usage must be consistent throughout.
- *Op cit.* should be shunned in favour of shortened citations.
- Shortened citations should include Author surname, shortened title, p.# for books. As long as a similar practice is used for journals etc., and is done consistently, it will be acceptable.
- Ibid., with a full stop before the comma, should be used for consecutive citations.

Examples of Citations:

- Michael Howard, *War in European History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 21.
- Michael Collins, 'A fear of flying: diagnosing traumatic neurosis among British aviators of the Great War', *First World War Studies*, 6, 2 (2015), pp. 187-202 (p. 190).
- Michael Howard, 'Men against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914', in Peter Paret (ed.), *Makers of Modern Strategy*, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994), pp. 510-526.
- The UK National Archives (TNA), CAB 19/33, Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Sclater, evidence to Dardanelles Commission, 1917.
- Shilpa Ganatra, 'How Derry Girls Became an Instant Sitcom Classic', *The Guardian*, 13 February 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio/2018/feb/13/derry-girls-instant-sitcom-classic-schoolgirls-northern-ireland Accessed 20 April 2019.

Note: Articles not using the citation style shown above will be returned to the author for correction prior to peer review.